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THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 


FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D. 


EDITED BY 
+ T. E. PAGE, 0.H., Lrrt.D. 
t+ E. CAPPS, pPu.p., LL.D. + W. H. D. ROUSE, trirv.p. 
L. A. POST, m.a. E. H. WARMINGTON, m.A., F.R.HIST.SOC. 


ARISTOTLE 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 
ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY 
ON THE COSMOS 











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ARIS’ JTLE. ste 


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ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 


ON COMING-TO-BE AND 
PASSING-AWAY 


ee 


BY 
7 E. S. FORSTER, M.A. 


EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD 


ON THE COSMOS 


BY 
D. J. FURLEY, M.A. 


LECTURER IN GREEK AND LATIN IN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON 





LONDON 


WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD 


CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 
HARVARD. UNIVERSITY PRESS 
MCMLY 











Tr ACT @ME . stots wages 


© Prknted in Great Britain 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 
Preratory Note . ; ; : ‘ pea a ht 
Der Sopuisticis ELENcHIS— 

Introduction . ; : y F : 2 

Text and Translation ; ’ : t 10 
De GENERATIONE ET CORRUPTIONE— 

Introduction . : ‘ : . . 2. 288 

Text and Translation ; : ; . 162 
Dr Munpo— 

Introduction . : , ; ; . 333 

Text and Translation P : . 844 
InpIcEs— aay 

To De Sophisticis Elenchis ,, ble 

To De Generatione et Corruptione ; . 415 

To De Mundo j : - : . 419 















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PREFATORY NOTE 


Proressor E. S. Forster completed his versions of De 
Sophisticis Elenchis and De Generatione et Corruptione 
before he died. I have checked the proofs and added 


a brief index. 
D. J. Furry 


Lonpon 
January 1955 


vii 





DE SOPHISTICIS 
ELENCHIS 


INTRODUCTION 


I. Tue Pruace or tHe J'O0PICA 
IN THE ORGANON 


Boru the Topica and the De Sophisticis Elenchis have 
always been regarded as genuine works of Aristotle. 
The two treatises are closely connected; the De 
Sophisticts Elenchis is an appendix to the Topica and 
its final section forms an epilogue to both treatises ; 
indeed Aristotle himself seems sometimes to regard 
the two as forming a single work, since he twice 
quotes the De Sophisticis Elenchis under the title of 
the Topica. 

It is generally admitted that what we call logic 
and Aristotle himself calls analytic was an early pre- 
occupation of the philosopher and a direct outcome 
of discussions on scientific method held in the Platonic 
Academy. Plato himself, however, never attempted 
a formal treatment of the subject and the theories 
put forward, for example, in the Theaetetus, Sophist, 
Parmenides and Politicus were never developed into 
a regular system. But while Aristotle’s systematic 
treatment of the process of inference and, above all, 
his discovery of the syllogism owe little to Plato, it 
has been generally recognized that the Platonic dia- 
logues contain some of the germs from which the 
Aristotelian system was afterwards developed ; for 
2 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 


example, in the Theaetetus the doctrine of the cate- 
gories is already implicit in the recognition of the 
abstract notions of substance, quality, quantity, re- 
lation, activity and passivity. 

Of the logical treatises of Aristotle, which since 
about a.p. 200 have passed under the title of the 
Organon or ‘instrument’ of science, the most im- 
portant are (1) the Prior Analytics, in which he sets 
forth the doctrine of the syllogism in its formal aspect 
without reference to the subject-matter with which 
it deals, (2) the Posterior Analytics, in which he 
discusses the characteristics which reasoning must 
necessarily possess in order to be truly scientific, 
(3) the Topica, in which he treats of the modes of 
reasoning, which, while syllogistically correct, fall 
short of the conditions of scientific accuracy. The 
Categories and the De Interpretatione are subsidiary 
treatises dealing, in the main, with the term and the 
proposition. 

A great deal of time and ingenuity has been 
expended, particularly by German scholars, in an 
attempt to fix the exact order in which the various 
treatises which constitute the Organon were com- 
posed. The problem is complicated by the fact that 
the treatises, in the form in which they have come 
down to us, seem to consist of rough notes, which 
were evidently subjected to a certain amount of 
revision due to the modification and development 
of his original doctrines. This process has naturally 
given rise to minor inconsistencies such as would 
naturally occur if corrections were made or additions 
inserted which were not completely adapted to the 
context in which they were placed. 

It has been generally recognized that the whole 


3 


ARISTOTLE 


of the Topica does not belong to the same date. 
H. Maier @ holds that the oldest portion consists of 
Books II-VII. 2 and that it was written under the 
direct influence of the Academy and belongs to the 
same period as the Aristotelian Dialogues, which have 
survived only in fragments ; in particular, he points 
out that the term ovdAAoyiopods is not used in the 
technical sense which it afterwards acquired (or, if it 
is used in that sense, e.g., in 130 a 7, it is a late inser- 
tion), whereas in the second half of Book VII the 
term is used in its well-known Aristotelian sense, and 
that, consequently, Books II-VII. 2 were composed 
before the philosopher made his greatest contribu- 
tion to logic. He holds that Books I and VIII belong 
to the same period as Book VII. 4-5, and form an 
introduction and conclusion to the treatise written 
after the discovery of the syllogism and that the De 
Sophisticts Elenchis was a subsequent addition to 
the Topica. On the other hand, F. Solmsen® and 
P. Gohlke @ hold that Books I-VII form the earlier 
portion of the work and that Book VIII and the De 
Sophisticis Elenchis were added subsequently. 

As regards the relation of the Topica to the rest of 
the Organon, Maier considers the Topica as a whole 
to be earlier than the Analytics ; Solmsen suggests 
that the order was (1) Topica I-VII, (2) Posterior Ana- 
lytics 1, (3) Topica VIII and De Sophisticis Elenchis, 
(4) Posterior Analytics II, (5) Prior Analytics ; Gohlke 
holds that the traditional order of the two Analytics 
is correct, and that the Topica and De Sophisticis 
Elenchis presuppose the Analytics. 

In short, there is general agreement that the bulk 
of the Topica embodies Aristotle’s earliest contribu- 


« See Bibliography. 
4 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 


tion to the systematic study of logic and that it was 
written in part before his discovery of the syllogism. 


II. Tue Content or THe TOPICA 


The purpose of the Topica is, in the words of its 
author (100 a 18 ff.), ‘ to discover a method by which 
we shall be able to reason from generally accepted 
opinions about any problem set before us and shall 
ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying 
anything self-contradictory ’; that is to say, it aims 
at enabling the two participants, the ‘ questioner ’ and 
the ‘ answerer,’ to sustain their parts in a dialectical 
discussion. The subject, then, of the treatise may 
be described as the dialectical syllogism based on 
premises which are merely probable as contrasted 
with the demonstrative, or scientific, syllogism, which 
is the subject of the Posterior Analytics and is based 
on premises which are true and immediate. The 
probable premises which make up the dialectical 
syllogism are described (100 b 21 f.) as ‘ those which 
commend themselves to all or to the majority or to 
the wise.’ The uses of dialectic are, we are told, 
three in number, (1) for mental training, (2) for general 
conversation, and (3) for application to the sciences, 
because (a) if we can argue a question pro and con, 
we shall be in a better position to recognize truth and 
falsehood, and (6) since the first principles of the 
sciences cannot be scientifically demonstrated, the 
approach to them must be through the study of 
the opinions generally held about them. 

After the general introduction in Book I, Aristotle, 
in Books II-VII. 3, gives a collection of the rd70. which 


5 


ARISTOTLE 


give their name to the treatise. The term rézou is 
somewhat difficult to define. They may be described 
as ‘commonplaces ’ of argument or as general prin- 
ciples of probability which stand in the same relation 
to the dialectical syllogism as axioms stand to the 
demonstrative syllogism ; in other words, they are 
‘the pigeon-holes from which dialectical reasoning 
is to draw its arguments.’ 4 

Books II and III deal with the problems of accident ; 
Books IV and V with those of genus and property ; 
Books VI and VII. 1-3 with those of definition. Books 
VII. 4-5 and Book VIII, after giving some additional 
notes, conclude the treatise by describing the practice 
of dialectical reasoning. 


Ill. Tue De Sopuisricis ELENcCHIS 


Just as Aristotle treats of the demonstrative and 
the dialectical syllogism in the Posterior Analytics and 
the Topica, respectively, so in this treatise, which 
forms a kind of appendix to the Topica, he deals with 
the sophistical syllogism. A knowledge of this is 
part of the necessary equipment of the arguer, not 
in order that he may himself make usé of it but that 
he may avoid it, and that the unwary may not be 
ensnared in the toils of sophistical argument; in 
fact, Aristotle is carrying on the Socratic and early- 
Platonic tradition by attacking the Sophists, who 
taught the use of logical fallacy in order to make the 
worse cause appear the better. 

The term €Aeyxos is strictly applied to the confuta- 
tion of an actual adversary, but it is also used more 


« W. D. Ross, Aristotle, p. 59. 
6 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 


widely of the confutation of an imaginary opponent. 
The treatise is, in fact, a study of fallacies in general, 
which are classified under various headings and fall 
into two main classes, those which depend on the 
language employed and those which do not. Some 
of these fallacies would hardly deceive the most 
simple minds ; others, which Aristotle seems to have 
been the first person to expose and define, are capable 
not only of deceiving the innocent but also of escaping 
the notice of arguers who are employing them. 
After two introductory chapters the work naturally 
falls into two parts, chapters 3-15, the refutation of 
fallacies, and chapters 16-33, the solution of fallacies, 
while chapter 34 forms an epilogue to the work. 


IV. Tue Manuscripts 


The chief manuscripts for the Topica and De 
Sophisticts Elenchis are : 


A Urbinas 35 saec. ix-x ineunt. 
B Marcianus 201 an. 955 
C Coislinianus 330 saec. xi 
D Coislinianus 170 saec. xiv 
u Basileensis F. 11.21 saec. xi-xii 
C Vaticanus 1024 ‘ satis vetustus ’ 
P Vaticanus 207 “non recens ’ 
f Marcianus App. IV. 5 saec. xiv 
q Ambrosianus M. 71 saec. XV 
N Laurentianus 72. 18 saec. XV 
i Laurentianus 72. 15 saec. xiv 
T Laurentianus 72. 12 saec. xiii 
O Marcianus 204 saec. xiv 


Of these A and B are in a class by themselves. 
7 


ARISTOTLE | 


Bekker preferred A, Waitz B; the Teubner Editors 
give a slight preference to B, the readings of which 
are sometimes supported by papyrus fragments. C 
sometimes preserves the true reading. 


V. Setecr BiptioGRAPHY 


EDITIONS 


J. T. Buhle, Text, Latin Translation and Notes, 
Biponti, 1792. 

I. Bekker, Text, Berlin, 1831, Oxford, 1837. 

T. Waitz, Text and Notes, Leipzig, 1844-1846. 

Y. Strache and M. Wallies, Teubner Text, Leipzig, 
1923. 

KE. Poste (De Sophisticts Elenchis only), Text, Para- 
phrase and Notes, London, 1866. 


TRANSLATIONS 


T. Taylor, London, 1812. 
O. F. Owen (Bohn’s Classical Library), London, 1902. 
W. A. Pickard-Cambridge (Oxford Translation), 
Oxford, 1928. 
In French : 
J. B. Saint-Hilaire, Paris, 1837. 


In German : 
J. H. von Kirchmann, Heidelberg, 1877. 
E. Rolfes, Leipzig, 1922. 


ARTICLES AND DISSERTATIONS 


P. Gohlke, Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik, 
Berlin, 1936. 


8 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 


H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles, ‘Tiibingen, 
1900. 

F. Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik 
und Rhetortk, Leipzig, 1929. 

J. L. Stocks, ‘ The Composition of Aristotle’s Logical 
Works,’ Classical Quarterly, 1933, pp. 115-124. 


In translating the Topica and De Sophisticis Elenchis 1 
have used the text of Bekker in the Berlin Edition, 
and when I translate any other reading this is noted 
at the foot of the page. I have constantly referred 
to the Teubner text of Strache-Wallies, which does 
not, however, seem to me to mark any considerable 
advance on that of Bekker. I have found Waitz’s 
edition of the Organon of great use, and the Latin 
version of Pacius is often helpful. I have frequently 
consulted the Oxford translation by W. A. Pickard- 
Cambridge. For the De Sophisticis Elenchis the notes 
and paraphrase in Poste’s edition are often enlighten- 
ing, though I cannot always agree with his interpreta- 
tion. 

My aim in translating has been to represent Aris- 
totle’s meaning as closely and faithfully as I can in 
simple English without resorting to paraphrase or 
trying to express it in modern terminology. 

I have to thank my friend and former colleague 
Professor W. S. Maguinness, of King’s College, 
London, for reading through my version and giving 
me the benefit of his fine scholarship and accuracy. 
He has suggested several improvements in the text 
which I have been glad to adopt. 


164 a 20 


2 


5 


164 b 20 


2 


oO 


APIXTOTEAOTS ITIEPI 
SOPISTIKQN EAETXON 


\ \ ~ ~ ~ 
I. Ilept d€ rv codiotiucdy edéyywv Kai tev 
/ \ > , ~ 

pawopevwy pev edéyywv dvtwy S€ mapadoyropav 
> > > > , / > , \ / 
arr’ obk éhéyxwv réywpev, apEdpevor kata dvow 
amo TOV mpuwTwr. 

“Ort pev obv of pev clot avddoyropol, ot 8 odK 

~ LA nn 
ovtes SoKxobar, davepov. womep yap Kal emi To 
dAAwy todro yivetar bud Twos OpowdTnTos, Kal 
emt THv Adywv woattws exer. Kal yap Thy ew 
¢ A ” _ ¢ A / ~ 
of pev exovow ed, ot dé daivovra, dudAetiK@s 
dvonocavres Kal emiokevdoarres adTovs, Kal KaAoi 
¢ \ \ / ¢ A / , 
ot pev ba KaAXos, of S€ dhaivovrar, Koupwoavres 
~ ‘ 

atdtovs. é€ml Te TOV aydywv WoadTws* Kal yap 

v4 \ A ” A A / > > ~ 
ToUTWY TA EV Apyupos Ta 5€ xpvads eoTw adAnOds, 

\ > \ ” / A \ \ ” 
Ta 8 €oTe prev ov, haiverar S€ Kata TH aicbnow, 
olov Ta pev Alapyvpwa Kal Ta KaTTITEpwa apyupa, 

\ \ / ~ ‘ | Se \ / 
ta d€ yodoBddiwa xpvod. tov adrov dé Tpdmov 

‘ \ Vi + ¢ A ” « > > 
Kal ovAAoy.opos Kal édeyyxos 6 pev EoTw, 6 8 ovK 





@ The reference appears to be provision of members of the 
tribal choruses at Athens for choral competitions (see Xen. 
Mem. iii. 4, 5). 


10 


ARISTOTLE ON 
SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 


I. Ler us now treat of sophistical refutations, that 
is, arguments which appear to be refutations but 
are really fallacies and not refutations, beginning, 
as is natural, with those which come first. 

That some reasonings are really reasonings, but INTRO- 
that others seem to be, but are not really, reasonings, a 
is obvious. For, as this happens in other spheres tes Hin 
from a similarity between the true and the false, so Mot cree: 
it happens also in arguments. For some people reasonings 
possess good physical condition, while others have tions which 
merely the appearance of it, by blowing themselves 37q"those 
out and dressing themselves up like the tribal which are _ 
choruses ¢ ; again, some people are beautiful because ent, ie 
of their beauty, while others have the appearance SPhistical. 
of beauty because they trick themselves out. So too 
with inanimate things ; for some of these are really 
silver and some gold, while others are not but only 
appear to our senses to be so; for example, objects 
made of litharge ® or tin appear to be silver, and 
yellow-coloured objects appear to be gold. In the 
same way also reasoning and refutation are some- 


times real and sometimes not, but appear to be real 


» Protoxide of lead, a by-product in the separation of 
silver from lead. 


11 


ARISTOTLE 
164 b 
” , y \ \ \ > i e A 
€oTt prev, hatverar de dia THY arreipiav: of yap 
” lon 
amreipo. WaTep av aaméxovres TOppwHev Aewpodow. 
165a 0 pev yap avAdoyiopos ex Twadv éotl tebévTwv 
LA ~ 
wate Aéyew erepov te €& avayKns TOV KEeyLevev 
dua TOV Keysevwv, eAeyyos 5é avAdAoytopos peT” 
avripdcews Tod ovpmepdopatos. ot d€ TodTO 
lot \ ” ~ A \ A  eY e 
trototot prev ov, Soxodar dé dua moAAds airias, dv 
e ve b] , / > \ / ¢ 
5 els TOmos edfpueoTatds €oT. Kal SyuoowraTos 6 
dud TOV OvoudTwv. eel yap ovK eoTw adTa Ta 
, / / > \ Cal Lees 
mpaypata Sdiadréyeobas pépovtas, aAAad Tots ove- 
pacw avTt TOV mpaypdtwv xpwpc0a ovpPorots, 
TO ovpBaivov emi Tav dvoudtwv Kal él TOV Tpay- 
patwv ywyovpeOa ovpBaivew, Kabamep emi TeV 
/ a / \ > > ” hid 
10 pyndwv tots Aoyilopevors. TO dS ovK EoTW GpoLor. 
TO bev yap ovoyara memépavTat Kal TO TOV Adywv 
~ \ \ / \ > \ ” tA wh ) 
TAHV0s, Ta 5€ Tpaypara Tov apiOwov azreipa E€oTW. 
dvaykatov obv mAeiw Tov abrov Adyov Kat Tovvom“a 
> A \ \ 
TO €v onpaivew. Womep odv KaKel of pa Sewwol 
is Tas ynhouvs fPépew bro TaV emLoTHLOVWY Tapa4- 
/ e  Oseew ~ c 
KpovovTat, TOV adTov TpdToV Kat emt THV AdywV ot 
~ ~ ‘ 
T@v dvopatwv THs Suvduews arepor mapadoyi- 
A > \ /, Sw > / 
Covrat kai adrot diadeyopevor Kal dAAwy aKkovorTes. 
dua prev odv Tadrnv THY airiav Kat tas AexOnao- 
, ” \ \ \ er / 
pévas €oTt Kal avAdoytopos Kat Eheyxos pawopevos 
\ > n” / > \ t yee 2 Ul AA . 
20 pev odk Mv O€. emel 8° earl Tat aAAoV TPO Epyou 
\ lal a ” \ qi \ \ Py ~ 
To doxeiv elvar codois 7) TO elvar Kai pr doxetv 
, , > » ie 
(€or yap 7) coguorixy pawopern codia odca 5’ ov, 
12 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, 1 


owing to men’s inexperience ; for the inexperienced 
are like those who view things from a distance. 
Reasoning is based on certain statements made in 
such a way as necessarily to cause the assertion of 
things other than those statements and as a result 
of those statements ; refutation, on the other hand, 
is reasoning accompanied by a contradiction of the 
conclusion. Some refutations do not affect their 
object but only appear to do so; this may be due 
to several causes, of which the most fertile and wide- 
spread division is the argument which depends on 
names. For, since it is impossible to argue by intro- 
ducing the actual things under discussion, but we 
use names as symbols in the place of the things, we 
think that what happens in the case of the names 
happens also in the case of the things, just as people 
who are counting think in the case of their counters. 
But the cases are not really similar ;Cfor names and 
a quantity of terms are finite, whereas things are 
infinite in number ; and so the same expression and 
the single name must necessarily signify a number 
of things.» As, therefore, in the above illustration, 
those who are not clever at managing the counters 
are deceived by the experts, in the same way in 
arguments also those who are unacquainted with the 
power of names are the victims of false reasoning, 
both when they are themselves arguing and when 
they are listening to others. For this reason, there- 
fore, and for others which will be mentioned here- 
after, there exist both reasoning and refutation which 
appear to be genuine but are not really so. But 
since in the eyes of some people it is more profitable 
to seem to be wise than to be wise without seeming 
to be so (for the sophistic art consists in apparent and 


13 


165 a 


25 


3 


o 


3 


o 


165 b 


ARISTOTLE 


\ ¢ \ \ \ 
Kal 0 oodioTis xpnuatioThs dad dawomevys 
7 > > >’ » ~ 7 > a “4 
copias aN odk« ovons), SiAov Stu dvayKatov Tov- 
\ \ ~ ~ val cal ~ 
Tos Kal TO TOD Gopod Epyov SoKetv trovety GAAov 
”“ lal \ \ ~ ” > ¢ a \ a 
7 movetv Kat pn dSoKeiv. eote 8° ws Ev mpds ev 
> a ” \ @ ~ 7 > a A 
eureiy Epyov TEepl ExaaTov Tod ElddTos axpevdetv pev 
, 
avTov mepi wv olde, Tov de yevddpevov eudavilew 
Py / a > > \ A \ > ~ 7 
vvacba.. tatra 8 éori ro pev ev 7@ Sdvacba 
~ / A > > ~ a > / a 
Sodvar Adyov, to 8 ev tH HaPeiv. avdyrn obdv 
\ / /, \ ~ > / 
tovs Bovdopévouvs codiorevew TO TOY cipnwevwy 
Adywv yévos (yreiv: mpd epyou yap eorw: % yap 
, , 0 re , 
TovavTyn Svvapis moujoe. faiveca coddv, ob Tvy- 
xXdvovat THY Tpoaipeaw €xovtes. 
“Ore pev obv eote te Toodrov Adywv yévos, Kal 
Ld / > / 4 a“ ~ 
oTt ToLavTns edievrar duvdurews ods KaAoduev ao- 
/ ~ / 7 ow \ oy ~ / ~ 
guards, SHAov. mdca 8 eotiv cidyn Tov Adywv Ta&Vv 
~ \ > / ‘ > \ ¢ 4 
cogioTiK@v, Kal ek mocwv Tov apiOuov % Sdva- 
pus avrn ovvéoTynKe, Kal méoa pépn Tuyxydver THS 
mpaypateias OvTa, Kal mepl TMV adAAwy Tov aurTE- 
Aovvrwv eis THY Téxvnv Tadrny dn Aéywpev. 
II. “Eore 87) t&v ev 7H SiadréyeoOar Adywv tér- 
/ \ \ \ \ 
Tapa yevn, didacKkaduKol Kat SiadeKTiKol Kal TreLpa- 
\ \ > / \ A <. ~ 
OTiKOL Kal EepiaTiKol, diWacKaAiKol pev of ex TOY 
olkelwy apx@v éxdorov pabiyjparos Kal ovK ék 
~ my, / ~ / “ 
T@V TOD amoKpwopevov dSo€dv avAdoyilopevor (de? 
\ 4, \ a / PS) aA \ 8 c 
yap morevew Tov pavOdvovta), duadexruKol 8° of 
> ~ > / \ > /, 
ex TOV evddEwv avdrdoytoTtiKol avTupdcews, Teipa- 
14 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, 1-u 


not real wisdom, and the sophist is one who makes 
money from apparent and not real wisdom), it is clear 
that for these people it is essential to seem to perform 
the function of a wise man rather than actually to 
perform it without seeming to doso. To take a single 
point of comparison, it is the task of the man who has 
knowledge of a particular subject himself to refrain 
from fallacious arguments about the subjects of his 
knowledge and to be able to expose him who uses 
them. Of these functions the first consists in being 
able to give a reason, the second in being able to 
exact one. It is essential, therefore, for those who 
wish to play the sophist to seek out the kind of argu- 
ment which we have mentioned ; for it is well worth 
his while, since the possession of such a faculty will 
cause him to appear to be wise, and this is the real 
purpose which sophists have in view. 

It is clear, then, that a class of arguments of this 
kind exists, and that those whom we call sophists 
aim at this kind of faculty. Let us next discuss what 
are the various kinds of sophistical arguments and 
what are the various component parts of this faculty, 
and into what different divisions the treatment of 
the subject falls, and all the other elements which 
contribute to this art. 

II. Of arguments used in discussion there are four Four kinds 
kinds, Didactic, Dialectical, Examination-arguments Sf ayaument 
and Contentious arguments. Didactic arguments are Ca ldactie 
those which reason from the principles appropriate to Be 
each branch of learning and not from the opinions of 
the answerer (for he who is learning must take things 
on trust). Dialectical arguments are those which, (2) Dia- 
starting from generally accepted opinions, reason to 4: 


establish a contradiction. Examination-arguments (3) Exami- 
nation. 


15 


165 b 
5 


1 


o 


1 


oO 


2 


o 


25 


ARISTOTLE 


otukot 8 of ex Tav doKotvTwv T@ aToKpwopevw 
Kal avayKaiwy €idévat T@ Tpootovwovpevw Eexew 
THY emvaTnuny (dv Tpdmov S€, SubproTas ev €Tépots), 
epiotucol 8° of ek T&v dawopevwv evddEwv }47) 
+ A \ ” / 

ovTwy de avddAoyioTiKol 7) dawvdpevor avdAoyLoTt- 
KOL. TEpl peev otv TOV amodetkTiK@v ev Tots “Ava- 
Avtixots elpytar, mepi Sé€ Trav SiadrexTiKdv Kal 
TELpATTLK@V ev Tois dAAots* Trepl 5€ TOV aywvioTt- 
K@V Kal €plorTiK@v vov déywpev. 

III. Ipa@rov 87) Anwréov moowv atoxalovTat ot 
ev Tois Adyos aywrilopevor Kat SvadiAoverkodvres. 
€or. S€ évte Tadta tov apiOudov, eAeyyos Kal 
peddos Kal tapado€ov Kal corokiopos Kal méumToV 
TO Tovjoa, adoAcoyjoa Tov mpoodiadreyomevov: 

~ > > ‘\ A A > 4 > ‘ 
tobto 8& eott TO modAdKis avayKaleoba Tadd 

/ ”“ \ \ wy > A \ / 7 
A€yew* 7 TO pr) Ov, GAAA TO hawopevov ExacTov 
elvan tovTwv. pddioTa pev yap TpoatpobvTat 

7 > / /, A / la 
paivecba édéyyovtes, Sevrepov dé pevddopevov Tu 
detxvivar, Tpitov eis trapddofov dyew, Téraprov 
de oodoikilew movetv: Tobro 8 earl TO movqoa 

~ 4 / > ~ / A > , 
TH A€Eew BapBapilew ex tod Adyou Tov amoKpw6- 
pevov' TeAevTatov bé€ TO mAEovaKis TadTO déyewv. 

IV. Tpozo 8 etot rob pev edéyyew Svo° of pev 

/ , * \ / € > ” ~ dé. 
yap «low Tapa THv AeEw, of 8 Ew ris AeEews. 
€or. b€ Ta pev mapa Thy AdEw eumrowodyTa THY 
pavraciay €€ tov apiOucv: radra 8° éoriv duwvupia, 
apdiBoria, atvOects, diaipecis, mpoowdia, oyna 

ta ~ ~ 
A€Eews. Tovrov dé riots 4 Te dua THs eTrAywyns 

\ vg »” ~ »” A a 

Kat avAdoyiopos, av te AndOH tis aGAAos, Kal drt 





“ Topics 159 a 25 ff. 
» Topics i-viii. 


16 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, m-1v 


are those which are based on opinions held by the 
answerer and necessarily known to one who claims 
knowledge of the subject involved (in what manner, 

has been described elsewhere *). Contentious argu- (4) Con- 
ments are those which reason or seem to reason “""°™* 
from opinions which appear to be, but are not really, 
generally accepted. Demonstrative arguments have 

been treated in the Analytics, and dialectical argu- 
ments and examinations have been dealt with else- 
where.’ Let us now deal with competitive and 
contentious arguments. 

III. We must first of all comprehend the various THE PER- 
objects at which those aim who compete and contend 7jon re 
in argument. They number five : refutation, fallacy, FARA 
paradox, solecism, and, fifthly, the reduction of one’s iii-xv), 
opponent to a state of babbling, that is, making him The aims of 
to say the same thing over and over again; or, if hi 
not the reality, at any rate the appearance of each et le 
of these things. Their first choice is a plain refutation, 
their second to show that their opponent is lying, 
their third to lead him on to a paradox, their fourth to 
make him commit a solecism (that is, to make the 
answerer, as a result of the argument, speak un- 
grammatically), and, lastly, to make him say the 
same thing over and over again. 

IV. There are two modes of refutations ; one has (A) Rx- 
to do with the language used, the other is unconnected ((hs" iv-xi), 
with the language. The methods of producing a (@) pews: 
false illusion in connexion with language are six in Gilles 
number : equivocation, ambiguity, combination, di- baat ae 
vision, accent and form of expression. The truth of diction, 
this can be verified by induction and by syllogistic ¥h'¢? ""° 
proof based on this (though some other assumption pumber, 


b 
is also possible), that this is the number of ways in oo ras 


17 


ARISTOTLE 
165 b 
a I a >? a y LS \ , A 
TOOAUTAVYWS AV TOLS AVTOLS OVOUAGL KAL Adyous 1) 


| / \ \ A \ ¢ 

30 TavTO SyAWoamev. eict S€ Tapa pev THY dpuw- 
vuptay of Trowoide THY Adywv, olov 6Tt wavOdvovaw 

¢ 
ot emorTdpevor’ TA yap arrooTopaTtiloueva pavid- 

, 

vovow ot ypappatiKol. To yap pavOavew dpuc- 
vupov, TO Te Evvievar ypwpevov TH emioTHuN Kal 
\ “4 > / \ 4, oe \ A 
70 AapBavew emoriunv. Kat mddAw ote Ta Kaka 
3 


or 


> / A A / > / A \ A / 
ayaa: ta yap déovTa ayabda, Ta Sé Kaka Sova. 
a / 

dutTov yap TO déov, TO T avayKatov, 6 ovpPaiver 

moAAdKis Kal emi TOV KaK@v (€oT. yap KaKdv TL 

> a \ > A \ / /, 

dvaykatov), Kat tayaba Se Sdéovrd dapev elvar. 

lon \ 

é7Tt Tov avtov KabjoPar Kal €oTdvat, Kal KdpveL 
oe , \ 

Kal vyiaivew. Oomep yap aviorato, €oTnKev, Kal 

166 


bud ¢ / ¢ / ee 2 /, 

domrep vyidleTo, byaiver: aviorato 8’ 6 Kabypevos 
Kal vyidleTo 6 Kdpvwr. TO yap TOY KdpvorTa 
e ~ ~ ”“ / > “a / > > @..< 0 
OTLobY Troveiv 7) mdoxew ody Ev onpaiver, GAN OTE 
pev OTL 6 viv Kdpvwy,' ore 8° ds Exapve mpdoTepov. 
mAnv byidlero pev Kal Kduvwv Kal 6 Kdpvwr- 


a 


bytaiver 5° od} Kdpvwv, add’ 6 Kdpvwyr, od viv, aAN 
c / \ \ % > Ad e iS 
6 mpotepov. mapa dé THv audiBortay of Tovoide, 
70 BovrAcoar AaBeiv pe Tods TroAEpiovs. Kal dp’ 
6 Tis ywwoKel, TOOTO ywwoKEeL; Kal yap TOY ywe- 
oKOVTA Kal TO ywwoKdopEvov evdexeTaL WS ywu- 
~ a “a ~ 
OKOVTA onunvar ToUTW T@ Adyw. Kal dpa 6 dpa 


1 Deleting 7 xa0yjpevos after xduvwv with Wallies, 





* i.e. can write or spell. 
» i.e. ‘ ought to be.’ 


18 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, IV 


which we can fail to indicate the same thing by the 

same terms or expressions. Arguments such as the (1) a 
following are based on equivocation: ‘Those who ~~ °™ 
know, learn; for it is those who know the use of 
letters that learn * what is dictated to them.’ Here 
‘learn’ is equivocal, meaning ‘ understand by using 
knowledge ’ and ‘acquire knowledge.’ Or again, 
‘Evils are good, for what must exist is good, and 

evil must exist.’ Here ‘must exist’ is used in 

two senses ; it means ‘ what is necessary,’ which is 

often true of evils (for some evil is necessary), and we 

also say that good things ‘ must exist.’® Or again, 

“the same man is seated and standing and _ is 

a sick man and restored to health; for it is the 

man who stood up that is standing, and it is he who 

was recovering his health that is restored to health, 

but it was the man who was seated that stood up and 

the man who was sick that was recovering.’ For that 

‘the sick man’ does such and such a thing or has 

such and such a thing done to him, has not one 
meaning only but at one time means ‘ the man who 

is now sick,’ and at another time ‘the man who was 
formerly sick.’ But it was the sick man who began 

to recover his health when he was actually sick, but 

he is in good health when he is not sick and is not 

the sick man now but the man who was formerly 

sick. The following examples are connected with (2) Am- 
ambiguity: ‘To wish me the enemy to capture,’ Pisuity. 
and ‘when a man knows something, surely there is 
knowledge of this’; for it is possible by this expres- 

sion to signify both the knower and the thing known 

as knowing. And ‘ what a man sees, surely that 


° i.e.‘ knowledge of this’ can mean either knowledge on the 
part of the knower or knowledge of the thing known. 
19 


ARISTOTLE 
166 a 

~ Cc a foo \ \ / 7 eee ¢ 
10 Tis, TOOTO Opa; Opa dé Tov Kiova, WoTE Opa oO 
Kiwv. Kat dpa 6 ad drs elvar, TobTo od dis elvar; 
\ \ / i 2 \ + \ / > ‘ 
dys dé AlBov eiva, od dpa dis AiOos civar. Kal 
dp €ott ovyavrTa déyew; Sittdv yap Kal TO ot- 
yavra réyew, TO TE TOV A€yovTa otyav Kal TO TA 
a ~ \ 
Aeyopweva. iol dé Tpels Tpdmor TOY Tapa THY 
e / A \ > , LJ A Ld n” ¢ 
Opwrvupiav Kat THV apdiBoAiay, eis ev STav 7} O 
A 
Adyos 7 Tov’vowa Kupiws onpaivy mA€cwW, olov aEeTos 
Kat Kvwv: els d€ dtav ciwldtes Gpev odtw A€yew: 
tpitos d5€ orav TO ovvTebev TAciw onuaivyn, Kexw- 
piopevov d€ amA@s, olov To émiorarar ypappata. 
ExdTEpov prev yap, «i eruxev, Ev TL onpmaiver, TO 
enloTaTa. Kal Ta ypdppara: dudw dSé mAciw, 7) TO 
Ta ypdppata abra emoriuny éxew 7) TOV ypap- 

patwy dAdov. 
¢ A > > / \ c / ‘ 4 
H pev ody audiBoAla Kai duwvupia mapa Tov- 
Tous Tovs TpoTous eoTiv, mapa Sé THY avvOeow Ta 
/ e \ 4 /, / \ 
Toudde, olov To dvvacbar Kabypevov Badilew Kai 

/ 
un ypddovra ypadew. od yap tavTo onpaiver, 
av dveAwy tis ein Kal ovvbeis, ws Suvarov 7d* 
, , *"e \ ay? ¢ , ” 

Kabyevov Badilew*®: Kat Tod?’ woattws av Tis 
avvO7, TO un ypddovta ypadew: onpaiver yap ws 
exer Svvapuw Tod pur) ypadovra ypadew. éeav dé 
30 ur) ovvOA, ote exer Svvapuv, STE od ypade, TOO 


1 


oOo 


2 


o 


2 


o 


1 Reading 76 for tov. 
2 Deleting xai pi) ypadorvra ypddew after BadiLew with 
Wallies. : 





* The personal pronoun not being expressed in Greek, 
todro, being neuter, can be either the subject or object of the 
verb 6pa. » ‘eagle’ or ‘ pediment.’ 

° * Dog,’ ‘ dogstar’ or ‘ Cynic philosopher.’ 

4 In which case the meaning is that a man, while sitting, 
has the power to walk (if he wishes to do so). 


20 


ON+SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, tv 


(he) * sees: a man a pillar sees, therefore the pillar 
sees.’ Again, ‘ Surely you insist on being what you 
insist on being. You insist on a stone being: there- 
fore, you insist on being a stone.’ Again ‘ Surely 
speaking is possible of the silent.’ ‘Speaking of 
the silent’ can also be taken in two ways, either 
that the speaker is silent or the things spoken of 
are silent. There are three modes connected with 
equivocation and ambiguity : (1) when the expres- 
sion or name properly signifies more than one thing, 
such as derés”® and xiwv,° (2) when we customarily 
use a word in more than one sense, (3) when a word 
has more than one meaning in combination with 
another word, though by itself it has only one mean- 
ing, for example, “knowing letters’; for it may 
so happen that taken separately ‘ knowing’ and 
‘letters ’ have only one meaning, but taken together 
they have more than one meaning, namely, either 
that the letters themselves have knowledge or that 
someone else has knowledge of the letters. 
Ambiguity and equivocation then take these 
forms. The following examples are connected with 
the combination of words, for instance, ‘ A man can 
walk when sitting and write when not writing.’ The 
significance is not the same if one utters the words 
separately @ as it is if one combines them, namely, ‘a 
man can walk-while-sitting,’’ and, similarly, in the 
other example, if one combines the words and says 
‘a man can write-when-not-writing,’ for it means 
that he can write and not write at the same time ; 
whereas if one does not combine the words it means 
that, when he is not writing, he has the power to 


¢ In which case the meaning is that it is possible for a 
man to walk and sit at the same time. 


21 


(3) Com- 
bination 
of words. 


ARISTOTLE " 
166 a 
/ / / ~ , ” > , 
ypadew. Kat, pavOdver viv ypdppara, etmep éudv- 
Oavev & emioratar. ert TO Ev povov Suvdpevov 
fépew moAAa divacbau Pepew. 
Ilapa d€ rv dialpeow, dru Ta TEevT? eoTi BUo 
\ “A 
Kal Tpla, Kal TEpiTTG Kal apTia, Kal TO petlov ioov* 
35 TooovTOV yap Kal ETL mpds. 6 yap adtos Adyos 
dunpnuevos Kal ovyKeiwevos 00K del Ta’TO Onpat- 
“ / e £t. 3 7 > ” ~ cd > 
vew av dd€eev, ofov “ eyes o° €Onka dSodAov dvr 
> / a) ‘ A ce /, > > ~ ¢ A 
eXeVOepov”? Kai To “ mevtnKovT’ avdp@v éxaTov 
Aime Sios "AxtAdAevs.”’ 
166b Ilapa dé tiv mpoowdiav ev pev Tots avev ypadis 
duadexruKois ov pddvov moujaat Adyov, ev de Tots 
YEypappevors Kal TOLnpLact padrov, olov Kat Tov 
“Opnpov eviot Suophodvrau mpos Tovs edéyxovTas 
5ws aTomws eipnKoTa “TO pev od Katamvberau 
wv a? /, \ ? \ ~ / / 
ouBpw.” Avovor yap adbro TH mpoowdia, rA€Eyovres 
TO ov o€UTEpov. Kal TO TeEpt TO evdmVioV TOD 
> / a > > \ ¢ \ ce id 
Ayapépvovos, 6tt odk adtos 6 Leds elmev “ di80- 
/ e€ > > / ” > \ ~ > / > 
pev b€ of edxyos apéoBa,” adAa TH EvuTTVviw Eve- 
TéAXeTo Siddvar. Ta pev odv ToLadTAa Tapa THY 
Tpoowdlav €oTiv. 
Fond ~ , 
10 Oé 5€ mapa To oytjpa Tis AeLews cvpBatvovow, 





@ With a different combination of words this can mean, 
‘ He understands now what he knows because he has under- 
stood letters.’ 

» This can also be taken to mean, ‘ Being able to carry 
many things, you can carry one single thing only.’ 

¢ If 5=2 and 3, 5=2 and 5=38, and so 5 is both odd and 
even: again, if 5=2 and 5=3, then 3=2, i.e. the greater = 
the less, since 3 is also 2+1. 

4 From an unknown source in Greek comedy imitated by 
Terence, Andria 37. 


22 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, tv 


write. Again, ‘He now understands letters, since 
he has understood what he knows ’*; and further, 
‘One single thing being able to carry, many things 
you can carry.’ ? 

The following propositions are connected with divi- Division 
sion: ‘5 is 2 and 3,’ ‘5 is odd and even,’ ‘the % 
greater is equal to the less,’ for it is so much and 
something more.® For the same sentence divided 
would not always seem to have the same meaning 
as when taken as a whole, for example, ‘ Free I made 
thee a slave’ % and ‘ goodly Achilles left a hundred 
(and) fifty men.’ ¢ 

It is not easy to construct an argument relating (5) Accent. 
to accent in discussions which are not written down, 
but it is easier in written matter and poetry. For 
example, some people emend Homer to meet the ob- 
jection of critics that his phrase ‘rd pev of Karariderar 
op.Bpy’ is a strange one.’ For they solve the difficulty 
by a change of accent, pronouncing the ov more 
sharply.’ Also in the passage about Agamemnon’s 
dream” they say that Zeus himself did not say, ‘ But 
we grant‘ him to secure the fulfilment of his prayer’ 
but bade the dream to grant it.’ Such examples, 
then, depend on accentuation. 


Refutations which depend on the form of expres- (6) Form of 
expression. 
¢ Probably quoted from some Cyclic poem. The words can 
mean either * left 150 men’ or ‘ left a hundred men fifty.’ 
f Il. xxiii. 328: * part of which decays in the rain.’ 
9 i.e. substituting od, ‘ not,’ for od: ‘and it does not decay 
in the rain.’ 
» Jl. ii. 1-35; but the actual words quoted occur in /1. xxi. 
297 and are spoken by Poseidon. For this and the following 
example see Poet. 1461 a 22-23. 
* i.e. didopev. 
§ i.e. S8duev=Siddva, the infinitive being used as an 
imperative. 


23 


ARISTOTLE 


#68 r i \ \ ¢ me e , e 4 \ 
OTav TO [Ly TAVTO WaadTwWS EppnvedynTaL, olov TO 


appev OAAv 7 TO OAAV appev, 7 TO peTakd Odrepov 
TOUTWwV, 7) TAAW TO TOLOY TOGOV 7) TO TOGOV ToOLOV, 
” \ ~ b) a 
TO Tovwobv macxov 7 TO dSiaKelwevov Toveiv, Kal 
Ss > e / / wv A A \ 
15 TGAAa 8’, ws Supyta mpdtepov. ott yap TO pH 
Tv Tovey Ov ws THY trovetv Te TH A€Eer onpaivew. 
olov TO vyvaivew dpolws TH oxnpwate THs AcEews 
Aéyerar TH Téuvew 7) olkodopetv: Kaito. TO meV 
aA \ ~ 
mowv Te Kal Siakeipevov ws SyAot, TO Se Troveiv 
\ > \ \ / Ae Bod ~ + 
TL. TOV adTov d€ TpdTOV Kal emi TOY GAAwY. 
€ \ > ® \ / ” > / 
20 Oct pev odv mapa tiv AdEw Edeyyou ex TovTwY 
~ / > / ~ > ” ~ / 
Tov ToTmwv ciciv: TOv 8 Ew ris AdEews mapa- 
Aoytopav cidn eotlv entra, Ev pev Tapa TO ovp- 
BeBynkos, Sedtepov S€ 70 atrAds 7) wn amADs aAda 
a «nN a ww An /, / , \ ‘ 
TH 1 70d 7 mote H Tpds TL A€yeaOar, TpiTov Sé TO 
Tapa THv Tod édeyyou dyvovav, Téraptov dé TO 
25 Tapa TO emdpevov, méuTTOV S€ TO Tapa {TO TO eV 
I as , 1¢e no yy . ” 
apy AapBavew,' Exrov S€ TO p27) alitiov ws altrov 
/ td A A \ / > / a 
Tibévar, EBdopov d€ TO TA TAciw EpwThpata eV 
TrOLEetv. 
‘ 
V. Oi pev odv mapa ro ovpPeBynKos mapado- 
yiopol eiow, STav dpolws dtiobv a€wwbh TH mpay- 
~ > ‘ ~ 
30 wate Kal T@ ovpBeByKdre brdpyew. Emel yap TO 
att® moAAa ovpBéBnkev, odKk avdyKn maou Tois 
~ \ 
KaTnyopoupevots, Kal Kal’ od Karnyopetrat, Tadra* 
/ LA > 
mavTa omdpyew. olov et 6 Kopioxos erepov av- 
1 Reading wapa <ro> 76 év apyf AapBavew with Strache, 
Reading ratra with Casaubon. 
24 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, tv-v 


sion occur when what is not the same is expressed 
in the same form ; for example, when the masculine 
is expressed by the feminine or vice versa, or the neuter 
by the masculine or feminine; or again when a 
quality is expressed by a quantity or vice versa, or the 
active by a passive or a state by the active, and so 
forth according to the distinctions previously made.* 
For it is possible for something which is not of the 
nature of an action to signify by the language used 
something which is of the nature of an action; for 
example, to ‘ flourish’ is a form of expression like 
to ‘cut’ or to ‘build’; yet the former denotes a 
quality and a certain disposition, the latter an action. 
So too with the other possible examples. 

Refutations, then, connected with language are (6) By fal- 
based on these commonplaces. Of fallacies un- (22s which 
connected with language there are seven kinds : Pendent on 
(1) those connected with Accident; (2) those in These are 
which an expression is used absolutely, or not abso- Seve? in 
lutely but qualified as to manner or place or time or depending 
relation ; (3) those connected with ignorance of the °"’ 
nature of refutation ; (4) those connected with the 
consequent ; (5) those connected with the assump- 
tion of the original point to be proved; (6) those 
which assert that what is not a cause is a cause ; (7) 
the making of several questions into one. 

V. Fallacies connected with Accident occur when (1) Acci- 
it is claimed that some attribute belongs similarly to °°" 
the thing and to its accident ; for since the same 
thing has many accidents, it does not necessarily 
follow that all the same attributes belong to all the 
predicates of a thing and to that of which they are 
predicated. For example, ‘ If Coriscus is different 


4 Topics 103 b 20 ff. 
25 


ARISTOTLE 
166 b 
Opwrrov, abtos atbrob érepos: éoTt yap avOpwTos. 


”“ > / 7 ¢ \ / ” 

7 €l LwKpdatovs Etrepos, 6 S€ LwxKparyns avOpwros, 
35 ETEpov avOpwzrov paciv poroynkéevat dua TO OUupL- 
, a ¢ > ms 
BeBnxévar, od ednoev erepov elvar, Todrov etvat 

get 
avOpwrrov. 
¢ A \ A € ~ / ” ~ , ‘ \ 
Oc d€ mapa TO amAds Tod 7) 7H A€yecOar Kai p47) 
/ iid \ > / / ¢ c ~ 
Kupiws, OTav TO ev peper Aeyopevov ws aTAds 
167a eipypevov AndOH, oiov «i TO pn) ov eote So€acrTov, 
Ld A \ a“ ” > \ >? \ / / \ 
OTL TO py OV EoTLW* od yap TavTov elvai Té TL Kal 
€ ~ a” / 7 A bal ? ” ” > 
elvat amADs. 1 7adw Sti TO dv odK €oTW OY, Et 
~ ” / > e > ye > 
TOV OvTWY TL pH €oTW, olov ei 47) avVOpwros. od 
\ > A \ s / +. Se ~ A , 
5 yap TadTo py elvat Te Kal aTrA@s py) elvar- daiverat 
\ \ \ / ~ / \ \ / 
de dua TO Tdpeyyus Tis A€Eews Kal puKpov Siade- 
pew 70 elvat te Tob elvar Kal TO pur) elval Te TOD p47) 
> ec / \ \ \ \ \ a \ b Veet ~ 
elvat. opolws d€ Kal TO Tapa TO TH Kal TO aTADs. 
olov «i 6 “Ivdds bAos péAas dv AevKds e€oTL Tods 
> / \ ad \ > / > ”“ >’ 
oddvras: AevKos dpa Kal od AevKds eoTw. 7 Eb 
»” ~ ” Ad A > / ¢ / \ \ 
10 dpudw mh, OT dua Ta evavtia vrapyet. TO de 
~ os 3D: Dea \ ‘ ~ cv 
ToLovTov em eviwy ev TravTi Oewpiaae pdd.ov, olov 
2»Q 7 
el AaBav tov AiPiora elvar péAava Tods dddvTas 
” > > / > - 4 / 7 / 
epo.r’ et AevKds: ef odv TavTn AevKds, OTL péAas 
Kat od péAas, olorto SrerAéxPar avdAdAopoTiK@s 
r / ‘\ > / > 3 : yf PS) \ A 6 , 
Tehewwoas THY epwrnow. em eviwv de AavOaver 
26 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v 


from “ man,” he is different from himself, for he is a 
man’; or ‘if he is different from Socrates, and 
Socrates is a man,’ they say that it has been admitted 
that Coriscus is different from a man, because it is 
an accident that the person from which he said that 
Coriscus is different is a man. 

Fallacies connected with the use of some particular (2) The 
expression absolutely or in a certain respect and not pester srg 
in its proper sense, occur when that which is pre- or with 
dicated in part only is taken as though it was predi- fleation. 
cated absolutely. For example, ‘ If that-which-is-not 
is an object of opinion, then that-which-is-not is ’ ; 
for it is not the same thing ‘ to be something ’ and 
‘to be’ absolutely. Or again, ‘ That-which-is is not, 
if it is not one of the things which are, e.g. if it is not 
aman. For it is not the same thing ‘ not to be some- 
thing ’ and ‘ not to be’ absolutely ; but, owing to 
the similarity of the language, ‘to be something ’ 
appears to differ only a little from ‘ to be,’ and ‘ not 
to be something ’ from ‘ not to be.’ In like manner 
when something is predicated in a certain respect 
and absolutely ; for example, ‘ If an Indian, being 
black all over, is white in respect of his teeth, then 
he is white and not white.’ Or if both attributes 
belong in a certain respect, they say that the contrary 
attributes belong simultaneously. In some cases this 
sort of fallacy can be easily perceived by anyone ; 
if, for example, after securing an admission that the 
Ethiopian is black, one were to ask whether he is 
white in respect of his teeth, and then, if he be white 
in this respect, were to think that he had finished 
the interrogation and had proved dialectically that 
he was both black and not black. In some cases, on 
the other hand, the fallacy escapes detection, namely, 


27 


ARISTOTLE 
167 a 
15 moAAdKis, &¢ dowv, Srav mH éynrar, Kav TO 


amArAds ddfevev axodovbeiv, kal ev dcors pu) pddwov 
fewpijcar méTepov abrdv Kupiws amodoréov. yive- 
Tat S€ TO ToLwobrov ev ois dpoiws brdpxYer TA avTL- 

/ ~ \ a” ” ” / / 
Kelweva’ Soket yap 7 audw  pndétepov Soréov 
amas elvat Katnyopeiv, ofov ef To pev uvov 
\ \ > Ld / / ‘ an 

20XevKov To 8° Huov pédAav, mdTEpov AevKov 7 

péAar ; . 

¢ \ \ A \ / aed ‘ 

Oi d€ mapa 76 7) Siwpicba ti eote avAdoytapos 

7 Ti €deyxos, GAAd Tapa THY eAAeubw yivovtat Tob 

Adyou: eheyxos pev yap avtidacis tod adbtod Kal 

évds, 1) Ovopatos GAAd mpdypatos, Kal dvéuaTos 
\ 7 > A ~ > ~ > an / 

25 wn avvwvdpov adda Tob adbrod, ex Tav dobévTwr, 
e€ avdykns, pi) ovvapioupevov tod ev apy, 
KaTa TAUTO Kal mpds Ta’TO Kal WoatdTws Kal ev 
TH adT@ xpdvw. Tov adrov dé tpdmov Kal TO 
pevoar0ar mepi twos. vio dé amodAurovTes Tt 

~ / / 2\/ oe ee) 
tov rexbévrwy paivovrar édéyxew, olov dre tadbro 
id \ > 4 \ \ 4, ~ \ 

30 OurAdovov Kat od SitrAdovov: Ta yap Svo0 Tob jpeEv 
CF 38 / a \ ~ >? / Bal > \ 
evos duAdova, Tv S€ Tpidv od SiAdova. 7 Et TO 
abto Tob adbrod SimAdovov Kat od duAdowov, aad’ 
od KaTa TavTO: KaTa meV yap TO pHKos SimAdotov, 

\ \ 4 | / > / ”“ > ~ > ~ 
Kata d€ TO TAdTos od SimAdovov. 7) Ef TOD adbrod 
‘ A > ‘ \ c 4 > > > A / 
Kal KATA TAVTO Kal WoavTws, ard’ ody dpa* SidmreEp 

> \ / ” Ld > ” ~ 

35 €0TL hawwduevos EXeyyos. €AKkou 8’ av Tis TodTOV 
Kal eis Tods mapa Thy AdEw. 

¢ \ \ A > > ~ / / A 
Oi dé mapa ro év dpyh AapBdvew yivovrar pev 
28 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v 


where, when an attribute is ascribed in some respect 
only, an absolute attribution would also seem to 
follow, and where it is not easy to see which of the 
attributes can be properly assigned. An instance 
of this occurs when both the opposite attributes 
belong similarly ; for then it is generally held that 
it must be conceded that either both or neither can 
be predicated absolutely ; for example, if something 
is half white and half black, is it white or black ? 

Other fallacies arise because no definition has been 
given of what a syllogism is and what a refutation, 
and there is some defect in their definition. For a 
refutation is a contradiction of one and the same 
predicate, not of a name but of a thing, and not of 
a synonymous name but of an identical name, based 
on the given premisses and following necessarily 
from them (the original point at issue not being 
_ included) in the same respect, relation, manner and 
time. A false statement about something also occurs 
in the same manner. Some people, however, appear 
to refute, omitting some of the above-named points, 
showing, for example, that the same thing is double 
and not double, because two is the double of one but 
not the double of three. Or, they show that if the 
same thing is double and not double of the same 
thing, yet it is not double in the same respect ; for 
it is double in length but not double in breadth. Or, 
if it is double and not double of the same thing and 
in the same respect and manner, yet it is not so at 
the same time; and so there is only an apparent 
refutation. One might, indeed, force this fallacy 
also into the category of those connected with 
language. 

Fallacies connected with the assumption of the 


29 


(3) Ignora- 
io elenchi. 


(4) Petitio 
principii. 


ARISTOTLE 
167 a 
4 \ ~ ¢ a > / \ > 
ovTwS Kal ToGa’TAaX@s daax@s evdexyerar TO e& 
> ~ > al 
apxis airetoba, datvovra 8 edéyyew Sua TO pur) 
/ ~ 
divacbar cvvopay 76 tadbrov Kal TO Erepov. 
€ 
167b 6 ‘O 8€ mapa 76 émdpevov Edeyyos Sia Td oleoBat 
> / \ > / ov ‘ 
avriotpédew tHv akodovOnow. srav yap. Tobd_ 
* > > , as 4 \ “~ + ” 
ovtos e€ avdyKys Todl 7%, Kal TobdE ovTos olovTaL 
\ /, > > / bd \ € \ 
Kat Odrepov elvar e€ dvdyKns. bev Kal at mepl 
\ / > od > / > , / 
Thv dd€av ex Tihs aicOnoews damdrar yivovra. 


o 


/ 
ToAAdKis yap THY yoAnY peru bréAaBov Sia 76 Ere- 
cba ro EavOov xpHpya TO pédute- Kal eel ovp- 
/ A ~ 4 / tA a“ 
Baten tHv yiv doavtos yivecbar SiudBpoyov, Kav 
% SidBpoxos, troAapBavopev boa. 7d 8 ovdK 
avayKatov. €év Te Tots pyTopiKois at Kata TO on- 
A > / > a“ ¢ / Dh / 
petov amrodetEers ex TV érropevwv etoiv. Bovdd- 
A A Ld / \ ¢ / ” 
10 pevor yap Seifar 6Tt porxyds, TO érrdpevov eAaBov, 
Li \ es 4 ea / 
ore KaAAwrLaTHS 7) OTL VUKTWP Oparat TrAaVapeEVoS. 
cal \ ~ A ¢ , ‘ \ 4 
moAdois S€ Tabra pev brdpyet, TO Sé KaTHyopoU- 
] ¢ / ¢ / de hy “a AA 
pevov ody drdpxer. Opoiws dé Kal ev Tois avAdo- 
a e € M rb Ad Ld Ed ‘ 
yiotixois, olov 6 MeXiccov Adyos Otte ameupov To 
4 ‘ \ \ ov > / > \ \ 
dmav, AaBav To pev amav ayéevntov (eK yap 427) 
bad LAND! nn / \ \ / > > ~ 
dvtos ovdev av yevecba.), TO Se yevouevov e€ apxis 
> \ > ” ‘ 
yevéoOar. et pr) odv yéeyovev, apxnv odK EXEL TO 
lod \ “~ 
mav, wor dzmeipov. otk avayKn d€ TodTo ovup- 
> A ” 
Batvew: od yap ei TO yevopevoy aay apyry EexeL, 
A ” > A ” / 4 10° > c 
Kal €l TL apynv Exel, yeyovev, Womrep ovd Ei 6 
‘ > , / 
20 mupeTrTwv Oeppds, Kal Tov Deppov avdyKn mupéerrew. 
30 


1 


o 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v 


_ original point to be proved arise in the same manner 
and in the same number of ways as it is possible to 
beg the original point ; they have an appearance of 
achieving a refutation because men fail to perceive at 
the same time what is the same and what is different. 

The refutation connected with the consequent is 
due to the idea that consequence is convertible. For 
whenever, if A is, B necessarily is, men also fancy 
that, if B is, A necessarily is. It is from this source 
that deceptions connected with opinion based on 
sense-perception arise. For men often take gall for 
honey because a yellow colour accompanies honey ; 
and since it happens that the earth becomes drenched 
when it has rained, if it is drenched, we think that 
it has rained, though this is not necessarily true. In 
rhetorical arguments proofs from signs are founded 
on consequences ; for, when men wish to prove that 
aman is an adulterer, they seize upon the consequence 
of that character, namely, that the man dresses him- 
self elaborately or is seen wandering abroad at night 
—facts that are true of many people, while the 
accusation is not true. So, too, in dialectical reason- 
ings; for example, the argument of Melissus that 
the universe is infinite assumes that the universe has 
not come into being (for nothing could come into 
being from what does not exist) and that everything 
which has come into being has come from a beginning; 
if, therefore, the universe has not come into being, 
it has no beginning and therefore is infinite. But 
this does not necessarily follow; for even if what 
has come into being always has a beginning, anything 
that has a beginning need not have come to be, any 
more than it follows that a man who is hot must be 
in a fever because a man who is in a fever is hot. 


31 


(5) The 
consequent. 


ARISTOTLE 
167 b 
‘O 5€ mapa To py alriov ws altiov, drav mpoo- 


~ \ > / e > > ~ / ~ 
And64 To avairiov ws Tap’ exeivo ywopevov Tob 
> / / A \ ~ > a > ‘ 
edéyyov. avpuPaiver d€ TO Towodrov ev Tots eis TO 
> Z a > / \ > cal 
advvatov avAdoy.opois: ev TovTows yap avaryKatov 


25 avatpeiy TL TOV Kelmevwrv. e€av odv eyKatapiOunOy 


ao 


€v Tois avaykalois epwrhpwact mpdos TO ovpPatvov 
advvatov, df. mapa todro yiveoBar mroAdadKis 6 
” e ¢ > ” \ \ \ or 
EXeyxos, ofov ore odK EoTte ux Kal Cw) Tadrov: 
> \ a / > / \ a ‘ lol 
et yap pbopa& yéveos evavtiov, Kal TH Twl Pbopa 
” / > / c \ / /, 
€oTaL Tis yeveois evavTiov: 6 dé Odvaros POopa Tis 
3 


o 


+2 ff ~ ¢ / ¢ \ ‘ ‘ ~ 
kat evavtiov Cw, wate yéveots 7 Cw Kat To Ci 
/ ~ > > / > ” : LD. | ¢ 
yweoba todro 8 advvatov: obK apa TavTov 7 
yuxn Kat 7 CwH. od 87) avAAcAdyrorau: ovpPaiver 
, n” / w£8 ~ \ \ a a ‘ 
yap, Kav pH tis Tadto OH THY Cwiv TH pox, TO 
> / > \ / > / \ A / 
advvatov, aAAd povov evavriov Cwiv pev Oavarw 
ovt. Pbopa, POopa dé yéveow. aovdddyioTor pev 
Yu ¢ ~ > > \ e “A / \ \ \ 
85 obv aTAd@s ovK €iaiv of ToLodToL Adyot, mpos Se TO 
mpoKeiwevov aovddAdytoTrot. Kat AavOdver moAAdKis 
odx ATTOV avTovs TOs EpwTavTas TO ToLodTOV. 
¢ A > A \ ¢ / A ‘ ‘ ‘ 
Ot pev odbv mapa TO érdpevov Kal Tapa TO [1 
” / ~ / > c \ \ \ \ 4 
aitiov Adyou Towodrol «iow: ot S€ mapa TO Ta Sto 
> /, “a ~ Ld / / a” ‘ 
epwrnpata €v mroveiv, 6tav AavOdvyn TAciw dvra Kai 
¢ en a+ is ~ > / / res 7 7 
168a Ws €vos OVvTOS am0d00H amdKpLiots pia. em” eviwy 
aA / 
bev obv pdd.ov ideiv Ste mAciw Kai OT od Soréov 
32 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v 


The refutation connected with taking as a cause (6) Mis- 
what is not a cause, occurs when that which is not “*&" Use 
a cause is foisted into the argument as though the 
refutation were due to it. Such a case occurs in 
reasonings leading up to an impossibility ; for in 
these one is bound to destroy one of the premisses. 

If, therefore, what is not a cause is enumerated among 
the questions which are necessary for the production 
of the resultant impossibility, the refutation will 
often seem to come about as the result of it; for 
example, in the argument that ‘ soul ’ and ‘ life’ are 
not identical. For if coming-into-being is contrary 
to perishing, then a particular kind of coming-into- 
being will be contrary to a particular kind of perishing; 
now death is a particular kind of perishing and con- 
trary to life; life, therefore, is a coming-into-being 
and to live is to come-into-being. But this is im- 
possible ; and so the soul and life are not identical. 
But this conclusion is not the result of reasoning ; 
for the impossibility occurs even if one does not 
assert that life is identical with the soul but merely 
says that life is contrary to death, which is a perishing, 
and that coming-into-being is contrary to perishing. 
Such arguments are not absolutely inconclusive but 
only inconclusive as regards the point at issue, and 
the questioners themselves are often equally uncon- 
scious of such a state of affairs. 

Such, then, are the arguments connected with the (7) Plur- 
consequent and the falsely imputed cause. Those St3,% 
which are connected with the union of two questions 
in one occur, when it is not noticed that they are 
more than one and one answer is given as though 
there was only one question. Sometimes it is easy 
to see that there is more than one question and 


c 33 


168 a 


an 


10 


1 


oO 


20 


ARISTOTLE 


> ~ 
amdxpiow, olov métepov %) yh OdAatTaé éorw no 
> / 2.9 > 7 > \ e ey od 
ovpavos; em eviwy 8° rrov, Kat ws évds bvTos 
Bd! ~ ~ 
7) Opodoyobor TH px) arroxpiveoOar 76 epwredpevov, 
”“ rE a / e x ey es ‘ wg 4 
7 €déeyxeoar fhaivovra, ofov dp’ obros Kal obtés 
coTw avOpwros; wor’ dv tis tUmTn Tobrov Kal 
~ »” > > > > 7 / 
tobrov, avOpwrov GAN odk avOpamovs TumTHoe. 
an“ 7 e \ / > > \ \ > > > 4, 
7 7aAw, dv 7a pév eorw ayaba ra 8 odk dyabd, 
TOVTO a 0 \ an“ > > ff] / © ¢ / A ” a 
yaa 7 ovK ayald; omdrepov yap av $f, 
* A e wv ” ~ / / 
eoTt pev ws Edeyxov 7) peddos dawdpevov SdEcev 
dv move: TO yap ddvar t&v pr) dyabdv ru etvar 
> eee. A > 07 ti \ a Ck a 
ayabov 7 T&v ayabdv pr dyabov pedSos. sdré Se 
mpoodnpbevrwy riwav Kav édeyxos yivouro GAnOwés, 
olov «i tis Soin dpwotws &v Kai modAd AéyeoOau 
\ \ \ A / ° A \ \ 
Aevka Kal yupva Kat tuddrd. ef yap tuddrdgv 7d 
pn Exov oxy mepuKos 8 exew, Kat tuddd ora 
\ A ” + / > ” 7 > 
Ta pn €xovta oyu meduxdta 8 é€xew. Srav ody 
\ \ ” ‘ \ , \ » ” “nu ¢ A 
TO ev Exn TO SE un ExN, TA dudw eora 7) 6pdvra 
a“ 4, hud > 7 
7 TupAd: orrep advvarov. 
VI. “H 87 ovrtws Svaperéov rods dawopévovs 
\ \ > / nn / > A 
avAdoyiapovs Kai édéyxous, 7) mdavras avaKxréov 
~ > A 4 
els THY TOO eA€yxouv dyvovav, apyiv TavTHY ToOLN- 
A \ # 
Gapévous* €oT. yap dmavtas avadioa tods rexbev- 
Tas Tpdtous eis TOV TOO eA€yxov Siopiopov. mpaTov 
a ~ 4, 
pev ef aovddAdyoro: Set yap ek TOV KEeyevwr 
@ > > / 
oupBaivew To cvprépacpa, wore Adyew e& avayKns 
‘ / “~ 
GAAa pn paivecbar. evra Kal Kara Ta épyn TOO 
34 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v—v1 


that an answer should not be given, for example, 
when it is asked ‘ Is the earth sea, or is the sky ?’ 
Sometimes, however, it is less easy, and thinking 
that there is only one question, people either give 
in by not answering the question or suffer an apparent 
refutation. For example, ‘Is A and is B a man?’ 
“If so, if a man strikes A and B, he will strike a man, 
not men?’ Or again, ‘ Where part is good and part 
evil, is the whole good or evil?’ Either answer 
might possibly seem to involve an apparent refuta- 
tion or false statement ; for to say that something 
is good when it is not good or not good when it 
is good is a false statement. Sometimes, however, 
if certain premisses are added, there might be a 
genuine refutation. For example, if one agrees that 
a single thing and a number of things are alike called 
“white ’ or ‘naked’ or ‘ blind.’ For if ‘ blind’ is 
used of something which does not possess sight 
though it is its nature to possess it, it will also describe 
a number of things which do not possess sight though 
it is their nature to possess it. When, therefore, 
one thing has sight while another has not, they will 
either both be able to see or both be blind ; which is 
impossible. 
VI. We must either divide apparent reasonings [Note (a). 

and refutations in the manner just described or else jh? above 


fallacies can 
refer them all to a false conception of refutation, all perenne 
making this our basis ; for it is possible to resolve all forms of a 
the kinds of fallacy which we have mentioned into ae ce 
violations of the definition of refutation. Firstly, we ignoratio 
must see if they are inconclusive ; for the conclusion sais 
ought to follow from the premisses laid down, so that 

we state it of necessity and do not merely appear to 


do so, Next, we ought to see if they accord with the 
. 35 


ARISTOTLE 
168 a . . 
~ an \ \ > ~ / / 
Siopiapob. tev pev yap ev TH AdEeu oi pev eit 

25 mapa TO SuTTov, olov 7 TE Ouwvupia Kal 6 Adyos 

Kal 7) dpovoaxynpoatry (atvnfes yap TO mavTA ws 
/ , ¢ \ 4 \ / A 
TOOE TL ONpaivev), 7 5é advOeats Kai diaipects Kal 
mpoowdia TH pn Tov adrov elvar tov Adyov 7 
4 / JA \ \ ~ , 
Tovvoua Siadépov. Eder de Kal Todto, Kabldmep 
\ A ~ > / > / »” bal 
Kal TO mpaypya, Tadrov, «i péAAeu EAeyyos 7) OvA- 
A ” e ? 7 5. 28 / 

30 Aoywopos EoeaOar, ofov «i AWmov, pw) tudriov ovA- 
Aoyicacba adda Awmov. aAnOes nev yap KaxKetvo, 
dAN’ od avdAdcAdyrorar, GAX’ ETL epwrnpatos Set, 
ort TavToVv onpatver, mpos TOV CyTodvTa TO dia TI. 

c A ‘ \ \ c / ~ 
Of 5€ mapa TO cupBeBynKds dpiabévros Tod avA- 
35 Aoyropod avepot yivovtat. Tov avTov yap dpiojov 
def Kal Tob édéyyou yivesbar, ARV mpocKetabat 
\ > / ¢ \ ” A > 
Thv avtipacw: 6 yap edeyxos avAdoyiopos avtt- 
pdcews. €l odv pn eat. avddAoyropuos TOD cup- 
/ > / ” ? \ > t4 
BeBnkortos, od yiverau Edeyyos. od yap ei rovTwr 
»” > 4, 4Q9 s ~ > > A , 
ovTwy avayKn Tod’ elvar, Tobro 8 éori HevKov, 
40 avadyKyn AevKov elvar dua Tov avdAdoyiopov. 00d 
> ‘ , a > ee ” , 
168b €L TO Tplywvov Svoiv dpbaiv toas exer, cvpPeBnKe 
~ a” lool 
& ait@ oxjpare elvac  mpwTw 7 apyH, Ore 
~ ”“ > ae) a“ A > 0) ~ 

OXIA 7) apx7 7 mpa@tov tobro. od yap Hh oxqua 

ov” 4 mpadtov, GAN 4 tpliywvov,  amddekis, 

¢ / \ oe | lol »” 7 > > 1c = 

dpotws 5€ Kai emi Tdv dAAwy. war’ ei 6 eAeyyos 

/ ? ”“ ” c \ ‘ 

5 ovAAdoyiopds Tis, OvK av ein 6 Kata ovpBeByKos 
” > \ \ ~ \ ¢ ~ ‘ 
éXeyxos. GAAA mapa Tobro Kal ot Texyvirar Kai 
36 ° 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v1 


remaining parts of the definition. For of the fallacies Mustrations 
connected with language, some are due to a double fom far 
meaning, for example equivocation and ambiguous — 
phraseology and similarity of formation (for it is () eee 
customary to indicate everything as a particular 
substance), whereas composition, division and accen- 

tuation are due to the phrase not being the same or 

the name different. For the name also, like the thing 
signified, ought to be the same, if refutation or 
reasoning is to result. For example, if the subject 

is a mantle, you should come to a conclusion about 

a mantle, not about a cloak; for the latter con- 

clusion is also a true one, but the reasoning is not 
complete, and a further question must be asked to 

prove that words mean the same thing, if the answerer 

asks how you have refuted him. 

Fallacies connected with Accident become obvious @) Acci- 
when ‘proof’ has been defined. For the same 
definition ought to be true also of refutation, except 
that ‘the contradictory’ is added ; for refutation is 
a proof of the contradictory. If, therefore, there 
is no proof of the accident, no refutation takes place. 

For if, when A and B are, C is, and C is white, it 
_ does not necessarily follow that it is white because 
of the syllogism. And again, if the triangle has its 
angles equal to two right angles, and it happens to be 
a figure, element or principle, it does not necessarily 
follow that because it is a figure, element or principle 
it has this character ; for the demonstration is con- 
cerned with it not qua figure or qua element but qua 
triangle. And so likewise with the other instances. 
Thus, if refutation is a kind of proof, an argument 
depending on an accident could not be a refutation. 
Yet it is along these lines that specialists and men of 


37 


168 b 


10 


15 


20 


25 


ARISTOTLE 


© “29 ~ 
OAws of e€muoTipoves bro TOY dvemornudve 
> / ~ 
edéyxovrar: Kata ovpBeBnKos yap movwodvTat Tods 
A ‘ A > / c > e) / 
avAdoyiopovs mpos Tods €iddTas. of 8 od durd- 
fevot Statpetv 1 Epwraevor Siddacw 7 od SdovTes 
otovrar SedwKeéevar. 
4 \ A A ~ \ c ~ a > To > ~ 
Ot 5€ mapa TO 7H Kal amADs, Ste Od TOO adtod 
¢ ~ ~ ~ 
n KaTadaos Kal 4 amddacis. Tod yap 7H AevKOD 
\ ~ ° / ~ > ¢ ~ ~ A c ~ 
TO 7H 00 AevKdv, TOD 8 amAds AevKOd TO amADs 
> A -J / > s / ~ A 
ov AevKov amddacis. et odv ddvTos 7H elvar AevKOV 
ws amA@s eipnuévov rapPdver, od move? edeyxov, 
paiverar dé dua THY ayvovay Tob Ti eorw Edeyyos. 
Mavepwraror d€ mavTwv oi mpotepov exOevtes 
Tapa Tov Tod €Aéyxou S.opicpov 810 Kal mpoc- 
nyopev0noav otTws: Tapa yap Tob Adyov TH 
4 € / 7 A Y 
eAArcup 1 ghavtacia yiverar, Kal Svarpovpevors 
oUTWws KoWwov emt maou TovTots Beréov tiv Tod 
Adyou eMreupur. 
Ot re mapa TO AnpBebees TO eV axa Kal TO avat- 
Tov ws aitiov TWWévar SHAoL dia TOO Sptapod. det 
~ ~ , 
yap TO ovpTépacpa TH Tabr eciva’ ovpPaivew, 
a > > > a“ > / \ aA \ > 
Omep odK Hv ev Tots avattiois: Kal mdAw pur) apiO- 
~ ~ ” ¢ 
povpevov Tob €€ apyts, dmep odK Exovow of mapa 
Thv altnow Tod év apy. 
¢ ‘ A ‘ ¢ / / es ~ 
Oi d€ mapa To émdpuevov pépos cial Tod cupPe- 
/ \ A i7 / / /, A 
Bnkotos: TO yap émopevov ovpBeBynKe, diadeper dé 
1 Omitting alria rod after elvac with ABC. 





® 167 a 21 ff. 
> mapadoyopoi from mapa and Adyos in the sense of * de- 
finition.’ 


38 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v1 


science in general are refuted by the unscientific ; for 
they argue with the men of science with reasonings 
based on accident, and the latter, being incapable of 
- making distinctions, either give in when questioned, 
or think that they have done so when they have not. 

Fallacies which depend on whether a statement (3) The 

is made in a limited sense or absolutely occur be- Comision. | 
cause the affirmation and denial are not of the same mag ese 
thing. For ‘not partly white’ is the negation of ments. 
‘ partly white,’ and ‘ not absolutely white ’ of ‘ abso- 
lutely white.’ If, then, one takes the admission that 
something is partially white to mean that it is abso- 
lutely white, he does not cause a refutation but only 
seems to do so owing to ignorance of what a refuta- 
tion is. 

The clearest fallacies of all are those already (4) Defec- 
mentioned* as connected with the definition of five det 
_ refutation (hence also their name); for the semblance 
of a refutation is due to the defect in the definition, 
and, if we distinguish fallacies in this way, we must 
put down ‘ defect of definition ’ as common to all these 
cases, 

Fallacies due to assuming the original point and (5) Petitio 
stating as a cause what is not a cause are clearly ?’"”?™ 
exposed by means of the definition. For the con- 
clusion ought to follow because this and that is so, 
which is not the case when the alleged cause is not 
the cause ; and, again, the conclusion should follow 
without the original point being included, which is 
not true of arguments based on the begging of the 
original point. 

Fallacies connected with the consequent form part (6) The 
of those due to accident ; for the consequent is an °™S¢tent. 
accident but differs from the accident because the 


39 


168 b 


3 


35 


40 
169 a 


o 


o 


ARISTOTLE 


~ / hid \ \ ‘ ” 
Tod ovpBeBnKdros, Ste TO pev ovpPeBnkds eorw 
34? ey A / ~ et > ‘ \ ‘ 
ef’ évos pdvov AaBeiv, ofov tadro elvar 7d Eavbdv 
Kal peu Kat 7d AevKov Kal KUKVoV, TO 8€ Tapemd- 
/ ~ ; 
pevov aet ev mAreloow: Ta yap evi tadT@ radra 
‘ > va > lol > > /, A , 
Kat aAdAjAots a€vodpev elvar tradrd- 810 yiverac 
Tapa TO émdpuevov eAeyyos. ort 8 od mavtTws 
> , e n” > \ \ , \ 
adnbés, ofov dv 7 AevKdv Kata ovpPeBnxds: Kal 
yap 1) xiv Kai 6 KUKVos TH AevKa tabrdov. 7 
LA ¢ > ~ M rd /, A ’ ‘ 
madw, ws ev tT MeAicoov AOyw, 7d adro elvar 
Aap Baver 76 yeyovévar Kai apyny exew, 7) TO toa" 
yweobar Kai radTo péyeBos AapPdvew. dr yap 
TO Yyeyovos Exe apxyv, Kal TO exov apyiv yeyovevat 
~ 2 ~ Ld 
afwit, ws dudw tatra dvta tH apyny exew, 7d 
TE yeyovos Kal TO TreTEpacpevov.” dpoiws Sé Kal 
emt THV towv ywopevwrv ei Ta TO adTo péeyebos 
Kat €v AapBadvovra toa yiverar, Kai Ta toa ywopeva 
a / / a \ e / 4 
ev weyebos AapBave. wore TO éxdpuevov AapBadver. 
> Col 
ere ov 6 mapa TO ovpBeBnKos EeAeyyos ev TH 
~ ‘ 
ayvoia tod éAéyxou, davepov ott Kal 6 Tapa TO 
Eropevov. emusKemtéov S€ TodTo Kal dAAws. 
~ ? 
Oi dé mapa TO Ta TrAciw epwrhwara Ev rroveiv ev 
~ a ~ \ a ‘ ~ 
T@ pn SiapOpodv Huds 7) wn Svapeiv tov THs mpo- 
/ > “a a Ke, 
tacews Adyov. 1 yap mpoTacis eoTw ev Kal” Evds. 


+ Reading ica for tcous. 
* Bekker misprints wezepacpévov as temepacpévww. 





* But it does not follow that because snow is white and 
swan is white, therefore snow is swan. 

> Cf. 167 b 18 f. 

© Of. 179 a 26 ff., 181 a 22 ff. 


40 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vi 


accident can be secured in the case of a single thing 
by itself, for example, a yellow thing and honey are 
identical, and so is a white thing and a swan, whereas 
the consequent always exists in more than one thing ; 
for we claim that things which are the same as one 
and the same thing are the same as one another ; 
_ and this is how refutation proceeds when the con- 
sequent is involved. It is not, however, always true, 
for example, in the case of accidental whiteness ; 
for both ‘ snow ’ and ‘ swan’ are the same in respect 
of whiteness. Or again, as in the argument of 
Melissus,’ someone takes ‘ to have come into being ’ 
and ‘ to have a beginning’ as the same thing, and 
‘to become equal ’ as the same thing as ‘ to take on 
the same magnitude.’ For because what has come 
into being has a beginning, he claims also that what 
has a beginning has come into being, on the ground 
that ‘having come into being’ and ‘ being finite’ 
are both the same thing, because both have a begin- 
ning. Similarly, too, in the case of things which 
become equal, he assumes that, if things which take 
on one and the same magnitude become equal, then 
also things which become equal take on the same 
magnitude. In doing so he is assuming the conse- 
quent. Since, then, the refutation where accident 
is concerned depends on ignorance of the nature of 
refutation. so also, it is clear, does the refutation 
where the consequent is concerned. But we must 
examine this question from other points of view also.°¢ 
Fallacies connected with the union of several (7) The 

questions in one are due to our failure to differentiate mane 4 
or distinguish the definition of the term ‘ proposi- questions 
tion.’ For a proposition is a single predication about 
a single subject. For the same definition applies 


41 


ARISTOTLE 
169 a 
¢ \ > \ Lid ee / A ¢ AG ~ , 
0 yap avTos 6pos vos pdovov Kal amA@s Tod mpay- 
, > 

10 watos, olov avOpuov Kal évds povov avOpumov- 
¢ / \ best ee Y ~ LAA > on / / 
opolws d€ Kal emi TOV dAAwy. et odv pia mpdTacts 
ce «a >] @ >A > ~ ‘ c AD ” , 

7 €v Kal” évos a€toboa, Kal amA@s Eotar mpdTacts 
¢€ , > 7 >? A a e vA ‘ >? 
1 TowvTH EpwTnots. erret 6 avAdoyiopos eK 
/ c > er AA /, ‘ c er 

mpotacewv, 6 8 Eheyxos avAAoyiopos, Kal 6 eAey- 

a 
Xos €oTar eK mpoTdcewy. el odv 1) MpdTaais Ev 

\ Te ae \ hid \ e > ~ ~ 2ré: 

15 Kal” évds, havepov 6tt Kal obTos ev TH TOO eA€yxou 
ayvoia daiverar yap elvar mpdtacis 7 ovK ovdca 
mpoTacis. et pev ody dédwKev amdKpiow ws mpds 

/ > 4 ” ” > \ \ / 
play epwrnow, €ora eAeyxos, «i S€ put) SedwKeEV 
aAAd / / ww oe , 

a daiverar, pawopevos eAeyyos. wate mavTES 
ot Tpomou' rimtrovow eis THY TOO eA€yyou adyvoay, 
¢ \ > \ \ , ¢ , t2 

2006 pev obv mapa trHv AdEw, ote Pawopnern 7 
avripacis, omep tv Wiov Tob édéyxov, ot 8 dAdot 
Tapa Tov Tob avAAoyiopod Gpov. 

VIL. ‘H 8 amdrn yiverau tOv prev mapa TH 
Opwvupiav Kal Tov Adyov TH ur) SUvacbau Scarpeiv 
To ToMax@s Aeydpevov (evra yap odK evropoVv 

25 OueAciv, ofov TO Ev Kal TO dv Kal TO TadTdv), TOV 

\ \ 4 \ U ~ \ ” 
de mapa ovvleow Kat diaipeow TH pndev oiecbar 
8 /, Og ”“ 8 / \ Ao 
vapépew ovvTewevov 7 Starpovpevov tov Adyov, 
Kabdamep emt TOV mAcloTwv. dpoiws S€ Kal Tadv 

\ \ ye > ‘ ” a , 
Tapa Tv mpoomdiav: od yap dAdo doKet onpatvew 
aviemevos Kal éemitewdpevos 6 Adyos, ex’ oddeVds 


1 Reading rpdaa for ré7or with Michael Ephesius. 
2 Adding 7 with Wallies. 


42 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vi-vir 


to ‘one single thing’ and to ‘the thing’ simply ; 
the definition, for example, of ‘man’ and of ‘ one 
single man’ is the same, and so, too, with the other 
instances. If, therefore, a ‘single proposition’ is 
one which claims a single predicate for a single sub- 
ject, a “ proposition,’ simply, will also be a question 
of this kind. And since reasoning is based on pro- 
positions, and refutation is a process of reasoning, 
refutation will also be based on propositions. If, 
therefore, a proposition is a single predication about 
a single thing, clearly this fallacy also depends on 
ignorance of the nature of refutation; for what is 
not a proposition appears to be one. If, therefore, 
a man has given an answer as though to a single 
question, there will be a refutation, but if he has not 
given it but only appears to have done so, there will 
be only an apparent refutation. Thus all the kinds 
of fallacy fall under the heading of ignorance of the 
nature of refutation—those connected with language 
because the contradiction, which is a particular char- 
acteristic of refutation, is only apparent, and the 
rest because of the definition of reasoning. 

VII. In fallacies connected with verbal equivoca- [Note (8). 
tion and ambiguous phrases the deception arises from Rutan es 
the inability to distinguish the various meanings of a palo 
term (for there are some which it is not easy to distin- fused think- 
guish, for example, the meanings of ‘ unity,’ ‘ being ’ ig ater eo 
and ‘identity ’). In fallacies connected with combina- make 
tion and disjunction the deceptionis due to the supposi- °"° he, 
tion that it makes no difference whether the term is 
combined or disjoined, as indeed is generally the case. 

So, too, in those connected with accentuation ; for 
it does not seem ever, or seems very seldom, to alter 
the significance of the word whether it is pronounced 


43 


ARISTOTLE 
169 a 
an” A ~ ~ A ~ 
307) odK emt moAAdv. Tdv S€ Tapa TO oxHpa dia 
\ ¢ / ~ / ‘ A ~ 
THhv OpmoLoTyTa THS A€Eews. xaderov yap S.eAciv 
Tota woavTws Kal Tota ws érépws A€yeTa oxEdov 
yap 6 Tobdro Svuvdpevos Tovey eyyts €aTt Tod 
a > , , "oe ~ 1 

fewpetv tadnbés. puddvora 8° emuomarat’ cuveti- 
vevew, OTL Tav TO KaTnyopovpevov Tivos UT0- 
/ / A € “a 1s 4 ~ A 
35 AapPdvopev TOde Tt Kal ws Ev UraKovopev* TH yap 
évi Kat TH ovcia pddAvoTa SoKet mapéemecba TO 

/ A \ »” \ ‘ ~ ‘ A / 
TOOE TL KaL TO OV. OHtO Kal TOV Tapa THv A€Ew 
ion is / / ~ A a ~ ¢ 
obtos 6 Tpdomos Beréos, mp@rov pev Ste aGAdAov 7 
> , , > »” , ” > 
amatn yiverar pet aAAwv oKoTroupevors 7 Kal 
adrouvs (7) ev yap pet aAAov axes dia Adyar, 

¢€ \ > ¢ A b) e > ’ ~ ~ /, 
407%) 5€ Kal? adrov ody Arrov du’ avTod Tod mpay- 
169b patos), era Kal Kal” adrov amatadobar ovpPaiver, 
7 > \ ~ , ~ A , ” ¢ A 
6rav emi Tob AOyou mouATar THY oKepuw: ETL 7 pev 
amdrn €k THs OpoidTnTos, 7 5 opoLdtTns €K TIS 
/, ~ ‘\ ‘A A A \ ‘ \ 
AgEews. Tav 8€ rapa Td ovpBeBynKos bia TO pH 
‘ 
dvvacba dvaxpivew TO TadvTov Kal TO ETEpov Kal 

aA , ~ , 

5 €v Kal TOAAG, dE TOis TOloLs TOV KaTYYOPHMaATwY 

~ , 
TaVTA TAVTA Kal TO Tpadypate ovpBeBnKev. Opotws 
d€ Kal TOY Tapa TO émopevov: pépos yap TL TOD 

/ ‘ ¢ / ” A > ‘\ ~ 
ovpBeBnKdtos TO émdpmevov. ETL KaL ETL ToAA@V 

, 4 > ~ tA , / > A ~ 
daiverar Kal a€vodrar ottws, et Téd€ amd ToddE 
pn) xwpilerar, und? amo Oarépov xwpilecbas Oa- 
~ \ A \ ” ~ / A 
10 Tepov. Tav S€ mapa THY EAAEeufuw Tod Adyou Kai 


1 Reading with Poste émozara for éeriorara. 


44 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vir 


with a lower or a higher pitch. In fallacies connected 
with the form of expression the deception is due to 
similarity of language ; for it is difficult to distinguish 
what sort of things belong to the same and what to 
different categories ; for he who can do this very 
nearly approaches a vision of the truth. What in 
particular seduces us into giving our assent to the 
fallacy is the fact that we suppose that every predi- 
cate of something is an individual thing and it pre- 
sents itself to our ears as a single thing ; for it is to 
the one and to substance that ‘ individuality’ and 
‘being’ are generally held most truly to be attached. 
On this account also this kind of fallacy must be 
classed among those connected with language ; firstly, 
because the deception occurs more commonly when 
we are inquiring with others than by ourselves (for 
an inquiry with someone else is carried on by means of 
words, whereas in our own minds it is carried on quite 
as much by means of the thing itself); secondly, 
because, even in solitary inquiry, a man is apt to be 
deceived when he carries on his inquiry by means of 
words ; and, thirdly, the deception arises from the 
similarity, and the similarity arises from the language. 
In fallacies connected with accident the deception is 
due to inability to distinguish the identical and the 
different, the one and the many, and what kinds of 
predicates have all the same accidents as their sub- 
ject. So, too, in fallacies connected with the con- 
sequent; for the consequent is a branch of the 
accident. Furthermore, in many cases it appears 
to be true and is treated as axiomatic that, if A 
is inseparable from B, then also B is inseparable 
from A. In fallacies connected with the defect in 
the definition of refutation and with the distinction 


45 


’ 


ARISTOTLE 
169 b 
~ \ \ ~ eed ~ > ~ A \ ¢ 
TOV Tapa TO TH Kal amAds ev TH Tapa puKpov 7 
andrn ws yap oddev mpoconpatvov 76 Ti } mh} 
ms } TO viv Kalddov cvyxwpoduev. dpotws Sé 
kal é€ml TOV TO ev apxn AapBavovtwy Kai Tadv 
avaitiwy, Kal dcou Ta TAciw epwrhpata ws ev 
15 Tovovow* €v dmace yap 1 dmdatn bia TO Tapa 
pukpov: od yap SiaKpiBobdwev ote THs mpoTdcews 
ovte Tod avAdoyiopob Tov Gpov dia THY elpnuevnv 
aitiav. 
VIII. ’Ezet 8 €xouev rap’ dca yivovrat ot dat- 
vopevor ovAdoyiopol, Exouev Kai map’ dmdca ot 
\ / > v \ \ ” 
20 gopioTiKol yevowrT av avddoyiopolt Kal éAeyyxor. 
reg \ \ ” A \ ? 
éyw d€ aod.otixov édeyxov Kat avAdoyiopov ob 
Ledvov Tov dawvduevov ovddAoyiopov 7 eAeyxov, p21) 
yw / > A \ A ww / / ¥ 
ovta S€, adda Kal Tov dvTa pev, hawopevov Se 
olkeiov Tod mpdypatos. etal 8 odrou ot pur) KaTa 
TO Tpaypa ed€yxovTes Kal SeiKvUvTeEs. ayvoobvras, 
25 OTEp Iv THs TeipaoTiKs. €oT. 8 1% meipaoruKt) 
/ ~ 8 r ~ A 8 \ Py / AA / 
Mépos Tis Siadextixfs: atrn dé ddvatar avAdoyi- 
~ > »” ~ / \ , 
leobar eddos 8x’ dyvorav Tod diddvtos Tov Adyov. 
€ \ 5. er n” \ / \ 
ot d€ aoduotixol edeyxor, dv Kai avAdoyilwvrar THY 
avtipacw, od Trovodar SiAov €i ayvoet: Kal yap Tov 
elddTa eumodilovat TovTo.s Tots Adyots. 
7 > ” > \ ~ 7 A / ~ 
30 “Ore 8 €xopev adbrods 7H abrH pcbddw, dSHAov- 
map doa yap paiverat Tots adkovovow ws npwrn- 
peva avddrcdoyicbar, mapa Tadra Kav TH amoKpwo- 
/ / id > ” 4 a 
pevm Sd€evev, War’ Ecovrar avddoyropoi yevdeis 
dia TovTwv 7) TaVvTWY 7) eviwv: 6 yap m1) epwrnbels 
46 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vi—-vin 


between a qualified and an absolute statement the 
deception is due to the minuteness of the difference ; 
for we regard the qualification of a particular case or 
respect or manner or time as having no extra signifi- 
cance and concede the universality of the proposition. 
So, too, when people assume the original point and 
when the wrong cause is assigned and when several 
questions are united in one; for in all these cases 
the deception is due to the minuteness of the differ- 
ence ; for we fail accurately to carry out the definition 
of ‘ proposition’ and ‘ reasoning’ from the above- 
mentioned cause. 

VIII. Since we know the various sources from (e) By re- 
which apparent reasonings arise, we also know those Jj)" 
from which sophistical reasonings and refutations phe gions So 
would arise. By sophistical refutation and reasoning I to be germane 
mean not only the seeming but unreal reasoning or re- 1 the subject 
futation but also one which, though real, only seems cussion. 
to be, but is not really, germane to the subject in hand. 

These are those which fail to refute and show up 
ignorance within the sphere of the subject in hand, 
and this is the function of examination. Now this is 
a department of dialectic, but it may reach a false con- 
clusion owing to the ignorance of the person under 
examination. But sophistical refutations, even if they 
prove the contradictory of his view, do not make clear 
whether he is ignorant ; for men try to entrap even 
the man of scientific knowledge by these arguments. 

That we know them by the same method is clear ; [Note (a). 

for the same reasons which make the hearers think Sophistical 


; refutations 
that a conclusion has been reached as a result of proceed on 
° P the same 
questions, would make the answerer think so too, jines as 
so that there will be false proofs as a result of all or 2PParent 


f: 
some of these causes ; for what a man thinks he has — 
é AIT 


169 b 
35 


40 


170 a 


oO 


ARISTOTLE 


ww 
olerar dedwKévar, Kav epwrnbels ein. Av ext 
/ Ld / ~ \ > A A 
ye TWoVv apa cupPaiver Tpocepwrav TO evdees Kal 
A ~ > / a 
70 eddos Eupavilew, olov ev tots mapa tiv AdEw 
\ \ rv / > > ¢ ‘ ~ 
Kat Tov GodAociKiopov. €t ody ot tapadoyiopol THs 
> / \ \ ~ 
avripdcews rapa Tov pawdpevov eAreyydv eior, d7- 
Ld \ ~ “ \ ~ ~ w 
Aov ort mapa Tocabra dv Kai Tov yevddv einoav 
AA \ > Lud \ e fi er 
avAdoyicpot Tap’ doa Kai 6 pawepevos eAeyxos. 
¢ A / A \ / a >? ~ c /, 
0 d€ hawédpevos Tapa Ta popia TOO GAnOwod- éxd- 
\ > / / n A by ¢ 
orov yap éxXeizovros davein av éeyyos, olov 6 
\ A \ A \ 4 / e > \ 
Tapa TO pn ovpBaivoy bia Tov Adyov, 6 Els TO 
> 4 \ ¢ \ tA > 4 / ~ \ 
advvarov Kai 6 Tas d0o épwrioes pilav Tov Tapa 
\ / \ > ‘ ~ > er. % e A \ 
THVv TpoTacw, Kal avTt Tod Kal” adTo 6 mapa TO 
/ \ A 4 / ¢ A ‘ 
cupBeBnkds, Kal 7d TovToV pdpiov, 6 Tapa TO 
¢ / ” A \ ; eB! ~ 7, iAN’ t SRR.) 
ETTOMEVOV" ETL TO MN) ETL TOU Tpaypatos GAN’ ent 
~ / / = 3 > \ ~ 662A A 
Tod Aoyou ovpBaivew: lr’ avti rob Kabodov ri 
> / \ A > 8 \ \ 3 \ ‘ 
avripacw Kal Kata TavTO Kal mpos TavTO Kal 
¢ 4 / ame / an“ bia 4 
WOAUTWS Tapa TE TO ETL TL) Tap EKaCTOV TOUTWY" 


a > > Col re 
ETL Tapa TO [47 evaptOwoupevov Tob.ev apy TO eV 


> ~ / Ld >” n” 7, 7 / 
10 apy7 AapBdavew. war’ Exoyrev av wap’ doa yivovrat 


4 / ‘ >| / A A > nn te 
oi mapaAdoyiopol: Tapa mAciw ev yap ovK ay elev, 
A A A > / ” / 
mapa d€ Ta eipnueva e€oovrar mavTeEs. 
¢ ~ ” 
"Eott 8’ 6 aoduatikds eAeyxos ody amAds eAey- 
\ € v4 
xos, GAAa mpds Twa: Kal 6 avdAdoytopos WaadTws. 


48 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vur 


conceded without being questioned, he would grant 
if he were to be questioned. But of course it some- 
times happens that, as soon as we ask the requisite 
question, we make the falsehood obvious, as happens 
in verbal fallacies and those due to solecism. If, 
therefore, false proofs of the contradictory depend on 
the apparent refutation, it is clear that proofs of 
false conclusions must be also due to the same 
number of causes as the apparent refutation. Now 
the apparent refutation depends on the elements 
which compose a genuine one; for, if any one of 
these is lacking, there would only be an apparent 
refutation, for example, that which is due to the 
conclusion not resulting from the argument (the 
reduction to an impossibility), and that which unites 
two questions in one and is due to a fault in the pro- 
position, and that which is due to the substitution 
of an accident for the essence of a thing, and—a 
subdivision of the last mentioned—that which is due 
to the consequent ; moreover, there is the case where 
the result follows in word only and not in reality, and 
also where, instead of the contradiction being uni- 
versal and in the same respect, relation and manner, 
there is a restriction in extent or in connexion with 
another of these qualifications ; and then again there 
is the case of the assumption of the original point due 
to a disregard of the principle of not reckoning it in. 
Thus we should know the various conditions under 
which false proofs occur, for there are no further 
conditions under which they could occur, but they 
will always result from the above causes. 

A sophistical refutation is not an absolute refuta- [Note (g). 
tion but is relative to some person, and so likewise A7oppitth 
is a sophistical proof. For unless the refutation which tion is not 


49 


ARISTOTLE 
170 a 
a“ \ \ A / ¢ \ A ¢ rd a“ 
av pev yap pn AdByn 6 Te Tapa TO dumvupov ev 

15 Onpalvew Kal 6 Tapa tiv OpovocynmoodvnY TO 

/, / \ € + ¢ /, mw 9 »” 
Hovov Toe Kal of ddA woatTws, ovr Edeyyor 

+ \ yA #f)> ¢ ~ A \ 
ovre avAdoyiopol Ecovtar, ov anAds ore mpds 

\ > / 2A \ / \ \ % 
TOV Epwrw@pevov' eav dé AdBwor, mpds pev TOV 
epwrwpevov EaovTar, ards 8° odk Ecovrar: od yap 
a ral > f > \ / \ \ 
Ev onpaivov eiAjdacw, adAd dawdpevov, Kal mapa 
TODOE. 

20 IX. Ilapa moca 8 €Aéyyovrar ot eAeyyopevor, 
od Set treipGobor AapBdvew avev THs Tov dvTwv 
emoTHns amdvtwy. Totro 8 obdemias earl réx- 
vns* aetpor yap tows at éemorhua, wore diAov 
OTL Kal at amrodetEes. eAeyxou 8” cial Kat adnbets: 
? \ ” > a ” \ 2»); 7 \ 
doa yap €oTw amodeifar, €ort Kal eAéyEar Tov 

/ \ > / ~ > ~ >? v4 

25 Jéuevov THY avtidacw Tob adnBods, ofov et ovp- 

\ 4 v > A A ~ 

petpov tHVv dudpetpov EOnKev, eAéyEevev av Tis TH 

/ 

amodeife OTL aovppetpos. woTe mdvtwy Sdenoer 

emoTrpovas elvar* of prev yap €covra mapa Tas 

év yewpeTpia apxas Kal Ta TOUTWY oUpTEpdoMaTa, 

ot b€ mapa tas év latpiKh, ot dé mapa Tas TOV 
a c a ” 

30 dAAwy emioTnpa@v. adda pv Kal of pevdeis EdAeyyou 

A 

dpoiws ev atreipois: Kal” éExdornv yap Téxvnv eoTi 
\ ec 

yevdijs avAdoyropds, olov Kara yewperTpiav 6 yew- 

HeETpiKOS Kal KaTa laTpiKnV 6 latpiKds. Aéyw Sé 

> 
TO KaTa THY TEXVHV TO KaTAa Tas eKelvns apyxds. 
~ > a +] / ~ y 7 > A ~ 
35 OjAov obv ot. od mdvTwy TaV eAéyywv aAAa TeV 


50 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vitt-1x 


depends on equivocation assumes that the equivocal absolute 
term has only a single meaning, and unless that which yelative 
depends on similarity of termination assumes that % the | 
: : : r.] 

there is only substance, and so on, neither refutation 
nor proof will be possible, either absolutely or rela- 
tively, to the answerer; whereas, if they do make 
these assumptions, they will be possible relatively to 
the answerer, but not absolutely ; for they have not 
secured a statement which has a single meaning but 
only one which appears to be such, and only from a 
particular person. : 

IX. Without a knowledge of everything which [Note (y). A 
exists we ought not to try and grasp the various ways ae all 
in which the refutation of those who are refuted is refutations 
brought about. This, however, is not the function sible, Be- 
of any art ; for the sciences are possibly infinite, and Caus¢ they 
so clearly demonstrations are also infinite. Now in number.] 
there are true as well as false refutations ; for wher- 
ever demonstration is possible, it is possible also to 
refute him who maintains the contradictory of the 
truth; for example, if a man maintains that the 
diagonal of a square is commensurate with its sides, 
one should refute him by proving that it is incom- 
mensurate. So we shall need to have scientific 
knowledge of everything ; for some refutations will 
depend on the principles of geometry and their con- 
clusions, others on those of medicine, and others on 
those of the other sciences. Moreover, false refuta- 
tions also are among things which are infinite ; for 
every art has a false proof peculiar to it, geometry a 
geometrical proof and medicine a medical proof. By 
“peculiar to an art’ I mean ‘ in accordance with the 
principles of that art.’ It is clear, then, that we 
need not grasp the commonplaces of all refutations 


51 


ARISTOTLE 
1704 
\ \ \ / \ , 
mapa tiv SvadextiKyy AnnTéov Tods TOmOUS* ODTOL 
\ 
yap KowWol mpos dracav Tréxvyv Kal d¥vayw. Kal 
~ > 

Tov pev Kal” éExdotyv éemoriunv edeyxov Tod Em- 
A / w > 
aTnpoves eat. Oewpeiv, cite un wv patveTar et T 
~ ~ \ A 
€ott, dua TL eotu: Tov 8 ex TAY Kowa@v Kal B70 

~ ~ ] v 

40 pndepiav Téxvnv TV diadreKTiKOv. El yap EXopev 
> e eo» \ oe = ” 
e€ dy ot évdokor avdAdoyiopol tepi dTiodv, EXopEV 
& e Cis at ¢ A ” , > > / 

170b €€ dv of EXeyyou 6 yap Edeyxds eoTw avTipacews 

/ LA - hah. ” , \ > 
ovAdoyiopds, wot” 7 els 7% S¥o0 cvdAdAoyiopol avTt- 
> / 

dpacews edeyxds eoTw. Exouev dpa map omoca 

~ ~ ‘ 

mavtes elalv of TowodTor. «i d€ Tobdr’ Exomev, Kal 

¢ , : 

5 Tas Avoeis €xowev’ al yap TovTwY evoTaces AvoeLs 
elolv. é€yopuev O€, rap omdca yivovTar, Kal TOvS 
dpaivopevous, pawvopevous d€ ody 6Twobtv adAa Tots 

a > a > 

Towwiade* adpioTa yap €oTW, €dv Tis GKOTTH Tap 
/ a ~ 

omdca daivovrat Tots Tuvxyotow. woTe davepov 

74 ~ ~ > \ \ / ~ > 

ore TOO SiadreKTiKod eori 7d Svvacba AaBetv wap 

doa yivetar dua TOV Kowadv 7 dv EAeyyxos 7) hawwe- 

10 wevos EAeyyos, Kal 7 SdiadeKTiKOs 7 PaLvopevos 
duaAeKTiKos 7] TELpAoTLKOs. 

X. OvdK ori 5é diadopa tv Adywv hv A€yovai 
A 
Ties, TO elvat Tovs pev mpos Tov’voua Adyous, 
érépous dé mpos THV Sidvovav’ aToTov yap TO br0- 
/ Ed \ A * / 
15 Aap Bdvew dAdAovs pev clvoar mpos Tobvopa Adyous, 
er. 7 \ ‘ \ / > > ? \ > 4 
ETépous de mpos THY Sidvorav, add’ od Tods adrovs. 
/ / > ‘ \ A \ / > > <& Ld 

Ti yap €oTt TO 7) TpOs TIHV Sudvorav GAA’ 7 dTav 
\ ~ ~ > / e ~ 

Le) XpHTac T@ ovopatt, ep’ @ oidpevos epwraaba,* 


1 Reading with Poste e¢’ & oldpevos épwradcba for oidpevos 
epwrdoba ed’ & of the mss. 


52 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, r1x-x 


but only those which concern dialectic ; for these are 
common to every art and faculty. And it is the func- 

tion of the scientific man to examine the refutation [Note (8). 
which is peculiar to each science and see whether it is ea of the 
apparent only and not real, or, if it is real, why it is so ; beri 
whereas it is the function of dialecticians to examine a scientist 
refutation which depends on common principles which et 1 
do not fall under any one art. For if we know the 
sources of generally accepted proofs about any par- 
ticular subject, we know also the sources of the refu- 
tations ; for a refutation is a proof of a contradictory, 

and so one or two proofs of a contradictory make up a 
refutation. We know, then, the various sources of all 

such proofs, and, knowing these, we also know their 
solutions ; for the objections to these are the solu- 

tions. We also know the various sources of apparent 
refutations—apparent, that is, not to everyone but 

only to a certain kind of mind; for it would be an 
endless task to examine the various ways in which 

they are apparent to the man in the street. It is, 
therefore, clear that it is the function of the dia- 
lectician to be able to grasp the various ways in 

which, on the basis of common principles, a real or 
apparent refutation, that is, dialectical or apparently 
dialectical or part of an examination, is brought about. 

X. No real distinction, such as some people pro- [Note (c). 
pose, exists between arguments used against the word fanigus.g* 
and those used against the thought; for it is absurd (@ Argu- 
to suppose that some arguments are used against eatin’ the 
the word and others against the thought, and not the Word = 
same in both cases. For what is failure to use the against the 
argument against the thought except what happens "8" 
when a man does not apply the term in the meaning 
about which the man questioned thought that he 


53 


ARISTOTLE 
170b 

ee | / ” \ > > \ i. HS \ 
6 Epwrwpevos edwKev; TO 8 adro TobTd éott Kal 
A ” A \ \ A / id 24? 
mpos Tovvopa. TO dE mpos THY didvorav, drav ed 

eo » , > \4 , , 
20@ edwkev Siavonfeis. ei 57 mAEiw onpaivovTos 
Tob dvdpmaTos oloiTo Ev onpaivew Kal 0 épwrav 


a , e ” vate 1a \ 
KQL O EPWTWLLEVOS, OLOV LOWS TO OV 1 TO €&V TOAAG 


/ > A ‘ ¢ 3 / \ £9. a 2 
onpativer, aAAa Kal 6 arroKpwopevos Kal 6 épwra@v 
a a7 > pap tA iv & ¢ , ” 
Ev olopevos elvat Npwrnae, Kal Eat 6 Adyos GTt 

n” 


3 ” \ 
év 7dVvTa, ObTOS POS TOvVoMa eoTaAL 7) TPOS THY 
/ ~ ? / / > /, / 
25 Oudvovav Tod epwrwpevov dretAeypevos; et dé ye 
\ ” / ~ Ld > \ \ 
Tis T70AAG oieTar onpatverv, SHAov Stu od mpds THY 
; A ‘ 
dudvotav. mp@tTov pev yap mept Tovs TovodTous 
> \ / \ A ” \ 4 \ / 
€aTl Adyous TO mpOs TovVOLA Kal mpos THY Sidvovay 
doot TAciw onuatvovow, elra mept ovTwodbv eoriv: 
> \ > al / > \ ‘ A \ / 
ov yap ev TH Adyw €otl TO mpds TH Sidvovay elvar, 
> > > ~ \ > / ” \ A 
30 dAd’ év 7H Tov amoKpwopevov exew TwWS TpOS TA 
/ \ 4 / > /, 
dedopeva. elra mpos totvoua mavras évdéyerau 
avtous «lvat. TO yap mpos Tovvoua TO pI) Tpds 
\ / s Ga? > ~ > \ \ / 
Thy Sidvovav elvai €oTw evtabba. ei yap pn TavTes, 
” 
EGOVTAL TES ETEPOL OUTE TPOS TOVVOLLA OUTE TpOS 
\ / € / / \ a 
Thv Sidvorav ot S€ hac mavras, Kal Svapodvras 
” ‘ + “ A \ / , 
35 7) pos TovVoLLA 7 mpos TV Sidvovay elvat mavTAsS, 
> 
ddAovs 8 ob. adda piv door avdAdoyropol iar 
~ of € 
mapa TO mAcovaxas, TovTwv clot Twes of Tapa 


1 Omitting vis after «7 8. 
2 Omitting Zjvwy after épwrdy as a gloss. 


54 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x 


was being questioned when he made the concession ? 
And this is equivalent to using it against the word ; 
whereas to use it against the thought is to apply it 
to the sense about which the man was thinking when 
he made the concession. If, then, when the word has 
more than one meaning, both the questioner and 
the man questioned were to think that it had only 
one meaning—as, for example, ‘ unity ’ and ‘ being’ 
have several meanings but both the answerer answers 
and the questioner puts his question on the supposi- 
tion that there is only one meaning and that the 
argument is that all things are one—will the argu- 
ment have been directed against the word and not 
rather against the thought of the man questioned ? 
If, on the contrary, one of them thinks that the word 
has several meanings, obviously the argument is not 
directed against the thought. For application to 
the word and application to the thought belong 
primarily to arguments which signify several things 
ambiguously, but, secondarily, to any argument what- 
soever ; for the application to the thought does not 
depend on the argument but on a certain attitude 
of mind in the answerer towards what has been con- _ 
ceded. Next, it is possible for all arguments to be 
applied to the word; for in the case under dis- 
cussion ‘ to be applied to the word’ means ‘ not to 
be applied to the thought.’ For if all are not applied 
to the word or the thought, there will be a third class 
not applied to either; but they declare that the 
classification is exhaustive and divide them into those 
applied to the word and those applied to the thought, 
and there is no other class. But, as a matter of fact, 
reasonings dependent on the word are amongst those 
dependent on a multiplicity of meanings. For it is an 


55 


ARISTOTLE 
170 b 
+ > , A \ A ” \ \ 
TOVVOMA. aToTWS peV yap Kal iene TO Tapa. 
> 
TOUVO[LA. pdvas mTavTas TOUS Tapa TH AeEw: ara 
obv elot tives Tapadoyiopol od TH TOV amoKpLVO- 
[evov mpos TovTous e€xew mws, GAA TH ToLovdl 
40 epwrnua TOV Adyov adrov exew, 6 wAciw onpaiver. 
t71a “Odws Te dromov TO epi éAeyyou diaddyecOa, 
> \ \ / ‘ ~ c \ ” 
aAAa, 147) TPOTEpov TrEepi avAAoyLopod: 6 yap EAeyxos 
- > Ld \ \ \ ~ 
avaAdoytopes eat, Ware xp7) Kal TEpl avAAoyropod 
, a“ \ ~ +\ / ” \ Ly ~ 
MpoTeEpov 7) Trept yevdods eA€yxou: EoTt yap 6 ToLOD- 
5 tos EXeyyos daivopevos avdAdoyiopos avTipdcews. 
\ ”“ ? ~ ~ 4 ‘ ” a“ > ~ 
d10 7 €v TH avddAoyrow@ Eora 7d aitiov 7 ev TH 
> / lal \ Cal \ > / 
avripdoer (mpookeicbar yap det rHv avridaovw), 
Gis ¥ > > > ~ bal > / ” ” 
ore 5° ev apdoiv, av 7% pawdpevos eAeyyos. €oTt 
\ < A ~ ~ / > lo > / > 
de 6 pev TOO ovyavra Adyew ev TH avTiddoer, odK 
> ~ ~ ¢ / a LT ~ > 
ev TH avrAdoyop@, 6 dé, & 7) Exou Tis, Sodvar, ev 
> a € veh f . Woh , / ~ \ ~ 
10 aupoiv, 6 dé dT 7» ‘Oprjpov moinats oyqua dud TOD 
7 > nn ~ ¢ > > la 
KUKAov ev TH ovdAdoytopd. 6 8 ev pndetépw 
aAnOyns avAdoytopos. 
*AAAa 87) dbev 6 Adyos HAVE, wOTEpoV ot ev Tots 
hs / \ \ / / > a“ ” ‘ 
pabyuact Adyou mpds THY Sudvordy elow 7 Ov; Kal 
” a A / ‘ / \ 
el tut Soke? moAAA onpaivew TO Tpliywvov, Kal 
” \ € ~ A ~ >7> * / . 
15 COWKE [L7) WS TOOTO TO oxTjpa Ep 0b avVETEpaVaTO 
¢ , > , , \ \ , a 
dtu S00 dpbai, métepov mpos THY Sidvotay odros 
/ \ > / n” ” 
duetAekTau THY eKelvov 7 Ov; 
»” > AAG A oo a ¢ de \ Cal 
Ext ef 7r0AAG. ev onpaiver rovvoua, 6 dé p42) voet 
56 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x 


absurd statement that ‘dependent on the name’ 
describes all arguments connected with language. 
The truth is that there are some false arguments 
which do not depend on a particular attitude of 
mind on the part of the answerer towards them but 
are due to the fact that the argument itself involves 
the kind of question which can bear more than one 
meaning. 

It is quite absurd to discuss refutation without (Refutation 
previously discussing proof ; for refutation is a proof, sac! 
and so we ought to discuss proof before discussing 
false refutation ; for such refutation is an apparent 
proof of a contradiction. Therefore the cause of 
falsity will lie either in the proof or in the contra- 
diction (for the contradiction must be added), but 
sometimes in both, if there be a merely apparent 
refutation. In the argument that‘ the silent speaks,’ 
the refutation lies in the contradiction, not in the 
proof ; in the argument that ‘a man can give away 
what he has not got,’ it lies in both; in the argu- 
ment that ‘ Homer’s poetry is a figure’ because it 
forms a ‘ cycle,’ it lies in the proof. The argument 
that errs in neither respect is a true proof. 

But to resume from the point whence the argu- 
ment digressed,* Are mathematical arguments always 
applied to the thought or not? If anyone thinks 
that the term ‘triangle’ has several meanings and 
has granted it in a sense other than a figure which 
he has proved to contain two right angles, has the 
questioner reasoned against the answerer’s thought 
or not? 

Further, if the name has several meanings but the 
answerer does not think or imagine that this is so, 


* 170 b 40. 
57 


ARISTOTLE 
171ia 
End olerar, THs otros od mpos THv Sudvorav Suel- 


r ; 4 7s Set epwrav rAnv Siddvar Srai, 
exTaL; 1 7s det epwrdv wAnv diddvar draipeow, 
t > > 7 1 > ~ / nn A ” 
2elr Epwrnoe' Tis et €oTe ovy@vtTa A€yew 7) Ov, 7 
” \ e Ld ” > ¢ / > la / 
€oTt ev ws ov, eat. 8 ws val; ef dH Tis Soin 
pndapads, 6 dé diadexbein, dp’ od mpos tiv Sudvovav 
PY ir v. / ¢ A / PS) a ~ \ mv 
etAextar; Kaitor 6 Adyos doKet TOV Tapa TOvU- 
> ? »” >? \ / / \ \ 
voua eivar. ovK dpa eati yévos TL AOywv TO mpOos 
\ / > > ¢ \ \ »” / > ‘ 
THhv Sidvovav. GAN ot ev mpds Tovvo"d elo’ Kal 
25 ToLooTOL od TavTES, OVX OTL oF EAeyyor, GAN” Odd’ 
a] / ” + \ \ \ \ A 
ot pawodpevor edeyxou. eiol yap Kal wy Tapa THV 
a , ” e € \ \ 
AeEw aivopevor EAeyxor, olov of mapa TO ovp- 
BeBnkos Kal €repor. 
Ei b€ tes a€vot diaipeiv, dtu A€yw dé ovyavra 
Aéyew Ta pev Wdi Ta 8 di, GAAA TObTE y’ eoTi 
~ A ” \ > ~ > 7 A > Cal 
30 Mp@Tov fev atotov, TO akvobv (eviore yap od doKe? 
\ > / ~ ” > 4 i 
TO €pwtwpevov modAdAaxyds exew, advvatov se 
Suaipetvy 6 py) olerat)* erecta TO SivddoKew Ti GAAO 
” \ \ / ¢ ” oA 49 
€aTat; pavepov yap Toinoe ws exer TH pyr 
hd 
eokeppevw pyT dor. HO drroAapBavovte ote aA- 
/ > \ <2 a \ r a / r la 
Aws r€éyerar. él Kai ev Tots 7 SutrAois Ti KwAVEL 
~ a > ” € , a 4 > 
35 TobTo maleiv; dpa ica at povddes Tais dudow ev 
lal / 7% be a) € \ jot > ~ 
Tois Tértapow; etal dé duddes at pev Wdi evotoat 
¢ \ ¢ / S:. # ~ > / / > , an” 
at dé wd. Kal dpa Tav evaytiwv pla éemornpn 7 
” ” 7s / \ \ \ \ & ” 
ov; €or 8’ evavtia Ta pev yrwora Ta 8 dyvwora. 
1 Reading el7’ épwrjce for eit’ épwricece. 


58 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x 


has not the questioner reasoned against his thought ? ~ 
Or how else must the question be asked except by 
offering a distinction? In which case one will ask, 
“Is it or is it not possible for a man to speak when 
silent, or is the answer in one sense “‘ No,” in another 
“Yes”’?’ But if the answerer were to refuse to 
grant the possibility in any sense and the questioner 
were to argue that it is possible, has he not argued 
against the thought of his opponent? Yet the argu- 
ment is generally regarded as among those connected 
‘with the name; there is not, therefore, any class 
of argument which is directed against the thought. 
Some arguments are directed against the name, and 
such arguments are not all of them even apparent 
refutations, still less true refutations. For there are 
also apparent refutations which are not connected 
with language, for example, amongst others, those 
connected with accident. 

But if one claims to make distinctions, saying, 
‘By “ the silent speaking ” I mean sometimes one 
thing and sometimes another,’ this claim is, in the 
first place, absurd (for sometimes the question does 
not seem to involve any ambiguity, and it is impos- 
sible to make a distinction where no ambiguity is 
suspected) ; and, secondly, what else will didactic 
argument be but this? For it will make clear the 
position to one who neither has considered nor knows 
nor conceives that a second meaning is possible. 
For why should not the same process be used where 
there is no double meaning ? ‘ Are the units in four 
equal to the twos? Bear in mind that the twos are 
contained in one sense in one way and in another 
sense in another way.’ Again, ‘Is the knowledge 
of contraries one or not ? Notice that some contraries 


59 


ARISTOTLE 


” > » > cal ¢ ~ > ~ hd oe ‘ 
17ib WoT €0LKEV GYVOELV O TOUTO aki@v ort ETEPOV TO 
Py Py / ~ 8 A / \ hid tal ‘ \ 
waoKew Tod diadréyecfar, Kal dtu. Set Tov pev 
4 \ > ~ > > >’ \ ~ nw ‘ 
diddoKovTa py epwrdv ard’ adbrov diAa mrovetv, Tov 
8° épwrav. 
XI. "Ere 70 davar 7 amoddvar d&évobv od de- 
/ > / > A a 4 € \ 
Kvuvtos €otiv, adda meipav AapBdvovtos. yap 
5 TeipaoTiKH eat. SiadeKTLKY Tis Kat Dewpet od TOV 
> ~ 
elddta, aAAa Tov ayvoodvta Kal mpocmoovpevov. 
6 pev odv Kata TO mpaypya Dewpdv 7a Kowa Sia- 
Aexrixds, 6 5€ TobTO Pawopevws TroL@v aodioTikés. 
Kal avddoyiopos éepioTiKds Kal coduoTiKds eoTW 
e A ¢ /, / \ e € 
cis ev 6 hawdpevos avddoytopos, mept dv 7 dia- 
10 AekTiKy) TeLpacTiKy earl, KaV GAnbes TO ovpTEpacpa 
}* Tob yap bia Ti amarntiKds éeott* Kal Soot j21) 
wv \ A ¢ / / A 
OvTes KATA THY EKadoTov pEeVodov mapadoyiopol 
doxodow elvar kata THY TéexVNHV. TA yap evdoypa- 
pjpara ovK eproTika (KaTa yap Ta UO THY TEXVNV 
e / > / > ” | ts / 
ot mapadoyiopot), ovd€ y’ el Ti eae yevdoypadnpa 
15 Tept aAnbés, oflov to ‘ImmoKpdtous 7) 6 TEeTpayw- 
\ e A ~ / > > ¢ / 
viapos 0 bia TOV pnvioxwv. GA ws Bptvowv 
/ c 
eretpaywrile Tov KUKAov, «i Kal TeTpaywvilerar Oo 
/ > > Ld ) A A lol A ~ 
KUKAos, GAA’ 6Tt od} KaTa TO TpPaypa, bia TOdTO 
~ / 
codioTiKds. Wate 6 TE TEpi THVdE Pawwdpevos 
‘ 7 
avAdAoy.opos epratiKos Adyos, Kal 6 KaTa TO Tpaypa 





@ On the method of squaring the circle by means of 
lunules and those employed by Hippocrates and Bryson see 
Ivor Thomas, Greek Mathematical Works (Loeb Classical 
Library), vol. I, pp. 234-253, 310-313 (Hippocrates); 314- 
317 (Bryson); and E. Poste, Soph, El. pp. 245 ff. 


60 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x—x1 


are knowable, others are not.’ Thus the man who () Didactic 
makes this claim seems not to know that didactic is pA preg: 
one thing and dialectic another, and that the man ment. 
who employs didactic should not ask questions but 

himself make things clear, while the dialectician 

asks questions. 

XI. Further, to demand that the answerer should (©) heages' 
either affirm or deny is not the function of one who pet 
is displaying something but of one who is making 47gument x 
an examination. For the art of examination is a argument. 
kind of dialectic and has in view not the man who 
knows but the man who is ignorant and pretends 
to know. The man, then, who views general prin- 
ciples in the light of the particular case is a dia- 
lectician, while he who only apparently does this is 
a sophist. Now one form of contentious and sophistic 
reasoning is reasoning which is only apparent, with 
which dialectic deals as a method of examination, 
even though the conclusion be true ; for it is deceptive 
in the matter of cause. Then there are those false 
reasonings which do not accord with the method of 
inquiry peculiar to the subject yet seem to accord 
with the art concerned. For false geometrical figures 
are not contentious (for the resultant fallacies accord 
with the subject-matter of the art), and the same is 
the case with any false figure illustrating something 
which is true, for example, Hippocrates’ figure or the 
squaring of the circle by means of lunules.¢ On the 
other hand, Bryson’s method of squaring the circle, 
even though this be successful, is nevertheless 
sophistical, because it does not accord with the sub- 
ject-matter concerned. And so any merely apparent 
reasoning on these topics is a contentious argument, 
and any reasoning which merely appears to accord 


61 


ARISTOTLE 
171 b 
20 dawwdpevos avddoyiopes, Kav 7 avAdoyiopos, €pt- 
atixos Adyos: hawvopevos yap €oTt KaTA TO TpaypLa 
> 
a 
WoT amaTyTiKOs Kal ddiKos. WoTep yap 7 eV 
> ~ LO / 75 "¢ ” \ ” > / 
dy@vu. aducia eldds Te exer Kal EoTw adiKopayia 
Tis, oUTws ev avtiroyia ddiKopaxia 1 €pioTiK? 
€oTw: ekel TE yap of TdvTwWS ViKaY TpoaLpovpevot 
/ wa A ve Pe / Me 
a \ 
25 TavTWwY amTovTa Kal evTabla ot epioTiKol. ol pev 
obv Ths viKns avTHs xdpw Tovwbro. epiotiKol av- 
Opwroa Kai dir€pides Soxodow elvar, ot S€ d0&ns 
4 a / 
ydpw THs «is xpnpaticuov codiotiKot: 7 yap 
God.oTiKy) €oTW, WoTEp ElmoMEeVv, XpPNMaTLOTLIKH 
Tis amo codias dawopevns, S10 pawopevyns azro- 
30 deiEews edievrar. Kal TOV Adywv TOV adTa@v pév 
elow otf didépides Kal coguoral, add’ od tav adbtayv 
évexev. Kal Adyos 6 abros pev EoTat codioTiKOS 
\ > / 1AN’ > \ >? / > > A 
Kat epiotiKds, add’ od Kata tadrov, add’ FH pev 
/ / > / \ / 
vikns pawopevyns, epiatikds, 7 dé codias, coduc- 
7 5) 
TUKOS* Kal yap 7) God.iaTiKy eats pavowern aodia 
> > > > c ie > / > / A 
35 Tis GAN’ odK otoa. 6 S° EptoTiKds EoTi TWS OUTWS 
éxwv mpos Tov duadAeKTiKOV ws 6 pevdoypados mpos 
>? \ P 
‘ / ~ > “~ ~ ~ 
TOV yewpmeTpiKoV: EK yap TaVv adTav TO SiadeKTiKg 
mapadoyilerar Kal 6 evdoypddos TH yewpmeTpn.” 
GAN’ 6 pev odK eptoTiKds, OTL ex TOV apx@v Kal 
172a ovpTrepacudtwv TOV bro THY Téxvnv yevdoypdader: 
¢ 8° ¢ ‘ \ 5 rv A ‘ \ > bid > 
6 8 bo tiv Siadextixiy rept ev TaAAG Ste ept- 
1 Reading 7@ diadextix with Wallies for dvadexrixs. 
2 Reading 7@ yewpeérpy with Poste for rov yewpérpny. 





9 165 a 22. 
62 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x1 


with the subject-matter, even though it be genuine 
reasoning, is contentious argument; for it only 
apparently accords with the subject-matter and so 

is deceptive and unfair. For just as unfairness in an 

athletic contest takes a definite form and is an unfair 

kind of fighting, so contentious reasoning is an un- 

fair kind of fighting in argument ; for in the former 

ease those who are bent on victory at all costs stick 

at nothing, so too in the latter case do contentious 

arguers. Those, then, who behave like this merely (d) Nange 
to win a victory, are generally regarded as contentious sophistical 
and quarrelsome, while those who do so to win a ®téument. 
reputation which will help them to make money are 
regarded as sophistical. For, as we have said,* the 

art of the sophist is a money-making art which trades 

on apparent wisdom, and so sophists aim at apparent 

proof. Quarrelsome people and sophists use the same 
arguments, but not for the same reasons ; and the 

same argument will be sophistical and contentious 

but not from the same point of view. Ifthe semblance 

of victory is the motive, it is contentious ; if the 
semblance of wisdom, it is sophistical : for sophistry 

is an appearance of wisdom without the reality. The () Further 
contentious arguer bears much the same relation to Lotwehad oe 
the dialectician as the drawer of false geometrical contentions 
figures bears to the geometrician; for he reasons lectical 
falsely on the same basis as the dialectician, while “@™"™°"™* 
the drawer of false figures argues on the same basis 

as the true geometrician. But the latter is not a 
contentious reasoner, because he constructs his false 

figure on the principles and conclusions which come 

under the art of geometry, whereas the former, 
arguing on principles which come under dialectic, 

will clearly be contentious on the other subjects. 


63 


ARISTOTLE 
17248 
/ > OnA te ¢ A ¢ \ 
aTiKos eoTat OfAov. olov 6 TeTpaywriopos 6 jev 
\ ~ / 
dua Gv pnvickwv odk epiotixds, 6 5é Bpdowvos 
> ‘a \ \ A > ” ~ > > 
EploTLKOS* Kal TOV Lev OvK EoTL pETEveyKEiV GAA 
” \ / / \ A >? ~ 07 
87 T™pos yewperpiav povov dia TO ex TeV idlwv 
* > ~ \ \ \ , bid \ 
evar apx@v, tov d€ mpds trodAovs, daot pu7) toace 
A 5 A > ¢ / \ ‘ iO 4 ¢ / 
TO OvvaTov ev exdoTw Kal TO ddvvaTov: apydceL 
/ “ ¢ > ~ >? 7 Bs w \ 
yap. 7 ws “Avripdv éererpaydvilev. 7) et Tus ua) 
/ tr t > \ PS) / A p>) \ \ 
dain BéAriov elvar amd Seirvou mepurareiy Bid Tov 
, / 
Zivwvos Adyov, ov« latpukds: Kowds ydp. et pev 
Ss / ¢ / ¢ 2 \ \ ‘ 
10 ovv mavTn Opowws elyev 6 epioTiKds mpdos TOV Sia- 
A ~ \ 
Aexrixov TH yevdoypddw mpos Tov yewperpyv, od« 
dv iv epi éxeivwv éepiotixds. viv 8 od« oTw 6 
\ \ / ¢ / > \ 
duaAeKtiKos mepl yévos TL wpiopevov, oddé SeuK- 
\ > , 2O\ P e € , ” 
TLKOS OVOEVOS, OVE TOLODTOS Olos 6 KabdAOV. odbTE 
LA > 7 > Late / ” > w / 
dp €oTw arravTa ev evi TwWe yevel, OUTE E« Ein, Oldv 
¥. 
¢ A \ > \ > A A + id > > 
15 TE UTO Tas adtas apxas elvar Ta dvTa. WoT od- 
a ~ \ ’ 
deuia téxvn TOV Sexvvovcdyv twa vow €pwrn- 
” ~ onl / 
TU? €oTW: od yap e€eaTW OToTEpovoby TAY jopiwy 
~ \ \ > / > > a © 
dodvar: avAAoyiopos yap od yiverar e€ apdoiv. 7 
\ \ ? / > > > BI ‘ 
dé duadextixt) Epwrntixy eoTtw. et 8 édeixvuer, 
> \ \ / > \ / ~ ‘ ‘ > / 
el Kal fu) TAaVTA, GAAa Ta ye TPM@TA Kal Tas OiKElas 
> \ Re. PR ea \ 5S 5S , , eee. ee ee 
20 apyas odK av Hpwra. ju7) duddvTos* yap ovK av Et 
> e uv / \ A ” ¢ 
elyev €€ cv éru SiadéLerau mpds tiv evoracw. % 


1 Bekker’s 8:ddvras is a misprint for 8Sdvzos. 





# See Phys. 185 a 17; Ivor Thomas, op. cit. pp. 310-317. 
> That motion is impossible ; see Phys. 239 b 10 ff. 


64 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x1 


For example, the squaring of the circle by means of 
lunules is not contentious, whereas Bryson’s method 
is contentious. It is impossible to transfer the 
former outside the sphere of geometry because it 
is based on principles which are peculiar to geo- 
metry, whereas the latter can be used against many 
disputants, namely, all those who do not know what 
is possible and what impossible in any particular 
case; for it will always be applicable. And the 
same is true of the way in which Antiphon used to 
square the circle.* Or, again, if someone were to 
deny that it is better to take a walk after dinner 
because of Zeno’s argument,? it would not be a 
medical argument ; for it is of a general application. 
Accordingly, if the contentious argument stood in 
every respect in the same relation to the dialectical as 
the constructor of false figures stands to the geo- 
metrician, there would be no contentious argument 
on those topics. But, as it is, dialectical argument 
has no definite sphere, nor does it demonstrate any- 
thing in particular, nor is it of the nature of the 
universal. For there is no genus which includes all 
things, and, if there were, it would not be possible for 
them to come under the same principles. So no art 
which aims at showing the nature of anything pro- 
ceeds by interrogation ; for it is impossible to grant 
either one of two portions of the question ; for a proof 
cannot result from both of them. Dialectic, however, 
does proceed by interrogation, whereas, if it aimed 
at showing something, it would refrain from ques- 
tions, if not about everything, at any rate about 
primary things and particular principles ; for if the 
opponent refused to grant these, dialectic would no 
longer have any basis on which to argue against the 


D . 65 


ARISTOTLE 
172 a 


> > \ \ 
3° avr?) Kal meipaotixy. obd€ yap % TELpacTuKt) 
7 > \ ’ € / > > a bal ” 
TOLAUTH EOTW ola 4 yewpeTpia, GAN’ Hv av Exot 
\ \ > 4 ” \ cal ~ \ 
Kal pun €ldWs Tis. e&eaTe yap metpav AaBety Kal 
\ \ > / A ~ ~ \ > /, ” 
TOV [Ln €lOdTA TO TpPGyya TOD 42) E€lddTOS, «iTEp 
25 Kal Sidwow ovK e& dv oldev odd ex TOV idiwv, 
> 2 3 ~ c / bid ~ fee a > / 
aA’ é€x T&v éropevwv, doa TovabTa éotw a €iddTa 
\ b] \ 4 \ > / \ / \ > la 
fev oddev KwAvEL 7) €ld€vae THY TEXVNV, 1) €lddTA 
> > / > a A ‘ Lid > \ 
5’ avaykn ayvociv. wore davepov dtu ovdevds 
¢€ / € \ > / > / ‘ \ 
Wpiapevov 1 TEelpacTiKy emoTHUn eaTiv. SLO Kal 
a ¢ ~ 
Tepl TavTwY €oTl aca yap at Téyvar yp@vrac 
‘ A / A / \ ©? ~ / 

80 Kal Kowvois TLaiv. 810 TavTeEs Kal ot idL@TaL TpoTrOV 
Twa xp@vrai TH SvaAektiKH Kal meipaoriKh mavTes 
yap mexpt Twos eyxeipotow avakpivew Tods emay- 

/ ~ me \ \ / ~ ‘ 
yeAdopevovs. tatra 8 €ori ra Kowd: TadTa yap 
> \ ” > / “ ~ / ” 
ovdev irrov loacw avroi, Kav dox@ar Aiav ew 
/ > / > A > / ‘ 
déyew. €déyyovow otv amavres: atéxyvws yap 
/ / e 52 / ¢ ae 
35 eTeXovat ToUTOV ov evTéxvws 7) SvadeKTLK €oTL, 
a \ 
Kal 6 Téyvyn avdAdoyoTiKH TeipaoTiKds diaAeKTLKOS. 
> \ Py ees ON i) \ > 2% ‘ > 
eel 5 €ott moAAa pev tavTa’ Kata TdvTwv, ov 
~ > 
roatra 8 wore dvow twa elvar Kal yévos, add’ 
A > 
olov at amopdces, ta 5° od Tovadra adAAd tdia, 
” > 2 \ c , a /, 
€oTw €k TovUTwY Tepl atavTwy Teipav AapPdvew, 


1 Reading radra for radra with BC and omitting «ai with 


66 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x1 


objection. Dialectic is at the same time an art of 
examination ; for neither is the art of examination 
of the same nature as geometry but it is an art which 
a man could possess even without any scientific 
knowledge. For even a man without knowledge 
of the subject can examine another who is without 
knowledge, if the latter makes concessions based 
not on what he knows nor on the special principles 
of the subject but on the consequential facts, which 
are such that, though to know them does not prevent 
him from being ignorant of the art in question, yet 
not to know them necessarily involves ignorance of 
it. Clearly, therefore, the art of examination is not 
knowledge of any definite subject, and it therefore 
follows that it deals with every subject ; for all the 
arts employ also certain common principles. Accord- 
ingly, everyone, including the unscientific, makes 
some kind of use of dialectic and the art of examina- 
tion ; for all, up to a certain point, attempt to test 
those who profess knowledge. Now this is where the 
common principles come in; for they know these of 
themselves just as well as the scientists, even though 
their expression of them seems to be very inaccurate. 
Thus they all practise refutation ; for they perform 
unmethodically the task which dialectic performs 
methodically, and the man who carries out an 
examination by means of an art of reasoning is a 
dialectician. Now there are many identical principles 
in every sphere, but these are not such as to have 
a particular nature and form a particular class— 
resembling, in this respect, negations—while others 
are not of this kind but limited to special spheres ; 
it is, therefore, possible by means of these to hold ex- 
aminations on every subject, and that there can be an 


67 


ARISTOTLE 


\ > / / \ \ , 

172b Kal elvar Téxvynv TWd, Kal pt) ToLvadTyny elvat ola 

at Secxvdovoa. Sidtep 6 epiotiKds odK eoTW 
A A / ¢ ¢ / b] \ ” 
ovTwWS Exwv TaVTH WS O Pevdoypddos: od yap EaTaL 
mapadoyiatiKos €€ wpiapevov Twos yevous apyOv, 
aAAa Tepi av yévos ~orar 6 épiotikds. 
/ \ > ee | 28 ~ ~ 2*\/ 

5 Tpdzro: pev ody eiaiv otro Ta codiotiKGv edéy- 
xwv: ore 8° earl tod diadextixob To Oewphoar trepl 
TovTwy Kai ddvacba. Tatra trovetv, od yaAemov 
> cal ¢ A \ \ / / 7 
ideiv: 4) yap mepl Tas mpotdces pébodos dmacav 

\ 
exe Tavtnv TV Oewpiav. 
XII. Kai epi pev rdv edéyywv elpnrar tov 
/ \ \ ~ / vs a \ 
10 pawvopevwr: trept dé Tod pevddpevov te Setar Kat 
\ / > yw > a ~ \ / 
tov Adyov eis ado€ov ayayeiv (rodto yap tv Sev- 
a loud ~ \ 
TEpov THs Gop.ioTiKhs mpoaipécews) Tp@Tov jev odv 
~ ~ > 
ex Tod TuvOdvecbai mws Kal dua THS epwrhcews 
ovpPaiver udAvora. TO yap mpos pndev dpicavra 
Keipevov epwrdv Onpevtixov eat ToUTwY: EiKh yap 
/ ¢ / ~ ca \ / 
15 A€yovtes apaprdvovot paAdov: eikn d€ A€yovow, 
orav pundev Exwor mpokeiwevov. TO TE €pwTav 
/ bal ¢€ / Dg \ “ / A A 
TOAAd, Kav wptopevov 7} mpos 6 diadéyerar, Kal TO 
7a Soxobvra Aéyew akvodv move? Tw" edtopiavy Tod 
> a > A ha! ~ 7 >? / 
els adofov ayayeiv 7 yeddos: edv Te epwrdpevos 
~ onl > / 
$f 7) atoph TovTwv TL, dyew mpos a emuyerpypwaros 
a lan a \ 
20 <dmropet. Suvarov dé viv Arrov Kakoupyeiv dia 
~ ~ ‘ 
TOUTWV 7) TpPOTEpoV amraLTOoVTaL ‘yap TL TOOTO TpOs 
taal A ~ a“ A / 

TO €v apxXf. oaTotxeiov dé Tod Tuyeiv 7 yWevdous 
\ ” 15 , \ § / 30 \ > = @ / 
Twos 7) addfov TO pndeniav edOds epwradv Oéow, 

68 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x1-x11 


art of doing this, though not of the same kind as the 
demonstrative arts. For this reason the contentious 
arguer is not in all respects in the same position as 
the constructor of a false geometrical figure ; for the 
contentious arguer will not reason falsely on principles 
of a definite class but will deal with every kind. 

These, then, are the modes of sophistical refuta- 
tions. It is easy to see that to investigate them and 
to be able to apply them is the task of the dialectician ; 
for the method of dealing with propositions constitutes 
the whole of this study. 

XII. We have now dealt with apparent refutations. (B) Fat- 
As for showing that the answerer is stating a fallacy O) Pinie 
and leading the argument towards a paradox—for }? saan Oh 
this was the second aim of the sophist—this is, in the are to be 
first place, best achieved by some kind of inquiry °°?! 
and by questioning. For to ask a question without (a) By ask- 
defining it in relation to a subject laid down is a good ectena: 
method of hunting out things of this sort ; for people 
are more likely to fall into error when they speak at 
random, and they speak at random when they have no 
definite subject set before them. Also to ask a number (6) By ask- 
of questions, even though the point against which one (ig ques” 
is arguing is defined, and to demand that the answerer tions. 
should say what he thinks, gives ample opportunity 
of leading a man into a paradox or fallacy, and also, 
if, when asked, he says ‘ yes’ or ‘ no’ to any of the 
questions, of leading him to topics on which one has 
abundant material for attacking him. This unfair 
method, however, is much less practicable than 
formerly ; for people demand, *‘ What has this to do 
with the original question?’ An elementary rule 
for obtaining a fallacious or paradoxical statement 
is not to put any thesis directly but to pretend that 


69 


ARISTOTLE 
172b 
> A ~ a 
aAAd jerken <purrary pabety BovAdmevov: ywpav 
yap errixerpijpiatos % oKéyus Trove. 

25 Naas d€ TO eubopevoy deiEat tdLos TOTOS O ae 
OTLKOS, TO dyew mpos ToLladra mpos a evmopet 
Aoywv: gota 8€ Kal Kadds Kai pi) KaADas TobTOo 
tovetv, Kabdmep €AéxOn mpdTEpov. 

IldAw mpos 70 mapddo€a Aéyew oxorreiv ex Tivos 

30 yevous 6 diadeyopevos, elt’ emepwtav 6 Tois moA- 
Aois odrou A€yovow wapddo€ov: €or yap éxdorots 
Tt ToLobTov. aToLyeiov S€ ToUTWY TO Tas EKAOTWY 

> / / > lal 4 7, A ‘ 
etAndevar Oécers €v Tais mpoTdceow. Avows dé Kal 

/ ¢ 7 / \ > / hid 
ToUTwY 7) mMpoorjKovoa péperar TO eudhavilew drt 

> \ \ /, / , ee A; \ ~ 
od dia Tov Adyov ovpBaiver TO ado€ov- aet 5€ TobTo 

\ 7 ee / 

35 Kal BovAetar 6 aywrildopevos. 

"Ett 8° ex t&v BovdAjoewv Kal tav davepav 
d0€dv. od} yap tatra Bovdrovrai te Kal daciv, 
> A / A \ > / ~ / 
adda A€yovar ev Tods edaxnpoveatdtouvs TaYV Ad- 
ywv, Bovrovra 5é€ Ta atvdueva Avowredciv, olfov 

~ ~ Lond val ‘ 
173a TEOvavar KaA@s paAdAov 7) Civ 7déws haci Seiv Kai 

/ / lod ” a > ~ 4 
méveoOat dixaiws waAdov 7 rAovuTEiv aiayp@s, Bov- 
Aovrat d€ Tavavtia. Tov pev odv A€yovTa Kara Tas 

/ > \ \ Py / > / A PS) \ 
BovdAnaeis «is tas Pavepas dd€as axréov, Tov Se 
/ 
Kata, TavTas €is Tas GmoKEeKpuppEvas’ apupoTépws 
a \ ‘ \ 

5 yap dvaykaiov mapddoka Aéyew: 7) yap mpos Tas 

davepas 7) mpos Tas adaveis Sd€as épotow evavria. 





® Topics 111 b 32 ff. 
70 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x11 


one is asking from a desire to learn ; for this method 
of inquiry gives an opening for attack. 

A special method of showing up a fallacy is the 2 Px 
sophistical method, namely, to lead one’s opponent peinelernihg 
to the kind of statements against which one has ‘make | 
plenty of arguments ; it will be possible to do this in which can 
a right and in a wrong way, as has already been said. P&casilY 

Again, to elicit a paradox, you should see to what (@) By 
school the person who is discussing with you belongs, restoring 
and then question him on some pronouncement of ee 
that school which most people regard as paradoxical ; Pal school t 

peop $4 sp 3 tal school to 
for every school has some tenet of this kind. An punhe 
elementary rule in this connexion is to have a ready- his views in 
made collection of the theses of the different schools ®°"°™" 
among your propositions. The proper solution here 
too is to make it clear that the paradox does not 
result because of the argument ; now your opponent 
always desires that this should be so. 

Furthermore, you should seek for paradoxes in 
men’s wishes and professed opinions. For they do. 
not wish the same things as they declare that they 
wish, but they give utterance to the most becoming 
sentiments, whereas they desire what they think is 
to their interest. They declare, for example, that a 
noble death ought to be preferred to a pleasurable 
life and honourable poverty to discreditable wealth ; 
but their wishes are the opposite of their words. He, 
therefore, whose statements agree with his wishes 
must be led to express the opinions usually professed, 
and he whose statements agree with the latter must 
be led to state the opinions usually hidden ; for in 
both cases they must necessarily fall into paradox, 
for they will contradict either their professed or their 


secret opinions. 
71 


ARISTOTLE 
173 a 
IlAcioros de TOmT0s €oTl Tob 7rovety mapddota 
Aéyew, WoTEep Kal 6 KadducAfs € ev TO Popyia yé- 
ypartat Aéywv, Kat ot dpxatou de mavres @ovro 
10 ovpBaive, Tapa TO KATA poow Kal KATO Tov 
vomov: evavtia yap elvau pvow Kal Vo_oV, Kad THYV 
Suxcauoodyny KATA VOLOV pev elvat KaAov Kara pu- 
ow 8 od Kaddov. deiv obv ™pos pev TOV <imovra 
KaTa puow Kara vopov amavTadv, mpos dé Tov Kara 
vomov emi Thy pdow a diyew: dpporépwrs yap éorat 
15 Aéyew mapddo€a. jv d€ TO pev Kata dvow 
adtois TO dAnbés, TO Sé Kata Vopuov TO Tois moAAots 
doxobv. ware dfAov dtu KdKelvor, Kabdmep Kal of 
viv, 7 €AéyEar 7 mapddoga A€éyew Tov amoKpwd- 
Levov emrexelpouv Totety. 
“Evia. de Tav <pernudray exet dporépws ddofov 
20 elvar TY amoxkptoww, olov mOTEpOV Tots aodots 7 7” TO 
mrarpt de? mreiBeoBat, Kal Ta ovppepovra T™parrew 
"Ta dikava, Kal adixetobar aiperarepov 7 7 BAdarrew. 
det 8 diyew eis Ta Tos 7oMois Kal Tots aodgots 
evayria, €av ev Aeyn Tus ws ot mrepl Tovs Adyous, 
25 «ls Ta Tots 7oAAots, eav 8 Os ot moMob, emt Ta 
tois ev Adyw. acl yap of pwev e& avdyKns TOV 
evoaijova Béikavov elvau: Tots de 7roMois ddofov TO 
Baowréa pur) eddaipoveiv. €ort S€ Td els TA OdTWS 
ddofa ovvdiyew TO avTO TH els THY KaTa puow Kat 
KaTa vopov drrevavTi@ow ayew* 6 ev yap vopos 
30 dd£a TOV TOAAAY, ot S€ Godot Kara dvow Kal Kar’ 
adjbevay Aéyovow. 


1 Reading éora: for elvat. 


* Plato, Gorgias 482 x. 





72 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xu 


A commonplace rule which makes men utter para- 
doxes in abundance is the application of the standards 
of nature and law, which Callicles is represented as 
applying in the Gorgias * and which all the ancients 
regarded as valid ; for according to them Nature and 
Law are opposites, and justice is a good thing accord- 
ing to law but not according to nature. Therefore, 
to a man who speaks in terms of nature you must 
reply in terms of law, and when he speaks in terms 
of law you must lead the argument to terms of nature ; 
for in both cases the result will be that he utters 
paradoxes. In the view of the ancients what accorded 
with nature was the truth, while what accorded with 
law was the general opinion of mankind. It is, there- 
fore, clear that they also, like the men of to-day, tried 
to refute the answerer or to make him utter paradoxes. 

Some questions involve a paradox whichever way_{¢) By ask- 

they are answered; for example, ‘Ought one to tans. the 
obey the wise or one’s father?’ and, ‘ Ought one Suswers to. 
to do what is expedient or what is just?’ and ‘ Is be para- 
it preferable to suffer or to inflict a wrong?’ You °°! 
ought to lead men to opinions opposed to those of 
the majority and of the wise—if a man speaks as 
trained arguers do, you should lead him to opinions 
opposed to the majority; if he speaks as do the 
majority, to opinions opposed to expert reasoners. 
For some say that the happy man is necessarily just, 
but in the view of the majority it is paradoxical that a 
king should not be happy. To lead a man to paradoxes 
of this kind is the same thing as to bring him into 
opposition to the standards of nature and law ; for 
law is the opinion of the majority, but the utterances 
of the wise accord with the standards of nature and 
truth. 


73 


ARISTOTLE 
173 a 
A \ A ~ 
XIII. Kai ra pev rapddo€a ex todrwv Set Cyreiv 
TOV TOnwv: Trepi 5€ Tob Tovhoa adorecyeiv, 6 ev 
/ \ > A > / »” . 4 A 
Aéyopev TO ddodrcoyxelv, cipjKkapev Ady. mares dé 
c / / ~ 4 ~ > A 
ot Tovoide Adyou TobTo BovAovrar Trovetv: ef pndéev 
/ A wv ” \ /, > ~ /, 
35 Ovadeper TO dvoua 7 Tov Adyov eEizeiv, SimAdcLOV 
\ \ / ¢ / > / >. wt. > ‘ € / 
dé Kai dimAdovov jyiocos tabTd, i dpa éorlv Hyl- 
4 ” i? , ¢€ / / 
aeos SurAdovov, e€otar Huioeos Hytocos SimAdovov. 
‘ / ” > \ ~ ad / e /, 
Kal mdAw av avtt Tob dimAdovov SimAdovov iceos 
T€09, Tpis EaTaL elpnuevov, uiceos HicEeos HyLiceos 
SurAdovov. Kai dpa eorw 7 emOupia 4S€os; Tobdro 
eae \ 4 € / ” + e > / ” 
40 5° €oriv dpetis Hd€os* EoTw dpa 7H emibvpuia Speers 
7d5€0s 7dé€os. 
173b Eloi d€ mavres of tovodtor TOV Adywv &v TE Tots 
/ CG \ ; ‘ / > ‘ ‘ rae | , 
Mpos TL, OTA fy Lovov Ta yevn GAA Kal adra mpds 
/ ‘ \ \ ? \ Va > / 
tu Aéyerar, Kal mpds TO abTO Kal Ev amrodidorax (olov 
hid + \ ” \ e > , \ > 
7 TE Opeis Tivos GpeEts Kal 7 emOvpia Twos em- 
/ ‘ ‘ 7, A / A 
5 Oupia, Kat To dumAdovov twos SimAdovov Kal S.- 
mAdovov Apiceos)' Kal dowv % odcia odK dOvTwV 
/, Lid e » Pw. 7” ” / ” ~ 
mpos TL dAws, dv eiaiv e€eis 7) 7aOy 7} Te TOLodTov, 
év TO Adyw abtdv mpoodsynAobrar Katrnyopoupevwv 
emi TovTos. olov TO mepitrov apiOuos péaov Exwv: 
” > > \ / ” »” > \ / 
€or. 8° apiOuos mepittds: Eotw dpa apiOuos wécov 
10 €xwv apiOuds. Kai ef 7d oysdv Kowddrns pds 
> ” \ e\ / ” a ey e\ / 
€or, EoTt O€ pis oysy, EoTwW apa pis pls KoiAn. 
Daivovrar dé rroveiv od Tovobvres eviore Sua 76 ju) 
, > / > ¢ ~ 5 A 
mpoomuvOdveobar «i onwaiver te Kal?’ add AexOev 





* 165 b 16. 
74 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xm 


XIII. It is, then, by these commonplace rules that (D) Bas- 
you should seek to obtain paradoxes. Next, as to Sean ohis 
making people babble, we have already said what ¢am be. 
we mean by this term.* Arguments of the following 
kind all have this end in view; ‘If it makes no 
difference whether one uses the term or the definition 
of it, and ‘‘ double”’ and “ double of half” are the same 
thing, then if ‘‘ double ” is “‘ double of half,” it will be 
** double of half of half’ ; and if ‘“‘ double of half” be 
substituted again for ‘‘ double,” there will be a triple 
repetition, ‘‘ double of half of half of half.” ’ Again, 

* Is not “‘ desire” ‘‘ desire of pleasure?” Now “desire _ 
is an appetite for pleasure ’’: therefore “ desire is an 
appetite for pleasure of pleasure.” ’ 

All arguments of this kind take place (a) when 

relative terms are used, where not only the genera 
but the terms themselves are relative and are ren- 
dered in relation to one and the same thing (for 
example, appetite is appetite for something, and 
desire is desire of something, and double is double 
of something, namely, double of half), and (b) where 
terms are used of which, though they are not relative 
at all, the substance (namely, the things of which they 
are states or affections or the like) is indicated in their 
definition, since they are predicated of these things. 
For example, ‘ odd’ is a ‘number which has a middle 
unit,’ and an ‘ odd number’ exists, therefore an ‘ odd 
number ’ is ‘ number-that-has-a middle-unit number,’ 
Again, if ‘snubness’ is ‘ concavity of the nose,’ and 
there is a ‘ snub nose,’ then a ‘snub nose’ is a ‘ con- 
cave-nose nose.’ 

Men sometimes appear to induce ‘ babbling ’ when 
they do not really do so, because they do not further 
inquire whether ‘ double’ used by itself has a signifi- 


75 


ARISTOTLE 
173 b 

A 8 Xr la a“ i>) < ‘ ” / , 

TO OimAdovov 7 oddev, Kal Et TL ONMalvEL, TOTEPOV 

\ > \ “ LA P > \ \ / / 

1570 avTo 4 ETEpov, adAa 7O ovpTrépacpa Aéyew 

> , > A / A ‘ ‘ + > 4 
edOvs. adda paivetat dia TO TO Gvopa TadTO elvat 
TavTO Kal onuaivew. 

XIV. Lodorxiopos 8” ofov pwév eorw eipnrar mpo- 
Tepov. eat. d€ TobTO Kal Trovely Kal p47) TOLOdVTA 
daivecbar Kai movotvtTa pn Soxeiv, Kabdmep Oo 

, ” > ¢ ~ \ ig / ” 

20 IIpwraydpas eAeyev, ef 6 fis Kal 6 mHAnE appev 
> / ¢ \ \ / ) / r / A 
eoTiv' 6 pev yap Aéywv ovAopéevnv aodouxiler pev 

he | a > / A a + ¢ \ .) , 
Kat’ exeivov, od haivetat 5€ Tots aAAos, 6 d€ odAO- 
pevov haiverar ev add’ od aodoixiler. dfAov odv 
OTe Kav TéxVN TiS TOOTO SUvatTO TroLEtv: 5d TOAAOL 

~ / > / Xr ‘ f 
TaV Adywr od avdrdAoyiCopevor GoroiKtapov daivov- 

25 rar avddoyilecbar, Kabdmep ev tots éAéyxors. 

* *A \ / A € / A 

Kiot 5€ mavres oxeddov of hawwopmevor coAortkiopol 
Tapa TO TOE, Kal OTAV 7) TTMois PATE appev pre 
Orv dndot adda TO peta€d. TO pev obTOS appev 

, \ > a” ~ \ \ ~ /r \ A 
onpaiver, TO 8’ avrn OAu- To 5é TobTo BéAer ev TO 

30 pweTraéd onpuaivew, ToAAdKis 5€ onwaiver KaKeivwv 

~ Ul 

exdatepov, olov ti TobTo; Kadddrn, EvAov, Kopi- 

okos. Tod pev odv appevos Kal Tod AyAcos Sdia- 
“~ ¢ 

p€epovow at mrwoes atracar, TOO dé pretakd at pev 

at 8° ot. Sd00évtos 81 moAAdKis Todt, avAdoyi- 
e > / ~ if / de ‘ ” 

Covrar ws eipnwéevov Tobrov: dpuoiws d5é Kai adAny 
~ > > »” ¢ de aA ‘ / 

35 mT@ow avr aAAns. 6 S€ mapadoyiopos yiverat 
dua TO Kowov elvar TO TOdTO TAELOVWY TTWOEWV" 





@ 165 b 20. > Because it is in fact feminine. 


76 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x11-x1v 


cation or no, and, if it has, whether the same or a 
different one, but they appear to draw the conclusion 
immediately. It appears, however, to have the same 
signification also because the word is the same. 

XIV. What solecism is has already been stated.% (E) Somn- 
It is possible to commit it, and not to commit it, How this 
yet to seem to do so, as well as to commit it, yet cat be, 
seem not to do so. If, as Protagoras used to say, r 
paves (wrath) and wjAné (helmet) are masculine, 
according to him, he who calls wrath a ‘ destruc- 
tress’ (otAopévnv) commits a solecism, though he 
does not appear to anyone else to do so,’ but he 
who calls it a ‘ destructor’ (otAdyevov) appears to 
commit a solecism but does not do so. It is obvious, 
therefore, that one might produce this effect by art 
also; therefore many arguments appear to infer a 
solecism, when they do not really do so, as happens 
also with refutations. 

Almost all apparent solecisms occur owing to the 
word ‘this’ or ‘it’ (réde) and when the inflection 
denotes neither the masculine nor the feminine but 
the neuter. ‘He’ (ofros) denotes a masculine, ‘she’ 
(uitn) a feminine, whereas ‘this’ or ‘it’ (rot7o), 
though meaning to signify a neuter, often signifies 
either a masculine or a feminine. For example, 
“What is this (rotro)?’ ‘It is Calliope,’ or ‘ It is 
a log’ or ‘It is Coriscus.” The case-forms of the 
masculine and feminine are all different, but some 
of those of the neuter are different and others not. 
Often, therefore, when ‘ it’ (rotro) has been granted, 
people argue as if ‘ him ’ (rovrov) had been used, and 
they similarly use another case in place of some 
other. The false reasoning arises because ‘it ’ (rovro) 
is common to more than one case ; for it signifies 


77 


ARISTOTLE 
173 b 
\ \ ~ Ud e-. 4 A Ly € 5% \ ~ 
TO yap ToOTO onpaiver OTE ev ODTOS OTE SE TODTOV. 
a ~ ‘ 
det 6° evadAa€ onpaive, peta prev ToD EoTt TO 
~ 7 ” 
obtos, peta S€ Tod elvac TO TobTov, olov €oTt 
Kopioxos, elvat Kopicxov. Kai émi tav Ond€wv 
40 dbvouaTwv woatTws, Kal emi TOY Aeyopevwy pev 
~ > / \ / Wie, ~ Ld 
174a oKevav exdvtwv 5é OndAcias 7} appevos KAfjow. doa 
~ ~ / 
yap «is TO 0 Kal TO v TeAcUTG, TabTa pdva GkKEvVOUS 
” ~ e 7 / \ A \ 7 
exer KAjow, olov EvAov, axowiov, Ta 5é fu7) OVTWS 
” ” , eo , > 4 ‘ y 
appevos 7) OjAcos, dv Evia hepopev emi Ta oKevn, 
e > \ \ ” ” , A a 
5olov aokos pev appev Tovvowa, KAiyn dé OAAv. 
dudmep Kal el TOv TowovTwv WoatTws TO EOTL Kal 
To elvat dtolcer. Kal Tpdmov Twa Spmoids E€oTW 6 
A c / 
coAotKiap.os Tots Tapa TO Ta [7 Spota Opolws 
ee “~ 
Aeyopevois eAéyxous. WoTep yap eKeivous Em TOV 
~ / 
TMpaypaTwv, TovUToOLs el THV OvowaTwY ovpTITTEL 
sodoikilew: avOpwros yap Kal AevKov Kal mpaypa 
Kal Ovoud eoTW. 
\ > Ld \ A /, > 
10 Wavepov obv Sti Tov codAoiKLopoV TELpaTeoV EK 
Tov cipnuevwy mracewv avdAdoyilecbar. 
Eid pev odv tatra TOV adywviotik@v Adywv Kal 
pepyn T&v €id@v Kal Tpdrror of eipnuevor. Svadeper 
a 4 > 
5’ od puxpov, éav tax0 mws Ta TEepl THY Epwrnow 
15 77pos TO AavOdvew, wWomep ev Tots SdiadeKTiKOIs. 
> a A ~ ~ / 
efets odv Tots cipnucvors Tadra mp@tov Aexréov. 
A ~ 
XV. "Eori 57) mpos TO eAéyxew Ev pev pAKos: 





4 i.e. the fallacy from the figure of speech (figura dictionis). 
78 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x1v-xv 


sometimes ‘he’ (ofros) and sometimes ‘him’ 
(rotrov). It ought to signify them alternately ; with 
the indicative ‘is’ (eore) it ought to signify the 
nominative “he’ (ofros); with the infinitive ‘to be’ 
(<vae) it ought to signify ‘ him ’ (rodrov), for example, 
“It is Coriseus,’ ‘ [I believe] it to be Coriscus.’ So 
likewise with feminine nouns and with so-called 
articles of use, which can have either a masculine 
or a feminine designation ; for only those which end 
in -ov have the designation which belongs to an 
article of use, e.g., &vAov (log), exouviov (rope). Those 
which do not take this form have a masculine or a 
feminine termination, and some of these we apply 
to articles of use ; for example, duxds (wine-skin) is 
masculine and «Aivy (bed) is feminine. Therefore, in 
such cases there will be the same difference when 
the indicative ‘is’ (é€or-) is used and the infinitive 
“to be’ (eivar). Also, in a way, solecism resembles 
the kind of refutation which is due to the use of 
similar terms for dissimilar things ¢ ; for as in the one 
case it happens that we commit a solecism in the 
category of actual things, so in the other we commit 
it in that of names ; for ‘ man’ and ‘ white ’ are both 
names and things. 

Clearly, then, we must try and argue up to a sole- 
cism on the basis of the above-mentioned case-forms. 

These are the branches of competitive arguments 
and their sub-divisions, and the above are the methods 
of employing them. Now it makes no small difference 
whether the accompaniments of the question are 
arranged in a certain way with a view to concealment, 
as in dialectics. Therefore, as a sequel to what has 
been said above, we must first treat of this subject. 

XV. To effect a refutation one expedient is length ; How to ask 


79 


174a 


ARISTOTLE 


xaderov yap dua moAAa cuvopav. els 5é 76 phos 


Tots TpoELpn|Levous aTotyelous xpnoréov. év de 


, € , A e aA ” > 
20 TAaXOS* vorepilovres yap YTTOV TT POOpWotv. ETL ) 


2 


30 


or 


> \ \ / / \ , 
opyn Kat didoverkia: traparropevor yap hrrov 8v- 
vavrar puddrrecbar mdvres. otorxeia dé ris dpyis 
/ \ e A ~ / > ~~ 
To Te davepov éavrov troveiv BovAdpevov aduKetv 
\ \ 4 > a ” \ > A \ 
Kal TO Tapamay avatoyuvTeiv. €Tt TO evadAak Ta 
> / / 27 \ > \ / 
epwrnuatra TUWévar, édv te pos TadbTO mAElous TLS 
” /, 27 \ LA Ad A Ld > 
éxn Adyous, édv te Kal Ste obrws Kal dre ody 
WA 4 \ / a“ A / a” \ 
ouTws* aya yap oupBaiver 7 mpos mAclw % mpos 
> / cal \ / id A 4 
TavavTia mrovetoban tiv dvdakynv. oAws d€ TavTa 
A \ \ 7 / / , 
Ta Tpos tHv Kpvyv AexOévta mpdTEpov ypHowwa 
, 
Kal TpOos TOs aywrioTiKOds AOyous: 7) yap Kpvius 
> \ ~ a / \ \ ~ ~ > / 
eott Tob Aabeiv xdpw, 7d dé Aabeiv THs amarys. 
IIpos 5€ tovds dvavevovtas dtr adv oinbdow 
> \ \ / > > / > 4, 
clvat mpos tov Adyov, e€ amoddcews epwrnréov, 
¢ b} / / ” \ > wv ~ 
ws tobvavriov BovAdpuevov, 7) Kal && taov mowdvra 
\ > 4 > / \ + lol , ¢ 
THhv EepwTnow: adjdrov yap dvTos Tod Ti BovAeTat 
Fe a , ¢ ae A 
AaBetv Arrov dvoxodaivovow. drav 7 émt tev 


A an > > / A 
Hep@v 886 tis TO Kal? Exaorov, emdyovra TO 


35 Kabdrov TroAAdKis odK epwrntéov, GAN ws Sedo- 


\ \ 
pévw xpnoréov eviore yap olovrar Kat adrol Se- 


/ ‘ a > / / 4 \ ~ 
dwKévar Kal Tots axovovar paivovta dia THY Tis 





* Topics viii. 1. 
80 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xv 


for it is difficult to keep many things in view simul- questions 
taneously. To produce length the above-mentioned Cl) Be ees 
elementary rules must be employed. One resource Hxity and 
is speed ; for when people lag behind they see less pes 
far ahead. Further, there are anger and contentious- 

ness ; for when people are agitated they are always 

less capable of being on their guard. Elementary 

rules for rousing anger are to make it plain that one 

wishes to act unfairly and to behave in an altogether 
shameless manner. Another device is to put one’s (2) By | 
questions alternately, whether one has several argu- pei acy . 
ments leading up to the same point or whether one 

has arguments proving both that this is so and that 

this is not so; for the result is that the answerer is 

on his guard at the same time against either several 

or contrary attacks. In a word, all the resources for 
concealment mentioned before “ are also useful against 
competitive arguments ; for concealment is for the 
purpose of escaping detection, and escape from 
detection is for the purpose of deception. 

When dealing with those who refuse to consent to (3) By in- 
anything which they think is in favour of your ferosetion 
argument, you must put your question in a negative negation. 
form, as though you wanted the opposite of what you 
really want, or, at any rate, as if you were asking 
your question with indifference ; for people are less 
troublesome when it is not clear what one wants to 
secure. Often, when in dealing with particulars a (4) By as- 
man grants the individual case, you ought not, in {rug that 
the process of induction, to make the universal the sal co 
subject of your question but assume that it is granted 7" 
and use it accordingly ; for sometimes people think | 
that they have themselves granted it and appear 
to their hearers to have done so, because they recall 


81 


ARISTOTLE 
174 a 
> ~ / ¢ > ” > / / 
eTaywyhs pvelav, ws odK av pwrnueva parnv. 
> e A Les / \ O6X > ‘A 
ev ols TE 2) OVvOmaTL Onpalverat TO KaBdAOV, GAAG 
TH OmoLoTnTL xpnotéov mpos TO aupdépov: AavOdver 
\ € ec , / /, A ~ 4 
40 yap 7) opowdryns moAAdKis. mpds Te TO AaBeiv THv 
174b mpoTacw Tovvavtiov TapaBddAovta xpi) muvOdve- 
aba. ofov ei déou AaBetv ore Set wavTa TH warpl 

/ / Aa a / cal 
mreWcobar, méTepov dmavra Set meiDecba Tots yo- 

~ ” 4 > > ~ A \ , / 
vedow 7 mavt ameletv; Kai to moAAdKis moAAd, 

/ \ / A AS 7, a / 
mOTEpov TOAAG avyxwpytéov 7 dAliya; paddov yap, 
” > / / vn 4 

5 etmep avaykn, dofevev av elvar moAAd: mapatibe- 
pévwv yap eyyds T&v evavtiwv, Kat peilw Kal 
1A. / A / \ Xr / al > 0 tA 
peydAa daiverar Kal xeipw Kai BeATiw Tots avOpw- 
Tous. . + 

Udddpa S€ Kai woAAaxKis Trove? SoKeiv eAnAeyyOat 

TO pddvora codioTiKov avKoddvTnua TOV epwrwy- 
10 rwv, TO uNdev avAdoyicapevous fut) EpwTna Trovety 
TO TeXevTatov, aAAd ocupmepavTiK@s eimeiv, ws 
/ > ~ A \ /, 
avAdcAoyitopévous, 00K Apa TO Kal TO. 

Lodguorixov d€ Kal TO KeEeysevov mapaddgov Td 
pawopevov a€todv amoxpiveobar mpoKeysevov Tod 
Soxobvros e& dpxfs, Kal tiv epwrnow Tov ToLov- 

15 Twv ovTw Tovetoba, méTEpdv cou SoKet; avayKn 

, ” - 0 a aay > * £ AA , * 
ydp, av 7 TO epwrnua e€ dv 6 avadAdoyiopds, 7) 
” “ 4 / / \ ” 
éreyxov 7 Tmapddokor yivecbar, Sdvros jev Edeyyxov, 





* Cf. Topics 156 b 10 ff. 
82 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xv 


the process of induction and think that the question 

would not have been asked without some object. 

Where there is no term to signify the universal, you 

should nevertheless use the resemblance of the 
particulars ¢ for your advantage ; for the resemblance 

often passes unnoticed. Also, in order to secure your (5) By 
premiss, you should contrast it with its contrary in et eo 
your question. For example, if you want to secure Position is 
the premiss that one ought to obey one’s father in through 
all things, you should ask whether one should obey pop ens 
one’s parents in all things or disobey them in all contrary. 
things. If you want to establish that the multiplica- 

tion of a number many times over results in a large 
number, you should ask whether it should be con- 

ceded that it is a large or that it is a small number ; 

for, if pressed, one would rather that it should seem 

to be large. For the juxtaposition of contraries 
increases the quantity and quality of things, both 
relatively and absolutely, in the eyes of men. 

Often the most sophistical of all frauds practised (6) By 
by questioners produces a striking appearance of Ss 
refutation, when, though they have proved nothing, fora 
they do not put the final proposition in the form of : , 
a question but state conclusively, as though they had 
proved it, that ‘ such and such a thing, then, is not 
the case.’ 

Another sophistical trick is, when the thesis is a (7) By 
paradox, to demand, when the generally accepted Latin Epo 
view is originally proposed, that the answerer should ie ee 
reply what he thinks about it, and to put one’s dilemma, 
question in some such form as ‘ Is that your opinion ? ’ . 
For, if the question is one of the premisses of the 
argument, either a refutation or a paradox must 
result. If he grants the premiss, there will be a 


83 


ARISTOTLE 
174b ; 
a A 
pt) Sdvtos Sé pndé Soxeiv ddoxovros adokov, p17) 
/ \ a > ¢ “A > /, 
ddévtos 5é€ Soxeiv 8’ dpodoyobvros edeyxoedes. 
"Erte kabdamep Kai év tots pyntopixois, Kal ev Tots 
20 €AeyKTiKots Opoiws Ta evavTubpata Dewpynréov 7 
A A C42 te ~ A /, ”“ A “A i r Cal 
mpos Ta dp’ EavTod Aeyopeva, 7 Tpos os dpodoye? 
KaAds A€yew 7 mpatrew, Ett mpos Tods SoKodvTas 
ToLOUTOUS 7) TpPOS TOs dfolovs 7 mpdos Tovs TAéi- 
OTOUS 7) TpPOs TaVTAS. WOTTEP TE Kal ATrOKpLVd[LEVOL 
/ Lu > 4 ~ / ba 
moAAdKis, Otav €d€yywvtTat, tovodo. Sitrdv, av 
25 weAAn ovpBaivew éreyyOrjcccbar, Kal epwradvras 
xpynotéov Tote TovTw mpos Tovs evioTapevous, av 
e ‘ \ , eg \ 7 Lid Ad w” 
wWdi pev avpBaivn wot dSé pj, dTt oVTwWS €lAnder, 
olov 6 KAcofdv moved ev TH MavdpoBovrAw. Set de 
\ > / “A / ‘ \ ~ > 
Kal adiotapevous Tod Adyou Ta Aowra THV emyxeEL- 
pnydtrwv emireuvew, Kal TOV amToKpLVopeEVvov, av 
30 mpoaobdvnTar, mpoevioracbar Kal mpoayopevew. 
> / > > 7 \ \ + ~ > / 
emixeipytéov 8 é€viote Kal mpos dAAa Tob eipynpe- 
vou, exeivo exAaBdvras, éav p47) 7pds TO KEipevor 
én Tis emuyepeiv: dep 6 AuKddpwv erroinae mpo- 
r 6 / Xr / > 4 \ P5) \ \ > 
BAnbévros Adpay éeynwpidlew. mpos Se tods am- 
aitodvras mpdos Tu emuyepeiv, erred) SoKe? Seiv 
35 dmod.dovar THVv aitiav, AcexPevtwy 8 eviwy eddu- 
, \ / ~ > a > / 
Aaxrdtepov, TO KadAov aupBaivov €v Tots eA€éyxots 
>| / \ > / Lid ” > ~ ~ A 
éyew, THY avripacw, 6 Tu edynoev atodjoa, 7 6 





¢ It has been conjectured that the author of this dialogue 
was Speusippus. 


84 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xv 


refutation ; if he refuses to grant it and even denies 
that it is the generally accepted view, he utters a 
paradox; if he refuses to grant it but admits that 
it is the generally accepted view, there will be the 
appearance of a refutation. 

Moreover, as in rhetorical arguments, so likewise (8) By seek- 
also in refutations, you ought to look for contradic- 8,contt™ 


dictions 
tions between the answerer’s views and either his between the 
own statements or the views of those whose words sath 8 
and actions he admits to be right, or of those who are ponent and 
P e school 
generally held to bear a like character and to re- to which he 
semble them, or of the majority, or of all mankind. pct as: 
_ Also, just as answerers, when they are being refuted, (9) By 
often draw a distinction, if they are on the point of Haq", 
being refuted, so questioners also ought sometimes, hasa double 
when dealing with objectors, if the objection is valid ; 
against one sense of the word but not against another, 
to resort to the expedient of declaring that the 
opponent has taken it in such and such a sense, as 
Cleophon does in the Mandrobulus.¢ They ought also (10) By 
to withdraw from the argument and cut short their pea et 


other attacks, while the answerer, if he perceives this pas to 
. . . ee . 5 ‘VOL 
move in time, should raise anticipatory objections and attack. 


get his argument in first. One should also sometimes (11) By 
attack points other than the one mentioned, excluding its pee 
it if one can make no attack on the position laid down, points. 
as Lycophron did when it was suggested that he 


should deliver an encomium on the lyre. To those (12) By | 
who demand that one should take some definite ni 


point of attack (since it is generally held that one obiectis 
ought to assign the object of a question, whereas if posts andi 
certain statements are made the defence is easier), Boe Oe 


you should say that your aim is the usual result of thesis. 
refutation, namely, to deny what your opponent 


85 


ARISTOTLE 
174b 
> / ~ > \ \ iid ~ > / e > \ 
dmédnoe pjoa, ada, pn) OTe THY evavrion 7 adry 
ETLOTH LN i) odx uh avr?) od det dé 70 oUpTEepacpa 
mporariKas epwrav: évia 8 08d’ epwrntéov, GAN 
40 Ws dpodAoyoupevols’ xpnoréov. 
175a XVI. “EE dv pev obv at eépwryoes, Kal mas 
Epwrnteov ev Tals aywviotiKais dvatpiBais, elpyrac: 
mept d€ atoKpicews, Kal THs xp7) Avew Kal Ti, Kal 
mpos Tiva xphow ot Towdro TOV Adoywv WhEeAipor, 
peta TavTa Aexréov. 
5 Xprouysoe poev obv etal Tpos pev prrocogiay dua 
vo. mp@rov pev yap ws emt TO Told yuopevor 
mapa tHv A€Ew adpuewov exew Trovwodc. mpds TO 
Tooax@s exactov AéyeTar, Kal Tota opolws Kat 
Tota €Tépws emi Te TOV TpayyaTwv ovpPaiver Kal 
10 emi THY ovoudtwv. Sevrepov Sé mpos tas Kal? 
\ me | / ¢ \ e 8D cc VW ¢ / 
avtov lyriceus: 6 yap th’ Eetépov padiws mapa- 
AoyiCopevos Kal TodTO p17) aicPavdpuevos Kav adTos 
ey? i. ~ ~ / / , A ‘ 
bp’ adbtod tobro mao. modAdKis. tpitov dé Kat 
TO Aowrov ert mpos Sd€av, TO TEpl TmavTa yeyv- 
pvdoba Soxeiv Kai pndevos ateipws exew* TO yap 
15 KowwvodvTa Adywv péyew Adyous, pndev ExovTa 
diopileww mept ths pavAdrntos atrav, troriav 
didwot tod Soxeiv Suvaxepaivew od dia Tadnbes 
aAAa du’ azrecpiav. 
> / \ ~ > /, \ A 
Azroxpwvopevous de mas amavrnTéov mpos TOVS 
Tovovrous Adyous, pavepor, eiep opbds elpnKaprev 
mporepov e€ dv eiciv of Tapadoyropol, Kal Tas ev 
207@ muvOdvecbar mAcovetias tkav@s SreiAowev. od 
> ‘ Pak A / \ / > cal \ ~ 
tavrov 8 eori AaBovra Te Tov Adyov ideiv Kal Adoat 
Thv poxOnpiav, Kal épwropevov amavrav Sivacbat 


1 Reading dpodoyoupévars with Wallies for éuoAoyoupeve. 
86 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xv-xv1 


affirmed and affirm what he denied, and not to prove 
that the knowledge of contraries is the same or not 
the same. One should not ask the conclusion in the 
form of a proposition, and some propositions should 
not be asked at all but treated as admitted. 

XVI. We have now dealt with the sources of ques- THE 
tions and how they ought to be asked in competitive 8OU2 {10% 
arguments. We must next treat of answering, and how LACTES 
solutions are brought about, and what are their sub- Oe eaaiii, 
jects, and for what purpose such arguments are useful. General | 

They are useful for philosophy for two reasons, The reasons 
In the first place, as they generally turn on language, S7,auayine 
they put us in a better position to appreciate the 
various meanings which a term can have and what 
similarities and differences attach to things and their 
names. Secondly, they are useful for the questions 
which arise in one’s own mind ; for he who is easily 
led astray by another person into false reasoning and 
does not notice his error, might also often fall into this 
error in his own mind. A third and last reason is that 
they establish our reputation, by giving us the credit 
of having received a universal training and of having 
left nothing untried ; for that one who is taking part 
in an argument should find fault with arguments with- 
out being able to specify where their weakness lies, 
rouses a suspicion that his annoyance is apparently 
not in the interests of truth but due to inexperience. 

How answerers should meet such arguments is The neces- 
obvious if we have adequately described above * the okies 
sources of false arguments and distinguished the 
fraudulent methods of questioning. To take an argu- 
ment and see and disentangle the fault in it is not 
the same thing as to be able to meet it promptly when 


@ 165 b 24 ff. 
87 


ARISTOTLE 
175 a 
/ a“ A ” / / > 
Taxews. O yap lopev, ToAAdKis peTaTOemevov ay- 
~ ” > iA > a A ‘ ~ ‘ 
voodmev. €7.0', worrep ev Tois dAXois TO OGTTOV Kal 
\ / > ~ / / ~ 
To Bpadvrepov ex Tod yeyupvacba yiverar paAdor, 
” \ a= 3 ~ / ” id ” ~ 
250UTW Kal emi tTav AdOywv exer, Wore, av SHAov 
fev Hiv 7, apeAerynTo 8’ Gpev, dotepotpev TOV 
~ / / / / > 
Kaip@v moAAdKis. ovupPaiver dé mote, Kabarep ev 
Tots diaypdppacw: Kal yap exe? avadvoavres eviore 
ouvOeiva maAw advvatotuev: ottTw Kal év Tots 
> / > / > a ¢ / / 
30 eA€yxous, elddTes Trap’ 6 6 Adyos ovpPaiver ovv- 
etpar, diaAdoar Tov Adyov amopobmev. 
XVII. [Iparov pev otv, womep avdAdoyilecbai 
papev evddEws tote waAdov 7) adnbas mpoapetabar 
a 4 \ / \ ~ > / ”“ A 
deiv, o0tTw Kai AuTéov Tote wGAXov evddEws 7 KaTa 
> / ov \ \ \ > A 
TaAnfés. SrAws yap mpos Tods EepiaTiKods [aye- 
, > e 2 \ 7 > > ¢ / 3 
35 Téeov ody ws eA€yxovras GAN’ ws dawopevous* od 
/ / / > / oe \ 
yap dhapyev avdAdoyilecbai ye adro’s, wore mpos 
‘ \ a / >? / >  -¥ 
To p17) SoKetvy Siopfwréov. «i ydp eotw 6 eAeyxos 
> / \ e 4 ” b) A ” / 
avripacis pq) Opmwvupos EK TWwv, oddev av déoL 
aA ‘ > / \ \ ¢ , 
diarpetobar mpos TapdiBoAa Kal THY dOpwvupiav: 
od yap mroret avAdoyiopdv. add’ oddevds dddAov 
40 Yap mpood.arperéov aA 7 OTL TO GvpTépacwa 
paiverar eAeyyoeides. ovKovv TO eAeyyOfvar adda 
‘ ~ > / > \ / > >? ~ > / 
To doxeiv edrAaBynréov, éemel 76 y’ Epwrdv audiBoda 
175b Kal Ta Tapa THY Ouwrpiav, doa T aAAaL ToLabTaL 
/ \ \ > A ” > / 
Tapakpovoeis, Kal Tov aAnOwov Eedreyxov adpaviler 
‘ A > / \ A ? / LA 
Kal Tov eAeyxopevov Kal jut) eAeyxopevov adnAov 
Tout. eel yap e€eotw emi réAer ovptrepavapevov 
88 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvi-xvi 


one is asked a question.© For we often fail to 
recognize something which we know when it is pre- 
sented in a different form. Furthermore, as in other 
spheres a greater degree of speed or slowness is 
rather a question of training, so in argument also ; 
therefore, even though something may be clear to us, 
yet, if we lack practice, we often miss our opportuni- 
ties. The same thing happens sometimes as with geo- 
metrical diagrams ; for there we sometimes analyse 
a figure but cannot reconstruct it ; so too in refuta- 
tions we know how the argument is strung together, 
but we are at a loss how to take it to pieces. 

XVII. In the first place, then, just as we say that Apparent 
we ought sometimes deliberately to argue plausibly 3 yi °tPan 
rather than truthfully, so too we ought sometimes teal, ner 
to solve questions plausibly rather than according to be -songt 
truth. For, generally speaking, when we have to 
fight against contentious arguers, we ought to regard 
them not as trying to refute us but as merely appear- 
ing to do so; for we deny that they are arguing a 
case, so that they must be corrected so as not to 
appear to be doing so. For if refutation is unequi- 
vocal contradiction based on certain premisses, there 
can be no necessity to make distinctions against 
ambiguity and equivocation ; for they do not make 
up the proof. But the only other reason for making 
further distinctions is because the conclusion looks 
like a refutation. One must, therefore, beware not 
of being refuted but of appearing to be so, since the 
asking of ambiguities and questions involving equi- 
vocation and all similar fraudulent artifices mask even 
a genuine refutation and make it uncertain who is 
refuted and who is not. For when it is possible in 
the end, when the conclusion is reached, to say that 


89 


ARISTOTLE 


115» A id ” > ~ / > > € 4, 
5 LN OTep ednoev amodjoa Adyew, GAN’ duwvdpws, 


> at / > ice ) A / »” 
et Kal OTe pdAvor’ Eervyev él tadrov dépwv, adnAov 
a ~ > 
et eAnjAeyKrat: addnrov yap «i addnOA A€yer viv. €t 
\ \ v A ¢ / an” A > / 
S€ dveAwv pero TO Suwvupov 7H TO apdiBodrov, 
? “ ” > ¢ Ld > > ~ ~ 
ovK av ddndos Hv 6 EXeyyos. 6 7 emlynrotar viv 
A , be SAA € >? , A ” 
juev HrTov mpdotepov Sé€ paAdAov ot epratiKol, TO 7 
10 vai 4 ov amoKpivecbar Tov epwramevov, eyiver’ 
»” ~ A ‘ A \ ~ >? ~ \ 
av. vov de da TO fu) KaADS epwrav Tods muvOavo- 
feevous avayKn tmpocamoKpivecbal Ti TOV épwrw- 
pevov, StopfobvrTa tHv pmoxOnpiav Tis mpordoews, 
> \ /, ¢ ~ an 74" ee 4 tf 
emret SteAopevov ye ikavars 7 val 7 ov avayKn Aéyew 
TOV ATTOKpLVOMEVOV. 
15 Ki dé tis broAnberar Tov Kata duwvuplav eheyyov 
/ \ > ” a A > ig 
elvat, Tpdmov Twa ovK eoTar diadvyeiv TO éeAéy- 
~ ¢ ~ 
xeacIa. Tov amoKpwopevov: el yap Tv dOpaTav 
> an a“ ” > ~ ” ‘ a > 
avaykatov 6 épnoev arodfaa dvoua, Kal 6 am- 
/, ~ ¢ A ~ "4 *O\ 
épynoe dom. ws yap Sipbodvrai ties, ovdev 
” b] \ / 4 \ 
20 ofeAos. od yap Kopicxov dao elvar povorkov 
~ 3 , 
Kat apovoov, aAAa Todrov tov Kopioxov povo.Kor 
~ \ 

Kal Ttodrov tov Kopioxov dpovoov. o yap avros 
€otar Adyos TO Tobrov’ tov Kopioxoy 7@ tobdrov 
‘ / + ” , hd ov 
tov Kopioxov dpovoov etvar 7) ovoixov' dep apa 
Ud ‘ > / > oe 2 > > ‘ 
dnot te Kal amddnow. . dA’ tows od tabtd o7- 

, 2S A aS ” ¢ ’ ; 2 
pratver: ode yap Exel TOVVoMa. wate Ti Siadéper; 


1 zodrov added by Waitz. 
2 Poste reads 7i for 7. and adds the question mark. 


90 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvn 


one’s opponent contradicted what he asserted only 
by means of an equivocation, however true it may be 
that he happened to be tending in the same direction, 
it is uncertain whether a refutation has taken place ; 
for it is uncertain whether he is speaking the truth 
now. If, however, one had made a distinction and 
questioned the equivocal or ambiguous term, the re- 
futation would not have been uncertain. Also, the 
object of contentious arguers—though it is less their 
aim in these days than formerly—would have been 
carried out, namely, that the person questioned 
should answer ‘ Yes’ or ‘No’; as it is, however, 
because the questioners put their questions im- 
properly, the person questioned is obliged to add 
something in his answer by way of correcting the 
unfairness of the proposition, since, if the questioner 
makes adequate distinctions, the answerer must say 
either ‘ Yes’ or ‘ No.’ 

If anyone is going to imagine that an argument If one sup- 
which rests on equivocal terms is a refutation, it will tag bie 
be impossible for the answerer to avoid being refuted ment which 
in a certain sense; for in dealing with visible things equivoca- 
one must necessarily deny the term which he asserted fnbn, 
and assert that which he denied. For the correction the answerer 

+ . canno 
which some people suggest is useless. For they do escape being 
not say that Coriscus is musical and unmusical, but ped Pec xi 
that this Coriscus is musical and this Coriscus is un- : 
musical. For it will be making use of the same 
expression to say that this Coriscus is unmusical (or 
musical) as to say that this Coriscus is so ; and one 
is affirming and denying this at the same time. But 
perhaps it does not mean the same thing; for 
neither did the name in the former case ; so what 
is the difference ? But if he is going to assign to the 


91 


ARISTOTLE 
175 b 
25 €l O€ TH prev TO ATADS Aeyew Kopicxov amodacet, 


~ 


T@ b€ mpocbyoe TO Twa 7 TOVdE, ATOTOV: OddEV 
yap padAov Oatépw: omotépw yap av oddev dia- 
pepe. 

Od pnv adr’ ered) ddndros pév eotw 6 pt) Svopi- 
/ \ > / / > / a“ > 
cduevos THV apdiBorlav ToTepov eArjAeyKTaL 7) OdK 
30 eAnjAeyKrat, SédoTa 8 ev tots Adyous 76 SueA€tv, 
pavepov Ott TO pun) Siopicavra Sodvar THY epwrnow 
> > ae ~ ¢ 4 "ke 7 “A > \ > / 
arn’ ards audprnud éorw, wore Kav et pr) adtos, 
> > LA / > / LA / > 
arAv’ 6 ye Adyos eAnAceypevw poids eoTwW. Gup- 
/ / / ¢ ~ \ > / 
Baiver pevtot moAAdKis dp@vtas THv dpudrBoAtav 
- oxvetv Statpetobar bua THY TUKVOTHTA TOV TA TOL- 
35 adTa TpoTELWovTwWY, OTwWSs pn TpPOS aTrav SoK@at 
duvoKodaivew: eft’ odk av oinbévrwy mapa TodTo 
/ \ / / > / / . 
yevéobat Tov Adyov, ToAAdKis amyvTnoe Tapddogov. 
7 > > \ / ~ ? > / / 
war’ emerd7) Sédo0Tat Svatpeiv, odK dKvnTéov, KabdTreEp 
€A€xOn mpdtepov. 
Ei b€ 7a SV0 Epwrjpara fy ev Trove’ Tis Epwrnma, 
99> NW ¢ \ \ ¢ / ‘ \ > /, 
40 00d’ av 6 Tapa THY buwvupiay Kal THY appiBortav 
ait ¢. / > > ”“ ” ”“ a / 
eyiveto trapadoyiopos, GAN’ 7 eAeyxos 7 ov. Ti 
176a yap Siaheper epwrjoar et KadAias Kai OeuroroKdAts 
/ > hal ee / a 4” ¢ / 
povokol elow 7 €l apdhoréepois Ev Gvoma Hv érépois 
> > A / Xr a, Cis rv / > / 
otow; et yap mAciw dndoi evds, TAciw HpwTyaev. 
> > \ > A \ 5 , > /, / > / 
el ovv p41) Opdv mpds S¥0 epwryoets play aTroKpLoWw 
aéodv AapBdvew ards, pavepov dri oddevi mpoo- 
/ ~ ¢ 4, > , 0 c AO 55° > 
5 KEL TOV Opwrvdpwv arroKpivedVar amA@s, odd" et 


92 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvi 


one person the simple appellation ‘ Coriscus,’ while 
to the other he adds ‘ acertain’ or ‘ that,’ itis absurd ; 
for the addition belongs no more to the one than to 
the other; for it makes no difference to whichever 
of the two he adds it. 

However, since, if one does not distinguish the The am- 
meanings of a doubtful term, it is not clear whether Pigu'y, 
he has been confuted or not, and since the right to explained. 
draw distinctions is conceded in arguments, it is 
obvious that to grant the question simply, without 
making distinctions, is a mistake ; so that, even if 
the man himself does not appear to be refuted, yet 
his argument certainly appears to be so. It frequently 
happens, however, that, though people see the 
ambiguity, they hesitate to make the distinction, 
because of the numerous occasions on which people 
propose subjects of this kind, in order to avoid seeming 
to be acting perversely all the time. Then, again, 
though people would never have thought that the 
argument would hinge upon this point, they are often 
confronted with a paradox. So, since the right to 
draw a distinction is conceded, we must not hesitate 
to use it, as was said before. 

If one does not make two questions into one, the The ques- 
fallacy which depends on equivocation and ambiguity Hore My 
would not exist either, but either refutation or absence makes two 
of refutation. For what is the difference between ask- apn 
ing whether Callias and Themistocles are musical and 
asking the same question about two people both with 
the same name? For if one indicates more things 
than one, one has asked more questions than one. If, 
therefore, it is not correct to demand simply to 
receive one answer to two questions, clearly it is not 
proper to give a simple answer to any equivocal 


93 


ARISTOTLE 
176 a 
A / > / i4 > ~ , ° \ 
kata tavrwy adnbés, womep akvodai twes. oddév 
\ A , ” > » ’ \ 
yap totro diadéper 7 ef pero, Kopicxos Kal 
KaAXias 7repov oikor eioty 7) odK oiKot, etre Tapév- 
Twv audow elre pr) Tapdvrwr: dudotépws yap 
, ¢ , +. > > \ 1 \ 
mAEtous at mpotdces: o} yap et ddnbes etmev,' Sid 
10 TodTO pla 7% Epwrynos. eyywpet yap Kal pupia 
Erepa epwrnlévta epwrnpata amavta 7) vat 7 od 
> \ > / < > cy > > / ~ 
aAnbes elvar A€yev: GAN’ dws odK amoKpiréov [ud 
amoKkptioe. avaipeirar yap 76 Svadéyecbar. rTodro 
5° Gpowov ws ef Kal 7d adto dvopa tebein Tots 
éerépois. et ovv pr Set mpds do epwrijoes pilav 
> ' A / \ a” 3Q> > \ ~ c 
15 amdxpiow diddvat, davepov dtu ovd’ emi tov bp- 
/ A L | a / > \ A 2 > ‘\ 
wrvvpwy TO vat 4 ov AexTéov. ovd€ yap 6 Eeimav 
> /, > > wv > > > ~ /2 > 
amoKkéKpitat add’ eipnkev. GAN aodrai® mws ev 
A / \ \ / \ ~ 
tots duadeyopevois Sia TO AavOdvew 7d cupBaivor. 
"CO Ss ww > 8 7 55° er , 
omep ovv elmopev, erevdymep odd Edeyyxot 
20 TwWes OvtTes SoKobow elvar, KaTa TOV adTov TpdTOV 
\ 7 / ul > - /, 
kal Avcets Sd€ovow elvai twes odK odcar Aces: 
~ A > 
ds 87 paper eviore uGAdov Seiv dépew 7) tas aAn- 
A a ~ ~ 4 A 
Gets ev tots dywviotixots Adyous Kal TH mpos TO 
durtov amavryice.. amoKpitéov 8 emt pev Tav 
¢ 
SoxovvTwr 70 €oTtw A€yovra: Kal yap oUTws HKLoTA 
/ ree, | ‘r n” Py / to > 
25 yivoit’ av trape€éAeyyxos: av 5€ Te mapddofov avay- 
~ ‘ 
Kalynrar A€yew, evtadla pddvoTa mpooberéov TO 
~ A A “” ay 9 »” a” 4 
Soxeiv: otrw yap av ovr’ édXeyxos ote Tapddofov 
~ a \ > ~ 
yivecOa Sdfevev. emel dé wHs aireirar TO ev apyh 
1 Reading elev for eizeiv. 
2 Reading dfvtrai for agvodvrai with Wallies. 


94 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvi 


question, even though the term is true of all the 
subjects, as some people claim that one ought. For 
this is just the same as asking ‘ Are Coriscus and 
Callias at home or not at home ?,’ whether they are 
both at home or not there; for in both cases the 
number of propositions is more than one. For if the 
answer is true, it does not follow that the question 
is a single one. For it is possible that it is true to 
say ‘ yes’ or ‘no’ when asked a countless number 
of questions ; but, for all that, one ought not to 
answer them with a single reply, for that means 
the ruin of discussion. This resembles the case of 
the same name being applied to different things. Tf, 
therefore, one must not give one answer to two 
questions, it is obvious that neither should one say 
“yes ’ or ‘no’ where equivocal terms are used ; for 
then the speaker has not given an answer but made 
a statement, but it is regarded in a way as an answer 
amongst those who argue, because they do not 
realize what is the result. 

As we said, then, since there are some seeming’ How the 
refutations which are not really refutations, in like thy Sap 
manner also there are some seeming solutions which 
are not really solutions. These we say that we ought 
sometimes to bring forward in preference to true 
refutations in competitive argument and in meeting 
ambiguity. In the case of statements which appear to 
be true one must answer with the phrase ‘ granted’ ; 
for then there is the least likelihood of any accessory 
refutation ; but if one is obliged to say something 
paradoxical, then in particular one must add that it 
seems so, for then there can be no appearance either 
of refutation or of paradox. Since it is clear what 
‘begging the original question’ means and since 


95 


ARISTOTLE 
176 a 
d7Aov, olovrar d€ mavres, av" 7 avveyyus, avaipe- 


Téov Kal 41) ovyxwpyTéov elvar Evia ws TO ev apyYH 
30 alrobvros, Otay TO” Towwdrov avi Tis 6 avayKatov 
prev ovp.Paivew ex THs Oécews, 7 dé peddos 7) ado€ov, 
tavto AeKréov: Ta yap e& avayKns ovpPaivovra 
a ee s ans ” ¢ ‘ aN 
THs adrijs elvar Soke? Oécews. Ett Orav TO Kabddov 
[7 ovopate AndOA aAAa wapaBoAH, AexTéov oti ody 
¢ 25 50 55° ¢ ” x / \ \ 
35 ws €d00n otd’ ws mpovrewe AapPdver- Kal yap 
Tapa Tobro yiverat moAAdKis Aeyyos. 
’"EE€eipydpuevov S€ tovtwv emt To pH KadA@s Be- 
detyPar mopeutéov, dmavT@vTa Kata TOV Eelpyn{LEevov 
Svopiopov. 
> \ s aA / / tee! J 
Ev pev obv rots Kupiws Aeyopévors ovdmacw 
> /, > / a > ~ ” / “a 
avaykn amoxpivesbar 7 amA@s 7) Svatpovpevov. a 
40 6€ auvuTovoobytes TiHewev, olov boa pu) cadds 
> \ ~ ? a \ ~ / 
176b GAA KoAoBds epwradrar, mapa rodro ovpPaiver 
¢ er e Se Vo AM SED: / ~ fF 4? 
0 €Aeyxos, ofov dp’ 6 av } ’AOnvaiwy, Kripa eorw 
"AOnvaiwy; val. opotws S€ Kal emi trav aAdwv. 
LAAG \ Lae. / > ~ / / ~ 
aAAa nv 6 avOpwrds €ort THv Cw; val. KTHWa 
apa 6 avOpwros tv Cawv. tov yap avOpwov 
~ 7 / Ld af ? ‘ 7 
sTav Caw A€youev, dTt C@dv eat, kat Avoavdpov 
Tav Aaxdvev, or. Adkwv. diAov obv ws ev ols 
adoades TO mpoTewdpmevov od ovyywpnréov ards. 
7 A ~ + / A aw > 
Orav d€ dvotv dvrow OBarépov pev dvros ef 


1 Reading dav for dv with Wallies. 
2 Reading 706 for re with Wallies. 


* 168 a 17 ff. 





ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xv 


people always consider that assumptions which lie 
near the conclusion must be demolished and that 
some of them must not be conceded on the ground 
that the opponent is begging the question, so when 
someone claims something of such a nature that it 
must necessarily follow from the thesis and it is false 
or paradoxical, we must use the same plea; for the 
necessary consequences are generally regarded as 
part of the same thesis. Furthermore, when the 
universal which has been obtained has no name but 
is indicated by a comparison only, we must say that 
the questioner takes it not in the sense in which it 
was granted nor as he proposed it; for a refutation 
often hinges on this point too. 

When we are excluded from these expedients, we 
must have recourse to the plea that the argument 
has not been properly set forth, attacking it on the 
basis of the classification of fallacies given above.* 

When terms are used in their proper senses, one What is_ 
must answer either simply or by making a distinction. ages 
It is when our statement implies our meaning without ment must 
expressing it—for example, when a question is not praake 
asked clearly but in a shortened form—that refutation conceded. 
ensues. For instance, ‘ Is whatever belongs to the 
Athenians a property of the Athenians?’ ‘ Yes; and 
this is likewise true of everything else.’ ‘ Well, then, 
does man belong to the animals?’ ‘ Yes.’ ‘Then man 
is a property of the animals. For we say that man 
“belongs to” the animals because he is an animal, 
just as we say that Lysander “ belongs to” the Laco- 
nians because he is a Laconian.’ Obviously, there- 
fore, when the premiss is not clear, it must not be 
conceded simply. 

When it is generally held that, if one of two things Other de- 


E O7 


ARISTOTLE 


aid > / / ~ / A ~ \ 
avayKns Odrepov elvar doxH, Oar€épov dé Tobro 42) 


> 1:29 ? , , 1 A \ oo» 
10 €€ avayKns, épwrwmevov mdTepov' Set TO €AaTTOV 
YRKIS» ‘va 
d.ddvau: yaAderrwtepov yap avdAdoyicacbar éx mewd- 
xX Yop 
2A > > ~ ¢ an / > > , 
vov. eav 8 emyeiph ort TO péev eoTw evavtiov 
~ > > ” nn e /, > \ Y > / 
T@ 8 ovK EoTw, av 6 Adyos aAnOijs 7, evavriov 
/ + \ BY a ma ¢ / 
dvat, ovowa de Kketabat Tod érépov. 
7) 
met 8 Evia prev @v A€yovow ot ToAAOL TOV LT) 
*Ezei 6 pev av X dr 
15 cvyxwpodvTa pevdeobar av daiev evra 8’ ov, olov 
doa apdidootow (mdTepov yap dbapr? 7 abavatos 
7 wvyn tov Caw, od Suptatat Tots moAXots), év 
t > 
ofs obv adnAov trotépws ciwhe Aéyecbar TO mpo- 
TELVOMEVOV, TOTEPOV WS at yrOpwor (KadAodar yap 
vapas Kal Tas adnbets dd€as Kal Tas dAas anoda- 
* kee a 
nn ¢ ¢ , a7 ” r Ree: 
20 Gels), ) WS 7 OudpweTpos GovppeTpos, ETL TE? OD 
A > 
Tadnbes audidoketrar, uddvora peradepwv av Tis 
»' / \ ~~ v \ , A \ \ ‘ 
avOdvo. Ta Gvopata Tept ToUTwY. Sia fev yap TO 
adnrov elvar troTépws exer TAaANOEs, od SdEeu codi- 
leobar, dua dé TO apdidokeiv od Sdfer PevdeoGa- 
¢ v3 \ s \ , > , 
257) ‘yap® petapopa mroujoer Tov Adyov avekéAeyKTOV. 
"Ett 60a dv Tis mpoaobdvyra TOV epwrnuatwv 
? 
mTpoevoTatéov Kal mpoayopeuvtéov: ovTw yap av 
/ \ / 4, 
pdAvora Tov muvOavdpevov KwAvoeter. 
1 Reading wérepov for mpdrepov. 
2 Inserting re after ev. 
5 Reading yap for 5¢ with AB. 
98 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvi 


is true, then the other is necessarily true, but, if the vices to be 
second is true, the first is not necessarily true, when is i 
asked which is true, we ought to concede the less 
inclusive ; for the greater the number of premisses, 

the more difficult it is to draw a conclusion. If the 
disputant tries to establish that A has a contrary 

while B has not, if his contention is true, we ought 

to say that both have a contrary but that no name 

is laid down for one of the two. 

Regarding some of the statements which they 
make, most people would declare that anyone who did 
not concede them was lying, while they would not 
say so about others, for example, about subjects on 
which people disagree (for instance, most people have 
no decided opinion whether the soul of living creatures 
is destructible or immortal). Therefore, when it is 
uncertain in which sense the suggested premiss is 
generally used, whether as maxims are employed (for 
people call both true opinions and general affirmations 
by the name of ‘ maxims’) or like the statement, 
‘the diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its 
sides, and further, where the truth is a matter of 
uncertainty,—in these cases one has an excellent 
opportunity of changing the terms without being 
_ found out. For, because it is uncertain in which sense 
the premiss bears its true meaning, one will not 
be regarded as playing the sophist, and, because of 
the disagreement on the subject, one will not be 
regarded as lying; for the change will make the 
argument proof against refutation. 

Furthermore, whenever one foresees any question, 
one must be the first to make one’s objection and say 
what one has to say, for thus one can best disconcert 
the questioner. 


99 


ARISTOTLE 
176 b 
XVIII. ’Esei 8 eoriv 7 peév op07 A¥ouws euda- 
30 vows yevdobs ovdAAoyiopod, map’ dmoiav epwrnow 
ovpPaive. TO ebdos, 6 dé yevdys avddoyiopos 
Aéyerar Six@s (H yap ei avdAdAcAdyrarar yeddos, 7) 
> \ n”“ \ a > / 
et pn @v avddoyropuos Soke elvar avAdoyiopds), 
ein av y Te eipnuevy viv Avats Kal %) Tod datvo- 
Lévov avdAoyiopod Tapa ti daiverar TOV epwrn- 
35 uatwr Sidpbwors. wore ovpPaiver Tav Adywv Tods 
\ / > / A \ 
fev avAdcAoytopévovs aveAdvta, Tovs dé dawwo- 
/ / 4, / > > >) ~ 
pevous SieAdvta Avew. mddAw 8 eel TaV avAde- 
Aoyiopevwv Adywv ot pev aAnbes of Se xbeddos 
EXOVoL TO oUpTépacpa, TOUS pev KaTa TO GUp- 
Tépaopa yevdets buys evddyerar Avew: Kal yap 
40T@ avereiv tr TOV Hpwrnuéevwv, Kal TO SetEar TO 
177a oupTepacpa €xov ovy ovTwWs Tovs b€ KaTa Tas 
TpoTdaceis TH avedeiv Tu Lovov: TO yap ovpTrépacpa 
> 4, ” a / / / ~ 
aAnbés. ware tots BovrAopévois AVew Adyov mparov 
\ / > / ”“ > /, 
fev oKeTttéov ei ovdAdcdAdyiorar 7 aavdAdAdyoTos, 
elra motepov adAnbes TO ovprépacpa 7 peddos, 
5 Omws 7 Staipodvres 7 avaipodvtes AVwpev, Kal 
> r n @ ne , »\7 , 
avatpobdvTes 7) Wde 7) We, Kabdmrep eA€exOn mpdTeEpov. 
/ \ a > / / \ \ 4, 
diadéper Se mAciorov epwrwpevov Te Kal pr) Avew 
Adyov: TO ev yap mpoideiy yaXderov, TO d5é€ KaTa 
axoAnv ideiv paov. 
XIX. Tév pev obv mapa tiv duwvupiay Kal Thy 
10 apdiBoAiav eAéyywv of wev Exovar TOV epwrnudTwv 
Tt TAciw onpaivov, ot dé TO cupTépacpa ToAAay@s 





@ In ch. xvii. > 176 b 36 ff. 
100 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvimi—xrx 


XVIII. Since a correct solution is an exposure of Genuine 
false reasoning, indicating the nature of the question Sto. 
on which the fallacy hinges, and since ‘ false reason- 
ing ’ can mean one of two things (for it occurs either 
if a false conclusion has been reached or if what is 
not a proof appears to be such), there must be both 
the solution described just now,? and also the rectifica- 
tion of the apparent proof by showing on which of the 
questions it hinges. The result is that one solves the 
correctly reasoned arguments by demolishing them, 
the apparent reasonings by making distinctions. 
Again, since some correctly reasoned arguments 
are true, while others are false, in their conclu- 
sions, it is possible to solve those which are false 
in their conclusion in two ways, either by demolishing 
one of the questions or by showing that the conclusion 
is not as stated. Those arguments, on the other hand, 
which are false in their premisses can only be solved 
by the demolition of one of the premisses, since the 
conclusion is true. Those, therefore, who wish to 
solve an argument should observe, firstly, whether 
it has been correctly reasoned or is not reasoned, 
and, next, whether the conclusion is true or false, 
in order that we may achieve a solution either 
by making a distinction or by demolishing a pre- 
miss and doing so in one or other of the two ways 
just described. There is a very wide difference 
between solving an argument when one is being 
questioned and when one is not ; for in the latter case 
it is difficult to see what is coming, but when one is 
at leisure it is easier to see one’s way. 

XIX. Of the refutations which hinge upon equi- (A) The 

* eed : + _. Solution of 
vocation and ambiguity some involve a question Ryryras- 


which bears more than one sense, while others have tpi ee. 


101 


ARISTOTLE 


177 a 
Aeyopevov, olov ev pev TH ovryavra A€éyew TO oup- 


/ / > \ ~ A p \ 
mépacpa duttov, ev d€ TH pu) Ovveriotacbar Tov 
bd 4 a“ ~ > / > / \ 
EmLOTapEVoV EV TOV epwrnpdtwv audiBodov. Kal 
TO OitTOv OTE prev EoTw, OTe BS ovK EaTW, GAAG 

/ \ \ \ A nn \ > < wv 
15 onpaiver TO SuTTOV TO ev ov TO 8 odK OV. 

a \ > > ~ / A ~ n” \ 

Ooois pev obv ev TH TEAL TO TOAAaXDs, Gv p47) 
mpoAdBy* THv avtipacw, od yiverar éAeyxos, ofov 
> ~ \ pa \ Lae = + \ 2 d / > 
ev T@ Tov TUpAdy Opav: dvev yap avtipacews odK 
* ” ” > ae , > 
jv €deyxos. daots 8’ ev Tols epwrnpacw, ovK 
> / ~ ‘ /, > A \ ~ 

20 avayKn Tpoatropjaa TO SitTOv" ov yap mpds TOTO 
adAa d1a tobto 6 Adyos. ev apyh pev odv TO 
~ \ ” \ /, Ad > / 
dumAobv Kal dvona Kai Adyov otTws amoKpitéov, 
hud ” e A > e ” ov ‘ _-~ 
oT. €oTw ws, €ott 8 ws ov, WorEp TO avy~OvTa 

/ ¢ ” e ” > e ” \ A / 

Aéyew, ote E€oTw ws, Eat. 8 ws ov. Kat Ta dSéovTa 
/ ” Lid ” > “a ” \ \ , 
mpaKktéov €oTw a, €oT. 8 a ov: Ta yap Séovra 
~ > 
25 Adyerat roAAaxa@s. eav dé AdOn, emi TéAEL TpooTL- 

/ ~ > / , 5 ee ” ~ 
Oévra TH epwrycer SvopPwréov: dp’ €or ovy@vra 

/ + > ‘ / A ‘ > a 
déyetv; ov, adda rovde ovydvTa. Kali ev Tots 
” \ \ ~ > a /, ¢€ / 
exovor d€ TO 7Acovaxyads ev Tais mpoTdceaw Opolws. 

> ” / id > / , > > 
ovK apa ouverioravTat 6 TL éemicravTat; vat, aAA 

) c 7 > / > \ > /, > hid 
oby of ovUTws emioTdpevot’ od yap TavTov eaTW OTL 


1 Reading zpoAdBy with B. 
102 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xix 


a conclusion which can bear several meanings ; for (@) Those 
example, in the argument about ‘ the speech of the Pe api 
silent,’ the conclusion has a double meaning, and ae 
in the argument that ‘a man who knows is not (1) Equi- 
conscious of what he knows,’ one of the questions Y°*to"- 
involves ambiguity. Also, that which has a double 

meaning is sometimes true and sometimes false, the 

term ‘ double’ signifying that which is partly true 

and partly untrue. 

When the diversity of meaning occurs in the con- (2) Am- 
clusion, no refutation takes place, unless the ques- "8™Y: 
tioner secures a contradiction beforehand, as, for 
example, in the argument about the ‘ seeing of the 
blind ’ ; for there never was refutation without con- 
tradiction. Where the diversity of meaning occurs 
in the questions, there is no need to deny the ambi- 
guity beforehand ; for the argument is not directed 
towards it as a conclusion but carried on by means 
of it. At the beginning, therefore, one ought to 
reply to an ambiguous term or expression in the 
following manner, that ‘in one sense it is so and in 
another it is not so’; for example ‘ the speaking of 
the silent ’ is possible in one sense but not in another. 

Or again, ‘ what needs must is to be done sometimes 
and not at other times’; for the term ‘ what needs 
must ’ can bear several meanings. If one does not 
notice the ambiguity, one should make a correction 
at the end by adding to the questioning : ‘ Is the 
speaking of the silent possible?’ ‘ No, but speaking 
of this particular man when he is silent is possible.’ 
So likewise also where the variety of meaning is 
contained in the premisses : ‘ Are not people conscious 
of what they know?’ ‘ Yes, but not those who know 
in this particular way ’ ; for it is not the same thing 


103 


ARISTOTLE 
177 a 
> »” , ‘ a \ e€ A > 
30 00K €oTt ouveriotacbat Kal OTL TOUS @OL emloTa- 


. b) ” a / nn \ 
fevous odK E€oTW. GAws TE payeTéov, av Kal 
¢ ~ 4 
amA@s avddoyilnrar, dtu ody 6 ednoev anépyce 

~ > ed LA > > ” 
mpaywa, adr’ dvopa: wor’ odK« eAeyxos. 

XX. Mavepov de Kai tods mapa TH Sdiaipeow 

\ 4 a , an” \ /, \ 
kat ovvOeow 7&s Avtéov: av yap Siarpovpevos Kat 

35 ovvTiOewevos 6 Adyos ETepov onuaivn, cupTrepawvo- 
pevov Tobvvavtiov AeKtéov. «loi d€ mdvTes ot ToL- 


~ / \ + / ”* / - -9 
obra. Adyo. Tapa THv otvOeow 7) Siaipeow. ap 


e > \ a , , mule 
@ eldes OU TOUTOV TUTTOMLEVOV, TOUTW ETUTITETO 


e \ e > / / \ ” 
ovtos; Kal @ érUmTeTO, ToUTW ad eldes; ExeEL 
a > 
177b Lev odV TL KaK TOV apudiBoAwy epwrnudtwy, aAA 
€oTt Tapa ovvbeow. ov ydp éori SitTOv TO Tapa 
\ / > ! e ? \ / / 4, 
Thv Siaipeow (ov yap 6 adres Adyos yiverar dvarpov- 
a / 
[evos), €lTEp 47) Kal TO Opos Kal Gpos TH Tpoowdia 
AexPev onpaiver Erepov. (add ev pev Tots yeypap- 
A“ ~ ‘ 
5 Levols TAVTOV OVoma, OTaV eK TV adTa@V aToLYELwV 
Yeypappevov 7) Kal waavTws, KaKel 8° dn Tapd- 
~ \ \ , > > / ” > 
ona tovobvrat, Ta S€ POeyyopueva ov TabTa.) WOT 
) ‘ ‘ \ / ‘ A tre 
od ditTOv TO Tapa diaipeow. davepov dé Kat OTL 
> / ¢ ” A \ / / 
od mdavtTes of EAeyxo. mapa TO dutrdév, Kabarep 
tues pao. 


10 Avaiperéov obty TH arroxpwopevw: od yap Tadrov 





“ In both examples the meaning can be either ‘ with a 
stick ’ or ‘ with your eyes.’ 
> i.e. breathings and accents. 


104 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x1x—xx 


to say that it is not possible for those who know to 
be conscious of what they know and that those who 
know in a particular way cannot be conscious of their 
knowledge. Generally speaking, too, even though 
one’s opponent argues in a straightforward manner, 
one must contend that what he has contradicted is 
not the actual fact which one affirmed but merely its 
name, and so there is no refutation. 

XX. It is evident, too, how fallacies which turn (3) Am- 

on the division and combination of words should be division, 
solved; for, if the expression signifies something 74 (0.a™ 
different when it is divided and when it is combined, combination 
when the opponent is drawing his conclusion we must % “°™* 
take the words in the contrary sense. All such 
expressions as the following turn upon the combina- 
tion or division of words: ‘ Was so-and-so being 
beaten with that with which you saw him being 
beaten ? ’ and ‘ Did you see him being beaten with 
that with which he was being beaten? ’¢ The argu- 
ment here has something of the fallacy due to 
ambiguous questions, but it actually turns on com- 
bination. For what turns on the division of words 
is not really ambiguous (for the expression when 
divided differently is not the same), unless indeed dpos 
and opos, pronounced according to the breathing, 
constitute a single word with different meanings. 
(In written language a word is the same when it is 
written with the same letters and in the same manner, 
though people now put in additional signs,? but the 
words when spoken are not the same.) Therefore an 
expression whose meaning turns on division is not 
ambiguous, and it is clear also that all refutations do 
not turn upon ambiguity, as some people say. 

It is for the answerer to make the division; for 


105 


ARISTOTLE 
177b 
>? a A cal a 
Weiv rots dbOaduois tunTépevov Kal Td ddvar iSeiv 


tots ofbaduots turropevov. Kai 6 EdOvdxou Sé 
Ao S >? ts \ ~ ” 2 I a Ie 
oyos, dp oldas av viv ovoas ev Ilewpate? tpirjpers 
> / ” \ / ye EN, > ‘ + 
ev LuiKeAia wv; Kal mddAw, dp’ gorw ayabdr dvra 
/ \ ” > ” > ‘ nn 
15 aKuTéa poxOnpov elvar; «in 8 av tis dyabds av 
akuteds poxOnpds: wor éorar ayabds oxuteds 
> ~ a 
LoxOnpos. dp’ dv ai émorhpwa orovdata, orov- 
data ta pabhpata; tod S€ Kaxod omovdaiov Td 
LdOnua: orovdatov dpa pdOnua 76 Kaxdv. aAAd 
Env Kal Kakov Kal udbnuwa TO Kady, wate KAaKOV 
/ \ / > > > ‘ ~ Ul > 
pdOnuwa TO Kakdv. GAN’ earl Kaxa@v orovdaia ém- 
7 43 > \ > A ~ hid \ / 
200TnUN. dp adAnbes cimeiv viv dtt od yéyovas; 
/ »* ~ a“ tA , / LA 
yéyovas apa viv. 7 dAdo onpaiver diarpeBev; adn- 
és yap cimeiy viv dru od yéyovas, add’ od viv 
/ Ss > ¢ 8 / \ “A 8 7, Ad 
yéyovas. dap ws dvvaca Kat & dvvacat, ovTws 
‘ lot / A > , > ” 
Kal TatrTa mouoas av; od Kibapilwv 8 eyes 
/ ~ / / a“ »” ’ / 
dvvapw 700 KBapilew: KBapioas av dpa od KBapi- 
n“ > / ” \ / a > / 
25 wv. 7) od TovTou exer THY SUvayuv Tod od KBapi- 
/ > baie ? a ~ a 
Cwv xibapilew, add’ dre od movet, Tod Tovetv; 
/ / ~ y > \ ” 
Avovor 5€ twes TodTov Kal dAAws. et yap €dwKev 
¢ , A ” ’ \ ld 
ws dvvatar Troveiv, o¥ dao ovpBaivew pt) KOapi- 
lovra KiOapilew: ob yap mdvrws ws Suvarar Troceiv, 


30 d<dd00a Troujoew: od tabrov 8 elvar ws Svvarat 





* See Rhet. 1401 a 27 and Cope and Sandys’ note. 
106 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xx 


‘ |-saw-a-man-being-beaten with my eyes’ is not 
the same thing as to say ‘ I saw a man being-beaten- 
with-my-eyes. —Then there is Euthydemus’ saying, 
“Do you know now in Sicily that there are triremes 
in Piraeus ? *’—And, again, ‘Can a good man who 
is a cobbler be bad?’ ‘No.’ ‘ But a man who is 
good can be a bad cobbler; therefore he will be a 
good-bad cobbler.’-—Again, ‘Things of which the 
knowledge is good are good objects of learning, are 
they not?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘But the knowledge of evil is 
good; therefore evil is a good object of learning.’ 
‘But, further, evil is both evil and an object of 
learning, so that evil is an evil object of learning ; 
but it has already been seen that the knowledge of 
evils is good.’—' Is it true to say at the present 
moment you are born?’ ‘ Yes.’ ‘ Then you are born 
at the present moment.’ Does not a different division 
of the words signify something different ? For it is 
true to say-at-the-present-moment that you are 
born, but not to say you are born-at-the-present- 
moment.—Again, ‘ Can you do what you can and as 
you can?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘ And when you are not playing 
the harp you have the power of playing the harp ; 
and so you could play the harp when you are not 
playing the harp.’ In other words, he does not possess 
the power of playing-when-he-is-not-playing, but he 
possesses the power of doing it when he is not doing 
it. 

Some people solve this in another manner also. 
If he has granted that a man can do what he can do, 
they say that it does not follow that he can play the 
harp when he is not playing it; for it has not been 
granted that he will do it in every way in which he 
can,—for it.is not the same thing to do it in the way 


107 


177 b 


35 


178 a 


co 


10 


ARISTOTLE 


‘ , e / nn > A A oe 
Kal TavTws ws Svvarar Tovetv. GaAAa davepov drt 
ob Kadds Avovow: Tav yap mapa tadtov Adywv 7 

b) A 4 o > b} c / > \ ‘4 > A 
avr Avois, avTyn 8 oby dppdoer emt mavTas ovde 

/ ~ 
TAVTWS EpwTwpevous, AAA’ EaTL Tpds TOV epwT@vTa, 
od mpos Tov Adyov. 

XXI. Ilapa d€ rHv mpoowdiav Adyor pev ovdK 

> , ~ ~ 
Ela, oUTE TOV Yeypappevwy ovTe TOV Acyowevwr, 

mt \ ww AC / bee t e ic Xr , 
mAnv et Twes OALyou yévowT’ av, olov obros 6 Adyos. 
Do tne a \ \ @ , a , > a Age 
dpa y’ €otl TO od Katadvets oikia; val. odKodv TO 

> / ~ 4 > / / ” 
od Katadveus TOO KaTadvers aTropacis; val. épnoas 

> > A e / > / ¢ > , ” > / 

5°’ elvat To 0b Katadvers oikiav: 7) oikia dpa amo- 
€ \ / ~ > \ e) A Ul 

paais. ws 57 AvTéov, SHAov: od yap TadTo onpaiver 

> / \ A 4 € / 

o€urepov To dé Baptrepov pybev. 

XXII. AjAov 5€ Kai trois mapa TO Woattws Aé- 
yeoOar Ta py TavTa THs amavTntéov, emeimep 
EXOMEV TA YEVN TOV KATHYOPL@V. O [LEV yap EOwWKeEV 
epwrnfeis pur) vUmdpxyew Te TovUTwY doa Ti €oTL 

, ¢ > bs ¢ / ~ , nn 
onpuatver: 6 & ekev trdpyov te TMV mpds TL 7 
a / 
Tmoa@v, Soxovvtwy S€ Ti eoTt onpaivew bia TH 

, e , a“ aA , >. 3 > / ‘ 
A€Ew, olov ev THe TH Adyw. Gp’ evdexerar TO 

> A A ~ ‘\ / wy > \ 
avTO dua tovety Te Kal memounKévac; ov. aAdAa 

~ \ 
Env opav yé Te dua Kal éwpaKkévat TO abTo Kal 
By / ~ , 
KaTa TavTO evdexeTaL. Gp e€oTi TL TOY TacxeEW 
aA ~ > 7 
movetv TL; Ov. ovKOdY TO TéuveTaL KaleTat aicbd- 
veTat opoiws A€yeTar, Kal TavTAa TaoYEW TL ON- 





* The point here is the difference of breathing and the 
presence or absence of the circumflex accent. 


108 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xx—xxn 


in which he can and in every way in which he can, 
But clearly this solution is not a good one ; for the 
solution of arguments which turn on an identical 
principle is identical, whereas this solution will not 
suit every argument nor every form of question into 
which it can be put, but is directed against the 
questioner, not against the argument. 

XXI. Arguments do not arise owing to accentua- (5) Wrong 

tion either in written or in spoken language, though sia a 
a few might occur such as the following: A house 
is ‘where you lodge’ (of xataAves), isn’t it? Yes. 
Is not “ you do not lodge’ (ov xatadves) the nega- 
tion of ‘ you lodge’ (karaAves)? Yes. But you said 
that ‘ where you lodge ’ (08 xaraAvews) was a house ; 
therefore a house is a negation. It is obvious how 
this must be solved ; for the spoken word is not the 
same with the acuter and with the graver accent. 

XXII. It is plain also how we must meet arguments (6) Similar 
that turn on the identical expression of things which diferent 
are not identical, seeing that we possess the various things. 
kinds of categories. Suppose that one man when 
questioned has granted that something which denotes 
a substance is not an attribute, and another man has 
shown that something is an attribute which is in the 
category of relation or quantity but generally held, 
because of its expression, to denote a substance, as 
for example in the following argument: Is it pos- Examples. 
sible to be doing and to have done the same thing 
at the same time? No. But it is surely possible to 
be seeing and to have seen the same thing at the same 
time and under the same conditions. Or again, Is 
any form of passivity a form of activity? No. Then 
“he is cut,’ ‘ he is burnt,’ “ he is affected by a sensible 
object ’ are similar kinds of expression and all denote 


109 


ARISTOTLE 
178 a 
poaiver: mdAw dé 7d Adyew Tpéxew dpav cpoiws 


/, = ‘ ~ 

15 dAArjAas A€yeTar* GAG pv Td y” dpav aicbavecbai 
Tl €oTW, WOTE Kal TdOYEW TL Ga Kal ToLElVY. Et 
/ > al \ \ > / 4 > \ ~ 
d€ tis exe? Sods pr) evdeyecPar Ga tabTo Toei 
Kal TemToinKevar, TO Opadv Kal éwpaKkévar dain 
> cal ” > / > A / ‘ ca 
eyxwpeiv, ovmw eArjjAeyxra, ef pr) A€you TO Opav 
a / a “~ 
movety Tt GAAA mdoxEW: Tpoddet yap TovTOV TOU 

? / > > ¢ \ ~ > /, ¢ 
20 €pwrjpatos: aAX’ sto Tob aKovovtos trrodap- 
/ / Ld \ / ~ A A 
Bdverar dedwKevar, STE TO Téuvelw ToLEeiy TL Kal TO 

/ / y \ Lid ” 

TETUNKEVAL TETOLNKEvaL EdwWKE, Kal doa GAda 


¢ / 


/ A AY \ > A / 
dpolws A€yerar. TO yap Aowrov adros mpoatibnow 
2. 3 4 ¢ ¢ / Le \ \ / \ 
6 akovwv ws dpoiws Aeydpevov: TO 5é A€yeTar pev 
ovdx Opoiws, haiverar 5é did tiv A€Ew. TO adro 

A / Ld > a ¢ Ul ” \ 

25 5€ cupPatver dmep ev Tals dpwvupiais: oleTaL yap 
> a ¢ / ¢ > \ ~ / “a mm 
ev Tois Ouwvtpots 6 ayvas TOV Adywv 6 edynoev 
> a ~ > * \ oe a 
anopjoa: mpayya, ovK ovoyas TO dé ETL Tpoadet 
> / 2S eS 2 / / ‘ ¢ "- 
epwrnpatos, ei ef’ ev BAétwv Ayer TO Spevupov" 
ovtws yap Sdvros e€atau EAeyyos. 

” \ \ Ld ¢ Ao 4, y we A 
Oporor 5€ Kat olde of Adyou TovTos, ef 6 TIS 
” 7 \ ” > / ¢ A ¢ / 

30 €ywv vorepov pu7) exer améBadev 6 yap Eva povov 
amoBaAwy aotpayadov ob» e€eu Sé€xa aotpayddAous. 
“ \ \ / ” > / Ld 
7 O pev pn) Exe mpoTEpov Exwv, amoBEBAnxKev, Soov 


\ a), na ] > / ~ > a 
dé pn) exer 7 doa, ovK avayKn Tocabdra amopaeiv. 





@ Knucklebones were used as dice by the Greeks. 
110 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxu 


some form of passivity ; and, on the other hand, ‘ to 
say, ‘ to run,’ and ‘ to see’ are forms of expression 
similar to one another ; but ‘ to see ’ is surely a way 
of being affected by a sensible object, so that passivity 
and activity occur at the same time. In the former 
case, if someone, after granting that it is impossible 
to be doing and to have done the same thing at the 
same time, were to say that it is possible to see a 
thing and to have seen it, he has not yet been refuted 
supposing that he declares that seeing is a form not 
of activity but of passivity. For this further question 
is necessary, though he is supposed by the hearer to 
have granted it when he granted that ‘ to cut ’ is ‘ to 
be doing something ’ and ‘ to have cut’ is ‘ to have 
done something,’ and so with similar forms of expres- 
sion. For the hearer himself adds the rest, on the 
supposition that the significance is similar, whereas 
it is not really similar but only appears so owing to 
the expression. The same thing occurs as in fallacies 
of ambiguity ; for in dealing with ambiguous terms 
the man who is not an expert in argument thinks 
that his opponent has denied the fact which he 
asserted, not the term, whereas yet another ques- 
tion needs to be asked, namely, whether he is 
using the ambiguous term with his eye upon one 
meaning only ; for if he grants this, a refutation will 
be achieved. 

Similar to the above are also the following argu- 
ments : Has a man lost what he had and afterwards 
has not? For he who has lost one die * only will no 
longer have ten dice. Is not what really happens 
that he has lost something which he had before but 
no longer has, but it does not follow that he has lost 
the whole amount or number which he no longer 


111 


Examples 
(continued). 


ARISTOTLE 


178 a 
> , > a »” , D4 ~ A \ 
EpWTINTAS OUV O EXEL, OVVQAYEL €77L TOU OOA* TA yap 


/ 4 > Ss ” > > ~ 7, 7 A 
35 O€ka Toad. el obv npeto e& apxfs «i doa TLS p71) 
” , ” > 7 > , A 
EXEL TPOTEpov Exwv, apa ye amoBeBAnKe TocabTa, 
? \ nv ” > : dines ~ n / \ 
ovdels av edwkev, dAd’ 7 TooatTa 7 ToUTwWY TL. Kal 
ov / ” a ed > \ ” 4 , 
ott doin av Tis 6 py exer. od yap exer Eva povov 
aotpayadov. 1 o¥ dédwKev 6 ovK elyev, add’ ws 
? \ ov \ \ / >? / / 
ovK elye, TOV Eva; TO yap povov od TOdE ONLaiver 
178b oVde ToLdvde OvdE TOddVde, GAN’ Ws EXEL TPS TL, 
e o °’ a! Lf A 9) oF i ee 
olov ott od per’ GAAov. warrep ody Ei NpeTo ap’ O 
/ ” / + \ / \ om” ] / 
py Tus exer Soin av, un pavtos dé Epoiro «i Soin 
»” / , \ ” / / \ 
av Tis TL Taxéws pr) Exwv Taxéws, dyoavros de 
/ Lu / ” “a \ ” A 
avAdoyiloito Stu Soin av tis 6 py Exel. Kal 
\ 7 > / \ \ / > 
5 pavepov ott ov avddcAdyroTaL: TO yap Tayéws ov 
Tdd€ Siddvar GAN’ Bde Siddvar eoriv: ws Se pr) Exer 
/, + ¢ / ” / n“ ~ 
tis, doin av, olov 7déws Exwv Soin av AvTNpAs. 
7 \ \ € y / 5S > . See 4 
Oporor 5€ Kai ot Towide TavTes. ap FH pr exer 
Xeupl TUTTOL av; 7 @ pr exer OdOaAu@ toe av; 
> \ ” oe / 4 \ be a \ , 
10 00 yap €xeu Eva provov. Advovow pev odv Twes Aé- 


A 
yovres Kal ws exer Eva povov Kal dfBadpov Kat 
112 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xx1r 


has? In the question, therefore, he is dealing with 
that which he has, in the conclusion with the total 
number ; for the number was ten. If, therefore, he 
had asked in the first place whether a man who 
formerly possessed a number of objects which he no 
longer possesses, has lost the total number of them, 
no one would have granted this, but would have said 
that he had lost either the total number or one of the 
objects. Again, it is argued that a man could give 
what he had not got; for what he has not got is one 
die only. Is not what really happens that he has not 
given that which he has not got but has given it in a 
manner in which he has not got it, namely, as a single 
unit? For ‘single unit’ does not denote either a 
particular kind of thing or a quality or a quantity 
but a certain relation to something else, namely, 
dissociation from anything else. It is, therefore, as 
though he had asked whether a man could give what 
he has not got, and on receiving the answer ‘ No,’ 
were to ask whether a man could give something 
quickly when he had not got it quickly, and, on 
receiving the answer ‘ Yes,’ were to infer that a man 
could give what he had not got. It is obvious that 
he has not drawn a correct inference ; for ‘ giving 
quickly ’ does not denote giving a particular thing 
but giving in a particular manner, and a man could 
give something in a manner in which he did not get 
it; for example, he could get it with pleasure and 
give it with pain. 

Similar also are all the following arguments : Further 
‘Could a man strike with a hand that he has not got *™ples. 
or see with an eye that he has not got?’ For he has 
not got only one eye. Some people, therefore, solve 
this by saying that the man who has more than one 


113 


ARISTOTLE 
178 b 
+ > c ~ ¢ / ” c \ ‘ ¢ “a 
GAN’ driv 6 mrciw exw. ot 5é Kai ds 6 exe 
eAaPev: édiSov yap piav povov obtos Widov: Kal 
obtés y’ éxet, pacl, piay pdvyv mapa Tovrov 
pidov. of & edOds thy epwrnow dvaipobvres, drt 
15 evdéxerar 6 pur) eAaBev yew, ofov olvov AaBédvra 
ndvv, Svapbapévros ev TH Aner, Exew dEdv. GAN 
omep €A€éxOn Kai mpdrepov, obto. mdvTes od pos 
\ / > \ A \ + , ’ 
tov Adyov aAAad mpds Tov dvOpwrov Adovow. ef 
\ Ss ¢ r / 5 / A > / b] el 
yap qv avTn Avois, ddvTa TO avTiKeipevov ody ofdv 
, 4, 24 ~ a e >” A 
Te Avew, Kabdrep emi Tdv dAAwv: olov «i Eort pev 
206 €ott 8 6 ob, 4 Avows, dv dmAds 8G AéyecOu, 
ovupTrepaiverau eay Sé pt) ovuptrepatvnrat, od av 
ein Avaws: ev S€é Tois Tpoeipnpévors TavTwv 8.S0- 
/ i) / / 0 AX / 
pevav odd€ hapev yiveobar ovAdoyiopov. 
” A \ aQ> > aX, /, ~ / a > 
Ere d€ Kai 018” eiot todtwv radv Adywv. Gp 
a“ / ” / / \ ~ bd 4 
25 6 yéypanrat, €ypade Tis; yéypamrar dé viv dre od 
Kdbnoar, pevdrs Adyos: Hv 8 ddAnOrys, 67’ eypadero- 
av ” > / 8 A \ an 0 / \ A 
dpa apa eypadeto pevdns Kai adnOys. To yap 
pevdt 7 adnOA Adyov 7 Sdéav elvar od Tdde GAAa 
To.ovde onuaiver: 6 yap abros Adyos Kal emi THs 
/, . 8 Sa / ¢ / a _'>"d \ 
30 d0€ns. Kal dp’ 6 pavOdver 6 pavOdvwv, Todr’ eoriv 
“a / / / \ \ / > 
6 pavOdver; pavOdver 5é tis TO Bpadd taxd. od 
/ a“ / iA > e 0 /, wv \ 
toivuy 6 pavOdver GAr’ ws pavOdver eipnKev. Kai 
ca € 
dp’ 6 Padiler tus maret; Padiler d€ tiv 7epav 





@ It seems probable that a new argument is dealt with here, 
cf. b 36 Kal 671 KrA. of 5€ possibly introduced a second solu- 
tion of the previous argument which has fallen out. 

» But B may already possess other pebbles. 

INT DSS. 


114 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxi 


eye (or whatever it is) has also only one. There is 
also * the argument of some people that ‘ what a man 
has, he has received’: A only gave one pebble, and 
B has, they say, only one pebble from A.? Other 
people argue by directly demolishing the question 
raised, saying that one can have what one has not 
received ; for example, one can receive wine that is 
sound but have it in a sour condition if it has gone 
bad in the process of transfer. But, as was said before,° 
all these people direct their solutions not to the argu- 
ment but to the man. For if this were a real solution, 
it would be impossible to achieve a solution by grant- 
ing the opposite, as happens in all other cases ; for 
example, if ‘it is partly so and partly not so’ is the 
solution, an admission that the expression is used 
without qualification makes the conclusion valid ; 
but if no conclusion is reached, there cannot be a 
solution. In the above examples, even though every- 
thing is conceded, yet we say that no proof has been 
effected. 
Moreover, the following also belong to this class 
of arguments : ‘ If something is written, did someone 
write it?’ It is written that ‘ you are sitting ’ ; this 
is a false statement, but was true at the time when 
it was written ; therefore what was written is at the 
same time false and true. No, for the falsity or truth 
of a statement or opinion does not denote a substance 
but a quality ; for the same account applies to an 
opinion as to a statement. Again, ‘Is what the 
learner learns that which he learns?’ A man learns 
a slow march quick; it is not then what he learns 
that is meant but how he learns it. Again, “ Does a 
man trample on that through which he walks?’ 
But he walks through the whole day. Was not what 


115 


ARISTOTLE 
178 b 
ov ” 
OAnv. 7 ody 6 Badiler GAN dre Badiler cipnKev- 
ov orav THY KUAUKa Tivew, 6 Triver GAN e€ od,” 
35 Kal dp 6 Tis oldev 7) wabwv 7 edpwr oldev; dv Se 
\ \ e A > »” A + > / nn a 
TO pev edpe TOD enable, Ta Gudw oddeTEpov. 7 6 
Spee 3 a 9? > ’ 1 \¢ ” , 
pev dmav, & 8 Cody) dmavra;' Kal Oru €oTe TLS TPl- 
»” > ? \ ‘ A 77 ‘ 
tos avOpwros Trap’ adrov Kai Tovs Kal’ ExaoTov. TO 
\ 4 \ so A \ > / > \ 
yap avOpwros Kal amav TO Kowov ov Tdd€ TL, dAAa 
TOLOVOE TL TPOS TL 7) TAS 7 THV ToLovTwWY TL O7- 
179a waiver. opoiws d€ Kal emi Tob Kopioxos Kai Ko- 
plokos povoiKds, TOTEpov TavTov 7 ETEpoV; TO 
A \ 0) \ de / 5 / a > > 
fev yap Toe TL TO SE ToLdVdE GHpaiver, WoT OvK 
” b] \ > / > ‘ > / \ a A 
éotw avTo exbéaba od To €xtibecIar Sé Trove? TOV 
/ ” > \ A ov / 
tpttov avOpwrov, adAAa TO Sep Tbe TL elvar ovy- 
a U 
5 ywpeiv. ov yap €ora Tdd€ TL elvat, 6mep KaAdXias, 
\ hid »” / > 29> ” \ > / 
Kal Omep avOpwros eotw. ovd’ et Tis TO exTLOe- 
pevov 1) OTrep TOE TL elvas A€you GAA’ Grrep TroLoV, 
> \ / ” \ A \ \ A Ld 
ovdev Svolcer’ ota yap TO Tapa Tods moAAovs EV 
e ¢ ” \ = Ld > / 
tt, olov 6 avOpwmos. davepov odv dtu od doréov 
~ > ~ 
rode TL elvar TO KOWT KaTHYyopoUpevov emi AoW, 
> > » A ” / ”“ 4 ”“ ~ 4, 
10 GAA’ TOL TrOLOV 7 POS TL} TOGOV 7 T@V TOLOUTwWY 
TL onpatvew. 
XXIII. “OAws 8 ev rots mapa tiv AéEw Adyous 
+ Tae | A ‘ > / ” ¢ / ”“ > hd 
del KaTa TO avTiKEeipevov EoTar 7) Avats 7) Tap’ 6 
1 Reading & 8 <ody> dzavra with Pickard-Cambridge. 
116 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxn-xxim 


was meant not what he walks through but when he 
walks ? Just as when we talk of a man drinking a 
cup, we refer not to what he drinks but to that out 
of which he drinks. Again, ‘Is it not either by 
learning or by discovery that a man knows what he 
knows?’ But, supposing that of two things he has 
discovered one and learnt the other, he has not either 
discovered or learnt the two taken together. Is it 
not true to say that what he knows is each single 
thing, but not all the things taken together? There 
is also the argument that there is a ‘ third man’ 
beside ‘ man’ and ‘ individual men.’ This is not so, 
for ‘man’ and every generic term denotes not an 
individual substance but a quality or relation or mode 
or something of the kind. So, too, with the question 
whether ‘ Coriscus ’ and ‘ the musician Coriscus ’ are 
the same thing or different. For the one term denotes 
an individual substance, the other a quality, so that 
it is impossible to isolate it ; for it is not the process 
of isolation which produces the ‘ third man’ but the 
admission that there is an individual substance. For 
“man ’ will not be an individual substance as Callias 
is, nor will it make any difference if one were to say 
that what is isolated is not an individual substance 
but a quality ; for there will still be a one as con- 
trasted with the many, for instance ‘man.’ It is 
obvious, therefore, that it must not be granted that 
the term predicated universally of a class is an in- 
dividual substance, but we must say that it denotes 
either a quality or a relation or a quantity or some- 
thing of the kind. 

XXIII. To sum up, in dealing with arguments summary of 
which turn on language the solution will always de- PC¢for the 
pend on the opposite of that on which the argument fallacies 


117 


ARISTOTLE 
179 a 
> e 
eotw 6 Adyos. olov ei mapa atvOeaw 6 oyos, 7 

/ 

Avars Srerovtt, ef 5é Tapa Svaipeow, ovvOevt.. mdAw 

> A / > lal € a , 

15 €l mapa mpoomdiay d€elav, 7 Bapeta mpoomdia 
A 4, > be ‘ a e > a > de > 
vais, et de mapa Papelav, 7 o€eia. «i de map 
¢ 
Opwvuplav, €OTL TO GVTLKEMEVOV Ovoma €imovTa 
Xr , i > + 1 4 ré: > / 
vew, olov «i aibvyov’ ovpBaiver Adyew, amody- 
A ~ e ” ” > > 
cavTa pn elvar, SnAodv ws Eorw epuibvyov: et 8 
” ” ¢ > m», / / 
abvyov epynaev, 6 8° Eurxsvyov ovveAoyioato, Aéyew 
€ ” ” c ¢ \ \ DICF ~ > 
200s eoTw aiyvyov. opoiws Sé Kal emi THS apdt- 
/ > \ eR. 4 /, / \ > / 
BoXias. «i dé map” duovdtynta A€Eews, TO avTiKEl- 
” 4 Ss > “ \ ” / ” 
fevov €otar Avous. Gp’ 6 pr exer, doin av Tis; 
a“ s “a A ” > > ¢ > ” ov / 
7 odx 6 py exer, GAN ws odK exer, olov Eva jLdvov 
aotpayadov. dp 6 émiorara, wabdv 7 etpwv 
2 7 2\\> > arene ‘2 a , 
emiotatat; daAd’ ody a éemiorata. Kal® 6 Badiler 
al > > > 4 ¢ / A \ Fs s% ~ 
25 Tate, GAA’ ody OTE. opoiws dé Kal em THY 
aAAwv. 

XXIV. IIpds 5€ rods mapa to ovpBeBynKos pia 
prev 4 adr? AvVows mpos GmavTas. emel yap adi- 
dpiorov e€oTt TO TOTE AeKTéov emi TOD mpaypaTos, 
oTav emt TOO cupBeBynKoTos brdpyn, Kal em” eviwy 

\ ~ ‘ / i > ¥ > ” > 

30 ev Soke Kal haoiv, em eviwy 8 ov daow avay- 
Kaiov elvat, pytéov odv ovpPiBacbertos® dpoiws 
mpos amavras Ott ovK avayKaiov. éxew de det 
mpohepewv TO olov. eiot dé wdvres of Towwide TOV 

/ \ ‘ / Ss >? “ , 
Aoywv mapa TO ovpPeBnKds. Gp’ oldas 6 wéedAAw 

1 Reading apuyov with Poste for euxpvyor. 


* Omitting «i after xai. 
3 Reading ovpBiBacbévros with A. 





@ See note on 178 a 31. > See 178 b 32-33. 
118 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxi1—xxiv 


turns ; for example, if the argument turns on com- which 
bination, the solution will be by division, if on division, $fhfn4 °° 
by combination. Again, if it turns on acute accentua- 
tion, grave accentuation will be the solution, and 
vice versa. If it turns on equivocation, it can be solved 
by the use of the opposite term ; for example, if it 
so happens that one says something is inanimate 
after having denied that it is so, one must show that 
it is animate ; and, if one has said that it is inanimate 
and one’s opponent has argued that it is animate, 
one must assert that it is inanimate. Similarly, too, 
in the case of ambiguity ; if the argument turns on 
similarity of language, the opposite will be the solu- 
tion. ‘Could one give what one has not got?’ 
Surely not what he has not got but he could give it in 
a way in which he has not got it, for example, a single 
die “ by itself. ‘ Does a man know the thing which 
he knows by learning or discovery?’ Yes, but not 
‘the things which he knows.’ Also a man tramples 
on the thing through which he walks, not on the t2me 
through which he walks.” And similarly, too, with 
the other instances. 

XXIV. To meet arguments which turn upon acci- (6) Solu- 
dent one and the same solution is universally appli- doounaand 
cable. It is undetermined on what occasions the rouge ol 
attribute should be applied to the subject where it xxx). — 
belongs to the accident, and sometimes it is generally ¢,A° 
held and stated to belong and sometimes it is denied () By 
that it necessarily belongs. We must, therefore, when poco Bo 
a conclusion has been reached, assert in every case from the | 
alike that it does not necessarily belong. But we must the subject. 
have an example to bring forward. Allsuch arguments 
as the following turn on accident : ‘Do you know what 
I am about.to ask you?’ ‘Do you know the man 


119 


ARISTOTLE 
179 a 
> an) > \ pp a” A >? 
oe epwrdv; dp’ oldas tov mpoowvra 7) Tov ey- 
> > 
KekaAuppevov; dap 6 avdpias adv éeoTw épyov, 7 
\ ¢ 4 / ss \ > / 3\7 2\7/ 

35 GOs 6 KUwY TaTHp; dpa Ta dAvyaKis oAiya oXiya; 
davepov yap év amaou ToUToLs OTL OVK avdyKN TO 
Kata Tob ovpPeBynKdTos Kal KaTa TOD mpdypwaTos 
aAnfevecbar: povois yap Tois Kata THY odolav 
> / 1, oa 7 9 a b eee Oe / 
adiapdpos Kai Ev ovow amavra SoKe? TabTa brdp- 

179b yew TO 9” ayalS od radrov éeorw ayabd 7° elvar 
Kat péAAovte epwrdobar, ovdé TH TpoordvTe 7) ey- 
Kekadvppeva mpoovovre Te elvar Kal Kopioxw: wor 
ovK €t oda Tov Kopicxov, ayvod dé Tov mpoo.ovTa, 

A > \ es ~ 99> > a >? 3 ‘ > / 
Tov avrov olda Kal ayvo®: otd’ ei Tobr’ E€aTiv Euov, 
” > ” >? / >? ” > bE ~ nn” 

5éoTt 8 épyov, eudov eotw epyov, add’ 7 KTHMA 7 
mpayya % dAdo Tt. Tov adrov Sé Tpdmov Kal emi 
Tov dddwv. 

4 / > ~ \ > 7 \ 
Avovor 5€ twes avatpotytes Tv epwrynow: Pact 
yap evdexeoOan tadTo mpa&ypa eidévar Kal ayvoeiv, 
GAAG. 7) KaTA TAVTO* TOV ObV mpoaLoVTA OdK EidOTES, 
\ \ / 99 7 ) ‘ \ 2» 7 \ 

10 Tov d€ Kopicxov eiddétes, tadbTo pev €id€évar Kal 
ayvoeiv daciv, add’ od Kata TabTo. Kaito. mp@rov 
pev, Kabdamep On eltopev, Set THY Tapa TadTo 
Adywv tHhv adrnv elvar didplwow: avrn 8 ovK 
” ” A +R ~ 9 / > 2, Des “~ 
€orat, av Tis pn emt TOO eidévar add’ emi Tob elvat 
” ~ ” \ > ‘ > / / .y > @ 
}) mas €xew 70 adbro akiwpa AapBavy, olov ei dde 





@ See 179 b 15. Cf. Plato, Huthydemus 298 x. 

» The reference here is to the question (a 33) ‘ Do you 
know what I am about to ask you?’ The reply is ‘ no.’ 
‘I am going to ask you about the good; therefore, you do 
not know aaa the good.’ 

ory bai. 


120 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxiv 


who is coming towards us?’ or ‘the man with his 
face covered?’ ‘Is the statue your work?’ or ‘ Is 
the dog your father ?’¢ ‘ Is the result of multiplying 
a small number by another small number itself a 
small number?’ It is obvious that in all these 
instances it does not necessarily follow that the 
attribute which is true of the accident is also true of 
the subject. For it is only to things which are in- 
distinguishable and one in essence that all the same 
attributes are generally held to belong ; but in the 
case of the good, it is not the same thing to be good 
and to be about to be the subject of a question.” Nor 
in the case of ‘ the man who is coming towards us ’ 
(or “‘ with his face covered ’), is ‘ to be coming towards 
us’ the same thing as ‘to be Coriscus’; so that, 
if I know Coriscus but do not know the man who is 
coming towards me, it does not follow that I know 
and do not know the same man. And again, if this 
is ‘ mine ’ and if it is also ‘ a piece of work,’ it is not 
therefore ‘a piece of my work’ but may be my 
possession or chattel or something else. The other 
instances can be treated in the same way. 

Some people obtain a solution by demolishing the (6) By de 
thesis of the question ; for they say that it is possible the ecateal 
to know and not to know the same thing but not question. 
in the same respect; when, therefore, they do not 
know the man who is coming towards them but know 
Coriscus, they say that they know and do not know 
the same thing but not in the same respect. Yet in 
the first place, as we have already said,* the method 
of correcting arguments which turn on the same 
principle ought to be identical, yet this will not be so, if 
one takes the same axiom to apply not to ‘knowledge’ 
but to ‘ existence’ or ‘ being in a certain state’ ; for 


121 


179 b 
15 


20 


25 


30 


ARISTOTLE 


> ‘ , ” \ l4 > A Bi 25. : Sal g a> 
€oTl TaTHp, €oTt dé ads ei yap em eviwy TodT 
> 
eotiv dAnfés Kat evdeyerar ravto ecidévat Kal 
ayvoeiv, add’ evradba oddev Kowwvel TO Acxbev. 
) \ A 7, \ > ‘ /, / , 
ovdev dé KwAver TOV adrov Adyov TrAciovs woxOnpias 
” > > > € , ¢ / > , 4, 
exew. aAX’ ody 7) TaonS dpaprias éuddviots Avats 
> / > a \ Ld A ~ / 
eoTiv: éyyxwpet yap dtu pev peddos avdAAcAdyorau 
deiEal twa, wap’ 6 de pr Sei€ar, olov tov Zivwvos 
Aoyov, drt odK Eat. KWyPHVaL. Gore Kal El TIS 
emixerpoin ouvayew ws advvaTrov, auapTdver, Kav 
> / > / > / > ” 
el poupidkis 7) avdAcAoytopevos: od yap eoTw avrn 
Avots. Fv yap 7 Avots euddvors pevdobs cvdAdAoyt- 
~ > a“ / > s \ / ” 
apod, map’ 6 yevdrs: ef odv pr avdAdcAdyrorar 7 
Kat adAnbeés 7 yeBdos <ievdas)' emryerpe? ovvayew, 
¢ > / / r 4, > / ” be \ a> 
7 ekelvov dHAwots Avots EoTiv. tows b€ Kal TooT 
rms > A /, / A > / 
en eviwy ovdev KwAver oupBaiveww? An emt ye 
7, > A ~ / EA \ A ‘ / 
Tovtwy ovde TotTo ddé€evev av: Kal yap tov Kopi- 
Ld / s \ A ‘ Ld 
okov ort Kopioxos olde, kal TO mpoadv Ott Tpoo- 
, > / \ a ‘ > \ > / \ , 
dv. evdexeacbar dé Soke? TO adro cid€var Kal pr}, 
a ev \ \ 207 ¢ \ A \ 
olov ore pev AevKov Eldévar, STL SE pLovarKov 47) 
/ a \ \ .] A td \ > tS 
yrwpilew: odtw yap TO adro olde Kal odKk older, 
adr’ od Kara tabrov. TO dé mpoatov Kai Kopicxor, 
“.@ \ ,\@ / 
Kal OTL mpootov Kal oT. Kopioxos, older. 
e / 2: 5 / \ ¢ r /, Ld id 
Opotws 8 dpaprdvovar Kal of Avovres, Ott amas 


1 Reading with W. A. Pickard-Cambridge Weddos <evdads>. 





* Cf. a 34 f., the false conclusion being, * This dog is your 
father.’ 


122 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxiv 


example, ‘ this dog is a father, this dog is yours.’ 4 
Though it is sometimes true and it is possible to know 
and not to know the same thing, yet the suggested 
solution is quite inapplicable in the above instance. 
But there is no reason why the same argument should 
not contain several flaws, but it is not the exposure 
of every fault that forms a solution ; for it is possible 
for a man to show that a false conclusion has been 
reached without showing on what point it turns, as, 
for instance, in Zeno’s argument that motion is im- 
possible. Even, therefore, if one were to attempt 
to infer the impossibility of this view, he is wrong, 
even though he has given countless proofs ; for this 
procedure does not constitute a solution, for a solu- 
tion is, as we saw, an exposure of false reasoning, 
showing on what the falsity depends. If, therefore, 
he has not proved his case or else if he attempts to 
draw an inference, whether true or false, by false 
means, the unmasking of this procedure is a solution. 
But perhaps, though in some cases there is nothing 
to prevent this happening, yet it would not be gener- 
ally admitted in the instances given above ; for he 
knows that Coriscus is Coriscus and that what is 
coming towards him is coming towards him. But 
there are cases in which it is generally held to be 
possible to know and not to know the same thing ; 
for instance, one can know that someone is white 
but be ignorant of the fact that he is musical, thus 
knowing and not knowing the same thing but not 
in the same respect ; but as to what is coming towards 
him and Coriscus, he knows both that it is coming 
towards him and that he is Coriscus. 
An error similar to that made by those whom we (Erroneous 


have mentioned is committed by those who solve wytyods of 


123 


ARISTOTLE 
179 b 
> ‘ >\7 ¢ “A ” > \ \ 
35 apiOuos oAlyos, womep ods elmomev’ ef yap pi) 
OULTEpawopevov, TOTO Tapadurovtes, aAnbes ovp- 
meTrepav0a haci, mdvra yap elvar Kal moAdv Kai 
oAiyov, dpaptavovow. 
"Evwoe b€ Kal TO SitT@ Avovat Tods avdAdroyicpors, 
e bi 4 > \ ” ey ” ~ / 
olov OTL Gos €aTL TaTHp 7 vios 7) SodAOS. Kaitou 
180a davepov ws ei Tapa TO ToAaxas A€yeoOar daiverat 
Cw ~ ” ” \ £ / 
0 €Aeyxos, Set Tovvoua 7 Tov Adyov Kupiws etvar 
4 ‘ A / > ~ /, > ‘ 
TAedvwv: TO dé TOvd’ elvat Todde TéKVov oddels 
A / / > , > \ / > A \ 
evel Kupiws, et OeamOTNS €oTl TEKVOU: GAAA Tapa 
‘ \ ¢€ 7 / > 2 > \ ~ 
570 avpPeBnKos 4 ovvOecis eorw. Gp éati TodTo 
gov; vat. €oTt d€ TodTo TéKvov; adv dpa TodTO 
/, hid / s \ A \ / 
TeKVoVv’ OTL oupPeByKev elvat Kal Gov Kal TEKVOV, 
> > ? ‘ / 
adn’ od oov TéKvov. 
‘ A ~ a > / € \ 4 
Kai ro eva tév Kaxdv te ayabov: 7) yap dpovn- 
ais €oTw emioTHUN TOV KAK@V. TO d€ TOTO TOv- 
> / ~ > A ~ > 
10 Twv elvae od Adyerar ToAAayds, GAAG KTHpa. Ef 
> lal \ \ ‘ »” ~ 7 
3° dpa 7odAaxas (Kai yap tov dvOpwrov tav Cobwv 
\ > > ” ond \ 7 \ \ 
papev elvar, adAd’ od tu KTAwa) Kal édv TL mpOds TA 
Kaka A€éynra ws TwWds, dia TObTO TMV KaK@v eaTiv, 
adn’ ob} tobto TOV KaK@v. Tapa TO TH odv Kal 
¢ ~ / / > / ” > ‘ 
amAds aiverar. Kaito. evdéxerar tows ayabov 
15 elvai Te TOV KaKa@v SitTHs, adr’ odk emt tod Adyou 
tovtov, aAd’ «i te dodAov etn ayabdov poxOnpod, 
~ ” > +9? 4 > \ ES ‘ \ 
paAAov. tows 8’ 08d’ otrws: od ydp ei ayabov Kai 





* When it is equivalent to our ‘* so-and-so’s,’ 


124 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxiv 


the argument that every number is small; for if, 
when no conclusion has been reached, they pass over 
the fact and say that a conclusion has been reached 
and is true because every number is both large and 
small, they are committing an error. 

Some people, too, solve these reasonings by the 
principle of ambiguity, saying, for example, that 
‘ yours ’ means ‘ your father ’ or ‘ your son’ or ‘ your 
slave.’ Yet it is obvious that, if the refutation turns 
upon the possibility of several meanings, the term 
or expression ought to be used literally in several 
senses ; but no one speaks of A as B’s child in the 
literal sense if B is the child’s master, but the com- 
bination is due to accident. ‘Is A yours?’ ‘ Yes.’ 
‘Is Aachild?’ ‘ Yes.’ ‘Then A is your child,’ for 
he happens to be both yours and a child ; but for all 
that he is not ‘ your child.’ 

There is also the argument that ‘ something “ of 
evils’ is good; for wisdom is a knowledge “ of 
evils.” ’ But the statement that this is ‘ of so-and- 
so’ is not used with several meanings but denotes 
possession. Granting, however, that the genitive has 
more than one meaning (for we say that man is ‘ of 
the animals,’ though not a possession of theirs), and if 
the relation of so-and-so to evils is expressed by the 
genitive, it is therefore a so-and-so ‘ of evils,’ but so- 
and-so is not one of the evils. The difference seems to 
be due to whether the genitive is used in a particular 
sense or absolutely. Yet it is perhaps possible for the 
saying ‘Something of evils is good’ to be ambiguous, 
though not in the example given above, but rather in 
the phrase ‘a slave is good of the wicked.’ But per- 
haps this example is not to the point either; for if 
something is ‘ good’ and ‘ of so-and-so,’ it is not at 


125 


ARISTOTLE 
180 a 
/ > \ , 7 OA \ ‘ y 
Tovtov, ayabov rovTov dua. ovd€é 70 Tov avOpwrov 


pavar t&v Caw elvar od A€yerar moddaxyds- od 
‘ ” / / > / ~ /, 
20 yap €l moTE TL Onpaivouev adheAdvTes, TOOTO Aé- 
yetar 7oAAay@s* Kat yap TO Huov elmdvTes Tod 
” / > / / \ ~ 
Emous dos pou “IAudda onpaivouev, ofov ro phy 
aewe Ded. 
A \ A \ / / n”“ lol ”“ 
XXV. Tovds 5€ mapa 7d Kupiws Tdde ) TH 7 
~ ” ~ ” / / \ \ c ~ 
Tod 4) THs 1 mpds te A€yeoOar Kai pr) adds, 
25 Auréov oKomobvt. TO cuptrépacua mpds TH avri- 
paow, et evdexerar TovTwv Tu meTovOdvar. Ta yap 
> / \ \ > / A / 1.43 / 
evavTia Kal Ta avTiKetpeva, Kat ddow Kal andpacw 
aTAds pev advvarov trdpyew TH adt@, mH wévTor 
¢ / ” , ” ~ ” \ \ a ‘ > 
EKATEpoV 7) TpOs TL THs, 7 TO bev TH TO SB 
€ ~ > A / A > > , \ ¢ ~ 
amdds, obdev Kwdta. war ef Tdde ev amAds 
~ ~ > ~ 
30 T0d€ Se mH, ovmw Edeyxos. Todto 8 ev TH ovp- 
mepdopat. Oewpntéov mpos Ti avridacw. 
.% A / ¢ ~ / Pind), ae 
Eioi d€ mavres of Tovodrot Adyou Tobr’ Exovres. 
\ 
dp’ evdéxerar TO pun) dv elvar; aAAA pay ere ye 
‘ ” ¢ / \ ‘ s > ” b \ 
TL pn Ov. dpoiws S€ Kal 7d dv odK EoTaL: od yap 
” ~ a+ Sd 3 / ‘ > ‘ Md 
85 €oTaL TL THY OvTwY. ap’ evdéxeTar TOV adrov dpa 
a a > a 
evopKelv Kai émuopKeiv; dp éyywpet tov adbrov 
7 ~ > ~ / ‘ > a n” * 
dpa TH avt@ meWecOa Kai amebeiv; i) ovre 
\ / \ > b] / \ \ \ ” ’ > 
To elvai Te Kat elvar tadrov; TO dé py Ov, odk ef 
” ey c ~ 4” > > > a , nn 
€oTt TL, Kal €oTw adds: ovr’ ef evopKel TdSE 7} 
126 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxiv—xxv 


_ the same time ‘so and-so’s good.’ Nor is the state- 
ment that ‘ man is of the animals’ used with several 
meanings; for a phrase does not acquire several 
senses every time we express its meaning in an ellip- 
tical form ; for we express, ‘ Give me the Iliad’ by 
quoting the half line “ Sing, goddess, the wrath.’ 

XXYV. Arguments which turn upon the use of an (2) The use 

_ expression not in its proper sense but with validity Words 
in respect only of a particular thing or in a particular wie 
respect or place or degree or relation and not ab- ion. 
solutely, must be solved by examining the conclusion 
in the light of its contradictory, to see if it can possibly 
have been affected in any of these ways. For it is 
impossible for contraries and opposites and an affirma- 
tive and a negative to belong absolutely to the same 
subject ; on the other hand, there is no reason why 
each should not belong in a particular respect or 
relation or manner, or one in a particular respect and 
the other absolutely. Thus if one belongs absolutely 
and the other in a particular respect, no refutation has 
yet beenreached. This point must be examined in the 

_ conclusion by comparison with its contradictory. 

All the following arguments are of this kind: Is Examples, 
it possible for what is-not to be? But surely it is 
something which is not. Similarly, too, Being will 
not be ; for it will xot be any particular thing which 
is.—Is it possible for the same man at the same time 
to keep and to break his oath ?—Is it possible for the 
same man at the same time to obey and disobey the 
same order? Is it not true, in the first place, that 
being something and Being are not the same thing ? 

On the other hand, Not-being, even if it is something, 
has not absolute being as well. Secondly, if a man 
keeps his oath on a particular occasion or in a par- 


127 


180 a 


180 b 


o 


1 


o 


15 


ARISTOTLE 


nO > / ‘ > ~ e ie > / > , 
THE, avayKn Kai edopKeiv, 6 8 duodcas emopKyncew 
> son AD ~ ~ /, > ~ \ ” 39> 
evopkel emiopK@v TobTo pLovov, edopKel Sé ov Ovd 
6 ameOdv meiBerar, adAd ru meiDerat. Spowos 8 
0 Adyos Kai Trept Tob eVdecar Tov adrov Gua Kat 
> 
adnbevew: adrAa bia TO pw) elvar edOewpytov, To- 
Tépws av Tis atrodoin TO aTADS aAnOevew 7 pevde- 
aba, d¥cKoAov daiverar. KwAver 8’ Tov adTrov" oddEV 
€ ~ ~ ~ a 
amAds pev elvar pevdq, mH 8 dAnOH, 7 Twos Kat 
elvar adnOA twa, adnOA Sé Cadrov) pH.? . dwotws dé 
Kal éml TOV Tpds TL Kal TOU Kal mOTE* TaVTES yap 
€ ~ / A ~ / > 
ot Towodrot Adyo. mapa TobTo cupBaivovow. ap 
7 vyleca 7 6 tAobros ayalbv; adAa TH adpovt 
\ \ > ~ / > > / > A ” 
Kat 7 opbds xpwyevw otk ayabov: ayaloyv apa 
‘ >? > , Ss \ € Ul “ 4 > 
Kat ovK ayalov. dpa Td vyraivew 7 d¥vacBar ev 
moAe ayabbv; aAd’ eotw 6re od BéAriov: radrov 
A ~ b) ~ > ‘\ ‘ > > , n” > \ 
dpa T@ abt@ ayabov Kat odk ayabov. 7 oddev 
Kwdver aTADs dv ayabov THde pr) elvar ayabdr, 7) 
T@dE pev ayalov, add’ od viv 7 odK evtadl’ ayabdv; 
ge _9 “ \ 4, > ” ¢ / / > 
dp 6 pt) Bovdror’ av 6 dpdvipos, KaKdv; azro- 
Badeiv 8 od BovAeTra tayabdv: Kaxov apa Ttayabov. 
? ‘ > ‘ > ~ > \ \ ‘ \ 
o¥ yap Tadrov eimeivy tayabov elvat KaKdv Kal TO 
amoBadeiv tayalov. dpoiws dé Kal 6 Tod KAémTOU 


1 Reading rév adrov or rodrov for adrov. 


128 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxv 


ticular respect, it does not necessarily follow that 
he is a keeper of oaths, but he who he has sworn that 
he will break his oath keeps his oath on this particular 
occasion only by foreswearing himself, but is not a 
keeper of oaths; nor is he who disobeys obedient, 
“except to a particular order. The argument is 
similar which deals with the question whether the 
same man can say what is at the same time both true 
and false ; but it presents apparent difficulties be- 
cause it is not easy to see whether the qualification 
~ absolutely * should be applied to ‘ true ’ or to ‘ false.’ 
But there is no reason why the same man should not 
be absolutely a liar yet tell the truth in some respects, 
or that some of a man’s words should be true but he 
himself not be truthful. Similarly, too, if there are 
qualifications of relation or place or time. All the 
following arguments turn upon a point of this kind. 
Is health (or wealth) a good thing? But to the 
fool who misuses it, it is not a good thing; it is, 
therefore, a good thing and not a good thing.—Is 
health (or political power) a good thing ? But there 
are times when it is not better than other things ; 
therefore the same thing is both good and not good 
for the same man. Or is there no reason why a thing 
should not be absolutely good but not good for a 
particular person, or good for a particular person, but 
not good at the present moment or here ?—Is that 
which the wise man would not wish, an evil? But he 
does not wish for the rejection of the good ; therefore, 
the good is an evil. This is not true ; for it is not the 
same thing to say that the good is an evil and that 
the rejection of the good is an evil. So likewise with 
the argument about the thief; it does not follow, 





2 Reading d\n04 8¢ <abrév> put. 
F 129 


180 b 


20 


30 


35 


ARISTOTLE 


/ b) \ > / > ¢ / ‘ \ 
Adyos. od yap «i Kaxdov éotw 6 KAémTHs, Kal TO 
a , > A 
AaBeiv €oti Kakdv: ovKovv TO KaKov BovAeTar, GAAG 
> / \ A ~ > \ > / \ € 
tayabov: to yap AaBeiv ayabov ayabov. Kai 7 
vooos Kakov eotw, aA’ od TO damoBadeiv vooov. 
> Lj / ~ > / \ \ / ~ 
dpa TO dikawov tot adikov Kal To diKaiws Tod 
> / € / > % 3 ~ > / ¢ 
adikws atperwrepov; aAd’ amobavety adixws aipe- 
7 > / ‘¢ > \ ¢€ a Ww ov 
TWTEpoV. dpa dikadv €oTw Ta adTod Exew ExaoToV ; 
“A > ” / \ / \ ¢ ~ na 
ad 8 av tis Kpivn Kata dd€av thy adrod, Kav 7 
~ / / >? > ~ / \ ? ‘ 4 
yevdh, KUpid €oTw €k TOO Vopouv' TO avTO dpa 
/ \ > / \ / a / A 
dikavov Kal od dikaov. Kal mdoTepa Set Kpivew Tov 
Ta Sikata A€yovra 7) TOV Ta GdiKa; GAAG prjVv Kal 
‘ > 4 / / > ¢ ~ / “a 
TOV adiKovpevov Sikaidv eotw ikav@s Adyew a 
eralev: tatra 5 Av dduca. od yap ei mabety tu 
> / c / \ > / ¢ 7 ~ 
adikws aipeTov, TO adikws alpeTwTepov TOD d- 
Kaiws: aAd’ amAds pev 70 duxaiws, Todt pévror 
> \ / > / a“ / ‘ A ” \ 
ovdev KwAver adikws 7) Suxaiws. Kal TO exew Ta 
¢ ~ , A A > / ? / / 
abtobd Sixaov, Td 5é€ TaAAdTpLA Od SikaLov- Kplow 
/ / PS) / t Oe A / i ” 
pevro. Tavrnv Suxaiav elvar ovdev KwAver, ofov av 
> \ 5 / ~ / ? \ > bu 
4} Kata dd€av tod Kpivavros: od} yap «i Sdikaov 
~ ‘ 
TOOL 7) Wdi, Kal amADs Bikavov. opoiws S€ Kal 
” + b) \ Xr 4 ré > \ 8d 
adika ovtTa ovdev Kwdver rEyew ye adra Sdixavov 
> \ > / / > / / 
elvar: od yap et Aéyew Sixaov, avaykn Sikora 
/ > / 
elvat, Womep ovd ef wWhdAov Adyew, wheAma. 
¢ / A \ <tate | ~ , @ > ? > 
opoiws d€ Kal emi TOV dikaiwy. wor ovK Et 


130 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxv 


if the thief is an evil, that to acquire things is also an 
evil. The thief, therefore, does not wish for what is 
evil but for what is good ; for to acquire something 
good is good. Also disease is an evil, but to get rid 
of disease is not an evil.—Is what is just preferable 
to what is unjust and are just circumstances prefer- 
able to unjust? But it is preferable to be put to 
death unjustly.—Is it just that each man should 
have his own? But judgements which a man passes 
in accordance with his personal opinion, even if they 
are false, are valid in the eyes of the law; the same 
thing, therefore, is just and not just.—Again, should 
judgement be given in favour of him who says what 
is just or of him who says what is unjust? But 
it is just for the victim of injustice to state in full 
the things which he has suffered, and these things 
were unjust. For if to suffer something unjustly is an 
object of choice, it does not follow that unjust cir- 
cumstances are preferable to just, but, absolutely, 
justice is preferable ; but this does not prevent unjust 
circumstances being preferable to just in a particular 
case. Again, it is just that a man should have his 
own, and it is not just that he should have what 
belongs to another ; but there is no reason why any 
judgement which is given in accordance with the 
judge’s opinion should not be just; for, if it is just 
in a particular case and in particular circumstances, 
it is not also absolutely just. Similarly, too, there is 
no reason why, though things are unjust, merely 
saying them should not be just. For if to say things 
is just, it does not follow that they are just, any more 
than, if it is expedient to say things, it follows that 
those things are expedient. Similarly, too, with things 
that are just. So that if what is said is unjust, 


131 


180 


181 


1 


15 


b 


on 


o 


ARISTOTLE 


A /, ” ¢ / + a 4 
Ta Aeyopueva ddika, 6 A€ywv ddiuka wKGa: Ayer 

\ “A i / > \ / c ~ \ \ a] ~ 
yap a Aéyew eoti dikata, amA@s 5€ Kal mrabeiv 
+ 
aoduka. 

XXVI. Tots d€ mapa Tov dpiopov yiwopevois TOO 
>? 3 / e / / > / 
eréyxov, Kabdrep breypadn mpoTepov, amavTynTéov 
okoTrovaL TO CUpLTEpacLa mpos THY avTidacww, OTwWS 

A 
€oTAL TO AUTO Kal KATA TO avTO Kal pos TO adbTO 

\ ¢ / \ >? ~ > ~ / baa} > z4 
Kal woattws Kal ev TH avT@ xpovw. eav 8 ev 

fod , 
apxX mpooepynrar, ody Opuodoyntéov ws advvarov 
To adro elvar dumAdotov Kal p1) dimAdotov, adda 

/ \ / ¢ / v > & \ 2Né iW] 
paréov, un pevtor wdi, ws tor wv To eAéyyeobat 

/ | ABE \ 4 79 c / 
diwpodroynuevov. lol dé mavtes old ot Adyou 

\ \ ~ eo € > | 7” v ov” 

Tapa TO ToLwwdTO. dp’ 6 €ldws ExacToV OTL EkacToY, 
> A ~ \ ¢ > ~ ¢ / > y 
olde TO TpGypya; Kal 6 ayvodv woatTws; €ldws 
/ \ / id / > , ”“ a 
dé tis Tov Kopioxov dtu Kopioxos, ayvooin av ort 
fLovalkds, woTe TavTO emioTaTar Kal ayvoel. dpa 

lot a > 
TO TeTpdamnxv TOO TpLTHxeos petlov; ‘yévorto 8 
av €K TpLTIXOUS TEeTpAaTNXY KATA TO [HKOS* TO OE 

cal ? / cal > \ »” ¢ ~ a 
peilov €Adtrovos peilov: atto dpa atrod petlov 

\ om” 

Kal €AatTov. 

XXVII. Tods d€ mapa 7rd airetobar Kai Aap- 

/ \ > > fond / / ” > ~ 
Bdvew 70 ev apyh muvOavonevw pév, av 7 dHAov, 
od dotéov, 005’ av evdokov 7, A€yovra tradnbes. 


av d€ AdOn, tiv dyvovavy bia THY poxOnpiav tav 





@ 167 a 23. 
132 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxv-xxvi1 


it does not follow that it is a case of the man who 
uses unjust pleas winning his cause ; for he is saying 
things which it is just for him to say but which are, 
absolutely, unjust for anyone to suffer. : 

XXVI. Refutations which are connected with the (3) Ignoratio 
definition of the refutation must, as suggested above, °°" 
be met by examining the conclusion in the light of 
its contradictory and seeing how the same term shall 
be present in the same respect and in the same 
relation, manner and time. In putting this additional 
question at the beginning, you must not admit that 
it is impossible for the same thing to be both double 
and not double but must admit the possibility but 
not in the way that was once admitted to fulfil the 
conditions of a refutation. All the following argu- 
ments depend upon a point of this kind. ‘ Does he 
who knows that A is A, know the thing A?’ And, 
similarly, “ Does he who does not know that A is A, 
not know the thing A?’ But one who knows that 
Coriscus is Coriscus, might not know that he is 
musical, so that he both knows and is ignorant of 
the same thing.—Again, ‘ Is an object which is four 
cubits long greater than an object which is three 
cubits long?” But an object three cubits long might 
become four cubits long. Now the greater is greater 
than the less ; therefore the object is itself greater 
and less than itself. 

XXVII. In refutations which are connected with (4) Petitio 
the begging and assuming of the original point at 2”? 
issue, it should not be granted to a questioner, if his 
procedure is obvious, even though his view is gener- 
ally accepted, but you should state the truth. If, 
on the other hand, his procedure is not detected, you 
should, owing to the badness of such arguments, 


133 


ARISTOTLE 
181 a 
TovovTwyv Adywy eis TOV épwravTa peTaoTpEeTTEoV 


¢ > / ¢ * ” ” ~ > 
Ws od Sdietdeypevov' 6 yap eAeyxos dvev Tod e€ 
> ~ SQ? «@ > / > € 7 / 
20 apy7js. «l8’ dru €dd0n ody ws ToUTw xpnoopevou, 
. > > ¢ \ ~ , > , hal 
adn’ ws mpos Tobto avAAoytovpevov Todvavtiov 7 
ry ~ / 
emi Tov TapeEcAdyywv. 
XXVIII. Kai rods d1a rod maperopevov ovp- 
/ So > a ~ / / ” \ 
BiBalovras én’ abrod tot Adyou Sexréov. €are dé 
\ ¢€ ~ ¢ / > 4 nn \ ¢ ~ 
du777) 7) TOV ETopevwv akodovonors. 7 yap ws TO 
25 ev weper TO KaOdAov, olov avOpwmmw CHov~ a€votrac 
t L 

4, > , \ ~ \ 7Q? \ ~ 
yap, el TOE peta TOBOE, Kal 708’ elvar eta TODOE. 
an \ \ > / > 4 / ~ > ~ 
7H Kata Tas avTilécets: et yap TOd€ THSE axodrovlei, 
T@ avTikeyevw TO avTiKeiwevov. Trap’ 6 Kal 6 TOO 

/ / > A A \ ” > / \ 
MeAioaov Adyos: «i yap TO yeyovos exer apxnv, TO 
> 4 > a 4) @. LA > > > / ¢ > 
ayévyntov aévot pn €xew, Wor’ ei ayevyTos 6 odpa- 

/, ‘ + ‘ > b] ” > / A 

30 vds, Kal amretpos. .TO 5° ovK EoTW* avdradw yap 
7 aKoAovbnoats. 

XXIX. “Ooo. te mapa To mpooriOéva te avdAdo- 

/ lal 2.9 / / \ 
yilovra, oxoretv ei ddaipoupéevov ovpPaiver undev 
HrTTov TO advvaTov. KazeiTa TodTO euhaworéor, 

‘ / e ” > ¢ ~ > > € 
Kat Aextéov ws cdwKev ody ws SoKobv aAX’ as 

‘ ‘ /, € \ / > \ \ \ 

35 mpos Tov Adyov, 6 dé KEexpyTat oddeév mpds TOV 
Adyov. 

XXX. IIpos 5€ rods ta mAciw epwrypara ev 
movobvtas «vOds ev apy Svopiotéov. epwrnats 
yap pia mpos tv pla amrdxpicis e€otw, Wot ovTE 
134 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxvii—xxx 


make your ignorance recoil on the head of the ques- 
tioner, on the ground that he has not argued properly ; 
for refutation must proceed without any assumption 
of the original point. Next, you must argue that the 
point was granted with the idea that he was going 
to use it not as a premiss but in order to argue the 
opposite view to it or for the purpose of refutations 
on side issues. 

XXVIII. Again, those refutations which draw (5) The 
their conclusions through the consequent must be °ms@duent 
exposed in the argument itself. There are two ways 
in which consequences follow: Either as the universal 
follows from the particular, as ‘ animal’ follows from 
‘man’; for it is claimed that, if A accompanies B, 
then B also accompanies A. Or else the process goes 
by opposites ; for if A follows B, A’s opposite will 
follow B’s opposite. It is on this, too, that the argu- 
ment of Melissus depends; for he claims that, if 
that which has come to be has a beginning, that 
which has not come to be has no beginning, and so, 
if the heaven has not come to be, it is also eternal. 

But this is not true ; for the sequence is the reverse. 

XXIX. In refutations which are argued by means (6) Inser- 
of some addition, you must examine whether the Honof 
impossibility occurs none the less when the addition matter. 
has been withdrawn. If so, then the answerer should 
make this fact clear and should state that he granted 
the addition not because he believed in it but for 
the sake of the argument, but that his opponent has 
made no use of it at all for his argument. 

XXX. In dealing with those who make several (7) Multi- 
questions into one, you should draw a distinction Pua, 
immediately at the beginning. For a question is 
single to which there is only one answer, so that one 


135 


181a 


ARISTOTLE 


mrciw Kal’ évos ovTE Ev KaTa TOAAGY, GAN ev Kal? 


OF of , A 3 / 4 ARN ~ e 
181 b evos hatéov 7} amofatéov. worep de emi TOV opw- 


o 


1 


oO 


15 


20 


/ abe : \ > cal Cees. > ? / i /, 
vUpwr dTé ev apdotv ote 8° oddeTepw UTapyet, 
LA ~ wy ~ , ~ 
ate p17) arAob ovros Tob epwrnpatos atAds atro- 

/ / \ 

Kpwopmevois ovdev ovpPBaiver mdoyxew, Opolws Kal 

/ « Ay ot: 

él ToUTwY. OTav pev obv TA TAciw TH Evi 7] TO 
a A ~ e ao ae ~ c ~ / a. 

év tots moAdots brdpyYn, TO aTADs Sovte Kat apap- 

/ / 

TovTt TavTnV THY Gpwaptiav ovdev drevavTiWpLa 

/ id \ ~ af a“ \ / ”“ / \ 

ovpPaiver: orav d€ TH pev TH SE pH, H TAEiw KaTa 

/ \ m” € ¢ / > / 2 / 

mAcovwv, Kal €oTw ws brapyer auddtepa aphore- 

/ / a a? 

pos, €oT. 8 ws ody brdpxyer mdAw, woTe TOOT 

> / e > ~ a , > ‘ 7 
evAaBnréov. otov év Toiade Tots Adyous. €t TO EV 
2 > \ ‘ \ / Ld ~ > \ > ~ 
€orw ayabov To dé Kakdv, 6tt TabTa adnles eizreiv 
> \ \ ‘ \ / fut > \ / 
ayaov Kat Kaxov kal mdAw pjr’ ayabov pyre 

” / ¢ / eo 
Kakov (ovK €oTL yap EKAaTEpov EKATEpoOV), WOTE 
eee 23 \ \ \ \ v4 > 9 \ ” / 
TavTo ayabov Kal Kakov Kal ovr’ ayabov ovTE KaKoV. 
\ 7° > \ ¢ ~ >? / { - ov 
Kat ef Exaotov adTo abit@ Tavrov, Kat aAAov ETepov, 
> 4 ? ” >’ 2\)\? eh a \o¢ 
ezretd1)' ovK dAAots TabTa GAN’ adrots, Kat ETepa 
~ a \ ” tf ‘ 
avT@v, TATA EavTois ETEpA Kal TaUTA. ETL EL TO 

A > \ A / ‘ de ‘ > 46 
pev ayalov Kakov yivera, TO dé Kakov ayabov 
>? / / > cal \ y TY ¢ / 
eat, dvo0 yevoir av. Svotv TE Kal aviowy EKaTE- 

an LA \ 
pov avrto att ltaov, wore toa Kal avca avTa, 
avtots. 
> \ 4 
’"Eprimrovot pev obv otro. Kal eis dAAas Adcets* 
hd 
Kal yap TO dudw Kal TO dravra mAciw onpaiver: 
/ ~ 
ovKouv TavTov, TArVv Ovopma, ovuBaiver Phoar Kal 


1 Reading ézed7 for erei & with Poste. 
136 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxx 


must not affirm or deny several things of one thing 
nor one thing of several things, but one thing of one 
thing. But just as in the case of equivocal terms, a 
predicate is sometimes true of both meanings and 
sometimes of neither, and so, though the question 
is not simple, no detriment results if people give a 
simple answer, so too with these double questions. 
When, therefore, the several predicates are true of one 
subject, or one predicate of several subjects, no con- 
tradiction is involved in giving asimple answer, though 
he has made this mistake. But when the predicate 
is true of one subject but not of the other, or several 
predicates are true of several subjects, then there is 
a sense in which both are true of both but another 
sense, on the other hand, in which they are not; so 
one must be on one’s guard against this. The follow- 
ing arguments illustrate this: (1) Supposing A is 
good and B evil, it is true to say that they are good 
and evil and, on the other hand, that they are neither 
good nor evil (for A is not evil and B is not good), so 
that the same thing is good and evil and neither good 
nor evil; (2) If everything is the same as itself and 
different from anything else, since things are not the 
same as other things but the same as themselves, 
and also different from themselves, the same things 
are both different from themselves and the same as 
themselves ; (3) Moreover, if that which is good 
becomes evil and that which is evil is good, they 
would become two ; and of two unequal things each 
is equal to itself, so that they are both equal and 
unequal to themselves. 

These refutations also fall under other solutions ; 
for the terms ‘ both ’ and ‘ all ’ have several meanings, 
so that to affirm or deny the same thing is verbal only, 


137 


ARISTOTLE 
181 b 
> ~ ~ > ” > 
anopjaa tobTo 8 ov« Hv éXeyxos. adAd davepdv 
OTL MN pds epwryicews TOV TAcrdvev ywopmevns,* 
> b err: j > REP / ”“ > / > ” 
ar’ év Kal’ évds pavtos 7) amodpdvros, obk €atat 
TO advvatov. 
2 XXXI. I[lepi 5€ r&v draydvrwy eis 7O* radbTo 
/ > lal \ ¢ >? / ~ / 
ToAAdKis eirreiv, pavepdv ws od S0Téov THV pds 
Tu Aeyouevwv onpaivew Tr ywpilopevas Kal’ adras 
‘ , e , ” ~ , 
Tas Katnyopias, olov dumAdovov avev Tob SumAdctov 
€ / Ld > / \ Ms \ / > a 
Hpiaeos, OTe eudaiverar. Kal yap Ta déKa ev Tots 
30 €vds Séovar SéKa Kal TO ToHoaL ev TH jun) TOLHoAL, 
Kal dAws ev TH atrodace: 1 daais GAN’ Suws odK 
” / ‘ \ / / > A ‘ 
et Tus A€you Todi pur) elvar AevKOov, A€éyer adto AevKdV 
elvar. 70 de dimAdovov oddé onuatver ovd€ev tows, 
oe b) \ A. 9 am € , > > ‘ , 
WoTrEp OvdE TO EV TH Huicer’ ef 8 Apa Kai onpuaiver, 
> > > > \ ‘ / #9? ¢ > , 
aN’ od radTo Kal ovvypnuevov. 008’ 7 emorHun 
>’ ~ to e = oe a fF. \ > / Lid 
35 ev T@ €lOet, olov et EoTw 7 larpiK?) emLoTHUN, OEP 
TO Kowov: exeivo 8 Hv emoriun emorntod. ev 
de trois db dv Sndrobrar KaTnyopovpevors Todo 
a / 
Aexréov, ws ob TO adto xwpis Kal ev T@ Adyw TO 
dnAovpevov. Td yap KoiAov Kowh pev TO adto 
SnAot eri Tob oyobd Kal Tob pouxob, mpoarWepwevov 
182a de ovdev KwAver dAAa, TO ev TH pwl TO dé TO 
/ / 3 * 0 \ \ ‘ / ” 0 be 
oxéXer, onuativew* évOa pev yap TO ayov, évOa Se 
1 Reading ywopevns for ywopevwr. 


2 Inserting ro before radro. 
® Reading onpaivew (onuaivee ABD). 


138 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxx—xxx1 


and this, as we saw, is not a refutation. But clearly, 
if one of the several questions is not asked but the 
answerer affirms or denies a single predicate of a 
single subject, the reduction to an impossibility will 
not occur. 

XXXI. As regards those who lead one on to repeat (B) Solu- 
the same thing several times over, it is clear that (ot nts 
one must not allow that predications of relative tending to 

LING, 
terms have any signification in themselves when 
separated from their correlatives; for example, 
that ‘ double ’ apart from the expression ‘ double of 
half’ is significant, just because it appears in that 
expression. For ‘ten’ appears in the expression 
“ten minus one’ and ‘do’ in the expression ‘ not 
do, and affirmations in general in negations ; but, 
all the same, if one were to say ‘ this is not white,’ 
one is not saying that it is white. ‘ Double’ has 
possibly no signification at all, just as ‘ the’ in ‘ the 
half ’ too signifies nothing. If it has any signification, 
it is not the same as in the combined expression. 
Nor is ‘ knowledge ’ of a specific kind, such as ‘ medi- 
cal knowledge,’ the same as ‘ knowledge’ as a 
general term; for the latter has always meant 
‘knowledge of the knowable.’ When dealing with 
terms which are predicated of the terms by means 
of which they are defined, you must say that the 
term defined is not the same when taken separately 
as it is in the combined expression. For ‘ concave 
has the same general meaning when used of the 
snub-nosed and of the bandy-legged, but when it is 
combined in the one case with the nose and in the 
other with the leg, there is no reason why it should 
not signify different things, for in the first case it 
signifies ‘ snub,’ in the other ‘ bandy,’ and it makes 


139 


182a 


or 


1 


o 


15 


20 


ARISTOTLE 


A ¢ \ / ‘ > A ve > cal ey 

To patBov onuatver: Kal obdev dSiadeper eimeiv pls 
\ ” ey / ” > / \ / > 
ain 1 pis KotAn. €rt od Soréov tiv A€Ew KaT 

30 eo SNe) / > ? 4 >? \ \ e\ 
cev0v- eidos yap €otw. od ydp éore TO aysov pis 
KotAn aAAa pivos Todi, ofov mdBos, wor’ oddev 

> 
aroTov, €¢ 7) pis 7 ovp7) pls €or éxovoa KowddrnTa 
pivos. 

XXXII. epi 8€ trav codoiiopadv, wap’ 6 TH 
bev faivovra. ovpPBaiverv, eimopev mpdtepov, ws 
de Auréov, en” abrdv tdv Adywv Eorar davepdv. 
" ~ 
dmavres yap oi towide todro BovAovrat Kata- 

, a> «a , > aA Wake a 
oxevalew. dp 6 Xéyers aAnOds, Kai €aTt TodTO 
adnbas; dis 8 eivai te ABov: 2orw dpa tu ALBov. 
7 TO AXyew AiBov od Ear Aéyew 6 GAN’ Sv, odde 

a > \ ms ee, er , B. FRM ~ 
tobro adda Tobrov: «i obv EpouTd Tis, ap’ dv aAnbas 

/ ” a > nn / c / 
Aéyeis, €oTe Tobrov, ovK dv SoKoin €AAnvilew, 
7 »Q> > ” H- -? a / 4 
womep ovd €i epoito, ap’ Hv Aéyes elvar, eorw 
a , he OS eer ] in « , a 
ovros; EvAov 8’ eimeiv obTws,' 7 doa pHre OAAV 

4 9 + / > \ / \ \ > 
nT appev onpaiver, oddev diadéper. 810 Kal ov 
yiwerat aodotkiopos, et 6 Aéyets elvar, Eott TodTO; 
EvAov dé Adyers elvar: Eat dpa EvArov. 6 dé AiBos 

~ > i ” 
Kal TO obTOS appevos exer KAHow. «t dé" Tis Eporro, 
> > @ 7 >? ” Z > aA / 8 _ > 
dp obtds €otw avrn; elra madw, ti 8’; ody 

e / > / > ” ” ” = 
obrds €att Kopioxos; lr’ elmevev, €otw apa obtos 

4 > / ‘ rv / 35” > 
avTn, od} avdAdcAdyrorar Tov aoAotKLopov, odd” Et 


1 Reading eizeiv otrws for elzev odros. 


2 Reading dé for 37. 





* 165 b 20 f. 
® The argument is clear in the original, because Greek is 
an inflected language, whereas English does not distinguish 


140 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxi—xxxu 


no difference whether you say ‘a snub nose’ or ‘a 
concave nose.’ Further, the expression must not 
be allowed to pass without qualification ; for it is 
a falsehood. For snubness is not a concave nose but 
something, namely a condition, appertaining to a 
nose ; so there is nothing absurd in supposing that 
a snub nose is one which possesses nasal concavity. 

XXXII. As regards solecisms, we have already (C) Solu- 
stated“ the apparent cause of their occurrence ; Hoh its 
how they should be solved will be clear in the actual inane © 

. : OLECISM. 
arguments. All the following arguments aim at 
producing this result : ‘Is a thing truly that which 
you truly affirm it to be?’ You affirm something 
to be a stone (accusative masculine) ®; therefore 
something (nominative neuter) is a stone (accusative 
masculine). Or does speaking of a stone (a masculine 
word) involve the use of the relative ‘ whom ’ rather 
than ‘ which’ and the pronoun ‘him’ rather than ‘it’? 
If, then, one were to ask, ‘Is a stone him whom you 
truly state him to be ?,’ he would not be considered 
to be talking good Greek any more than if he were 
to ask, “ Is he whom you state her to be?’ But the 
use of the word ‘stick,’ or any other neuter word, 
in this way, involves no difference between the 
nominative and accusative; therefore no solecism 
is committed if you say, ‘ Is this what you affirm it 
to be?’ You affirm it to be a stick; therefore it is 
a stick. ‘ Stone,’ however, and ‘ he’ have the mascu- 
line gender. Now if one were to ask, ‘ Can “ he” 
be a “she ’”’?,’ and then again, “Why? Is he not 
Coriscus ? ’ and then were to say, ‘ Then he is a she,’ 
he has not proved the solecism even if Coriscus 


between the nominative and accusative except in the personal 
pronouns and the relative. 


141 


ARISTOTLE 
182a 
\ / UJ Ld Ad \ / \ 
To Kopioxos onpuaiver dep airy, pr didwor Sé 
6 amoKpwopevos, aAAa Set TooTO mpocepwrnPFvac. 
et d€ pyr €oTrw pyre didwow, od avdAdeAdyrorat 
~ A ‘ / 
ovTE TH GvTL OUTE TPOS TOV NpwTnMEevoV. djLo0lwWsS 
25 obv Set KaKet Tov AiBov onpuaivew odros. ei Se 
, ” , , > s \ st 
Ente €ore unre didora, od Aexréov TO cupTrépacpa: 
, ~ ~ 
paiverar dé mapa TO THY avopowov mT@oW TOD 
oe ¢ / / s > > / > > 
ovopatos opoiav daivecbar. dp’ aAnbés éeorw. €i- 
al LZ ” ov o \ PRY 
Teiv OTe €oTWw avn, Omep elvar dys adrnv; elvau 
\ \ > / ” +” WA > / a > 
dé dis aomida: eoTw dpa arn donida. % ovK 
> / > \ A 7 > / , > 3,39 / 
30 aVaYKN, EL (47) TO AUTYH aomida onpaiver GAX’ donis, 
4 > > / 4, 29? te \ ~ 
To 8 aomida tavrynv; odd’ ei 6 djs elvae TodTov, 
e 
eotly obros, dis 8 elvar KAdwva, éorw dpa obtos 
4 
KXgwva: od yap éotw odtos KAdwva: elpnrar yap 
o oe A ” e > ~ 
ore O hypu elvat Tobrov, €oTw odtos, od TobToV: 
ovde yap av EAAnvilor otTws TO epwrnua AcxOer. 
ek > / ~ ~ > > \ / t ay 
35ap €emiotaca. TodTo; TobTo 8 é€ati Aifos: éni- 
»* / ”“ > b) ‘ / ‘ ~ 
araca apa AiBos. 7 od tadTo onpaiver TO ToObTO 
€v T® dp emiotaca Todto Kai ev T@ TodTo Be 
/ > > > \ ~ , ~ > \ ~ 
AiBos, aN’ ev pev 7H mpwtw Tobrov, ev 8€ TO 
¢ / Ga + ee - 8 / ” > / 
botépw obtos; dp od éemornuny exes, emioraca 
~ > / > ” / > / ” 
TovTo; emotHynv 8 €xes AiMov- ericracat dpa 


182b Aiov. 7 TO ev TovTov Alou Aéyers, TO 5€ TodTOV 





@ But Cleon. 
142 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxm 


signifies a ‘she,’ though the answerer refuses to 
concede this; but this must be the subject of a 
further question. But if neither this is so nor does 
he concede it, then the solecism has not been proved 
either in fact or relatively to the person to whom the 
question was put. Similarly, therefore, in the first 
example also, ‘he’ must signify the stone. If, how- 
ever, this is neither true nor is conceded, the con- 
clusion must not be stated, though it is apparently 
true, because the case which is used of the word, 
which is unlike, appears to be like.—‘ Is it true to 
say that this object is what you affirm it to be?’ 
You affirm it to be a shield (accusative), therefore 
it is a shield (accusative). Or is this not necessarily 
so, if “ this object ’ (nominative) signifies not shield 
(accusative) but shield (nominative), while ‘ this 
object ’ (accusative) signifies shield (accusative).— 
Nor again if he is what you affirm him to be, and you 
affirm him to be Cleona (accusative of Cleon), is he 
therefore Cleona? for he is not Cleona®; for the 
statement was that he not him is what I affirm him 
to be. For the question if asked in this form ’ would 
not be Greek either.— Do you know this?’ But 
this is a stone (nominative); therefore you know a 
stone (nominative). Has not‘ this ’ a different force 
in the question ‘ Do you know this?’ and in ‘ This 
is a stone,’ in the first case standing for an accusative 
and in the second for a nominative ?—When you 
exercise recognition of an object, do you not recognize 
it? You exercise recognition of a stone ; therefore 
you recognize ‘ of a stone.’ Do you not in the one 
case put the object in the genitive and say ‘ of the 
stone,’ and in the other case in the accusative and 


> ie. with the subject in the accusative. 
143 


ARISTOTLE 
182 b 
NiO. “ 25 5) > 2 DD / ” > / a 9 
(Oov: €566n 8°, ob emuorHunv exes, emiotacbar, ov 
/ > \ ~ LA > > / > ‘\ A / 
TovTov, adAAa TodTo, War’ od AiBov adda Tov AlBov. 
“Ore pev obv ot Tovotro. TMV Adywv od avdAdoyi- 
\ > ‘ / ‘ \ / 
Covrar codortkiopov aAAa daivovta, Kat dia Ti Te 
5daivovrar kal m@s amavrntéov mpos avrous, 
pavepov €k TOV eipnuevwv. 
XXXII. Ac? 5€ Kai katavoeiy 6Tt mavTwv THY 
/ e / > cs ~ e \ / 
Adywv ot pev eiot pdovs Katideiv of S€ yaderu- 
TEpoL, Tapa Ti Kal ev Tin trapadoyilovrar Tov 
akovovTa, ToAAdKLs ot avrol exelivots OVTES. TOV ad- 
10 Tov yap Adyov det Kadcivy Tov mapa tadTo ywo- 
pevov 6 adbtos dé Adyos Tols pev mapa THY A€Ew 
tots d€ mapa TO ovpPeByKos Tots Sé€ map erepov 
ddfevev av elvar did TO perahepdpevov EkaoTov jA1) 
dpotws elvar dfjAov. wamep obv ev Tots mapa Ti 
opwvuplav, Oomrep SoKet Tpdmros etnbéotatos elvat 
an ~ A ~ > 
15 TOV Tapadoyiou@v, TA ev Kal Tots TUYoDaWW €oTL 
~ a > 
d7Aa (Kai yap ot Adyou ayedov of yeAotor TaVTES Eat 
\ \ /, et > \ >? / A Ad 
mapa THV A€Ew), olov avnp eh€épero kata KAijaKos 
dippov, Kat Omov oréAAcobe; mpos tiv KEepaiay. 
~ ~ / 
Kat ToTépa TV Pov eumpoobev réEeTar; ovdeTepa, 
> > ” »” \ \ ¢ / > 
GAN’ omiobev audw. Kat Kabapos 6 Bopéas; od 
20 OfTa* ameKTovynKE yap TOV TTWXOV Kal TOV Wvov- 


prevov. ap Kvapyos; od dfra,aAN’ >AmodAAwvidns. 





* The two meanings of the phrase are uncertain; the 
Oxford translation suggests (1) ‘a man got the body of the 
car taken off its chassis,’ and (2) ‘ he came a “ sitter ” (8éhpos) 
down from the ladder.’ 

» The reply takes the word in the sense of ‘ To what do you 
fasten the sail when you furl it ?’ 

¢ The answer understands the question to mean ‘ which 
cow will calve forwards ?’ 


144 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxi—xxxu1 


say ‘a stone’? But it was granted that, when 
you exercise recognition of a thing, you recognize 
‘it ’ not ‘ of it,’ so that you recognize not ‘ of a stone ’ 
but ‘a stone.’ 

That arguments of this kind, then, do not prove 
solecism but only appear to do so, and why they 
appear to do so and how you must face them, is clear 
from what has been said. 

XXXIII. It must be noted about arguments in Note on the 
general that in some it is easier and in some more (cmbarative 
difficult to see why and where they mislead the difficulty in 
listener, though often the latter are identical with the tion of 
former. For an argument must be called identical *“** 
when it depends on the same principle, but the same 
argument might be held by some people to depend on 
diction, by others on accident and by others on some- 
thing else, because each, when applied in different 
contexts, is not equally clear. So, just as fallacies due 
to equivocation, which are generally regarded as the 
stupidest form of fallacy, some are obvious even to 
ordinary minds (for almost all the most laughable 
remarks depend upon diction). For example,‘ A man 
was carried over the standing board of the framework 
of the chariot ’*; and ‘ Whither are you bound ?’ 

‘To the yard-arm’”; ‘ Which of the two cows will 
calve in front?’ ‘ Neither, but both behind.’ ¢ ‘ Is 


the north wind? clear?’ ‘No, certainly not; for he 
has killed the beggar and the purchaser.’* ‘Is he 
Evarchus ?’ ‘Certainly not; he is Apollonides.’ / 


4 The answerer takes Boreas as a proper name. 

® kal tov wvovpevov is almost certainly corrupt; Poste 
suggests kai Tis 6 wvovpevos ; 

? The literal meaning of these names might be rendered 
* good-manager ’ and ‘ squanderson.’ 


145 


182 b 


25 


30 


3 


Oo 


183 a 


o 


ARISTOTLE 


\ en, \ / \ ~ »” \ c val 
Tov avtov d€ Tpomov Kal TOV dAAwv oxedov ot mAeéi- 
A \ 
aTo., Ta S€ Kal TOvSs euTELpoTatous daiverar Aav- 
Odvew: onpeiov Sé€ TovTwv Stu pwayxovrar ToAAdKiS 
\ ~ 
TEpt TOV ovoudtwr, olov méTepov Ttabrov onpat- 
vel KaTa TdVTWY TO OV Kal TO Ev H ETEpoV. Tots 
cal ov 
pev yap Soe? Tadrov onpatvew TO Ov Kal TO EV" 
¢ A A / / A UL 4 
of d€ tov Zivwvos Adyov Kat Ilappevidov Avovor 
\ \ ~ / A oa / A A wy 
dua. TO TroAAaxyas ddvar TO év AéyecBar Kai TO dv. 
~ \ 
Opoiws dé Kal TMV Tapa TO cvpBeBHKds Kai Trapat 
~ ” oe ¢ \ ” cv > ~ c 
Tt@v aAdwy ExaoTov ot ev Ecovtar pdous ideiv of 
a“ ~ Ud 
dé xaderuitepor TOV Adywv- Kal AaBetv ev rin yéver, 
\ / ” an > ” > ev 
Kal qmotepov €Aeyxos 7 odK EAeyxos, od padzov 
Lt , \ / 
Omoiws Ep TaVvTWY. 
” \ A / hid > ~ lal / 
Kort d€ dpuyuds Adyos dots arropeiv movet pa- 
e , > 
dora: Sdkver yap obdtos uddvoTra. amopia 8’ é€art 
/ ¢ A > a / id > / 
dit77H, 7) ev ev Tots avAdceAoyropevois, 6 TL aveAn 
~ > a > cal ~ 
Tis TOV epwrnpdtwv, 7 8 év Tots eprotiKois, THs 
> an 
ein Tus TO mpoTabev. Sudmep ev Tois avAAoyort- 
Kots ot Spyutrepor Adyou Cnreiv waAXAov mrovotew. 
” \ \ \ / , xn > 
€ote d€ avAdoyioTiKos pev Adyos Spyntratos, av e& 
Lid / 4 ov A ” > lod 
67t udAvora SoKovvTwv ott wdAvora Evdoov avaiph. 
/ ~ > /, 
els yap @v 6 Adyos petaTWenevns THs avTipdoews 
/ > \ 
dmavras dpolovs eer Tods avAdoyiopovs: del yap 
> >? / c / ” > / nn 4 
e€ evddEwv dpolws evdofov avaipyjoe 7) KaTaoKevd- 
~ lal / 
cet, Sudmep atropeiv avayKkaiov. pdAora pev odv 
~ / ~ 
6 Towodros Spits, 6 €€ taov TO ovprrépacpa ToL@v 
a DItS. oF ¢ 4 , 
Tots epwrrpact, Sevtepos 8’ 6 €€ amdvTwv dpoiwv: 
1 Reading with Poste raév mapa 76 cupBeBnkds Kai mapa for 
Ta&v Tepi Tob cupBeBynKdTos Kal zrepl. 


146 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxim 


And so on with almost all the rest of the ambiguities, 
but some even the most expert seem to fail to dis- 
cern. A proof of this is that people often dispute 
about the terms used, for example, whether ‘ Being ’ 
and * Unity ’ always mean the same thing or some 
thing different ; for some people hold that ‘ Being’ 
and * Unity ’ are identical in meaning, while others 
solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides by saying 
that ‘ Unity ’ and ‘ Being ’ are used in several senses. 
Similarly, too, of the arguments which are dependent 
on accident and each of the other classes, some will 
be easier to detect and others more difficult, and it 
is not always equally easy to grasp into which class 
they fall and whether refutation takes place or not. 
A shrewd argument is one which causes most Shrewdness 
embarrassment ; for it bites deepest. Embarrass- ido 
ment is of two kinds. In a reasoned discussion one 
is in doubt which of the questions one should subvert, 
whereas in contentious arguments it is about the way 
in which one is to express the proposition. Hence it is 
in reasoned discussions that shrewder arguments are 
more stimulative of inquiry. Now a reasoned argu- 
ment is shrewdest when from the most generally 
accepted premisses possible it subverts the most 
generally accepted thesis possible. For the single 
argument, if the contradictory is changed about, 
will result in all the syllogisms being alike ; for from 
' generally accepted premisses it will subvert or estab- 
lish an equally generally accepted conclusion ; there- 
fore embarrassment must necessarily arise. Such, 
then, is the shrewdest argument which puts the con- 
clusion on an equality with the premisses. The next 
shrewdest is that which argues from premisses which 
are all on an equality ; for this will cause an equal 


147 


183 a 


1 


1 


2 


2 


Oo 


5 


0 


o 


ARISTOTLE 


obros yap dpolws Troujoer amopeiy dOmotov TeV 
epwrnpdrov dvaupeTéov. Tobro d€ yaderov avat- 
peTéov peev yap, 671 8? dvaupereor, adyAov. Tav 8 
épuorixa@v dpyvratos pe 6 mp@rtov edOds ddnAos 
TOTEpoV ovMeAoyrarat 7), ov, Kal mdOTEpov Tapa 
yeBdos 7 Siaipeciv € €or 7 Avars, devrEpos be TOv 
dddwv 6 > OfAos pev ort Tapa Svaipeow 7 7) dvaipeotv 
€OTL, [L1) pavepos &° wv dia Tivos TOV Tperneveo 
dvaipeow 7 7 Suatpeow Autéos é orl, aad’ i TOTEpov 
avrn Tropa TO OvpTépacpa 7) Tapa Te TMV epwrn- 
pedroov corly. 

"Eviore pev ovv © [L1) ovMoytobeis Adyos ednjOns 
eoTw, ea 7) Niav ddofa 7H evdh Ta Ajppara: 
eviote 5° ovK a§wos karappovetobar. oTav peev yap 
eAXcirn TL TOV Towovrwv epaTnuarov, mept ob 6 
Adyos Kat 8” 6, Kai px) mpoodAaBav rodto Kal 
pn avddrAoyradpevos ediOns 6 avddoyiopds, Srav 
de TOV EEwbev, odk edxatadpovyntos oddapas, aAr’ 
6 pev Adyos emeikys, 6 8 epwrdv npwrnkev od 
Kadds. 

"Hott Te, waorrep Avew OTe ev pds TOV Adyov OTE 
d€ mpos Tov epwrdvTa Kal THv épwrnow ote Se 
mpos odvd€étepov TovTwY, dpolws Kal epwrav ort 
Kal ovMoyileobar Kal pos THY déow kal T™pos TOV 
daroKxpwyopLevov Kal Tos TOV xpovov, oTav 7 Tei - 
ovos xpdvov deouevn 1 AdVors 7) TOO mapdvTos 
Kawpoo.” 

XXXIV. Ex méowv pev ody Kal moiwy yivovrat 
tois diadeyopévors of mapadoyiopol, Kal As Sdei- 
fopev te evddpuevov Kal mapddoka éyew mrown}- 

a Reading aAX’ 4 with Wallies. 
2 Omitting with Waitz ro SiahexBfvar mpos Thy Avow as a gloss, 
148 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxi1—xxxiv 


embarrassment as to which kind of question ought to 
be subverted. The difficulty lies in this, that some- 
thing must be subverted but it is not clear what. The 
shrewdest of contentious arguments is that which, 
in the first place, immediately makes it uncertain 
whether the reasoning is conclusive or not, and also 
whether the solution is due to a false premiss or a 
distinction. Of the rest, that comes next which 
clearly depends on a distinction or a subversion, but 
it is not clear which of the premisses it is on the 
subversion or distinction of which the solution de- 
pends, but only whether this process depends upon 
the conclusion or one of the premisses. 

Now sometimes an inadequately reasoned argu- Stupid 
ment is stupid if the premisses assumed are too para- “8U™en' 
doxical or false ; but sometimes it is not deserving 
of contempt. For when some question is wanting 
such as concerns the argument or the means of 
carrying it on, the reasoning which has failed to 
supply this and is not properly argued is stupid ; but 
when something which is merely extraneous has been 
omitted, the reasoning is by no means to be lightly 
condemned but is respectable, though the questioner 
has not asked his questions well. 

As it is possible to address the solution sometimes 
to the argument, sometimes to the questioner and 
his mode of questioning and sometimes to neither 
of these, so likewise also it is possible to address one’s 
questions and reasonings both to the thesis and to 
the answerer and to the time, when the solution needs 
more time than the present occasion supplies. 

XXXIV. The number, then, and the nature of the EPI- 
sources from which fallacies arise in discussion, and Gy see 


how we are to show up a pretender and make him mary of 
results. 
149 


ARISTOTLE 
183 a 


30 gouev, ért 8° ek tivwy ovpPaiver 6 codouxtopds,! 
Kal 7s €pwrnréov Kat tis } tdéis TOV épwrn- 
pdrwv, €Tt mpos TL XpHoysor Tavres elolv of ToLodToL 
Aoyor, Kal TEpi amoKpisews dmA@s Te mdons Kal 
ms Avtéov tods Adyous Kai Tods coAouKiopods,” 
cipjobw mepi amdvrwy juiv tadta. Aovrdv Sé mept 

as THs €€ apxfs mpobcews dvapyvicaow eimety tt 
Bpaxd epi adris Kal tédos émBeivar trois etpy- 
[evous. 

TpoeAdpeba pev odv edpeivy Sivapiv twa ovA- 
AoyoriKny mept Tob mpoPAnBevtos ex t&v srap- 
xovrww ws evdofoTdtwv: totro yap epyov éotl ris 

183 b Ovadentixajs Kal” adtriy Kat THs TeipaotiKAs. érel 
dé mpookatackevdlerar mpos adriv Sia tiv Tis 
cogiotikis yertviaow, ws od pdvov retpav Svvara 
AaBetv Siadrextik@s GAAd Kai ws €idds, Sua TobTO 
ov povov 70 Aexbev Epyov breOeucba THs mpaypya- 

5 Telas, TO Adyov S¥vacba AaBetv, GAAa Kal drws 
Adyov bréxovtes pvddkopuev tiv Oéaw ds 8’ evdoko- 
TaTwV OmoTpoTws. TH 8 airiav eipjKapev Tovrou, 
emet kai dia Tobro LwKpdtyns hpwra, add’ odK 
ameKpiveto* wpoddyer yap ovdk €idévar. SedxjAwrar 
5° €v tots mpdtepov Kal mpds méca Kal ex méowv 

10 TOTO EaTat, Kal dOev edropicopev TovUTwY, Ere Se 
TOs Epwtyntéov } TaxrTéov THY epwrnow macav, Kal 

1 Reading with Pacius codo:xopds for avAdoyopds. 
150 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxiv 


utter paradoxes, and, further, in what circumstances 
a solecism occurs, and how to ask questions, and 
what is the right arrangement of questions, and, 
moreover, what is the use of all such arguments, 
and also about all answering of questions in general 
and in particular how to solve arguments and sole- 
cisms, on all these subjects let the treatment we have 
given suffice. ‘There remains to call to mind our 
original purpose and say a few words about it and 
then bring our treatise to an end. 

Our purpose, then, was to discover a faculty which (2) Con- 
could reason on the problem set before us from the @uding 
most generally accepted premisses that exist ; for dialectic. 
this is the function of dialectic in itself and of the 
art of examination. But, since there is further added 
to it, on account of its close affinity with the art of 
sophistry, that it can undertake an examination not 
only dialectically but also with a pretence of know- 
ledge, we therefore proposed as the purpose of our 
treatise not only the above-mentioned task of being 
able to conduct an argument but also the discovery 
how, when supporting an argument, we are to defend 
our thesis by means of the most generally accepted 
premisses in a consistent manner. Of this we have 
given the reason ; for this was why Socrates used to 
ask questions but never answered them, because he 
confessed ignorance. An indication has been given, 
in what has been said above, of the number of cases 
in which this will apply and of the various kinds of 
material which can be used for this and the various 
sources from which we may obtain an abundance 
of them; moreover also how questions must be 
asked and about the arrangement of questions in 





2 Reading with Pacius codouxtopovs for cvAAoyiopods. 
151 


15 


i) 


2 


25 


30 


ARISTOTLE 


Ul > ~ 
Tepl TE amoKpioewv Kal AVoewv TaV Tpds Tods 
, ~ 
avdAdoyiopovs. SedijAwTat Sé Kal wept TOV dAdrwv, 
a ~ ~ ~ 
ooa THs avris p<lddov Ta&v Adywv eotiv. Tpos 
dé Tov LTO aA Dv SreAnavd 
€ TovTOLS TEpL THY TapadoyiopOv SreAnAvOaper, 
WoTeEp eipykapyev On mpdoTepov. STL pev ody ExeEL 
/ ¢ ~ “a / , cal > c ~ 
TéAdos ikavas a mpoetAducba, havepov: Set 8° tuas 
\ / \ \ \ 7 \ 
pn AceAnbévac to oupBeBynKos mepl tadrny Tiv 
Tpayuareiav. THV yap edpiokomevwy amdavTwv Ta 
fev map érépwv Andbévta mpdtepov meTovnpeva 
KaTa peépos emidddwKkev bd TOV TapadaBdovtwv 
votepov: Ta 8° e& brapyis evpioKdpeva puKpav TO 
mpQ@tov emidoow AapBdvew ciwhe, ypnoy.wrépav 
Lévtou TOAA@ Tis vorepov eK TovTwY adbfjcews. 
7 
LéyloTov yap tows apx?) TavTos, womep Aéyerat: Sud 
Kat xaAeTwTaTOV’ Gow yap KpdtiaTov TH Suvdpet, 
, / nv ~ / / / 
TOGOUTW puLKpoTaToV ov T@ peyeler yaderwratov 
eotw ofOjvar. tavrns 5° edpnuevns padov TO mpoo- 
TWévar Kai ocuvav&ew 7d Aourov eoTw* Gmep Kal 
\ A ¢ \ / / ‘ ‘ 
TEpl ToVs pyTtopiKkovs Adyous avuPEeByKe, axedov SE 
c \ \ 
Kal mept Tas dAAas mdoas Téxvas. ot pev yap Tas 
~ , 4 
apxas edpdovtes TavTEADs emt pwuKpov Te mpoyyayov- 
of d€ viv eddoxyobvtTes TapadaBdvres Tapa ToAA@Y 
~ WA 
olov ex d.adoyfs KaTa “épos TpoayayovTwy otTwS 
‘ 4 
nvéjKaor, Tisias ev peta Tods mpwrovs, Opacd- 
\ A / >) de \ ~ 
paxos dé peta Trsiav, Meddwpos S5é pera Tobrov, 
‘ \ \ / / / ide 
Kat ToAAot troAAa ovvernvdyact pep: Sudtrep obdev 
~ / 7, A 
Bavpacrov éxew te TAHVoS Thy Téxvyv. Tavrns dé 
152 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxiv 


general, and about answers and solutions applicable 
to the reasonings employed. All the other points 
have also been set forth which belong to the same 
system of argument. In addition to these we have 
also explained about fallacies, as we have already 
remarked above. That what we purposed has been 
satisfactorily carried through to the end is plain ; 
but we must not fail to observe what has happened 
regarding this inquiry. In all discoveries, either the 
results of other people’s work have been taken over 
and after having been first elaborated have been 
subsequently advanced step by step by those who 
took them over, or else they are original inventions 
which usually make progress which at first is small 
but of much greater utility than the later develop- 
ment which results from them. It is perhaps a true 
proverb which says that the beginning of anything is 
the most important ; hence it is also the most difficult. 
For, as it is very powerful in its effects, so it is very 
small in size and therefore very difficult to see. When, 
however, the first beginning has been discovered, it 
is easier to add to it and develop the rest. This has 
happened, too, with rhetorical composition, and also 
with practically all the other arts. Those who dis- 
covered the beginnings of rhetoric carried them 
forward quite a little way, whereas the famous 
modern professors of the art, entering into the heri- 
tage, so to speak, of a long series of predecessors who 
had gradually advanced it, have brought it to its 
present perfection—Tisias following the first in- 
ventors, Thrasymachus following Tisias, Theodorus 
following Thrasymachus, while numerous others have 
made numerous contributions ; hence it is no wonder 


that the art possesses a certain amplitude. Of our (3) Origin- 
ality of the 


153 


ARISTOTLE 
183 b 
35 THs Tpaywatetas od TO Lev HV TOO OvK HV TpoEeeLp- 
yaopevov, add’ ovdev tavteA@s bripyev. Kal yap 
TOV epi Tods epiatikods Adyous picbapvovvTwr 
Opota Tis Hv 7 maidevors TH Vopyiov mpaypareia. 
Adyous yap ot pev pyTropiKods of dé epwrntiKods 
edidocav expavOdvew, eis ods 7AGLoTaKIS epTrinTew 
184a wyiOnoav éxdtepor Tods aAAjAwY Adyous. Sx07Ep 
~ A wv > = ¢ / a 
Taxeia pev atexvos 8° Hv 7 didacKkadia Tots pav- 
Odvovor map’ abtdv- od yap téxvyv aAAa TA amo 
~ 4 / 4 e / ¢ 
Ths Téxvns Siddvres mradevew breAduBavov, waTep 
Sav el tis emorniunv ddoKkwy Tmapada@oew emt TO 
pindev tovetvy Tovs mddas, elta oKUTOTOMLKTY [eV 
\ , > iid , / 8 \ 
pn Svddoxor, und bev Suvyjcetar topilecba ra 
~ / A ‘ rk ~ ¢ 
Toatra, doin dé moAAa yévn mavrodama@v db10dn- 
pdtwv: odtos yap BeBonOnke ev mpos THY xpetay, 
texvnv 8 od TapédwKev. Kal mepi pev TOV py- 
184b TopLK@Y wmhpxe TOAAG Kal madAaa Ta Aceyomeva, 
\ \ ~ / ~ > A ww 
mept d€ Tod avAdoyileobar mavTeAds oddev elyomev 
mpotepov dAdo A€yew, add’ 7) TpLBH Cnrobvres troAdy 
xpovov éemovodpev. «ft dé daiverar Jeacapevois 
bpiv ds ex TovovTwv e€ apyns brapyovTwv Exew 7 
5 €00d0s ixav@s mapa tas aAAas mpayycreias Tas 
ex mapaddcews nv&nuevas, Aourov av ein TavTwV 
bpav 7) TOv hKpoapéevwy Epyov rots pev mapade- 
Aeyupevors THS pweOddov ovyyvapnv Tots 8’ edpy- 
pevors TroAAny Exew xapw. 


154 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxiv 


present inquiry, however, it is not true to say that present 
it had already been partly elaborated and partly — 
not; nay, it did not exist at all. For the training 
given by the paid teachers of contentious argument 
resembled the system of Gorgias. For some of them 

gave their pupils to learn by heart speeches which 

were either rhetorical or consisted of questions and 
answers, in which both sides thought that the rival 
arguments were for the most part included. Hence 

the teaching which they gave to their pupils was 
rapid but unsystematic ; for they conceived that they 
could train their pupils by imparting to them not an 

art but the results of an art, just as if one should 
claim to be about to communicate knowledge for the 
prevention of pain in the feet and then were not to 
teach the cobbler’s art and the means of providing 
suitable foot-gear, but were to offer a selection of 
various kinds of shoes ; for he has helped to supply 

his need but has not imparted an art to him. Also, 

on the subject of rhetoric there already existed much 
material enunciated in the past, whereas regarding 
reasoning we had absolutely no earlier work to 
quote but were for a long time labouring at tentative 
researches. If, therefore, on consideration, it appears (4) Appeal 
to you that, in view of such original conditions, our bad 
system is adequate when compared with the other 
methods which have been built up in the course of 
tradition, then the only thing which would remain 
for all of you, or those who follow our instruction, 
is that you should pardon the lack of complete- 
ness of our system and be heartily grateful for our 
discoveries. 


155 





‘ie t 10.) geese Metin s 


oJ 4 4 rt 7 








» ~ .§ i 
A ‘ y 
so 4 J 
y , nl \ y 
. Wy “ lel | tad 
4 ‘el 
’ Tk Part avces 





: Yop hte, A 
“— qari doce 
‘ 
, * 
ed 
ee | 
‘ ; 
: 
: 
: 
= ss ’ 
7. 
“Zi 
md 
st 
i , 
" a 
4 


DE GENERATIONE ET 
CORRUPTIONE 





Nes 
oe 
ee 
a ‘ 
> 
" : ee 
te 





ta AMO Aga 
TOTP TUAS 


, 
. 
3 ; 
\ ‘ 


INTRODUCTION 


Tuat the De Generatione et Corruptione is a genuine 
work of Aristotle has never been disputed. It belongs 
to the group of physical treatises which also includes 
the Physics, the De Caelo and the Meteorologica. Its 
composition has been generally ascribed to the period 
covered by Aristotle’s residence in the Troad, in 
Mitylene and in Macedonia, that is, circa 347 to 
335 B.C. 

Professor H. H. Joachim, to whose work I am deeply 
indebted, tells us that during the preparation of his 
version for the Oxford Translation of Aristotle he 
realized that something more was called for. “ It 
soon became evident,” he writes, ‘that a mere 
translation would be of little or no value, since the 
intrinsic philosophical interest of the original depends, 
to a large extent, upon what it implies and presup- 
poses. In short, Aristotle’s fascinating and masterly 
little treatise calls for a commentary in almost every 
sentence. It is full of allusions to the speculations 
of his predecessors and contemporaries, and inex- 
tricably interwoven with the theories elaborated in 
his other works, particularly in the Physics, De Caelo 
and Meteorologica, of which no modern English edi- 
tions exist.’’ Anyone who attempts to translate the De 
Generatione et Corruptione must feel that a translation 
by itself is unsatisfactory, but the present translator 


159 


ARISTOTLE 


has found it impossible, within the scope of a Loeb 
version, to do more than provide brief explanatory 
notes on some of the major obscurities and to give 
the references where Aristotle is obviously referring 
to passages in his other treatises, and to recommend 
those who require something more to consult Pro- 
fessor Joachim’s masterly commentary (Aristotle on 
Coming-to-be and Passing-away, Oxford, 1922). 

Amongst the other works which have been con- 
sulted most unas been made of the Latin Version 
of Franciscus Vatablus in vol. iii of the Berlin Aristotle 
and of Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away : 
Some Comments by Dr. W.'T. Verdenius and Dr. T. H. 
Waszink (Leiden, 1946), which was kindly sent to me 
by a friend, Dr. H. J. Drossaart Lulof. The summary 
of the treatise given by Sir W. D. Ross in his Aristotle 
(pp. 99-108) has also been very useful. 

The text which has been used is that of I. Bekker 
in the Berlin Aristotle, any divergences from which, 
except for obvious misprints, have been noted. 

The De Generatione et Corruptione discusses the 740» 
to which the natural bodies in the sublunary sphere 
are liable, namely, ‘‘ coming-to-be ”’ (yéveous) and 
“ passing-away ”’ (POopa). In Book I these processes 
are explained and distinguished from alteration 
(dAXAoiwors) and from “ growth and diminution ” 
(av&nors kai pOiors) ; incidentally the views of Anaxa- 
goras and Empedocles are examined and shown to be 
inconsistent. In the second half of the book it is 
shown that what comes-to-be is formed by combina- 
tion (uigis) of certain natural constituents, a process 
which implies “action and passion” (zoveiv kat 
maoxe.v), Which in their turn imply contact (dq¢yj). 
Book II proves that the material constituents of 


160 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY 

all that comes-to-be are the elements or “ simple 
bodies,” Earth, Air, Fire, and Water, and shows the 
manner in which they are transformed into one 
another and how they combine. Aristotle then 
briefly discusses the material, formal and final causes 
of “ coming-to-be ”’ and “ passing-away,”’ in particular 
criticizing the theory of Socrates in the Phaedo. He 
further states that the efficient cause of the double 
process is the sun’s annual movement, and, in con- 
clusion, shows that what ‘“‘ comes-to-be ”’ is necessary, 
since absolute necessity is characteristic of a sequence 
of events which is cyclical, that is to say, continuous 
and returning upon itself. 


MANUSCRIPTS 


J = Vindobonensis, phil. Graec. 100 (10th century) 
E = Parisiensis Regius 1853 (10th century) 

F = Laurentianus 87. 7 (12th century) 
H=Vaticanus 1027 (12th century) 

L=Vaticanus 253 (14th or 15th century) 


Diels = Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, by Hermann 
Diels (rec. W. Kranz, 5th edition, Berlin, 
1934) 


G 161 


APISTOTEAOYTS TEPI 


FENEXSEQS KAI ®OOPAS 
A 


3i4a1 1. Ilepi d€ yevécews cai dbopas trav dice: ywo- 
/ / 

Levwv Kal P0eipopevwv, dpoiws Kata mavTwY, Tas 

Te aitias Suaiperéov Kal rods Adyous abra@v, ert 


A ‘ > / \ > / ‘ ¢ / 
dé mepit av&yjcews Kat adAdowoews, Ti éExdTEpov, 


on 


A / \ > \ ¢ / F 4 
Kal TOTEpov THY avdTHv vrodnnTéov dvow elvar 
> / ‘ / a” / ov 
ddAowcews Kal yevéoews, 7) ywpis, womep d- 
WpioTa Kal Tots dvopmacw. 
~ \ bs > / ¢ \ A / 
Tav pev ody apxyaiwy of pev tiv Kadovpevny 
c ~ /, > / . / < > @ 
anAjv yéveow dddoiwow elvai daow, oi 8 Erepov 
> / ‘ / hid \ \ a A ~ 
adXAoiwow Kai yéveow. Soo pev yap &v TL TO TAY 
¢ ~ 
Aéyovow elvar kal wavta e€ évds yevrv@ow, Tovrous 
1 


o 


\ > / A / > / / ‘ ‘ 
fev avaykn THv yéveow aAdoiwow ddvar Kali TO 
/ /, > ~ Lid a! / A 
Kupiws ywopevov addAovodcbar: Gao. Sé€ tAciw TH 
vAnv evos TWéaow, ofov ’EuredoxAjs Kat ’Avagéa- 
yopas kat Aev«immos, tovros 5é Erepov. Kaitou 
> / \ > / A >? / / 
Avagayopas ye tiv olkeiav pwviy hyyvonoev’ Aéyer 
162 


| ARISTOTLE ON 
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY 


BOOK I 


1. In discussing coming-to-be and passing-away of Chs. 1-5. 
things which by nature come-to-be and pass-away, (mine to 
as exhibited uniformly wherever they occur, we must sing-away 
distinguish their causes and definitions ; further, we Sees 
must deal with “growth” and “ alteration,” and tn) nor 
inquire what each of these terms means, and whether growth and 
we are to suppose that the nature of “ alteration”? “i 
and coming-to-be is the same, or whether each is of 

a separate nature corresponding to the names by 

which they are distinguished. 

Of the ancient philosophers some assert that what Views of 
is called “ simple ’’ coming-to-be is “ alteration,’ the Monists 
while others hold that “ alteration ” and coming-to- hc sain 
be are different processes. Those who hold that the ““"'"" 
universe is a simple entity and who generate all 
things from a single thing, must necessarily maintain 
that coming-to-be is “ alteration,’ and that what 
comes-to-be in the proper sense of the term under- 
goes “ alteration.’’ Those, on the other hand, who 
hold that the matter of things is more than one, must 
_regard the two processes as different—Empedocles, 
for example, and Anaxagoras and Leucippus. Anaxa- 


goras, however, misunderstood his own statement ; 
163 


31i4a 


15 


20 


2 


o 


314b 


or 


ARISTOTLE 


~ ¢ A / \ > / > % 
yotv ws To ylweoba Kat dddAvoba radrov 
Kkabéarnke TH aAXovobobar. modrAa dé Adyer TA 
ato.xeia, Kabdmep Kal éerepor. *EpmedoxAns pev 

\ \ \ 
yap Ta fev CwpaTiKa TéTTapa, TA dé TdVTA peETA 

~ , a“ A > £ > , \ 
T&v Kwovvtwy €& tov apiluov, "Avakaydopas Se 
ameipa Kat AevKummos kai Anudxpitos. 6 pev yap 

\ lo a > ~ \ 
TA Opolopmeph oTorxyeta TiPynow, ofov dorodv Kal 
odpka Kal pveAdv, Kal tdv ddAwy dv ExdoTou 
ouvavupov TO pépos eativ: Anpoxpitos S€ Kal 
Aevkimmos €k owpdtwv dad.iapérwv tarda ovy- 

cal / “A > eat \ \ ~ 
Kelobai dac., Tadra 8 ameupa Kai To TAOS elvac 

\ \ / 9:55, 9 \ \ e-% / , 
Kal Tas popdds, adTa S5€ mpos attra Siadépew Tov- 
Tows e€ dv cial Kal Oéoe Kal rafer TOUTWY. evaVy- 
tiws dé paivovrat Aéyovres ot mept “Avagaydpay 
Tots rept “Epsredoxheéa: 6 pev yap pyar mp Kal 
vdwp Kal dépa Kal yhv orovxeia Téooapa Kal amAd 
elvar waAAov 7) odpka Kal dorobv Kal Ta ToLabra 
TOV dpmovopep@v, ot S€ Tadra pev add Kal orot- 
xeia, yav Sé€ Kal ip Kal vdwp Kal aépa avvbera- 
TavoTeppiav yap elvar TovTwv. 

a / 

Tots pev odv e& evds mavra KatacKevalovow 
> a / \ / \ \ A > 
avayKatov A€yew TiIv yeveow Kal THv Plopay adA- 

‘ 
Aoiwow: del yap péevew TO bTroKEipevov TAaUTO Kal 
td A \ ~ > ~ / cal A ‘ 
év (ro 8€ rovobrov adAowdobai dapev): tots 5€ Ta 

/ / ~ / \ > / cond 
yévn TAciw movotor Siadepew tHv aAdoiwow Tis 





a Diels, fr. 17. 

» i.e. compounds (though, it may be, in different propor- 
tions) of the same four simple bodies—Earth, Air, Fire and 
Water—such as wood, the metals, and blood, flesh and 
marrow in animals, Such compounds, when divided, still 
retain the same constituents, 


164 





COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1 


for example, he says that coming-to-be and destruc- 
tion constitute the same process as “ being altered,” @ 
though, like others, he says that the elements are 
‘many. Thus Empedocles holds that the corporeal 
elements are four, but that all the elements, including 
those which create motion, are six in number, while 
Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus hold that 
their number is infinite. For Anaxagoras puts down 
as elements things which have like parts, for example 
bone, flesh and marrow, and anything else of which 
the part bears the same name as the whole ; whereas 
_ Democritus and Leucippus say that all other things 
are composed of indivisible bodies, and that these 
are infinite both in number and in the forms which 
they take, while the compounds differ from one 
another in their constituents and the position and 
arrangement of these. Anaxagoras and his school 
obviously take, a view directly opposite to that of 
Empedocles and his school; for Empedocles says 
that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements 
and are “simple ’”’ rather than flesh and bone and 
similar things which have like parts, whereas Anaxa- 
goras and his school assert that the things which have 
like parts are “ simple ” and are elements, but that 
Earth, Fire, Water and Air are composite, for each 
of them is, they say, a “ general seed-ground ”’ for 
things which have like parts. 

Those, therefore, who construct everything out of 
a single element must necessarily say that coming- 
to-be and passing-away are “ alteration,” for their 
substratum remains the same and one (and it is such 
a substratum which we say undergoes “ alteration ’’) ; 
but those who make the kinds of things more than 
one must hold that “ alteration ” differs from coming- 


165 


314b 


10 


~ 
or 


20 


25 


ARISTOTLE 


yevecews* auvidvTwr yap Kal SvaAvonevwy 1 yéveots 
/ A ¢ 4 ‘ /, ~ \ 
oupBaiver Kai 7 POopd. S10 Aéyet Tovrov TOV 
TpoTov Kal jEpmedoxhijs, | ore“ ddaus odderds 
éorw) aAAa pdvov pikes TE Bid dagis TE puyevTwy.” 
6Tt pev odv oiketos 6 Adyos abtav TH trobéce 
4 4 ~ ‘ Lid / \ f 
ovrw davar, diAov, Kal dtu A€yovor Tov TpdTOV 
TotTov' avayKatov dé Kal tovTos tiv adAoiwow 
elvar prev Te pavar Tapa thy yéveow, advvarov 
pevro. Kata Ta Um’ éxeivwv Aeyoueva. TodTo 8 
iid / > ~ cs a a ‘ 
ote Aéyomev opbds, pddvov ovvideiv. woTep yap 
Op@uev jpewovons tis oboias ev abtH petaBoAnv 
Kata peyelos, THv KaAdovpevny avEnow Kal dOiow, 
ovTw Kai dAAoiwow. od pnv add e& dv Aéyovow 
¢ / > \ ~ ~ > 4, > 
ot mAciovs apyas TovwodvTes puds advvatov aAdot- 


~ A \ / > Ad ~ t 
oto8a. ta yap man, Kal’ a dapev TodTo ovp-— 


/ \ ~ / ao. ft / > 
Baivew, dSiahopat tadv ororxeiwy ciciv, rAE€yw 8 


olov Bepyov yuxpdv, AevKov péAav, Enpov vypov, 


\ \ \ ~ ” Ld o 
padakov oxAnpov Kai THv dAdwy ExactTov, worep 
\ \ > a Ae IS \ \ ca 
Kat dnoiv *EumedordAjs ““ jéAvov prev AevKov opav 
\ A ¢ / ld 2) ¢> lo , / 
Kat Deppov amdavTn, ouBpov 8 ev maaw dvoddevra 
c / ” ¢ / \ U ‘ 7 & ~ 
Te puyadéov Te,” dpoiws dé dropiler Kal emt trav 
Aowr@v. wor’ ef pur Svvarov ex updos yeveobat 


vdwp pnd’ e€ vdatos yijv, 005’ ex AevKod péAav 


€orar ovdev 00d’ ek padaKkod oxAnpov: 6 8’ adros 
Abyos Kai mepl TaV GAAwv. Todto 8 Fv aAdroiwais. 
4 Kat davepov Ore pilav adel Trois evavtio sro- 





@ Diels, fr. 8. » Diels, fr. 21 lines 3 and 5. 
166 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1 


to-be, for coming-to-be and passing-away occur when 
things come together and are dissolved. This is the 
reason why Empedocles also is speaking to this effect, 
when he says that “ there is no origin of anything, 
but only a mingling and separation of things which 
have been mingled.” ¢ It is clear then, that their 
description of coming-to-be and passing-away in this 
way accords with their assumption and that they 
actually describe them in this way ; they also must, 
however, admit that “alteration” is something 
different from coming-to-be, though they cannot 
possibly do so consistently with the views which they 
express. It is easy to see that we are correct in 
saying this ; for just as we see changes in magnitude 
taking place in a thing while its substance remains 
unchanged (what we call “ increase ”’ and “ diminu- 
tion ’’), so also we see “ alteration” occurring. Never- 
theless, the statements of those who suppose the 
existence of more than one first principle make it 
impossible for “ alteration ’’ to take place. For the 
qualities, in respect of which we say that “ altera- 
tion” occurs (for example, hot and cold, white and 
black, dry and moist, soft and hard, etc.) are differ- 
ences affecting the elements. As Empedocles says, 


The sun is white to look upon and hot 
In every part, the rain is dark and chill ° ; 


and he likewise characterizes also the other elements. 
Hence, as it is impossible for Water to come-into- 
being from Fire, or Earth from Water, neither will 
black come into existence out of white, nor hard out 
of soft ; and the same argument applies also to the 
other qualities. Now this is what “ alteration ’’’ has 
always meant. From this it is also clear that it must 
be assumed that.a single matter belongs to the “ con- 

167 


314 b 


315 a 


oC 


10 


15 


ARISTOTLE 


/ WA EA / \ / A 
feréov vAnv, dv Te petaBdAAn Kara TOToVv, av TE 
> A \ / + > > / 
kat avénow kai dbiow, av te Kat adAdAoiwow. 
” > ¢ , > a > a 1, 9 , 
ért 8 Opoiws avaykatov eivar TobTo Kai dAAoiwow: 
” \ > / / > ‘ \ ¢ / a 
cite yap aAdolwais €oTL, Kal TO UTOKEyLEVOV EV 
oTo.xeiov Kal pia 7) TavTwv VAn TOV exdvTwv eis 
wy tA an” > A ¢ / ov ” 
aAAnAa petaBoAny, Kav et TO broKEipevov EV, ETL 
aAAoiwats. 
> Aq \ s ” > / re \ 
EpredoxAjs pev obv €oixev evavtia A€yew Kat 
mpos Ta hawdpeva Kal mpos adrov atdros. apa 
\ A + 7 > ay, / ~ 
pev yap ov dnow Erepov e€ érépov yiweoar Tayv 
/ > / > \ Ss / > / 
aTo.xyetwy ovdev, aAAa tadAa TavTa eK TovTwY, 
4 > cd > “A Vs A a 4 
dpa 8° drav eis €v ovvaydyn THv dmacay Pvow 
\ lon f >? ~ €:-35 / /, 
mTAiv too veiKous, ek Tod évos yiveoBar maw 
tA LA > > c + ~ Ld ~ 
Exaotov. wor e& évds twos dhAov dtu Siadopats 
Tio ywpilopevwv Kai mafeow eyeveTo TO ev VOwP 
\ \ ~ / / \ A 7 \ \ 
To 5€ wip, Kabamep A€yer TOV prev HALov AevKOV Kal 
/ \ \ lon \ ‘ Ld > 
feppov, thv dé yhv Bapd Kai oxAnpdv. adatpov- 
péevwv obv to’twv Tav Siahopav (cial yap adat- 
peTat yevopevat ye) SHAov ws avdyKn yiweoBar Kat 
a > ¢ ae 4 > a ¢ , beige ea 
ynv e& Batos Kal vdwp ek ys, Opoiws Se Kal 
~ + Ld ? / / > \ \ ~ 
Tav dAdwv éxaoTov, od TOTE povov aAAa Kal viv, 
peraBadArovTd ye Tots maQeow. eoTr & e€ cy 
eipnke Suvapeva tpocyivecbar Kal xwpilecba ma- 
” \ / > 4 ” ~ 
Aw, dAAws Te Kal paxopevwv adAjAots Ere TOO 
/ \ ~ / / \ / > 2.4 
velkous Kal THs diAias. Sidmep Kai TOTE €€ EVvOS 
eyervnOnaav: od yap 51) Tip ye Kal yh Kal vdwp 





@ j,e, when the elements originally came-to be. 


168 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1 


trary poles,’ whether they change in respect of place, 
or of “ growth” and “ diminution,” or of “ altera- 
tion’; furthermore, that the existence of a single 
matter and that of “ alteration ”’ are each as necessary 
as the other, for, if “ alteration’ takes place, then 
the substratum is a single element, and so all things 
which change into one another have a single matter, 
and, conversely, if the substratum is one, “ altera- 
tion ” takes place. 

Empedocles, then, seems to contradict the observed 
facts and himself as well. For he denies that any one 
of his elements comes-to-be from any other element, 
but declares that all other things come-to-be from 
these elements, and at the same time, after collecting 
all nature, except Strife, together into one, he declares 
that each thing again comes-to-be out of the One. 
Hence it is clear that out of a One, when separation 
took place owing to certain differences and qualities, 
one thing came-to-be Water and another Fire, as is 
shown by his calling the sun “ white and hot ”’ and 
the earth “heavy and hard.” If, therefore, these 
differences are taken away (and it is possible to take 
them away, since they came-to-be), it is clear that 
Earth must necessarily come-to-be out of Water, and 
Water out of Earth, and similarly with each of the 
other elements, not only then? but also now,? when 
they undergo a change in their qualities. According 
to his statements, the qualities can be attached and 
can be separated again, especially as Strife and Love 
are still fighting against one another. This is also the 
reason why the elements were originally generated 
from the One ; for, I suppose, Fire, Earth and Water 


» i.e. when according to Empedocles “ Strife” is gaining 
the upper hand: 


169 


315a 


20 


25 


30 


35 


315 b 


ARISTOTLE 


” + a S \ ~ * A \ , 
Ere OvTa Ev HV TO Tav. addnAov dé Kal moTEpov 
> \ b ~ / 1a a” \ / / \ ~ 
apxnv abdt@v Oeréov To Ev 7 Ta TrOAAG, Aéyw dé TrIp 
Kal yhv Kal Ta avoToLYa TOUTwWY. 7 peV yap ws 
vAn broKertat, €€ ob} peraBaAdovra dia THY Kivnow 
ywovra yh Kal mip, TO €v otoxeiov: 4 S€ TobTO 
/ 
pev ex ovvldcews yiverar cuvidvTwy exeivor, 
>? A > >? , / > 7 
exeiva 8 ek duaddcews, ororyewwdéoTepa eKeiva 
Kal mpdorepa THY pow. 

2. “OAws tre 57) epi yevecews Kai dbopas THs 
amAjs Aextéov, moTEpov EoTw 7 ovK EoTL Kal TAs 
> / ‘ \ a »” ¢ ~ , 
€oTlv, Kai Tept TOV GAAwv anAdv Kwioewv, olov 
mepi av&ijaews Kal adAowcews. IlAdtrwy pev odv 
pLovov mepi yevécews eoxeyato Kal Plopas, dmws 
bmdpye. Tols mpdypac., Kal mept yeveoews od 

~ ~ ~ nn 
maons aAAa THs TOV oToLYelwv’ THs S€ GadpKes 7 
> ~ “ ~ A ~ | 4 > / ” 
ooTd 1 TOV GAAwv TL THY ToLOvTwWY, OvdEV* ETL 

” A > / ” \ > i é 
ovTe mept adAowscews ovTe TEpi adfjoews, Tiva 
TpoTov bmdpxovor Tois mpdypacw. dAws dé mapa 

\ > ~ \ > \ > ‘ > / ” 
Ta EemuToAns mept ovdevds ovd«eis eméotnoev e&a 
Anpoxpirov. otros 8 owe pev Tept amdavrwy 

, ” Ju? A A é ” ‘ 
fppovrioa, On S€ ev TH TAs Siadeper. ovrTEe yap 
\ > / 2 ‘\ 2O\ / a / 
mept ab&jaews oddeis ovdev Siwpicev, wWomep Aeé- 
YouEVv, O TL [7) KaV 6 TUXWY ElrELEV, OTL TPOOLOVTOS 
abvédvovra Tod dpolov'’ TH opoiw (Hs S€ todTo, 


1 rod dpoiov addidi. 





@ j.e, Water and Air. 
» Namely, that set up by Strife. 
¢ Timaeus 52 pv ft. 


170 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1-2 


did not exist separately at all while they were still 
one. Now it is also not clear whether we must ascribe 
to him the One as his starting-point, or the Many— 
by which I mean Fire and Earth and their co- 
ordinates. For the One, in as much as it forms, as 
its matter, the substratum from which Earth and 
Fire come-to-be through the change due to motion, 
is an element ; on the other hand, in as much as the 
One comes-to-be through a process of composition, 
due to the coming together of the Many, whereas 
the Many are the result of dissolution, the Many are 
more “ elementary ” than the One and by nature 
prior to it. 

2. We must, therefore, deal in general with the 
subject of unqualified coming-to-be and_passing- 
away, and discuss whether they exist or not, and how 
they exist, and with the other simple motions, such 
as “ growth”’ and “ alteration.” Plato,¢ it is true, Plato's 
investigated coming-to-be and passing-away, but only Yew Js too 
as to the manner in which passing-away is inherent in 
things, and as regards coming-to-be he did not deal 
with it in general but only that of the elements ; he 
never inquired how flesh or bones or any other similar 
things came-to-be, and, further, he did not discuss 
how “alteration”? and ‘“‘ growth” are present in 
things. In fact no one at all has applied himself to 
any of these subjects, except in a superficial manner, 
with the single exception of Democritus. He seems Views of 
to have thought about them all, and from first to last ee 
he excels in his manner of treatment. For, as we Leucippus. 
assert, no one else made any definite pronouncement 
about “ growth,”’ except such as any man-in-the- 
street might make, namely, that things grow by the 
coming together of like with like (without a word as 


171 


315 b 


On 


10 


15 


20 


ARISTOTLE 


ovKeTL), odde TEpl pikews, oddE TEpL TAV ddAAwWY 
ws elmetv oddevds, olov Tob Toveiv Kal TOO TacyxeW, 
/ ls A \ aA \ A / ‘ A 
Tiva TpOToV TO peVv Troe? TO OE TAGE TAS PudLKas 
/ / \ \ 7 / 
mounoets. Anydxpitos S€ Kat AevKurmos Trow)- 
\ BA \ > / ‘ \ / 
cavTes TA OXHpaTA THY GAAoiwow Kal THY yEeveow 
ex TovTwv Trovote., SiaKkpioer prev Kal ouyKpicet 
yéveow Kat P0opdv, ta€er d€ Kai Poe. aAdoiwow. 
ereL 8° Wovto TaAnbes ev TH haivecbar, evavria Se 
‘ + \ / ‘ bd + 
Kal ameipa Ta awopeva, Ta oXHpaTA arTreipa 
LA a a ~ 
emoinoav, worTe tais petaPoAais tod ovyKeyevov 
\ > ‘ > / ~ »” \ »” ‘ 
To abvTo evavtiov doKeiv dAAw Kal adAAw, Kai peTa- 
Kweiobar puKpod éeupwyvepevov, Kal dAws Eerepov 
paivesbar evos peraxwnbévros: ex TOV adrav yap 
Tpaywoia Kal Kwumdia yiveTar ypappdatwr. 
a \ \ Cal A ~ 4 > / 
mel d€ Soke? oxedov mAow €repov elvar yeveats 
Kat adAdAoiwois, Kail yiveobar pev Kal Pbeipecbar 
/ \ / > ~ \ 
ovykpwopeva Kal diakpiwwopeva, adAdAovotcbar Sé 
/ ~ / ‘ /, >? 
petaBadrcvrwy Tav Tabnudtwr, Tepi ToUTwWY ée7U- 
/ ~ 
oTrjnaao. Jewpynréov. amopias yap éxe. Tadra Kal 
\ ‘\ b) / > \ / > , 
moAAas Kat evAdyous. ef ev yap €oTt avyKpLots 
 yéveois, ToAAa advvara ovpPaiver: eiot 8 ad 
/ id > \ ‘ > »” , 
Adyou ErEpot avayKaoriKol Kal odK EVTOpoL Siadvew 
a > > Or ” ” >Oo"U ie , 
ws odK evdexeTar GAAws exew. et Se’ un eort avy= 
€ / n” Lid b] ” / ” > 
Kptois 1) ‘yeveows, 7] OAws odK Eat yeveois 7) GA- 
172 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 


to how this happens), and they tell us nothing about 
“ mixing ” and practically nothing about the other 
terms, such as “ action ”’ and “ passion,” that is, how 
one thing acts upon and another is affected by physical 
action. Democritus, however, and Leucippus postu- 
late the “ figures’? and make “ alteration”’ and 
coming-to-be result from these, attributing coming- 
to-be and passing-away to their dissociation and 
association, and “ alteration’ to their arrangement 
and position ; and, since they held that the truth 
consisted in appearance, and appearances are con- 
trary to one another and infinite in number, they 
made the “ figures ” infinite in number, so that, owing 
to changes in the compound, the same thing seems 
to be contrary to different people and to be “ trans- 
posed ” by the mixing in of a small ingredient and 
to appear quite different owing to “ transposition ” 
of one constituent. For a tragedy and a comedy are 
composed of the same letters. 

Since almost all philosophers think (a) that coming- 
to-be and “ alteration” are different processes and 
(6) that things come-to-be and pass-away by “ associa- 
tion’ and “ dissociation,’ whereas they undergo 
“alteration ”’ by a change of their qualities, we must 
fix our attention on these views and examine them ; 
for they present many arguable questions for dis- 
eussion. For if coming-to-be is “ association,’’ many 
impossible situations arise ; and, on the other hand, 
there are other compelling arguments, not easy to 
disentangle, to prove that coming-to-be cannot be 
anything else. If, on the other hand, coming-to-be 
is not “ association,’”’ either coming-to-be does not 





1 ef S€ scripsi: etre codd. 
173 


315 b 


25 


30 


35 
316 a 


Oo 


ARISTOTLE 


, lo ~ 
Aoiwots, 7 Kal tobro Svaddoa yaderov ov mreipa- 
Téov. 

> \ A 4 4, / id / 

Apx7) 5€ Tovtwy mavTwv, TOTEpov OVTW yiveTaL 

Se ~ \ ? / 3 Gaby \ > / 
Kal aAAovodrar Kal av€dverar Ta OvTAa Kal TavavTia 
TovUToLs TdoxXEL, THY TpwTwWY bTapxoVvTWY peyeO@v 
> / a” > / > / > / 
adiaipéerwv, 7 ovdev eat peyeos adiaipetov: dia- 
dpéper yap Tobto mAciorov. Kat madw «i peyebn, 
motepov, ws Anuoxpitos Kat AevKurmos, owpara 
Tatr éotlv, 7) womep ev TH Tipaiw, emimeda. 

~ \ on b) / / ‘ > + > 7 
Tovro pev odv avtdo, Kabdmep Kal ev adAdAots «ipy- 

A / > / ~ A 
Kapev, GAoyov péxpe emimedwv Siaddoa. 810 
parrAov evAoyov cwpata elvar advaipera.  aAda 
Kal TabTa ToAAHy exer dAoyiav. dpuws dé TovTois 
dAAroiwow Kal yéveow evdexeTar troveiv, Kabdmep 
elpntar, TpoTH Kat dvabvyy petraKwobvta TO avro 
Kal tTais Tov oxnudtwy dvadopais, Smep Tovel 
Anpoxpitos (S10 Kal xpoav ov dynow elvae: tpomy 
yap xpwparilecba), Tots 8° eis erimeda Svacpodow 
ovdKéTe’ ovdev yap yiverar ANY oTeped ovvTibe- 
péevv: 7400s yap 088’ eyxerpodar yevvdv ovdev €€ 
avTav. 

Alrvov 5€ T08 én” EXarrov S¥vacba Ta dpuodroyou- 
peva avvopay 7) atrevpia. S10 doou evpKyKace paa- 
Nov év trois duotkots, paAAov Sdvavrat drrotiMecOat 
rovavras apyas at emi moAd ddvavrar ouveipew: 


1 ef post 7 omisi cum EH. 





@ Plato, Timaeus 53 c ff. 
> De Caelo 299 a 6 ff. 
© These terms are explained in Met. 985 b 15 ff. 


174 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 
exist at all or it is “ alteration”; or else we must try 
to unravel this problem too, difficult as it is. 

The starting-point for dealing with all these pro- There are 
blems is the question, ‘‘ Do things which exist come- 3).iiple 
to-be and ‘alter’ and ‘ grow,’ and undergo the magnitudes. 
contrary changes, because the primary existences 
are indivisible magnitudes ? Or is no magnitude in- 
divisible?’ For it makes a great difference which 
view we take. Again, if primary existences are in- 
divisible magnitudes, are they bodies, as Democritus 
and Leucippus assert ? Or are they planes, as is the 
view expressed in the 7imaeus?* To resolve them 
into planes and to stop at that point is, as we have 
said elsewhere,” in itself contrary to reason. Hence 
it is more reasonable to hold that they are indivisible 
bodies, though this view also involves considerable 
irrationality. Nevertheless, as has been said, it is 
possible with these bodies to bring about “ altera- 
tion ’ and coming-to-be if one ‘ transposes ” the 
same thing by “ turning ”’ and “ intercontact ” © and 
by variations of the “ figures,’’ as Democritus does 
(hence he denies that colour exists, for coloration, 
he says is due to the “ turning ” of the “ figures ”’) ; 
but it is impossible for those who divide bodies into 
planes to bring about “ alteration’ and coming-to 
be; for, when planes are put together, nothing can 
result except solids; for they never even try to 
generate any quality from them. 

The reason why we have not the power to compre- 
hend the admitted facts is our lack of experience. 

Hence those who have lived in a more intimate com- 
munion with the phenomena of nature are better able 
to lay down such principles as can be connected to- 
gether and cover a wide field; those, on the other 


175 


316 a 


i 


oOo 


20 


25 


ARISTOTLE 


la ~ ca ¢ 
ot 8 éx ta&v TOAAGY Adywv dDewpytor TOV drrap- 
/ 
xXovTwy ovtes, mpos drlya Brepavres arrodaivovTar 
ta to ie ” \- 3 /, hd 8 /, 
pdov. ido. 8’ av tis Kal €x ToUTWY doov Siadepovow 
of voids Kai AoyiK@s oKotobvTes* Tepl yap 
a / ¢€ / a A > 
Tod atopa elvar peyeln ot péev dacw rt TO adro- 
tplywvov toAdd €orar, Anudxpitos 8° av davein 
a a a > 
oikelois Kal duarKkois Adyos memetobar. SHAov 3 
€otat 6 Aéyopev tpoiodow. 
” \ > / ” fa / ~ / \ 
Eyer yap azopiav, et tis bein o@pad te elvar Kat 
/ / / \ ~ 8 / / 
peyeOos mavrn Svatperov, Kat todro duvatov. Ti 
\ ” of \ / , > ‘ 
yap €aTa. omep THV Siaipeow Siadedyer; et yap 
/ a! ‘ ~ , a“ 7 wv 
mavTn SvaipeTov, Kat TodTo SuvaTov, Kdv dua ely 
Totro mdvTn Sinpynpevov, Kal ei fur) dpa Surjpyrac: 
Bal > ~ / > A Bd) ” > , 

Kav €t TovTo yévoito, ovdev av ein dadvvaToV. 
> ~ \ A \ / ¢ / \ «@ / 
ovKobv Kal KaTa TO Lécov Woa’Tws, Kal dAws 8é, 
el mavTn mépuKe Siaperov, Kav SiaipeOH, oddev 
” > 4 , > \ 29> ”“ > / 
€ora. advvatov yeyovds, eel odd adv eis pupia 
ft / ty 291 > 4 / ” 
Lupiakis Sunpnueva 7, oddev advvaTov KatToL taws 
) \ ”“ / > \ / / nT > 
ovdeis av du€Aow. eel Tovey madvTyn Towwdrdv éoTt 
‘ ~ / / > ” / , 
TO o@pa, Sinpyjobw. ti obv gorau Aoumdv; é- 
6 > \ td: ” /, > / 
yeOos; ov yap oldv re €ora yap re od Sunpnpevor, 


hv dé mavrn Siaperov. aArAa pry ef undev Cora 





4 i,e. the Platonists. 
> See De Lin. Insec. 968 a 9 ff. 


176 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 


hand, who indulge in long discussions without taking 
the facts into account are more easily detected as 
men of narrow views. One can see, too, from this 
the great difference which exists between those whose 
researches are based on the phenomenon of nature 
and those who inquire by a dialectical method. For 
on the subject of atomic magnitudes one school ¢ 
maintains their existence on the ground that other- 
wise the “ideal triangle” will be many,’ while 
Democritus would appear to have been convinced by 
arguments germane to the subject and founded on 
the study of nature. What we mean will be clear as 
we proceed. 

If one postulates that a body, that is, a magnitude, Difficulty 
is divisible throughout and that such a division is (Aa Dy 
possible, a difficulty arises, namely, what will the tion that 
body be which escapes division? If it is divisible divisible 
throughout and this procedure is possible, it might ttoughout. 
be simultaneously divided throughout, even though 
the divisions have not been made simultaneously, 
and, if this were to result, no impossibility would be 
involved. Therefore, supposing it is of a nature to 
be divisible throughout, by a series of similar bisec- 
tions or on any other principle, nothing impossible 
will have been achieved if it has actually been 
divided, since, even if it has been divided into in- 
numerable parts innumerable times, there is no 
impossibility, though perhaps no one would carry 
out this division. Since, therefore, the body is divi- 
sible throughout, let us suppose that it has been 
divided. What then will be left? A magnitude? 

No : that is impossible, since then there will be some- 
thing which has not been divided, and it was divisible 
throughout. But if no body or magnitude is to be left 


177 


316 a 


30 


316 b 


ou 


ARISTOTLE 


~ \ / / > ww n” > 
oGpa pndé péyebos, Suaipecis 8° eora, 7) ek 
a n“ 
oTlyua@v €oTa, Kal dpeyebn e& dv ovyKertat, 7} 
‘ 
ovdev TavTdracw, wore Kav yivoito eK pndevos 
nn ” / ‘ \ ~ A > A > + Re. | 
Kav €in ovykKeipevov, Kal TO Trav 81) oddév GAN’ 7 
pawopevov. odpoiws 5€ Kav H ek ortypav, ovK 
€oTa. Toad. OmdTE yap HTTOVTO Kal ev Hv wéyeOos 
\ ov s > \ > / ~ \ ~ 
Kal apa jHoav, ovdev erroiovy peilov To wav. Sua- 
0 / \ > Py / \ Av / i>) A er 35 A 
peevtos yap «is dvo Kal rAciw, oddev EAaTTov ode 
petlov TO 7av Tob mpdTEpov, wWoTe KaV TAAL oUV- 
~ > A / / > \ \ A 
TeAdaw, oddev roujoovor péyefos. GAA pay Kal 
et TL Starpoupevov oiov exmpioya yiverar TOD ow- 
patos, Kat oUTws ex Tob peyefovs o@pd TL amép- 
XeTaL, 6 avTos Adyos, exeivo THs Siawperdv; et 
8 \ \ ~ iAX’ td / \ n“ / “a 
€ pn o@pa add’ eldds te xwpiotov 7 mdbos. 6 
> ~ Se. A / +. ¢€ 4 A 
anjAbev, kal. €or. TO péyeBos orvypal 7) adat Todi 
maQotoa, aromov ex pr peyeOdv péyeBos elvar. 
ér. S€ mod e€oovra: Kai aKkivntou 7) Kwovpevar at 
otvypai; addy te det pia dvoitv twav, ds dvTos 
Twos Tapa THY adiv Kal Thy Siaipeow Kal Tv 
oriypnv. et dx tus Ojoerar driody 7) dmnAiKovody 
o@pa elvac mavtn Svaperov, mavra tadra ovp- 
Batver. €re eav dSveAwv ovvOA 7d Evrov % 7 GAXo, 
/ ww > ..e& > ~ LA 4 ta 
mddw ioov Te Kal Ev. odKodv ottws exer SnAovdre 
”“ / \ , > ¢ ~ A 7 

Kav Téuw Td EvAov Kal” driody onpetov. mdvrn 
+ / / , he »” ) A , 
dpa diunpyrar Suvdyer. ri odv €ort mapa ri d.al- 





* i.e, the sum of the separated parts. 
178 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 


and yet division is to take place, the body either will 
consist of points, and its constituents will be things 
of no magnitude, or else it will be absolutely nothing ; 
and so it would come-to-be and be compounded of 
nothing, and the whole would be nothing but an 
illusory appearance. Similarly, if it consists of points, 
it will not be a magnitude ; for when the points were 
in contact and formed a single magnitude and were 
together, they did not make the whole any larger. 
For when it was divided into two or more parts, the 
whole ¢ was no smaller or larger than before ; so that, 
if all the points were to be put together, they will 
not make any magnitude. Further, if, when the body 
is being divided, a minute portion of it, like a piece 
of saw-dust, is formed and in this way a body is 
detached from the magnitude, the same argument 
holds good, and the question arises : “ In what sense 
is this portion divisible ?”’ Ifit was not a body which 
was detached but a separable form or quality, and 
if the magnitude is points or contacts thus qualified, 
it is absurd that a magnitude should be composed 
of things which are not magnitudes. Furthermore, 
where will the points be ? And, are they motionless 
or do they move ? Also a contact is always a contact 
of two things, since there is always something as well 
as the contact or the division or the point. All this 
results, if one is going to posit that any body of any 
size whatever is divisible throughout. Furthermore, 
if, after having divided a piece of wood or some other 
object, I put it together again, it is again both equal 
to what it was and a unity. Obviously this is so at 
whatever point I cut the wood. The wood has, there- 
fore, been divided potentially throughout. What 
then, is there in the wood besides the division ? For 


179 


316 b 


15 


25 


30 


ARISTOTLE 


> \ \ ” / > 4 ~ > 
peow; et yap Kal €o7Ti te 7d00s, GAAa TAs eis 
Tatra dvadverar Kal yiverar ek TovTwv; TAs 
/ ~ iA > w” > 4 > ¢ o 
xwpilera tabra; wor eimep advvatov e& addy 
 ottypa@v elva Ta peyebn, avaynn elvar owpara 
> / A / > A > \ \ ~ 
adiaipera Kal peyeln. od pv adda Kai rabra 
Bepevois odx Hrrov ovpBaiver advvatov. eoKemrat 
dé wept atr&v ev érépois. aAda rabdra meipatéov 
r / \ / > > ~ A > / / 
vew* d10 mdAw €€ apyis THY atopiay AeKréov. 
To pev obv dmav o@pua aicPyrov elvar dvaperov 
Kal’ oriodv onpeiov Kal advaipetov oddev aroTov: 
\ \ A 4 / \ > > , 
TO pev yap Suvduer Siaiperdv, TO 8 evredcyeia 
€ 4 A > bo A / A 4 
brdpfer. ToS elvar dua mavTyn diaiperov Suvaper 
> 4 / a“ > \ /, nn 
advvatov dd€eev av elvar. ei yap duvarov, Kav 
/ > a > Ad EA > , 
yevoto, odx worte elvar dua audw evredeyeta 
> , ‘ / > \ / > 
adiaiperov Kal dinpnuevov, adda Sinpnuevov Kab 
OTLobv onpeiov. ovdev apa eoTat AouTOV, Kal Eis 
> / > / A ~ \ / x es 
aowpatov eplappevov TO o@pa, Kal yévoto 8 av 
/ ” > ~ a! id > > , \ 
mdAw row eK oTvypa@v 7 dAws e& oddevds. Kai 
TovTo TMs SuvaTov; 
> ‘A \ 4 a > A \ BE | 
Ada pv oti ye Svapetras eis ywproTa Kal det 
els eAdtrw peyeln Kai els améxovta Kal Kexwpt- 
\ ~ 
opeva, pavepdov. ovTe 81) Kara pépos Svatpodvre €in 
a“ 4 ¢ / ” A es ~ 
av arreipos 7) Optus, odre aya oldv Te SiatpeO Avan 
Kara Trav onpetov (od yap duvardv) aAAa péxpt Tov. 
/ , 
avadykn dpa atrowa evumdpyew peyébn ddpara, 


¢ 


” ‘ ” ” / ‘ ‘ 
ad\Aws Te Kal eimep EoTar yeveois Kal POopa 7 





* i.e. points of division and quality, 
» Phys. 231 a 21 ff. i.e. uncuttable. 


180 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 


even if there is some quality, how is it dissolved into 
these constituents * and how does it come-to-be out 
of them? And how are these constituents separated ? 
Therefore, since it is impossible for magnitudes to 
consist of contacts or points, there must be indivisible 
bodies and magnitudes. However, if we posit these, 
an equally impossible consequence arises, which has 
been the subject of discussion elsewhere.’ But we 
must try to solve these difficulties, and so the problem 
must be stated again from the beginning. 

It is, then, in no wise absurd that every perceptible 
body should be divisible at any point whatsoever and 
also indivisible ; for it will be potentially divisible and 
actually indivisible. But it would seem impossible 
that it should be, even potentially, divisible through- 
out at the same time ; for, if that were possible, it 
would actually happen, with the result, not that it 
would actually be simultaneously both things—in- 
divisible and divided—but that it would be divided 
simultaneously at any and every point. Nothing will, 
therefore, be left, and the body will have passed-away 
into a state of incorporeity, and so it also might come- 
to-be again either from points or absolutely from 
nothing. And how is this possible ? 

It is clear, however, that a body is divided into 
magnitudes which are separable and grow smaller 
and smaller and come apart from one another and 
are separated. If you divide a body piece by piece, 
the process of breaking it up would not be infinite, 
nor can it be divided simultaneously at every point 
(for this is not possible), but the process can only be 
carried on within a certain limit. There must, then, 
exist in a body atomic ° magnitudes which are in- 
visible, especially if coming-to-be and passing-away 


181 


316 b 


317 a 


o 


10 


15 


ARISTOTLE 


\ / e \ / ¢€ A ys > / 
pev Staxpioe: 7) 5€ cvyKpioe. 6 ev odv avayKdlew 
~ 7 
doxdv Adyos elvar peyeOn aroua obros éoriv: drt 
d¢ AavOdver tapadoyilopevos, Kat 7 AavOdver, rA€- 
ywpev. 
> ‘ \ ? ” A lol > , A 
Emel yap ovK €orTt orvypn orvypas €xouevn, TO 
/ a 
mavTn elvar Svaiperov cor. pev ws brdpxe. Tots 
cal > ~ 
peyebcow, Ear. 8 ws ov. Soxe? 8 Srav TobTo 
od A ¢ ~ \ / \ Ld > 
Te, Kal Omnodv Kal mavTn oTvypay elvar, Wor 
avaykKatov elvar SiarpeOfvar TO péyebos eis pundev- 
7 \ / 7 an > ¢ ~ a“ > 
mavTn yap elvar orrypyv: wore 7 €€ addv 7 ex 
ortypa@v elvar. to 8 eoTw ws tbrdpye mavrn, 
Ort pula Omnodbv €or, Kal TAcat Ws ExdoTH, TAELoUS 
dé pds odK eclaiv (eheEjs yap od elaiv), war ob 
€ pds ovK Et js yap , WoT ov 
mavTn. €b yap KaTa pécov SdtaipeTov, Kal Kat 
> & \ 4 5 / ‘i O= <% de): > 
exomevnv otiypnv eorar Svarperov odyt Sé** od 
yap eoTw exdpevov onpelov onpetov } orvyp) 
oTiyphns. totro 8 éoti diaipeois Kal? ovvOears. 
7 > + ‘ 4 \ / > > vw > 
Qor’ got Kai dudkpiois Kal avyKpiats, GAN’ ovr 
> 4 A > > / AA \ ‘ \ io 4 
els adrowa Kal €€ atéuwv (7oAAa yap ra advvara) 
ovTe ovTws wote TavTn Siaipeow yeveobar (et 
‘ > / \ ~ oD SM > > 
yap Hv e€xonevn oTvypy otvypas, Toor av Hv), aAA 
eis pukpa Kal éeAdttTw é€ori, Kal avyKpiois e€& 
2r / iAA’ b] ¢ > AR \ r / 4 
eAarrovwv. GAN ody 7 amd Kal reAcla yéveots 
¢ 
ovykpice. Kal SiaKpice: WpioTar, Ws Twes dpaow, 
~ a \ 
Thy & ev TH ovvexet petaBoAny ddAoiwow. adda 
1 odxl d¢€ J: om. cet. codd. 
2 xal H: 9. 


182 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2 


are going to take place by association and dissocia- 
tion respectively. This, then, is the argument which 
is thought to necessitate the existence of atomic 
magnitudes, but let us now show that it conceals a 
false inference, and where this false inference lies. 

Since no point is contiguous to another point, the 
divisibility throughout of a body is possible in one 
sense, but not in another sense. When such divisi- 
bility is postulated, it is generally held that there is 
a point both anywhere and everywhere in it, so that 
it follows that the magnitudes must be divided until 
nothing is left. For, it is urged, there is a point every- 
where in it, so that it consists either of contacts or 
of points. But divisibility-throughout is possible only 
in the sense that there is one point anywhere within 
it and that all its points taken separately are within 
it ; but there are not more points than one anywhere 
in it (for the points are not “ consecutive ’’), so that 
it is not divisible throughout ; for then, if it was 
divisible at its centre, it will also be divisible at a 
contiguous point. But it is not; for one moment 
in time is not contiguous to another, nor is one point 
to another. So much for division and composition. 

Hence both association and dissociation occur but Coming-to- 
neither into atomic magnitudes and out of them (for dea 
the impossibilities involved are numerous), nor in a 
such a way that division-throughout occurs (for this particles 
would be possible only if point were contiguous to Dot DAge 
point) ; but dissociation occurs into small, or relatively their dis- 
small, parts, while association occurs out of relatively °°" 
small parts. But unqualified and complete coming- 
to-be is not defined as due to association and dis- 
sociation, as some people assert, while they say that 
change in what is continuous is “ alteration.’”’ In fact, 


183 


317 a 
20 


25 


3 


o 


35 
317 b 


ARISTOTLE 


totr eotlv ev @& oddAderar mavTa. €or yap 
/ ¢ a \ A > / ‘ / 
yeveots amrAj Kat Pbopa od ovyKpice: Kal Svaxpicer, 
aA’ drav petaBdArdAn ex todd eis Té5€ SAOV. of 
5 ” > / a \ 7 
dé olovra adAdoiwow raoav elvar tiv Tovadrnv 
if \ A / > A onl ¢ / 
petaBoAnv: To dé Siadeper. ev yap TH broKEypevy 
\ / > i) \ / A \ \ a A 
TO Mev €oTt Kata Tov Adyov, TO 5é Kara THY BAny. 
a \ on > / s € / / 
oTav pev obv ev TovTOLs 7 4 peTaBoAn, yéveots 
” ”“ / Lud > > ~ / A \ 
€ora. 7) pOopa, dtav 8 ev rots wdbect Kal Kara 
ovpBePnkds, dAdoiwors. Svaxpwopeva S€ Kal ovy- 
Kpwopeva evpOapra yiverar. dv pev yap ets 
> / € / “A ~ | / 2\ 
eAdrrw vddria SiarpeOH, OGrrov ap yivera, eav 


Se ovyKpi07, Bpaddrepov. paddov 8’ ora SAAov 


’ > ~ 7 ~ \ ~ / Lid 
ev Tots vaTepov. viv d€ Tooobrov Siwwpicbw, dre 


> 4 \ / 4, 7 / / 
advvarov elvar THV yéveow avyKpiow, olay 5% Tues 
pacw. 
/ \ 7 ~ / 
3. Awwpispévwv dé tovtwv, mp@rov Yewpnréov 
/, ” / € r ~ A , 
TOTEpOV EOTL TL ywopuevov aTrA@s Kal Pbecpopevor, 
“ / \ > / piss | > \ / / > 
7 Kupiws ev ovdev, ael S’ ex Twos Kal Ti, Aeyw § 
olov €k Kdpvovtos byvaivoy Kat Kdyvov e€ sprai- 
n“ A / \ / ~ 
vovTos, 7) pikpov ek peydAov Kal péya eK puKpod, 
7 AR , a \ , e Us ¢ ~ 
Kai TaAAa mavta TobToY TOV TpdTOV. Et yap amAds 
” / ¢ ~ vn” / > + a > 
€oTa. yeveois, aTADs av yivowro eK pr) dvTos, WoT 


> A ”“ ” / Lid ¢ 4 ‘ \ \ »” 
aAnbés av ein Aéyew Ste drdpyer Tot TO pr) Ov. 





® 328 a 23-b 22. 
184 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2-3 


this is where the whole mistake occurs ; for unqualified 
coming-to-be and passing-away are not due to associa- 
tion and dissociation, but take place when something 
as a whole changes from “ this” to “that.” But 
some philosophers hold that all such change is “ altera- 
tion,’ whereas there is a difference. For in that 
which underlies the change there is a factor corre- 
sponding to the definition and a material factor ; 
when, therefore, the change takes place in these, 
coming-to-be or passing-away will occur, but, when 
the change is in the qualities (that is to say, there 
is an accidental change), “ alteration ” will result. 
Things which are associated and dissociated become 
liable to pass-away ; for if drops of water are divided 
into still smaller drops, air comes-to-be from them 
more quickly, whereas, if they are associated together, 
air comes-to-be more slowly. This, however, will 
be clearer in what follows *; for the moment let us 
assume this much as established, namely, that 
coming-into-being cannot be association of the kind 
which some people assert it to be. 

3. Having made the above distinctions, we must Do unquali- 
first inquire whether there is anything which comes- (040mg 
to-be and passes-away in an unqualified sense, or sty 
whether nothing comes-to-be in the strict sense, but ally occur? 
everything comes-to-be something, and out of some- 
thing—for example, comes-to-be healthy out of being 
ill, and ill out of being healthy, or small out of being 
large, and large out of being small, and so on in the 
other instances which one might give. For, if there 
is to be coming-to-be without qualification, something 
must come-to-be out of not-being without qualifica- 
tion, so that it would be true to say that there are 
things of which “ not-being ” can be predicated ; for 


185 


ARISTOTLE 
317 b 
\ * \ / > A + /, lo > 
tis pev yap yeveots ex pq) OvTos TwWds, olov Ex 
~ ~ ¢ 5 € ~ > © A 

5 pny AcevKoD 7H pun KaAod, 7 Se amAH e€ amAds py 

OvTos. 
To > ¢ AO ” \ onl , 0 
0 8 dmA@s jrow TO TpA@rov onpaiver Ka 
c / / ~ ”“ ‘ O6A ‘ 
ExdoTynv KaTnyopiav Tod ovTos, H TO KaboAov Kat 
~ / 
TO TdVvTa TEeplexov. Ei ev OV TO TPA@TOV, Ovaias 
” / > \ > / e A Ae / b erg 
€ora yeveats ek 7) odaias. @ dé pr) brapyer odoia 
~ ~ / 
unde Tdd€, SHAov ws oddé THV GAAwy oddepia KaTn- 
10 yopu@v, olov ovre mrovov ovTE ToaoV oUTE TO TOD" 
\ \ ”“ ” \ 10: ~ b) ~ > de 
Xwpiora yap av ein Ta 7aOn TaV ovoiWv. «i Se 
\ \ “ hid > la ” A6A / 
TO pn ov dAws, amddacis eoTtar KaboAov mavTwr, 
woTe ek pndevos avayKn yiveobar TO ywopevov. 
II \ \ oO 4 > ” 8 , 3 | 
Ep prev odv ToUTw ev aAAoLs Te SuNTOpHTat Kal 
/ a / bee a , A \ 
15 Suwpiotat Tots Adyous él mA€iov: ovvTdpws Se Kai 
~ /, a , 4 > \ + c ~ 
viv Aekréov, OT TpdTOV eV Ta EK I OVTOS aTADS 
/ /, \ + > ” > 7 ‘ \ 
yiverat, tpdmov dé dAdAov e€ dvtTos dei TO yap 
4 nn > / \ Ae > / + / 
duvdper ov evreAcxeia Sé pur) Ov avayKn Tpovmapyew 
/ > / “a \ ‘ 7, 
Aeyopevov appotépws. 6 S€ Kal TovTwv Siwpi- 
/ ” A > / /, > 
opevwv exer Oavpacrny amopiav, maAw émavarro- 
/ ~ ” c ~ / “o> > 4, 

20 SuaTéov, TAs EoTw adn yéeveors, elt’ ex Svuvaper 
lA > ” / a > / \ ” 
ovros ovoa Eire Kal TwWs GAAwWS. aTropHoEe yap av 

> ee ee of / \ ~ ~ > \ 
Tis dp e€oTw ovoias yéveots Kal Tod Todde, adAAa 


\ lat ~ ‘ ~ A ~ ‘ > ‘ \ 
7) TOD ToLodde Kal ToacoddSe Kai Tod (Tov avdrov SE 





@ Phys. i. 6-9. 
» i.e. as “ being ” and as “ not-being.” 


186 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 


some kind of coming-to-be proceeds from some ead 
of not-being, for example, from “ not-white ” and 
“ not-beautiful,’ but unqualified coming-to-be pro- 
ceeds from unqualified not-being. 

Now “ unqualified ” signifies either (a) that which The mean- 
is primary in each category, or (6) that which is pont 
universal and universally comprehensive. If, then, 
it signifies that which is primary, there will be a 
coming-to-be of substance out of not-substance ; ; but 
that which has not a substance or a “ this ’’ obviously 
cannot have any predicate from the other categories, 
either, for example, quality, quantity or position, 
for then the properties would exist apart from the 
substances. If, on the other hand, “ unqualified not- 
being ”’ signifies that which does not exist at all, this 
will be a general negation of all being, and, thene- 
fore. what comes-to-be must come-to-be out of 
nothing. 

This problem has been discussed and settled at 
greater length elsewhere *; but a short restatement 
of it is called for here : In one way things come-to-be 
out of that which has no unqualified being, in another 
way they always come-to-be out of what is ; for there 
must be a pre-existence of that which potentially is, 
but actually is not, in being, and this is described in 
both ways.’ This having been established, a ques- 
tion involving extraordinary difficulty must be re- 
examined, namely, how can there be “ unqualified 
coming-to-be,’’ whether it comes from what exists 
potentially or in some other way? For one might Are coming- — 
raise the question whether there is a coming-to-be pea 
of substance (that is, of the “ this ”’) at all, and not away con. 
rather of a “such” or a “ so-great ” or a “ some- substance 
where ” 


é . . ith 
; and the same question might be asked Qi tity? 


187 





er rere ana . 


ARISTOTLE 
out od / \ \ > / A 
TpoTov Kai mepi dbopds). et ydp tu yivera, SAAov 
e ” / > / > / > a > 
ws €ora Suvdper tis ovoia, evreAeyeia 8° ov, €€ 
a e¢ , ” ie 5 aie 54 , 

25 Hs W yeveots EoTat Kab eis Hv avayKn petaPdArew 
TO Pleupdpevov. mdotepov ody brdper Te ToUTw 
Tav ddAwy evredcxeia; Aeyw 8 olov dp’ eorat 

\ an“ A a“ lot \ / / / \ 
TOGOV 7) TOLOV 7) TOD TO SuVdpEL [LOvoY TOE Kal OV, 
amAds Sé pt) TOE nd’ Ov; ef yap pydev aAda 
mavra Suvdper, xwpioTov Te ovpPaiver TO p21) OVTWS 
” % ” a“ / - / © 

30 Ov, Kal ETL, O pdAvora doBovpevor dreTéAecav oi 

~ /, \ > \ / 
mpato. picocopyaavtes, TO ek pundevos yiveoOar 
mpotmdpxovtos: ei S€ TO pev elvar Tdd€ TL 7) Ovoiav 
) ¢ / a > 8 ~ > / ” 
ob» UrapEer, TOV 8’ GAAwv Te TOV eipnuevwr, Eorar, 
Kabdmep eltopev, xwpioTa Ta 7d0n TaV odoidy. 
Tepl Te TOUTWY ObV SoOV EvdexXETAL TPAyLaTEUTEOV, 


w 
on 


‘ / > 7s ~ / Fee A A ¢ ~ 
Kal tis aitia Tob yéveow aei elvar, Kal THY amAqv 
Kal THY KaTa [Lepos. 

” > Ola g ~ \ bud \ > A / 
318a QOuvons 8° airias puds pev d0ev thy apyny elvai 
lol 7 ~ \ lol 
papev THs Kwioews, pds 5€ THs VAns, THY ToLadTHV 
airiav Aekréov. mepi ev yap exeivns eipntat T7pd- 
TEpov ev Tois Tepl KWHaEews Adyous, OTL eoTl TO 


o 


\ 
fev akivnrov Tov amravTa xpovov, TO dé Kwovpevov 
ael. tovrwv dé mepl ev THs aKwHrov apyns THs 
Cie ‘ / al > \ / ” 
érépas Kal mpotepas dieAciv e€ort didoaodias Epyov: 





@ Tn lines 10, 11 above. 

» i.e. qualified, that is, changing in respect of quality, 
quantity or position. 

© Phys, 258 b 10 ff. 


188 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 


about passing-away also. For, if something comes- 
to-be, it is clear that there will be substance, not 
actually but potentially, from which the coming-to-be 
will proceed and into which that which is passing- 
away must change. Will any other attribute then 
belong actually to this supposed substance? For 
example, I mean, will that which is only potentially 
a “this” (and only potentially exists), and which is 
not a “ this’ and does not exist without qualification, 
possess size or quality or position? For, (1) if it 
actually possessed none of these determinations but 
possesses them all potentially, the result is (a) that 
a being which is not a determined being can possess 
a separate existence, and (6) that coming-to-be arises 
out of nothing pre-existent—a view which inspired 
great and continuous alarm in the minds of the early 
philosophers. On the other hand, (2) if, although it 
is not to be a “ this ”’ or a substance, it is to possess 
some of the other attributes which we have men- 
tioned, then, as we said,? the qualities will be separ- 
able from the substance. We must, therefore, deal 
with these matters to the best of our ability, and also 
with the causes of continuous coming-to-be, both 
the unqualified and the partial.? 

Now there are two meanings of “ cause,” one being 
that which, as we say, results in the beginning of 
motion, and the other the material cause. It is the 
latter kind with which we have to deal here ; for with 
cause in the former sense we have dealt in our dis- 
cussion of Motion, when we said that there is some- 
thing which remains immovable through all time and 
something which is always in motion. To come to 
a decision about the first of these, the immovable 
original source, is the task of the other and prior 


189 


ARISTOTLE 
318 a 


mept 5€ Tob dia TO ovvexds Kwvetcbar TaAAa Kwodv- 
Tos UoTepov amodotéov, Ti ToLodrov Tav Kal? 
id / ” , > ~ \ A e > 
exaoTa Aeyouevwv airiov eorw. viv dé THY ws ev 
A ww / Led ” > “a Lan 
10 VAns elder TiWEepevyy airiay cimwpev, Sv Tv del 
0 \ ‘ / > e Av / A 4 Md 
P0opa Kal yéveats ody trodeirer tHv ddow: apa 
yap av tows tobdto yévoito SHAov, Kal wept Tod 
~ ~ A ‘ ~ 
vov amtopnbévtos, mHs mote Set Aeyew Kai wept THs 
anAjs Plopads Kai yevécews. 
wv > > / ety \ A / \ ” ~ 
Eye 8° azopiav ixaviy Kal ti TO aitiov Tod 
> ‘ 
auveipe THY yeveow, elrep TO POELpdpevov eis TO 
\ vn“ > / ‘ A \ a“ / > »” 
15 uy Ov amépxerar, TO SE py) Ov pundev eat: ovTE 
yap Ti ovTe ToLov ovTE TOGdY OvTE TOD TO j41) OV. 
~ > 
eimep obv aei TL TMV OvTwWY amrépyeTat, Sua Ti TOT 
? > / / ‘ ~ ‘ ~ ” 
otk aviAwrat mada Kal dpotdov To may, «i ye 
meTEepacpevov nv e€ ov yiveTar TOV ‘ywomevwv 
¢ > ‘ \ \ Ras cw ? > 
Exaotov; ov yap 81) dua TO amevpov elvar e& ob 
~ > 
20 yiverat, ovx drroAcimer TobTO yap ad¥vaTov. KaT 
b Ca 4 \ \ > / > ” / 
eveépyevav pev yap ovdev eotw ameipov, Suvaper 
Pia ee, | \ / ” > /, / 
emi THY Siaipeow, Wor eder Ta’rnv elvar pdovynv 
THv pn bToXeimovoay TH yiveoBai te del EAatToV: 
vov d€ TodTo ody dpapev. 
*Ap’ obv dia TO THv Tobde POopav aAdov elvat 
/ ‘ \ ~ / ” \ 
5 yeveow Kal THV TOOdE yeveow GAAov elvar dbopayv 


pr 
ut 





* Usually called mpwrn dirocodia. 

> See 336 a 13 ff. 

¢ Or “ specific’ causes, as opposed to causes in the 
universal sense: ef. Phys. 195 a 27 ff. 


190 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 


branch of philosophy,* while, regarding that which 
moves all other things by its own continuous motion, 
we shall have to explain later? which of the individual ° 
causes is of this kind. For the moment let us deal 
with the cause which is placed in the class of matter, 
owing to which passing-away and coming-to-be never 
fail to occur in nature ; for perhaps this may be 
cleared up and it may become evident at the same 
time what we ought to say about the problem which 
arose just now, namely, about unqualified passing- 
away and coming-to-be. 

What is the cause of the continuous process of What is the 
coming-to-be is a perplexing enough problem, if it posers 
is really true that what passes-away vanishes into be and 
“ what is not” and “ what is not” is nothing ; for feasts 
‘* what is not ”’ is not anything and possesses neither 
quality nor quantity nor position. If, therefore, some 
one of the “ things-which-are ” is constantly vanishing, 
how is it that the whole of being has not long ago 
been used up and has not disappeared, provided, of 
course, that the source of each of the things which 
come-to-be was limited? For, I suppose, the fact 
that coming-to-be never fails is not. because the 
source from which it comes is infinite ; for this is 
impossible, since nothing is actually infinite but only 
potentially so for the purpose of division, so that 
there would have to be only one kind of coming- 
to-be, namely, one which never fails, because some- 
thing which comes-to-be is successively smaller and 
smaller. But, as a matter of fact, we do not see this 
happening. 

Is it, then, because the passing-away of one thing Why is the 
is the coming-to-be of another thing, and the coming- Process of 


han 
to-be of one thing the passing-away of another thing, unceasing ? 


191 


ARISTOTLE 
318 a 
” > a > ‘ , \ 
dmavotov avayKaiov elvar tiv petaBoAjv; epi 
\ = ~ / \ \ if / \ 
bev obv Tod yéveow eclvar Kal Pbopav opoiws Tept 
ExaoTov TOV ovtTwv, TavTnv ointéov elvar TGow 
€ \ kee 4 \ / / A A ¢ ~ / 
ixaviy airiav. dia ti S€ mote Ta pev amAds yi- 
veoba Aéyerar Kai Pbeipecbar 7a 8’ ody adds, 
30 mdAw oKemTéov, elep TO adTO eaTL yeveots fev 
tovdl Pbopa Sé Tovdi, Kal Plopa ev Tovdi yEeveats 
\ / a 4 ~ / / 
S€ tovdi: Cytet yap twa todto Adyov. A€yopev 
\ 7 / ~ c ~ A > / / 
yap Oru Pbeiperar viv amA@s, Kat od povov Todt: 
\ AA \ / ¢ ~ ¢ A yd \ 
Kal avrTn pev yeveois amA@s, avtn S¢ POopd. Todi 
dé yivera pev TL, yiverar &° amADs ov dapev yap 
35 Tov pavOdvovta yivecBar pev emvoTHpova, yiveobat 
8 adds ov. 
318b Kaédzep odv roAAdkis Sdiopilopev A€yovtes Ott TA 
\ / / \ > ” A ~ / 
pev TOdE TL ONpaiver TA 8’ Ov, Sia TOdTO cupPaiver 
To Cnrovpevov: duadéper yap eis & petaBdAAe TO 
/ e ” ¢ A > ~ eo \ / 
peraBdaAdAov: ofov tows 1) ev els mip dd0s yeveots 
\ € ~ \ \ / > ~ ec A ~ 
5 pev adn, Plopa dé Tiwds eoTw, olov ys, H Se yas 
/ ‘ / / > ) ¢c ~ ‘ 
yéveats Tis yéveois, yéveots 8’ ody amAds, Popa 
> ¢ aA e , ¢ , , , 
8’ amA@s, olov rupds, Worrep Ilappevidns A€yer Svo 
TO Ov Kal TO p47) Ov Elva dacKkwv, Tip Kal yhv. TO 
on ~ ”* 50’ Ld € /@ 0 8 / 
7 Tatra 7 Toad? érepa trorifecar Siadeper 
> / \ A / ~ > > > \ ¢ 
ovdév: Tov yap TtpdTov Cyrobpuev, GAN’ od TO dr0- 





* Fr. 8 lines 53 ff. (Diels), but Parmenides mentions this 
theory as being wrong, 


192 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 


that the process of change is necessarily unceasing ? 

As regards the occurrence of coming-to-be and 
passing-away in everything which exists alike, the 

above must be regarded by all as an adequate cause ; 

but why some things are said to come-to-be and to The dis- 
pass-away without qualification and others mith quali- ee 
fication, must be examined once more, if it is true ret % 
that the same process is a coming-to-be of “ this,” qualified.” 
but a passing-away of “ that,” and a passing-away 

of “this” but a coming-to-be of “‘ that’’; for the 
question calls for discussion. For we say “ It is now 
passing-away ” without qualification, and not merely 

“ This is passing-away ” ; and we call this a “‘ coming- 

to-be,” and that a “‘ passing-away,” without qualifica- 

tion. But this “ comes-to-be-something,”’ but does 

not do so without qualification ; for we say that the 

student “ comes-to-be learned,’ not ‘‘ comes-to-be ”’ 
without qualification. 

Now we often make a distinction, saying that some 
things signify a “ this,” and others do not ; and it is 
because of this that the point which we are examining 
arises, for it makes a difference into what that which 
is changing changes. For example, perhaps the 
passage into Fire is “‘ coming-to-be ”’ without quali- 
fication but “ passing-away-of-something ” (for in- 
stance, of Earth), while the coming-to-be of Earth 
is qualified (not unqualified) coming-to-be, but un- 
qualified passing-away (for example, of Fire). This 
_ agrees with Parmenides’ theory, for he says that the 
things into which change takes place are two and 
asserts that these two things, what is and what is not, 
are Fire and Earth. Whether we postulate these or 
other things of a like kind makes no difference ; for 
we are seeking not what underlies these changes, but 


H 193 


ARISTOTLE 
318 b 
10 Keiwevov. 1 prev odv els TO pu) Ov amA@s Odds 


Plopa amAj, 7) 8 «is TO aTA@S ov yéeveots amAq. 
e > / ” ‘ \ ~ ” * , 
ols obv Sudpioras €ite Trupt Kal yh elite aAAous Trot, 
/ ” A \ BAN ‘ \ A a a A ion 
ToUTwY €oTat TO pev Ov TO SE py) OV. EVa peV OdV 
/ 7 / A € n~ / ‘ 
tpotov Tovtw Swice. TO aTADsS te ylvecOa Kal 
U ~ \ ¢ ~ »” \ ~ c / 
pleipecbar Tob put) aTrA@s, dAAov S€ TH VAN orroia 
15 Tis dv A As pev yap paArov at Svadopal Tdd€ Te 
onpaivovot, p~adAov ovoia, Hs Sé oTépyow, j47) Ov, 
- \ \ \ , ‘ € \ 
olov TO prev Yeppov Katnyopia tis Kal eldos, 7 Se 
/ £ / \ ~ ‘ ~ ‘ 
yvyxporns atepnois: Suadepovar d€ yh Kal mop Kat 
4 a A 
TravTas Tats diadopais. 
Aoxet 5€ padAov tots modAots TH aicbnTr@ Kal 
\ > ~ / id \ \ > > A 
20 p71) alaOnr@ Siadhépew* Grav pev yap eis aicbyriy 
petaBarAn vAnv, yivecbai dacw, drav 5’ eis apavy, 
P0eipecbar: TO yap ov Kal TO pu) Ov TH alcOdveabar 
A ~ \ > / / a \ \ 
Kat T@ pr) alcbdveoOar diopilovaw, womep TO pev 
> \ ~ ‘ > »~ OE i? \ La 
emioTnTov Ov, TO 8 ayvworov p47) dv" H yap aloOnats 
> / uv lA / > b] ‘ ~ 
emoTHpns exer SUvapuv. Kabdrep odv adbrol T@ 
25 aicbdvecbar 7) 7TH Svvac8a Kai Civ Kai elvar 


vopilovow, otrw Kal Ta Tpdypata, Tpdmov Twa 
194 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 


the manner in which they take place. The passage, 
then, into that which “ is not ” without qualification 
is unqualified passing-away, while the passage into 
that which “ is’ without qualification is unqualified 
coming-to-be. Hence, whatever it is by which the 
things which change are distinguished from one 
another—whether it be Fire and Earth or some other 
pair—one will be “ a being,”’ the other “ a not-being.” 
One way, then, in which unqualified will differ from 
qualified coming-to-be and passing-away is obtained 
by this method. Another way of distinguishing them 
is by the special nature of the material of that which 
changes; for the more the differences of material 
signify “ a this,” the more is it a real being, whereas 
the more they signify a privation, the more unreal 
it is. For example, “ hot’ is a positive predication 
and a “ form,” while “ cold ” is a privation, and Earth 
and Fire are distinguished from one another by these 
differences. 

In the opinion of most people the difference be- A note on 
tween qualified and unqualified depends rather on bi ss 
perceptibility and imperceptibility ; for when there mtg Pa 
is a change to perceptible material, they say that the panienie 
coming-to-be takes place, but, when they change to !ble and the 
invisible material, they say that passing-away occurs : the imper- 
for they distinguish between “ that which is ” and °P#Ple. 
“that which is not” by their perception and non- 
perception, just as what is knowable ts and what is 
unknowable is not (for to them perception has the 
force of knowledge). As, therefore, they themselves 
think that they live and have their being in virtue of 
perceiving or having the power to perceive, so, too, 
they consider that things exist because they perceive 
them—and, in a way, they are on the right road to 


195 


ARISTOTLE 
318b 
> 

du@kovres TaAnBés, abto Sé A€éyovtes odk AAnOés. 
ovpBaiver 87 Kara ddfav Kal Kar’ adiPevav dAdws 
TO yweobal te dmAds Kat 76 PbeipeoOa mvedua 
yap Kal ap Kara pev TH alabnow Frrdv eorw (S10 
kai Ta POeipdpeva adds 7H cis tadra peraBorH 
pbcipecbar Aéyovow, yivecOar § Srav eis dmrév Kal 
els yiv weraBddrn), Kara 8° dAjbevav padov rdSe 
Tt kal eldos Tadra THs yas. 

“Tob per obv elvar tiv pev and yéveow dbopav 
b 7 \ \ \ \ ¢ ~ / bg / 
ovoav Twos, THY de POopay tiv andy yéveow odadv 

85 TWoOS, ElpynTa TO atrLov (Sia yap TO THY DAnY dia- 
319a dépew 7) TH odoiav elvar 7) TH er}, ) TH TH uev 
parrov tiv 8€ pH, } TO THY ev padov aicbynriv 

> \ 4 > \ > ” \ \ 5 
elva tHv VAnv e€ Hs Kai eis Hv, THY dé Hrrov elvat)- 
ToD Serra prev amAds yivecbar réyecBar, ra SE TH 
re \ a 3 > , / > a ” 
Hovov, un TH €€ aAAjAwv yeveoes, Kal’ dv elzomev 
viv tpdmov (viv pev yap Toaobrov Suipiorar, Ti 57 
moTe mdaans yeveoews ovons POopas dAdov, Kal 
maons P0opas ovens érépov twos yevéoews, ody 
¢€ / > Us ‘ / ‘ \ / 
Opoiws amodisopev TO yiveobar Kal TO Pbeipecbas 

“a > »” / A we > 
Tois ets GAAnAa petabddAdAovow. 70 8’ vorEpov eipy- 
Lévov od Tobro Siamrope? aAAa Ti Tote TO pavOdvov 

\ > / ¢ ~ / > \ / > 
10 pev od A€yerar amADs yiveobar adAa yiveoBar ém- 
oTjpov, TO Se dvdpevov yiveoba), radra Sé &- 

Wpiota. Tais KaTnyopias: Ta pev yap TddE TL 


3 


o 


oO 





* rod pev (318 b 33) is answered by rod Sé (319 a 3), and the 
construction is broken by the parenthesis. 

» i.e. in 318 a 33 ff. 

¢ i.e. to the question raised in lines 3-5 above. 


196 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 


the truth, though what they actually say is not true. 
Indeed, the popular opinion about the way in which 
unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away occur, 
differs from the truth; for Wind and Air have less 
reality according to our perception of them (hence, 
too, things which pass-away are said to do so in an un- 
qualified sense by changing into Wind and Air, and to 
come-to-be when they change into what is tangible, 
namely, into Earth), whereas in truth they are more 
a definite something and a “ form ” than Earth. 

We have now stated the reason why ¢ there is un- Summary 
qualified coming-to-be, which is the passing-away of poor 
something, and unqualified passing-away, which is ope a? 

s 2 pass- 
the coming-to-be of something (for it depends on ing-away 
the difference of the material, from which and into ®2°*Wosides 


: ‘ of a single 
which the change takes place, and on its being sub- transforma- 


stance or not, or on its having more or less of the ee ote 
nature of substance, or on its being more or less substance. 
perceptible) ; but why are some things said to come- 
to-be without qualification, while others come-to-be 
some particular thing only and not by coming-to-be 
reciprocally out of one another in the manner which 
we described just now? (For up to the present we 
have only determined this much, namely, why, 
although all coming-to-be is a passing-away of some- 
thing else and all passing-away is a coming-to-be of 
some other thing, we do not attribute coming-to-be 
and passing-away uniformly to things which change 
into one another ; but the problem afterwards raised » 
does net discuss this difficulty, but why that which 
learns is said to come-to-be learned and not to come- 
to-be without qualification, yet that which grows is 
said to come-to-be). The answer ° is that this is 
determined by the differences of the categories ; for 


197 


319 a 


15 


20 


25 


30 


ARISTOTLE 


/ A \ / A \ 4 hd mY \ 
onpaiwer, Ta Se Towvde, TA 5€ Toad? doa odv p21) 
> / , > / € ~ > \ \ / 
ovoiav onpaiver, od Aéyerar amA@s, GAAG Ti Yi- 
> \ > > ¢ / > ~ / \ 
veobar. od pnv aad cpoiws ev maou yéveots pev 
A Vexed ie Se eS 6 / / > ‘ 
KaTa Ta ev TH ETEpa avoTorxia A€yeTat, olov ev jev 
> / A ~ > > b) 2A iol > A ~ ~ A 
ovoia €av Tip add’ ovk eav yi, ev 8€ TO ToL eav 
> ~ > > bs) 7 > lo 
emtaThpov add’ odx Stay avemoTHov. 
‘ \ s ~ A A € ~ , ‘ ) 
Ilepit pev ody rob ta pev amrADs yiveobar ra, Sé 
, 1 Se \ > a ? / > a ” 
pn, Kat dAws Kal ev tats odoias adrais, eipyras, 
A / ~ / > ~ VIF e a 
Kat did7t Tod yéveow elvar ovvexy@s airia ws vAy 
\ € / Ld \ > > / 
TO UToKEiwevov, OTL petaBAnTLKOV eis TavarTia, 
A ” ¢€ / / 28 o> ® ~ > ~ 
Kat €oTw 1 Oarépov yéveots del emi T&v odoidv 
¢€ 
ddAov Plopa Kai, 7 dAdov POopa dAdrov yeveais. 
> A \ 99> > “~ a A , / > 4 
aAAa pv odd drophoa Set Sia ti yierar del 
aToAAupévwr' woTep yap Kal TO Pbeipecbar amADs 
/ hid > > / ” \ \ \ »” 
faci, Grav ets avaicbnrov €AOn Kai TO p21) Ov, 
¢ / ‘ / > A ” , Lid > 
Opoiws Kat yiveoBar ex pun ovtos daciv, bray e€ 
> / ww 3 a ” ‘ ro Me / 
avaabjrov. «tr obv dvTos Twos TO broKepevov 
” 7 / ? \ 4 7 ¢ , \ 
eiTe py, yiveTat EK [2 OVTOS. WOTE Opolws Kal 
. / > \ cA ‘ a] / > A \ a” 
ywerau eK pn OvTos Kai POeipera eis TO fur) OV. 
> / > > ¢ / ¢ \ / AY 
eixoTws obv obx t7odcimer 7 yap yéveots POopa 
~ \ » ¢ \ A / fol aa 
Too 7 OvTos, 7) Sé Popa yeveots TOO pu) OvToOS. 


> \ a A Sw 8 NS > s ” 
Adda. TOUTO TO [L1) OV ATTAWS ATTOPI)OELEV AV TLS 





“ i.e. the two parallel columns containing co-ordinate 
pairs; see W. D. Ross on Met. 1054 b 35. 


198 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3 


some things signify a ‘“ this,” others a ‘‘ such-and- 
such,” others a “‘ so-much.”’ Those things, therefore, 
which do not signify substance are not said to come- 
to-be without qualification, but to come-to-be some- 
thing. However, coming-to-be is said to take place 
in all things alike when a thing comes-to-be some- 
thing in one of the two columns*: in substance if it 
comes-to-be Fire, but not if it comes-to-be Earth ; 
in quality, if it comes-to-be learned, but not if it 
comes-to-be ignorant. 

It has already been stated how some things come- 
to-be without qualification and others do not, both 
generally and in the substances themselves, and that 
the substratum is the material cause why coming-to- 
be is a continuous process because it is subject to 
change into the contraries, and, in the case of sub- 
stances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a 
passing-away of another, and the passing-away of 
one thing another’s coming-to-be. It is, however, 
not necessary even to raise the question why coming- 
to-be goes on when things are being destroyed ; for, 
. Just as people use the term passing-away without 
qualification when a thing has passed into the im- 
perceptible and into apparent non-existence, so like- 
wise also they talk of coming-to-be from non-exist- 
ence, when a thing appears out of imperceptibility. 
Whether, therefore, the substratum is something or 
is not, what comes-to-be does so from not-being ; 
and so it comes-to-be from not-being and passes- 
away into not-being in the same manner. Therefore 
it is probable that coming-to-be never fails ; for it 
is a passing-away of that which is not, and passing- 
away is a coming-to-be of that which is not. 

But about that which “ is not,’”’ unless you qualify 


199 


319 a 


319 b 


10 


15 


ARISTOTLE 


/ A ~ ~ 
MOTEpov TO ETEpov THY evavTiwy eoTiv, olov yh 
Vigo \ \ + a \ ean a 17 * 
Kat TO Bapv pn Ov, Top dé Kal TO Koddov" dv, 4 
a > > ae, ‘ ~ \ + A \ \ a“ A ¢€ ~ 
ov, add’ Eore Kai yh TO dv, TO S€ py dv VAN H THs 
nn A \ 
yijs, Kal mupos woavTws. Kal dpa ye érépa éxa- 
/ ¢€ 
Tépov 7) vAn, 7 ovK av yivoito e€ adAjAwv ovd’ e& 
> ~ 
evavTiwv; Tovto.s yap dmdpyer Tavavria, Tupl, yh, 
WA 77 ” ” A e © > 7 ” > e € 
vdaTL, aépt. 7 €oTe pev Ws H adry, €or. 8 ws 7 
ETépa’ 6 pev yap mote Ov UroKeiTar TO adTo, TO 
> > > A > , \ \ ye , b Pee, | 
5’ elvar od to adro. mTepi pev odv TovTwr emi 
Toaobrov eipjiabw. 
4. Tlept d€ yevéoews Kal adAdAowwoews Aeywpuev Ti 
/ \ \ / A 
dvapépovow: dapev yap étépas elvar TavTas Tas 
peraBoAas aAAjAwv. érreid1) odbv eori Te TO broKEl- 
fLevov Kal ETepov TO 7AO0s 6 Kata TOO broKELwevov 
/ / A y” \ ec / 
Aéyeobar mépuKev, Kal €oT. petaBoAn éKatépov 
TovTwv, adAdoiwois pév eoTw, GTav bropevovTos TOD 
¢€ / > ~ wv 4 > ~ 
brroKepevov, aicOnTobd dvros, petaBadAn ev Tots 
¢ ~ / ”“ > , > n” 4 
adtob mdfeow, 7 evavtios odow 7 peTatd, olov 
TO o@pa vyiaiver Kal mdAw Kdpver bropevov ye 
> / M. ' 16 A \ 5A e's de 87 
TavTO, Kal 6 xaAKos oTpoyyUros, OTe Sé ywrioerd7s 
\ 
6 adtdés ye wv. otav 8 dAov petaBdAdAn p27) dr0- 
pevovtos aicOnrot Twos ws broKepevov Tob avrod, 
~ ~ / ” > A 
GAN’ ofov ex Tis yous afua maons 7 e& vdaTos 
aA n“ > a 4 A AA /, ” A ~ 
dnp 7 €€ a€pos mavTos vdwp, yéveois 75n TO TOLOD- 
~ ¢ A 
tov, Tod S€ POopd, pddvora Sé, av 7 peraBoAr 
1 post xoddov add. ro EL. 
200 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3-4 


it, one might well be puzzled. Is it one of the two 
contraries ? For example, is Earth, and that which 

is heavy, “ not-being,”’ but Fire, and that which is 

light, “ being”? Or is this not so, but is Earth also 

“what is,’ while “ what is not” is matter—the 

matter of Earth and of Fire alike ? And is the matter 

of each different, or else they would not come-to-be 

out of one another, that is, contraries out of con- 
traries? For the contraries exist in these things, 
namely, in Fire, Earth, Water and Air. Or is the 

matter the same in one sense, but different in another ? 

For their substratum at any particular moment is the 

same, but their being is not the same. So much, then, 

on these subjects. 

A. Let us now deal with coming- -to-be and “‘ altera- Alteration 

tion” and discuss the difference between them ; for * change of 


quality ; 
we say these forms of change differ from one another, coming-to- 


Since, then, the substratum is one thing and the paselng- 
property which is of such a nature as to be predicated {ices of 
of the substratum is another thing, and since change substance. 
takes place in each of these, “ alteration” occurs 

when the substratum, which is perceptible, persists, 

but there is change in its properties, which are either 
directly or intermediately contrary to one another : 

for example, the body is healthy and then again sick, 

though it persists in being the same body, and the 

bronze is spherical and then again angular, remaining 

the same bronze. But when the thing as a whole 
changes, nothing perceptible persisting as identical 
substratum (for example, when the seed as a whole 

is converted into blood, or water into air, or air as a 

whole into water), such a process is a coming-to-be— 

and a passing-away of the other substance—particu- 

larly if the ehange proceeds from something imper- 


201 


ARISTOTLE 
319 b 
yunra e€ dvaobyrov eis aicOnrov 7 adh 7 mdoas 
7) 


Pap 


> 27 G \ aA > A > , > \ 
els aepa* Oo yap anp €7TTlLELKWS avaicOnrov. €V be 


a > , a ¢ ” , 
20 TALS atobjcecow, OLOV OTQAV vdwp YEVIT AL 


7, ” ie: / /, \ b] \ > & 
ToUTOLS av TL UTopEevyn TAD0S TO adTO evavTLMTEwS 
> ~ / \ ~ , Lid > 
ev TH yevonevp Kat TH POapéevte (olov drav e& 
d€pos vdwp, <i dudw Siadavi 7 pvypd), od Set 
tovtov Odrepov mdBos elvar cis 6 peraBddAAa. €f 

~ On , > , ¢ 1» 

25 dé py, €atar dAXoiwors. olov 6 ovarkds avOpwros 
edbdpn, avOpwros 8 duovaos éyévero, 6 8 dvOpw- 

€ / \ > / > A s , A 4 

10S UTOMEVEL TO AUTO. Et Lev OdV TOUTOU [1 TADOS 
2 > , Fk! ¢€ \ \ e > /, ~ \ 
jv Kal’ adro 7 povoixr Kal 7 dpovoia, Tod pev 
yeveots Hv av, tod d¢ POopa: 80 avOpdov pev 

~ / > 7 A ~ ‘ > 4 
Taira 7d0n, avOpwrov S€ povorkod Kat avOpumov 
> 7, / ‘ 7 lo \ / ~ 

30 aovaov yeveats Kal dbopda: viv dSé€ mabos Tobro 
~ ¢ rd \ > / \ ~ 
Tov vmopevovtos. S10 addAdoiwois Ta ToLadTa. 

“Orav pev obv Kata TO ToGo 7 7 petaBoAn TAs 
> / ” \ / Ld \ \ , 
evavTimoews, av&y Kal Pbiois, drav dé Kata TOToOV, 
dopa, orav dé kata mdfos Kai 7d Trodv, adAAoiwars, 

om geo RD RNE. Sate tetera 

320a Orav dé pndev vropevyn od Odrepov mdbos 7 cupu- 

a rm) pevy p i) ovp 

BeByKos odws, yéveots, 7d 5€ POopd. are Se FAH 

— ‘ ORT ee nan e , , ‘ 

pdAvora pev kal Kupiws 70 bToKelevov yevécews Kal 

P0opas SextiKdv, Tpdmov Sé Twa Kal TO Tats GAAaLsS 

an Ld / A \ e / > 

5 wetaPodats, ore mavra dexriKa Ta bToKE(peva evav- 

202 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 4 


ceptible to something perceptible (either to touch 
or to all the senses), as when water comes-to-be out 
of, or passes-away into, air; for air is pretty well 
imperceptible. But if, in these circumstances, any 
property belonging to a pair of contraries persists 
in being the same in the thing which has come-to-be 
as it was in the thing which has passed-away—if, for 
instance, when water comes-to-be out of air, both 
are transparent or cold—that into which it changes 
is not necessarily another property of this thing ; 
otherwise the change will be “alteration.” For 
example, the musical man passed-away and an un- 
musical man came-to-be, but the man persists as 
identically the same. Now if musicality (and un- 
musicality) were not in itself a property of man, 
there would be a coming-to-be of the one and passing- 
away of the other; therefore, these are qualities of 
a man, but the coming-to-be and the passing-away 
of a musical man and of an unmusical man; but, 
in fact, musicality (and unmusicality) are a quality 
of the persistent identity. Consequently such changes 
are “ alteration.” 

When, therefore, the change from one contrary 
to another is quantitative, it is “ growth and diminu- 
tion ’’ ; when it is a change of place, it is “ motion ”’; 
when it is a change of property (or quality), it is 
“ alteration’; but when nothing persists of which 
the resulting state is a property or an accident of any 
kind, it is a case of coming-to-be, and the contrary 
change is passing-away. Matter, in the chief and 
strictest sense of the word, is the substratum which 
admits of coming-to-be and passing-away ; but the 
substratum of the other kind of change is also in 
a sense matter, because all the substrata admit of 


203 


ARISTOTLE 
320 a 
, , \ \ = , om ” 
TLWOEWV TLVWV. TrEpl bev OUV VYEveoews, €LTE EOTLV 


” / \ ~ ” \ ‘ > , 
ElTE LN, Kal Tas EoTL, KaL Tept aAAoWaEws Su- 
wpicbw totrov Tov TpdTov. 
5. Ilept S€ advéyjoews Aowrov eimetv, ri te Sia- 
/ / \ ee. 7 A ~ by /, 
péper yevecews Kai ddAowwcews, Kal mas ab&dverat 
~ > - bid \ / ¢ ~ ~ 
10 TOV avfavopevwv ExacTov Kal dOiver dtiobv Tov 
pbwovrwy. oKxertéov 87 mpOtov mdTepov povws 
A ~ 4, 
€v T@ Tepi 6 eotw adbtdv % mpos aAAnAa Siadopa, 
~ > 
ofov ori 7 pev ex TobdEe cis TIDE reTaBoAn, ofov ex 
, > ¥ NFS / 7 , bien c 
duvdper odaias eis evteAexela ovolav, yeveais eorw, 
/ > 
n Sé rept péyebos avfnois, 7 S5é wept mdbos aA- 
/ > /, \ > 4 * >’ > 
15 Aolwots: auddrepa dé ex Suvaper dvTwv eis evre- 
A / r \ ~ > / > / “ ‘ € 
éxevcay petaBodn T&v ecipnevwv eoriv, 7) Kal 6 
/ "4 ~ ~ / \ ‘ 
Tpomos Siadéper THs petaBodrjs: daiverar yap Tod 
fev aAdAovodpevov odk &€ avayKns petraBaddAov Kara 
/ *O\ A / \ > > / \ 
Tomov, ovd€ TO ywopevov, TO 8 adfavopevov Kal 
20 T0 Pbivov, ddAov S€ tpdmov Tob depopevov. TO per 
yap pepopevov odrov aAdAdrre Tomov, TO 8 ad€a- 
vouevov Warep TO eAavvdpevov: TovTOU yap [LéVvoV- 
\ / / \ / > 7 
Tos Ta popia petaBddAe. Kata Tomov, ody WoTreEp 
~ ‘ an 
Ta THs obaipas: Ta pev yap ev TO low TOmw peETa- 
/ ~ Lid /, \ A “~ > / 
BddAe rod dAov pévovros, Ta S€ Tob adbfavope- 
ey | 1 ee, | / / Se > 4 \ ‘ ~ 
25 vou aet emt tAciw Tomov, en’ eAdtrw Sé Ta TOO 
pbivovros. 


1 kal POopas post yevécews add. Bekker. 
204 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 4-5 


certain kinds of contrariety. Let this, then, be our 
decision on the question about coming-to-be, whether 
it exists or not, and how it exists, and about “ altera- 
tion.” 

5. It remains, therefore, for us to deal with The nature 
“ growth ” and to discuss (a) how it differs from com- ° &°¥"- 
ing-to-be and from “alteration,” and (b) how 
“ growth ”’ takes place in each thing that grows and 
how “ diminution ” occurs in each thing that dimin- 
ishes. First we must consider whether the difference 
between them lies only in the sphere of each. For 
example, is it because the change from one thing 
to another (for instance, from potential to actual 
substance) is coming-to be, while the change in re- 
spect of magnitude is “ growth’’; and the change 
in respect of property is “ alteration,’’ and both the 
last two involve a change from what is-actually to 
what is-potentially ? Or does the difference also lie 
in the manner of the change ? For it is manifest that, 
whereas neither that which is altering nor that which 
is coming-to-be necessarily changes in respect of 
position, that which is growing and that which is 
diminishing do change in this respect but in a manner 
different from that in which that which is moving 
changes. For that which is moving changes its place Growth is 
as a whole, but that which is growing changes its (hange Mt 
position like a metal which is being beaten out ; for, size. 
while it retains its place, its parts undergo local 
change, but not in the same manner as the parts of 
a revolving globe. For the latter change their places 
while the whole remains in an equal space, whereas the 
parts of that which is growing change so as to occupy 
an ever larger space, and the parts of that which is 
diminishing contract into an ever smaller space. 


205 


ARISTOTLE 
320 a r ; 
x ¢ A / 
Ore pev odbv 7 petaBodr Siadéper od jrdvov crept 
“ iAAG \ “a ~ / 4 GAA , 
0 adda Kai @s TOO TE ywopevov Kal adAoLoUpevov 
‘ b] / ~ \ Yo ae € 
Kat avfavomevov, SfAov. epi S€ 6 eoTrw 1) peTa- 
\ i? ~ > la ‘ € lo / ‘ 
Body 4 tis ab&joews Kal 4 THs pbicews (epi 
peyebos dé Soke? elvar 7d advédvecbar Kat dbivew), 
30 moTépws vroAymTéov, méTEpov eK Suvaper ev 
peyeBous Kal owpatos, evteAcyeia 8° daowpdrov 
Kal apeyebovs yivecbar o@pa Kali péyeBos, Kal 
tovtov dix@s_ evdexouevou Aéyew, motépws 1H 
avo yivera; mdTEpov eK Kexwproperyns adris 
> € A ~ id ”“ > 4, > A 
Kal” adtiv ths Ans, 7} evuTTapyovens ev ddAw 
> A 
320b OWpaTL; 7 advvaTov apdoTépws; ywpLoT? peVv 
\ Ly " 55 / Og / bal / 
yap ovoa 7 ovdeva Kabéer Tomov, [7] olov orvypy 
Tis, 7) Kevov €oTar 7) G@pa ovK aicbynrov. TovTwv 
dé TO pev ovK evdexeTa, TO 5é€ dvayKaiov év TL 
elvat: adel ydp mov €otar TO yuwopevov e€ adrod, 
ov > ~ mal > ¢ \ ”“ A /, 
5 woTe Kakeivo, 7) Kal? atto 7 Kata ovpPeBynKos. 
> ‘ \ ” > ¢ 4 > ‘ , 
GAAa pny ety’ ev Tur drrdpEer, ei ev KExwpLopLevov 
ottws wate py eKelvov Kal? adro 7) KaTa oup- 
/, > / AAG \ > 4 
BeBnkos te elvar, ovpPyjoerar toAAad Kal advvata. 
/ > et > / >\ > a > ~ 
Aéyw 8 olov ei yiverar anp &€€ vdaTos, od Tod 
vdatos e€oTat peraBadAovros, adda dia TO WomTep 
ev dyyeilw TH vdaT. evetvac tHv vAnv adrod. 
> / ‘ oO \ 7 WA ¢ ‘ 
amelpous yap ovoev KwAver Aas elvar, WorTe Kal 
/ > / uv 5’ >: “ Ul 
yivecOar evredexeia. ETL ovd’ ovTw daiverau 





* i.e. either as itself occupying a place, or contained in 
something else. 


206 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 


It is clear, then, that the changes both of that 
which comes-to-be and of that which “ alters ”’ and 
of that which “ grows,” differ not only in sphere but 
also in manner. But how are we to conceive the 
sphere of the change which is growth and diminu- 
tion? Growth and diminution are generally re- 
garded as taking place in the sphere of magnitude. 
Are we, then, to suppose that body and magnitude 
come-to-be out of what is potentially body and magni- 
tude but is actually incorporeal and without magni- 
tude? And since this can be meant in two different 
senses, in which of these senses does growth take 
place? Does it come from matter which exists 
separately by itself or matter previously existing in 
another body ? Or is it impossible for growth to take 
place under either of these conditions? For, since 
the matter is separate, either it will take up no space, 
like a point, or else it will be void or, in other words, 
an imperceptible body. Of these alterations the 
first is impossible, and in the second the matter must 
be in something. For, in the first case, what comes- 
to-be from it will always be somewhere, so that the 
matter too must exist somewhere, either directly or 
indirectly *; in the second case, supposing it is to 
be in something else, if it is so separated as not to 
belong to that something, either directly or indirectly, 
many impossibilities will arise. For example, if Air 
comes-to-be from Water, it will not be due to any 
change in the Water but owing to the presence of 
the matter of the Air in the Water, as in a vessel. 
For there is nothing to prevent there being an 
infinite number of matters contained in the Water, 
so that they might actually come-to-be; and, 
furthermore, the Air cannot be seen coming-to-be 


207 


ARISTOTLE 
320 b 
/ “et > i) e > \ c tA 
ywopevos anp e& vdatos, olov eEvav tropevov- 
TOS. 
BéAriov roivuy roveiv maow axyapiotov thy bAnv 
ws oteay THY adtiy Kat play TO apioua, TH Aoyw 
15 dé py plav. adda pry ovd€ otiypas Deréov odde 
ypappas THv Too owpatos bAnv bia Tas adrds 
2) 8 > a \ es lot ” ¢ MA “a 
aitias. ékeivo 5€ od Taira eoyata, 7 vA, HY 
> / > + MA or So 2Q> © ~ 
ovdémo7’ dvev afous oidv Te elvat 00d’ dvev popdijs. 
yiverar pev odv. amA@s erepov e& Erépov, woTrep 
Reg Ed / \ ¥ , a ee , 
Kal ev dAdAois Siwdprorat, Kal bd Twos Sé evreAexeia 
20 OVTOS 7 OpoLoELOods 7) SOpoyevods, olov mip tro 
\ vn + 4.9 *) 2 7 WR Ge" Oe. / 
mupos 7) avOpwros bn’ avOpadrov, 7 bm’ évteAcxetas* 
okAnpov yap ovx tbo oKAnpod yivera. eel 3 
€oTl Kai ovoias UAn cwpaTiKis, cwpatos 8 dH 
ToLovel (cia yap Kowov ovdev), 7) adT7 Kal pe- 
yeGovs Kai mafouvs eoti, TH pev AOyw xwpLory, 
25 TOmW 8 ov ywpLioTyH, ef 1) Kal Ta 7aOn YwpLoTa. 
Davepov 81) ek Tv Sintropynpevwv ote odK E€oTw 
¢ ” 3 2 § a ‘0 2 r 
y av&nows petaBodAn ex duvdper peyebous, evrede- 
xela 5é pndev exyovros péyePos: ywpiotov yap av 
ein TO Kevov, TobTo 8 dtu advvaTov, elipnrat ev 
4 , ” hg ¢ , Ar 
érépois mpotepov. ets 5 H ye TovadTyn peTaPoAr) 
> > / ” > \ / e \ ” , 
30 00k ab&jaews idios GAAd yevécews: 7 yap av&nais 
€oTt Tod evumdpyovros peyebous emidoas, 7 dé 
/ / \ \ ” Cal / ‘ 
P0icts petwous (S10 57 exew te Set peyeos To 
* See Met. 1032 a 12 ff. 
> Or “form”; see Met. l.c. 25 ff. 


© In 320 a 27-b 12. 
4 Phys. iv. 6-9. 





208 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 


in this manner out of Water, namely, issuing forth 
while the Water is left as it was. 

It is better, therefore, to suppose that the matter 
in anything is inseparable, being the same and 
numerically one, though not one by definition. 
Further, for the same reasons also, we ought not to 
regard the matter of the body as points or lines ; 
matter is that which has points and lines as its limits 
and cannot possibly ever exist without qualities and 
without form. Now one thing comes-to-be, in the 

-unqualified sense, out of another, as has been deter- 

mined elsewhere * and by the agency of something 
which is actually either of the same species or of 
the same genus—for example, Fire comes-to-be 
through the agency of Fire and Man through that 
of Man—or through an actuality ° (for that which 
is hard does not come-to-be through that which is 
hard). But since there is also a matter out of which 
corporeal substance comes-to-be, but already be- 
longing to a body of such-and-such a kind (for there 
is no such being as body in general), this same matter 
is also the matter of magnitude and quality, being 
separable by definition but not in place, unless the 
properties are also separable. 

Now it is clear from the difficulties which we have 
discussed,° that growth is not a change from a 
potential magnitude which actually has no magni- 
tude ; for then, “ the void ”’ would be separable, and 
that is impossible, as has already been stated else- 
where.? Moreover, such a change is not peculiar 
to growth but characteristic of coming-to-be ; for 
growth is an increase, just as diminution is a reduc- 
tion, of the already existing magnitude (hence that 
which grows must already possess a certain magni- 


209 


ARISTOTLE 
320 b < 
> / > > > / WA ~ 
avfavopevov), wor odk && apeyebous bAns Se? elvan 
Thy avénow eis evteAdyevay peyelous: yéveois yap 
n“ ” / ~ > ” /, \ 
av ein awpatos paAdov, odk av&nows. Anmréov 87 
~ ¢ / fond 7 > > ~ 
321a dAAov olov amropevovs THs Cytnoews e& apyis, 
4 A ” lol > / ”“ ~ / A 
motov Twos ovtos Tob adv&dvecbar 7 Tod POivew Ta 
atria Cnrobpev. 
Daiverar 57) Tob avfavopevov dtiobv pépos nv- 
~ € / \ \ > ~ , ” 
Ejo8a, spoiws S€ Kai év TO POivew EdatTov ye- 
, ” A , A > 4 \ 
yovevat, €Tt d€ mpoodvTos Twos avédvecOar Kal 
> / / > a \ “ > / > 
s amdvros P0ivew. avayKaiov 8) 7) aowuaT@ ad- 
> 
Edvecbar 7 ow@part. «i pev odv dowpdTw, EoTaL 
‘ \ / > 7 A / 5A 
Xwpiotov TO Kevov: advvatov Sé peyelouvs BAnv 
elvar ywpioTiy, wWomep elpntat mpotepov: «i Se 
owpatt, d0o év TH adT@ owpara tomw EoTa, TO 
2 / \ ‘\ > ” \ ‘ lon 
re avf€dpuevov Kal TO adfov: €oTt Sé€ Kal TobTO 
> 4 > A \ 29> A > / /, 

10 ddvvatov. GaAAd pv odd oUTWs evdexeTar A€eyew 
/ 0 \ ” ‘ \ bi. o id 
yiveoba tHv avénow Kali tHv Pbiow, woTep Srav 

> Ad a2 Y Sod A / c¢ m / 
ef vdaTos arp: TéTe yap peilwv 6 dyKos yéyovev: 
> A »” lot > \ / \ ~ > “a 
od yap avénois Totro aAAa yéveos pev Tod els 6 
, ” \ A lon > / »” 
pereBarev eotar, Plopa dé Tod evayriov: av nats 
dé ovdeTepov, adr’ 7 oddevds 7) €l Te KoWOV audoiv 
15 UTdpxYel, TH ywowevw Kal TH POapévri, olov ei 
cpa. To 8 vdwp odk nvEnrar odd’ 6 anp, adda 
4 \ > / \ \ / \ ~ / ” 
TO pev amdAwre 76 Sé yéyovev: TO c@pa Sé, eimep, 
” > \ \ ali aN , 8 Pea , 
nvénrat. adda Kai Todr’ advvatov. Set yap ad- 





2 In 320 a 27 ff. > i.e, steam. 
210 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 


tude), so that growth must not be from matter 
without magnitude to an actuality of magnitude ; 
for that would be rather a coming-to-be of a body 
and not a growth. We must, therefore, lay hold 
more closely and, as it were, get to grips with our 
inquiry from the beginning as to the nature of growth 
and diminution, the causes of which we are seeking. 
It appears that every part of that which grows What is 

has increased, and likewise in diminution every part 344¢4 when 
has become smaller, and, further, that growth occurs takes place? 
when something is added and diminution when 
something departs. Growth, then, must be due to 
the addition of something incorporeal or of a body. 
If it is due to something incorporeal, there will be 
a void existing separately ; but, as has been stated 
before, it is impossible for matter of magnitude to 
exist separately ; whereas, if it grows by the addition 
of a body, there will be two bodies in the same place, 
one which grows and the other which causes the 
growth, and this also is impossible. But neither is 
it admissible for us to say that growth or diminution 
occurs in the manner in which it occurs when air ? 
is produced from water. For then, the volume has 
become greater ; for it will not be a case of growth 
but of a coming-to-be of that into which the change 
has taken place, and a passing-away of its contrary. 
It is a growth of neither, but either of nothing or 
of something (for example, “ body ”’) which belongs 
in common both to that which is coming-to-be and 
to that which has passed-away. The water has not 
grown nor has the air, but the former has perished 
and the latter has come-to-be ; and the “ body,” if 
anything, has grown. But this is also impossible ; 
for in our account we must preserve the character- 


211 


ARISTOTLE 
321 a 
~ / \ e 4 ~ ? / ‘ 
lew 7T@ AOyw Ta brdpyovtra 7H adfavopevw Kal 
plivovrt. tadra dé tpia eoriv, dv &v pév eote TO 
20 6TLodv prepos peilov yiyvecbar tod adf€avopevov 
peyeBous, olov ei cap€ THs capkds, Kal mpoo.ovTos 
Twos, Kal Tpitov cwlopuevov Tot advf€avopevov Kat 
brropevovtos: ev prev yap T@ yiveobai tu amAds 
“ / 0 ? ¢ / > de ~ GAA ~ 6 
7 PbcipecOar ody bropever, ev S€ TH aAAovobaIan 
nv > 4, ”“ / ¢ / \ F<. & A > 
H avédvecba 7 Pbivew tropever TO adto TO ad- 
/ an > / > > \ \ / 
Eavopevov 7) adAAotovpevov: aad’ évba ev 7d dBos 
” A \ / ‘ : wea > / > » 
eva dé To péeyebos 70 adro od pever. et 82 Eorat 
» elpnpevn avfnats, evdéxour’ av pndevos ye mpoo- 
udvtos nde dropevovtos avfdvecar Kal pndevos 
amovros Pbivew Kai 7) bropevew TO adfavopevov. 
> \ Cal ~ / ¢ / A ¢ ” 
aAAa dei tobro owlew: brdKertar yap 7 avénows 
TOLOUTOV. 
> / > ” \ Pir ‘ ? , 
30 "Amoproce 8° av tis Kal ti é€ott TO adfavope- 
vov, 7OTEpov @ mpootierai TL, olov et THY KVHELNV 
bE / Ld iC e 8 \ a / € $m, ” 
adfdver, airy peilwv, @ d€ avfdver, 7 Tpopy), ov. 
\ ” + 
dud Ti 57) obv ovK Gupoy nvénrar; petlov yap Kat 
6 Kal @, Borep oTav pees olvov ware: Spoiws 
yap mAclov Exdtepov. 7 Ott TOD prev pever 7 ovaia, 
35 ToD 8° ov, olov Tis tpodis, eel Kal evradla rd 
321 b emukpatobv A€yerar ev TH pier, olov drt olvos: 
a 4 \ ~ ” ” > > > ‘ a 
To.et ‘yap TO Tob olvov Epyov add’ od To Tob BdaTos 
‘ , a e / \ ee Le Met , 
TO avvodov piypa. dpoiws dé Kal én’ addowwdoews, 
el pever capt ovoa Kal To Ti éeott, maBos Sé TH 


2 


on 





2 j.e. the generation of air from water. 
» i.e. the persistence of that which grows. 
* In line 22 above. 

@ With Aéyerau understand zAe¢iov. 


212 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 


istics which belong to what is growing and diminish- 
ing. These characteristics are three : (a) that every 
part of the growing magnitude is greater (for example, 
if flesh grows, every part of it grows); (5) that it 
grows by the accession of something ; and (c) that 
it grows because that which grows is preserved and 
persists. For while a thing does not persist in un- 
qualified coming-to-be or passing-away, in alteration 
and growth or diminution that which grows or alters 
persists in its identity, but, in the case of alteration 
the quality, and, in the case of growth, the magnitude 
does not remain the same. Now if the change men- 
tioned above “ is to be growth, it would be possible 
for something to grow without anything being added 
to it or persisting and to diminish without anything 
going away, and for that which grows not to persist. 
But this quality ® must be preserved ; for it has been 
assumed ° that growth has this characteristic. 


One might also raise this difficulty : What is it ibe apr 


which grows? Is it that to which something is * 


added? For example, if a man grows in his leg, is 
it his leg which is greater, while that which makes 
him grow, namely, his food, is not greater? Wh 

have not both grown? For both that which is added 
and that to which the addition was made are greater, 
just as when you mix wine with water; for each 
ingredient is similarly increased. Or is it because 
the substance of the leg remains unchanged, but that 
of the other (¢.e. the food) does not? For in the 
mixture of the wine and water it is the prevailing 
ingredient which is said to increase,? namely the 
wine; for the mixture as a whole performs the 
function of wine and not of water. Similarly, too, 
in the process of “ alteration,” flesh is “ altered,” if 


213 


t grows ? 


321 b 


5 


— 
vu 


20 


ARISTOTLE 


bmdpxet TOV Kal? adrd, 6 mpdTepov ody trhpxev, 
~ >? A 
7Moiwrat tobro: @ 8 HAAoiwrar, dre prev ovddEeV 
méTrovev, ote 5é Kakeivo. aAAd TO aAdowodv Kai 
 apxn Ths Kwhoews ev TH adbavopevw Kal TO 
~ ‘ 
aAdowovpévy’ €v TovToLs yap TO KWwodv, émel Kal 
‘ > \ / > a” a \ ‘ > 
To eiaeAOov yévour’ dv tote peilov, Kal TO amo- 
Aabcav atrob odpa, olov «i eiceAMov yévouto 
~ ~ , 
mvetpa. adr édbaprai ye tobtro mafov, Kal To 
Kwobv ovK év ToUTw. 
> ‘ \ / A 7 A ¢ al 8 a A 
Ezet 5€ dunmdpnra: mepi atr@v tkavads, det Kai 
THs amopias teipdo0a Avow etpeiv, awlovras TO 
dropevovTds Te TOO advf€avouevov Kai mpoarovTos 
\ b) / > / A / ” A ‘ 
twos avfdvecbar, amdvros dé Pbivew, Ett S€ TO 
oTiobv onpetov aicbnrov 7 petlov 7 eAatTov yeyo- 
véevat, Kal prjre Kevov elvar TO CHa pre So ev 
an > ~ / / / > / > / 
T@ adT@ row peyeln pyre dowparw adv&dvecbar. 
Anmréov dé 76 altiov Siopicapevois mp@tov Ev pev 
~ ral A lo 
OTL TA Gvopoiopeph avfdverar TH TA Opovopeph 
avédveobar (ovyKertar yap €k TovTwy €KacTor), 
ere?” Sti cap Kal doToby Kai ExacTov THY ToWwv- 
/ > ‘ / a ‘ ~ ” ~ 
Twv poplwy €or Sitt6v, WoTep Kal TOV GAAwy TaV 
ev vAn «ldos éexdvtwv: Kal yap 7 vAn Aéyerar Kal 
Hf] S €X b YEP 3p OM em ¢ 
‘ A ” > ~ ‘ > ¢ ~ / 
70 «loos capt 7 ooTobv. To obv dTLoby pépos 
) / \ , ‘ \ A ‘ /, 
avfédveobar Kat mpoo.dvTos Twos Kata pev TO €ldds 
> > / A A \ A > ” 
€oTiw evdexopevov, Kata Se tHVv VAnv odK E€oTW. 





* i.e, the organic parts. > i.e. the tissue. 
214 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 


it remains flesh and its substance remains the same, 
but some inherent quality now belongs to it which 
did not belong before ; but that by which it has been 
altered sometimes has not been affected but some- 
times has also been affected. But that which causes 
alteration and the source of movement reside in that 
which grows and in that which is altered (for the 
' motive agent is within them); for that which has 
entered might sometimes become greater as well as 
the body which benefits by it (for example, if, after 
entering in, it were to become wind), but after having 
undergone this process, it has passed-away and the 
motive agent is not in it. 

Now that the difficulties have been adequately Conclusions 
discussed, we must try to find a solution of the pete 
problem. In doing so we must maintain the doctrine 
that growth occurs, when that which grows persists 
and grows by the accession of something (and 
diminishes by the departure of something), and that 
every perceptible particle has become greater (or 
less), and that the body is not void, and that there 
are not two magnitudes in the same place, and that 
growth does not take place by the addition of anything 
incorporeal. We must grasp the cause of growth 
by making the distinctions (i) that the parts which 
are not uniform * grow by the growth of the parts 
which are uniform ’—for each part is composed of 
these—and (ii) that flesh and bone and every such 
part, like all other things which have their form in 
matter, are of a double nature ; for the form as well 
as the matter is called flesh or bone. It is quite 
possible, then, that any part can grow in respect of 
form by the addition of something, but not in respect 
of matter ; for we must regard the process as like that 


215 


321 b 


25 


30 


35 
322 a 


5 


ARISTOTLE 


dei yap vofoat womep el tis peTtpoin TH adTa@ 

/ 4 r Be! A ” ‘ ” \ , 
LéTpw Vdwp* del yap ddAo Kai dAAo TO ywopevov. 

M4 > > / ¢ 4 ~ / A > 
ovtw 8 avédverar 7 bAn Tis capKds, Kal ovy 
oTmodv TavTi mpooyivera, aAAd TO pev UreKpet 

‘ A /, lal ~ 
To 5€ mpocepyerat, Tob 5é ayrnparos Kal Tod €ldous 
¢ ~ / ~ ~ ~ 
OTwobv popiw. emi d5é€ THV avopoiopep@v TodTO 

a ~ , 
paAAov Sirov, olov yxewpds, dt. avdAoyov nvEnrac- 
¢ A ~ lot 
» yap vAn érépa otcoa SyAn paAdov Tod eldous 
> ~ an ~ 
evratda 7 emi oapKos Kal T&v dpowopep@v- d10 
Kat teOve@tos paAdov dv Sddgevev elvar ere aap 
Kal doToby 7 yelp Kai Bpayiwy. wate eat pev 
if e ~ ~ \ + ” > e Ld 
ws oTlobdy THs capKkos nuvéntar, €oTt 8 ws ov. 

\ \ A \ e ~ / \ 
KaTa pev yap To eldos 6twotv mpoceAnAvber, Kara 

\ \ ” ” a / A a / 

de tHv vAnv ov. peilov pévror TO GdAov yéyove 

, , a“ a A ‘ 
mpoceAOdvros pev Tivos, 0 Kadcirar tpody Kal 
evavtiov, wetaBaAdrovros S€ eis TO adro «€ldos, olov 
el Enp@ mpocior bypov, mpoceAPov dé peTraBadrot 
Kal yévouro Enpov: €oT. pev yap Ws TO GpoLov 
7 .e7 ” > ti pee 
opoiw advf€dverar, €or. 8 ws TO avdpovov' avo- 
polw. 

"Amopjaee 8 dv tis Trotdv tu Set elvac TO @ 
avédverar. davepov $1) dru Suvdper exeivo, olov 
ei odp&, Suvdper odpxa. eévredexeia apa dAdo- 

~ ~ \ 

pbapev 57) todto aapE yéyovev. ovdKodv odK adro 

A 

Kal? adro (yéveots yap av tv, od« av&nots)* dAda 
1 +6 dvopovov addidi. 


216 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 


which happens when a man measures water with 
the same measure, for there is first one portion and 
then another in constant succession. It is in this way 
that the matter of the flesh grows ; something flows 
out and something flows in, but there is not an addi- 
tion made to every particle of it, but to every part 
of its figure and “‘ form.” That the growth has taken 
place proportionally is more obvious in the parts 
which are not uniform, for instance, in the hand ; 
for there the matter, being distinct from the form, 
is more noticeable than in the flesh and the parts 
which are uniform ; for this reason one is more likely 
to think of a corpse as still possessing flesh and bone 
than that it has a hand and an arm. Therefore, in 
one sense it is true that every part of the flesh has 
grown, but in another sense it is untrue; for in 
respect to its form there has been an accession to 
every part, but not in respect to its matter; the 
whole, however, has become greater (a) by the acces- 
sion of something which is called food, the “ con- 
trary” of flesh, and (b) by the change of this food 
into the same form as that of the flesh, just as if moist 
were to be added to dry, and, after having been 
added, were to change and become dry ; for, it is 
possible that “like grows by like” and also that 
‘“‘ unlike grows by unlike.” 

One might raise the question what must be the 
nature of that by which a thing grows. It is clear 
that it must be potentially that which is growing, for 
example, potentially flesh, if it is flesh which is 
growing ; actually, then, it is something different. 
This, therefore, has passed-away and come-to-be 
flesh—not alone by itself (for that would have been 
a coming-to-be and not growth) ; but it is that which 


217 


ARISTOTLE 
322 a 
\ > / tf , bo \ € ‘ uf 
To av€avopevov TovTw. Ti otv mabov bro TovToV 


4, n”“ / 
[nvéyOn]'; 7 puxbev, womep olvw el tis emuyéor 
A ¢ A , > a \ / ‘ 
10 Vdwp, 0 Se ddvatto olvov moeiv TO puyOev; Kal 
wotep TO Top aibdevov Tob KavoTod, oUTws ev 
~ ? / \ » > / ‘ ‘ t see. 
T@ avEavowevw Kat ovtTe evreAeyeia oapKi TO evov 
b) ‘ / 4 ‘ > / 
avéyntiukov mpoceAGovros Suvdper capKos émoinoev 
‘evreAcxeia odpKa. ovKody apa OvTos: ei yap xwpis, 
yéveois. oT fev yap ovTw Tip movhoat emi TO 
15 Umdpyov embevra EvAa. add’ ovrw pev avénors, 
dtav b€ abra Ta EvAa adOA, yéveors. 
\ \ \ \ / > / LA 
Iloodv 5€ TO pév KabddAov od yiverat, worep 
29O\ ~ “a ’ pie Soe /, ~ 7 7 
ovdé Cov 6 pir’ dvOpwros pyre TOV Kal? Exaora: 
aA’ ws evrat0a ro Kabodrov, KaKet TO ToGov. 
‘ Ve eS ~ xn ‘ \ / 4 Ae ~ 
cap€ dé 7) OoToby 7 xElp Kal TOUTWY TA OpMoLomEpT, 
/ \ / ~ > > > ‘ 
20 mpoceAbdvros pev 54 Twos Toad, GAN’ od} capKos 
Toons. % pev odv Suvdper TO cvvapdorepov, olov 
4 , , \ »” \ \ \ a 
moo7) odpl, TavTn pev avfer Kal yap Toonv dei 
/ ‘ / A / / / 
yevéobar Kal odpxa:  Sé povov odpk, tpéder- 
7, \ / \ ‘ ” ~ / 
TavTn yap Siadéper tpod?) Kai avéynois TH Adyw. 
510 tpéderar prev ews av awdlynra Kal dbivor,* 
> ‘4 A > aR ‘ ¢ \ ~ > / \ 
25 av&dvera Sé ovK dei. Kal 7) Tpod7) TH adEjoe TO 
> ‘ / ‘ > »” \ / > ‘ 
avro pev, TO 8 elvar dAdo: 4 pev yap €or TO 


1 »d&4Oy seclusit Joachim. 
2 dbivoyv L: dbiver F: dOivn H. 





* And not a growth of already existent tissue. 
218 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5 


grows which now comes-to-be flesh owing to the food. 
How has the food been affected by the growing 
thing? Is it by admixture, as if one were to pour 
water into wine, and the latter were able to convert 
the mixture into wine? And like fire when it takes 
hold of inflammable material, so the principle of 
growth present in that which grows (?.e. in what is 
actually flesh) lays hold of the added food which is 
potentially flesh, and turns it into actual flesh. The 
added food must, therefore, be together with that 
which grows ; for, if it is separate, it would be a case 
of coming-to-be.* For it is possible to produce fire 
by placing logs on the fire which is already in exist- 
ence ; in this case there is growth, but, when the 
logs themselves are set on fire, there is a coming- 
to-be of fire. 

“ Quantum-in-general ”’ does not come-to-be, just 
as ‘“‘ animal,” which is neither man nor any other 
particular animal, does not come-to-be ; but what 
“ animal-in-general ”’ is in coming-to-be, that “ quan- 
tum-in-general ”’ is in growth. But what comes-to-be 
in growth is flesh or bone or hand and the uniform 
parts of these, by the accession of such-and-such a 
quantity of something, but not of such-and-such a 
quantity of flesh. In so far, then, as the combination 
of the two, e.g., so much flesh, is a potentiality, it 
produces growth ; for both quantity and flesh must 
come-to-be, but in so far as it is potentially flesh only, 
it nourishes ; for it is here that nutrition and growth 
differ in their definition. Therefore the body is 
nourished as long as it is kept alive, even when it is 
diminishing, but it is not always growing; and 
nutrition, though it is the same as growth, is different 
in its being ;. for, in so far as that which is added is 


219 


322 a 


30 


322 b 


oO 


10 


ARISTOTLE 


mpoo.ov duvdyer toon capt, TavTn pev adb&nriKov 
capKos, 7 dé pdvov duvdper odpé, tpody. 
F Ars 4 ” ¢ 1 s\/ 297 , 

Todro de 76 €lSos [dvev tAns],' ofov adAds,” S¥vapis 

> 7 > / A / / A 
Tis ev VAn eotiv. éav dé Tis mpoain vAn, ovca 
duvdpet avrds,” €xovoa Kal TO Toadv Suvaper, odToL 
€sovrar peilous avdAoi.” éav Sé pnkéte Toveiv 

, > > ” wn te | a , 
duvyTat, add’ ofov vdwp oivw det mA€lov puyvdpevov 
Tédos Bdaph trove? Kal vdwp, Tore POlow rovetrac 
Tod mocot, TO 8 eldos peéver. 

6. ’Ezet 5€ mp@rov Set mepi tis vAns Kal Tov 
KaAovpevwv oTorxeiwv eimeiv, eit €oTw elTe pH, 
kal méTepov aldwov ExaoTov 7) yiveral mws, Kal 

> / / > > /, / / \ 
et yivetar, 7oTEpov e& aAAjAwy yiverar mavTa TOV 
adrov TpdTrov 7 TL TpA@Tov €v altav eoriv, avayKy 
57) mpdorepov eimety mept dv dd.iopiotws Aéyerar 
vov. mavrTes yap ot Te TA OTOLXEla yevvaVTEs Kal 
of Ta €k TOV oToLxeiwy Svaxpice. yp@vTar Kal 
avykpices Kal T@ Tovey Kal mdaoyew. €or 8 
 oavyKpiots pikiss Os 5é€ piyvucba Aéyopev, 

> 4 ~ > \ \ 299 > “~ 
od diwpiorar cadds. aAAad pv ovd’ ddAdovosabat 
duvarov, ovde Svaxpivecbar Kat ovyKpivecbar, pn- 
devos movodvtos unde mdoxovTos: Kal yap ot mAciw 
A ~ ~ ~ a“ ‘ 
Ta oTOoLxela TowwdvTes yervMor TH Troveiv Kal 

/ (ae > / \ cal >? ey > P. 
mdoxew vm aAdArjAwv, Kal tois é& Evos avayKy 

1 dvev vAns seclusit Joachim. 

> 


2 avAds ... avAds ... avdAoi Joachim: avdAos...avAos... 
avAo codd: tibia... tibia . . . tibiae vertit Vatablus. 





¢,'In-391 b 99-ff, 

> i.e. the Pluralists, like Anaxagoras, Democritus and 
Plato, who regard Earth, Air, Fire and Water as composed 
of some prior constituents. 

¢ i.e. other Pluralists, like Empedocles, who regard them 
as actual elements. 


220 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5-6 


potentially so much flesh, it is productive of the 
growth of flesh, but, in so far as it is only potentially 
flesh, it is nutriment. 

This ‘‘ form ” of which we spoke ¢ is a kind of power 
present in matter, as it were achannel. If, therefore, 
matter is added which is potentially a channel and 
also potentially possesses such-and-such a quantity, 
these channels will become bigger. But if the 
“form ” is no longer able to function, but, as water 
mixed with wine in ever-increasing quantities eventu- 
ally makes the wine waterish and converts it into 
water, it will cause a diminution of the quantity, 
though the “ form ”’ still persists. 


6. We must first deal with the matter and the Chs. 6-10. 


so-called ‘‘ elements ” and determine whether they 


That which 


comes-to-be 


exist or not, and whether each is eternal, or whether és formed of 
there is a sense in which they come-to-be, and, if so, constituents 


whether they all come-to-be in the same manner PY their 


nation. 


out of one another, or whether one among them is Combina- 
something primary. We must, therefore, first deal 10% innalpes 


; ; Dicer teallt 
with matters about which people at present speak and" pas- 


“es 


only vaguely. For all those who generate the ele- invoive 


ments ? and those who generate the bodies composed 
of the elements,* apply the terms “ dissociation ”’ 
and “association ”’ and “ action”’ and “ passion.”’ 
Now “ association’”’ is a process of mixing; but 
what we mean by mixing has not yet been clearly 
defined. But there cannot be “ alteration” any 
more than there can be “ dissociation ”’ and “ associa- 
tion’ without an “ agent ’”’ and a “ patient.” For 
those who suppose the elements to be several in 
number ascribe the generation of composite bodies 
to the reciprocal ‘‘ action’ and “ passion ’’ of these 
elements, whereas those who derive them from a 


221 


** contact.”” 


ARISTOTLE 
322 b 
Ae \ / ‘ a_> > Ad rNé A 
eyelw THY Tolinow, Kal Tobr’ dpbds Eyer Aw- 
4 Ld > \ > ey wd > an“ S ‘ 
yevns, ore et pn e€ Evos Hv dravta, obK av Hv TO 
val A \ / \ Saat oy / e A ‘ 
15 Trovety Kal TO Tacxew UT’ aAAjAwY, olov TO Depyov 
tA ‘ ~ , / > A 
poxeobar Kai tobto Oepyaivecbar madw: od yap 
9 Oeppdrns peraBdddrc Kat 4 yvxporns eis GAAnAa, 
> \ ~ i \ ¢ / a > A 
dAAa SHAov ott 7d broKeipevov. wore ev ols 7d 
a iy 
Tov €oTl Kal TO TdoxeW, avayKn TovTwY jLlav 
elvat THv droKkepevny didow. 7d pev odv mavT’ 
~ / > > / > > > Lud 
elvar tovabra ddoxew od dAnfés, add’ év daots 
\ e 3 > / > / 
70 bm aAAjAwy éeoriv. 
> ‘ \ > \ lon a \ / ‘ 
Ara pv ei mept tod movety Kal mdoxew Kal 
mept pigews Oewpyréov, avayKn Kal mept adis 
ovTe yap Troveiy Tabta Kal mdoxew SvvaTae KUpiws 
“A \ es a > / ” \ ¢ / / 
a& pn olov te arbacbar addAjAwy, obre pi) cubdevd 
25 ws evdexeTat puxOvat mp@tov. WorTe TEpl TpLOV 
, / , c \ A /, / ‘ / 
tovTwv dwopioréov, Ti adi Kal Ti pieis Kal TL 
moinats. 
"Apx7v Sé AdBwpev rHvde. avayKn yap TeV 
»” bid > \ / ra / c , 
ovTwv daots e€oTi pikis, elvat Tabr’ GdAjAwY arTiKa* 
a 4 
Kav el Tu Trovet, TO S€ TaoXYEL KUpiws, Kal To’TOLS 
waattws. 80 mparov rAexréov wept adys. ayxedov 
A - i \ ~ ” > / Lid 
30 ev odv, WoTep Kal TOV GAAwY dvopaTwy EKacToV 
Aéyerar troAdayds, Kal Ta pev Ouwvdpws Ta dé 
Odrepa amd ta&v érépwv Kal T&V TpoTépwv, odTwsS 
~ / / 
exe Kal Trepl adijs. dpws Sé 70 Kupiws Aeyopevov 
a > ‘ 
323a UTdpxer Tots Exovar Oéow. Oéais 8 olomep Kai 


2 


o 





@ Fr, 2 (Diels). 
222 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 6 


single element must necessarily hold that there is 
“ action’; and Diogenes ® is right in saying that 
there could not be reciprocal action and _ passion, 
unless all things were derived from one. For example, 
what is hot would not become cold, and the cold 
become hot again ; for it is not heat and cold which 
change into one another, but it is obviously the 
substratum which changes; so that, where action 
and passion exist, their underlying nature must be 
one. It is not, however, true to say that all things 
are of this kind ; but it is true of all things between 
which there is reciprocal action and passion. 

But if we must go into the question of “ action ” 
and “ passion ”’ and of ‘“‘ commingling,” we must also 
investigate “ contact.” For action and passion ought 
properly to be possible only for such things as can 
touch one another; nor can things be mixed with 
one another in the first instance without coming in 
some kind of contact. Hence we must decide about 
these three things, namely, what is ‘‘ contact,”’ what 
is “‘ mixture,” and what is “ action.” 

Let us take this as our starting-point. All existing 
things which can undergo mixture must be able to 
come into contact with one another, and this must 
also be true of any pair of things, one of which acts 
and the other is acted upon in the proper sense of 
the word. Therefore we must first speak about 
“ contact.”” Practically speaking, just as every other 
term which is used in several senses is so used owing 
to verbal coincidence or because the different senses 
are derived from different prior meanings, so it is 
also with “contact.”’ Nevertheless, “ contact” in 
its proper sense belongs only to things which have 
“ position,” and “ position ” belongs to those things 


223 


What is 
contact ? 


323 a 


o 


10 


15 


ARISTOTLE 


Tomos* Kal yap Tots pabnpwatiKots duolws amodo- 
/ c \ ‘ /, ” 9 > ‘ / Ld 
Téov adi Kal TOTOV, €lr €oTl KexywpLopevov EKa- 
) ~ =o er f > > > , ¢ 
otov abta@v eit’ aAdov tpdmov. et odv eoTiv, WoTeEp 
/ / ‘ Ld A A ” 
Suwpichn mpotepov, TO antecbar TO Ta EoxaTa 
wv hd ~ a“ o > / Ld 
exew dpa, Tatra av amtoito aAAjAwv dca Sdiwpt- 
/ / \ / ” ov ” \ wm 
opeva peyebn Kal Oéow Eexovra dpa exer TA Eoyara. 
>? \ A / \ id \ , ¢ / / 
evel 5€ Oéaus prev daois Kal Témos bmdpyet, TOTO 
\ \ / Aw A / \ A ~ 
d€ dvadopa mpwTyn TO dvw Kal KaTW Kal Ta TOLADTA 
~ > / Ad A > / ¢ / 
TOV avTikeevwv, amavtTa Ta aAAjAwY amropeva 
4 n ” “” / ” ” a 4 
Bapos dv €xor 7 Kouddtnta, 7) adudw 7) Odrepov. 
A \ ~ \ A / a \ 
7a 5€ Tovatra TabnTiKa Kal ToLNnTLKa* WoTe davepov 
AY av 
6Tt Tabra amrecba. mépuKev aAArjAwv, dv dSinpy- 
pevov peyeO@v apa ta €oxaTd eoTw, dvTwY KWn- 
~ ~ 9439 , ~ 
TUKaV Kal KwWyTav br’ GAAjAwv. érrel 5é TO KWodV 
> ¢ / al \ / > \ A A > 4, 
ody Opolws Kwel TO KwWovpevov, GAAd TO LEV avayKn 
, \ > \ al \ 2. ¢® / ” ~ 
Kwovpevov Kal adTo Kweiv, TO 8 axivyntov ov, d4- 
Nov Ort Kal emi Tob mowbvTos epodpev Waadtws’ 
Kal yap TO Kwodv Tovey ti pact Kal TO TroLodVY 
a \ > \ / a 
kweiv. od pry adda diaddpe ye Kat Set dvopilew: 
od yap oldv te mév TO Kwobdv Tovey, elmep TO 
~ > 6 / la / ~ 8° t ¢€ 
mowbv avriOyjcopev TH Tacxovtt, TobTo 8 ols % 


Kinots mdbos, mafos Sé Kal? dcov ddAdotodrat 





* Phys. 226 b 21-23. 
224 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 6 


which have also a “ place’ ; for “‘ place,” just as much 
as ‘‘ contact,’’ must be attributed to mathematical 
objects, whether each exists in separation or in some 
other manner. If, therefore, as has been defined in 
a previous work,* for things to be in “ contact ” they 
must have their extremities together, only those 
things would be in contact with one another, which, 
possessing definite magnitudes and a definite posi- 
tion, have their extremities together. Now, since 
position belongs to such things as also have a“ place,” 
and the primary differentiation of “ place ”’ is “ above” 
and “‘ below ” and other such pairs of opposites, all 
things which are in contact with one another would 
have “ weight ” and “ lightness,” either both of these 
qualities or one or other of them. Now such things 
are capable of “ acting ”’ and “ being acted upon ” ; 
so that it is clear that those things are of a nature 
to be in contact with one another, the extremities 
of whose separate magnitudes are “ together ’’ and 
which are capable of moving one another and being 
moved by one another. But, since that which moves 
does not always move that which is moved in the 
same way, but one mover must move by being it- 
self moved, and another while itself remaining un- 
moved, it is clear that we must speak in the same 
terms about that which “ acts”; for the “ moving 
thing ”’ is said to “ act ’’ (in a sense) and the “ acting 
thing ”’ to “‘ move.’”’ There is, however, a difference, 
and a distinction must be made; for not every 
“ mover ”’ can “ act,” if we are going to employ the 
term “agent ”’ in contrast to the term “ patient,” 
and the term “ patient ”’ is applied only to those 
things for which the movement is an “ affection ”’ ” 


> See Met. x. 1022 b 15 ff. 
I 225 


ARISTOTLE 


323 a 
20 pLovov, olov To AevKov Kat Td Deppdv: aAAa TO Kwety 


SLUR / ~ ~ > / > a > > " , 
emt mA€ov Tob Toveiv eoTiv. exeivo 8 obv davepov, 
Lid ” A € A ~ ~ ~ Ld > 
OTL E€OTL ev WS TA KWodVTA TOV KWHT@V amTOLT 
+ wv > € ” > > ¢ \ a & 
av, €oTt 8 ws ov. GAN’ 6 Sv0piapods Tob amrecOat 
/ A ¢ ~ / >? / ‘ ~ \ 
KaBdrov pev 6 Ta&v Odow exovTwy Kal Tod pev 
~ ~ \ lo \ »” / 
KwyTtKOD Tob bé€ KwyTOb, mpos aAAnAa Sé, Kwn- 
a a 3 / ‘ a ‘ ‘ 
25 TUKOD Kal KLWNTOD ev ols UrdpxeL TO ToLEly Kal TO 
/ ” > ¢ i i% ‘ A \ c /, 
TaoXEW. EOTL EV OUV Ws ETL TO TOAD TO AmTO- 
¢ , \ \ a 7, 
pevov amtToevov amTdomevov: Kal yap Kiel Kwov- 
4 \ A > / Ld > rs ‘ 
peva travTa oxedov TA Eutrodwv, doo avayKn Kal 
/ ‘ c / a c / ” 
daiverat TO amtopevov amrecbar amropevov: éott 
ie e > 7 / \ ~ Ld 6 6 “~ 
, ws evioré hapev, TO Kiwobv anreobar povov Tod 
/ ‘ > ¢ /, \ ” < 
Kiwoupevov, TO 8 amrdopevov pr) amrecba amro- 
/ > 4 A \ a 4 A c na 
30 pevov' aAAd dia. TO Kweiv KWovpeva TA OmoyeErT,, 
> /, ~ ¢ / ov a ” 
avaykn Soxei elvar dmropéevov amtrecba. worte et 
a > / id >? a \ ” ¢ ~ 
TL KWwel aKivyntov ov, exelvo prev av amroiTo TOD 
~ > / A > / \ \ > 7 ‘ 
Kwytob, exeivov dé ovdev dapyev yap eviore Tov 
~ ov e ~ > > b] > ‘ >? , 
Avrobvra anrecbar nudv, adr’ odK« adroit exeivov. 
a ~ a a / 
mepl prev odv adas THs ev Tots puatkois Siwpicbw 
~ / 
ToUTOV TOV TpOTOV. 
~ a ‘ / / > 
saab 67. Hepi 5€ rod movetv Kai madoxew Aexréov €p- 
~ / \ \ lo / e 
effs, maperAnpapev 5€ mapa Tav mpdTepov Urevay- 


226 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 6-7 


(an “ affection,” that is, such as whiteness and heat, 
in virtue of which they only undergo “ alteration ”’), 
whereas to “ move ”’ is a wider term than to “ act.”’ 
But this, at any rate, is clear, that there is a sense in 
which the things which move can come into contact 
with the things which are capable of being moved, 
and a sense in which they cannot do so. But the 
distinction between contact in the most general sense 
and “ reciprocal contact ”’ is that, in the first sense, 
two objects should have position and that one should 
be capable of moving and the other of being moved ; 
in the second sense, that there should be one thing 
capable of moving and another of being moved, 
possessing, respectively, the qualities of “ agent ”’ 
and “ patient.’ Generally, no doubt, if one thing 
touches another, the latter also touches the former ; 
for almost all things, when they move, cause motion 
in the things which stand in their way, and in these 
eases that which touches must, and obviously does, 
touch that which touches it. But it is possible, as 
we say sometimes, for that which causes motion 
merely to touch that which is moved, and that which 
touches need not touch something which touches it ; 
but because things of the same kind impart motion 
by being moved, it seems to follow necessarily that 
they touch that which touches them. Hence, if any- 
thing causes motion without being itself moved, it 
might touch that which is moved, though not itself 
touched by anything; for we say sometimes that 
a man who grieves us “ touches ”’ us, though we 
ourselves do not “touch”? him. So much for our 
definition of contact in the realm of Nature. 


7. Next we must deal with “ action ’”’ and “ pas- “ Action” 


sion.” We have inherited conflicting accounts from 2 
227 


nd 
Passion ”’ ; 


323 b 


10 


15 


20 


ARISTOTLE 


/ > / / ¢ \ ‘ a A. F 
tiovs aAAjAois Adyous. of pev yap mAcioToL TObTS 
ye opovontikas Aéyovow, ws TO pev GpLoLtov B70 

~ ¢ / lad > / ? \ A \ ~ 
Tob opoiov wav amabés eott dia TO pndev pad- 
Aov mountikov 7) mabyrikov elvar Oarepov Oarépov 
\ a 
(rdvra yap opolws brdapyew tavTa Tots polos), 
7a 8° avopo.a Kat Ta Siddopa movetv Kal maoyewv 
> ” / \ \ Lid \ ” 
eis GAAnAa méduKev. Kat yap dotav TO €AaTToV 
~ € \ “~ / / ‘! ‘ > / 
mip b10 Tob TrAclovos Pleipynrar, dua THY EevayTiwow 
TobTo dact maoxew: evavtiov yap elvat TO moAd 

lan s\7 /, \ \ \ a 27 
T@ oAltyw. Anpoxpitos d€ Tapa tods adAous idiws 
” , \ \ A b) A A oe 
éXeEe povos: dynot yap To avTo Kal Opouov elvar 
TO TE TOLOOV Kal TO TdCoxOV" od yap eyyxwpelv TA 
Erepa Kal diadepovta macyew br’ addjAwv, adda 

nn 4 * ~ >] + > ¢ 
Kav €Tepa OvTa Torn TL eis GAAnAa, ody FH ETEpa 

> cee > / ¢€ / 4 lo U 
GAN 7} tadrov te brdpyet, Ta’TH TOOTO cupBaivew 
avrots. 

A \ ss / ~ > > / \ 

Ta pev ody Acyopeva tabr’ éeoriv, €oixacr de 
of todrov tov tpdmov A€yovtes trevavtia dai- 

/ ” \ lol > / o 
veobar Aéyew. aitiov Sé€ rhs evavTioAoyias Ort 
Séov dAov tt Oewphoa pépos te Tuyxdvovar Xé- 

\ \ /, 
yovtTes ékdTEepo.' TO TE YAP Opolovy Kal TO TaVYTH 
mdavras aduadopov evAoyov pu) macxew v0 TOD 
¢ / / / A ~ / ” 
dpoiov pndeév (Ti yap pwaGAdov Odrepov e€orat Trown- 
~ / 
tuxov 7) Oarepov; «i Te’ bd TOO dpolov TL MdaxeW 
Suvarov, Kal adto bf’ adrod: Kaito TovTwY OvTwWS 
> / 29O\ bal ww ” »” fa] ” > / 
exdvtwy ovdev av ein ovte adbaprov ovTe aKivy- 
‘ 
TOV, €lTEp TO Spowov 7 Gporov trownTiKOV, adTO yap 
1 ef re Bonitz: etre Bekker. 


228 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 7 


our predecessors. For most of them agree in de- view of 
claring that (i) like is always unaffected by like be- philo- 
cause, of two things which are like, neither is, they *°Ph¢™. 
argue, at all more liable than the other to act or to be 

acted upon (for all the same properties belong in a 

like degree to things which are like), and (ii) things 
which are unlike and different are naturally disposed 

to reciprocal action and passion; for, when the lesser 

fire is destroyed by the greater, it is said to be thus 
affected owing to its contrariety, the great being 

the contrary of the small. Democritus, however, in 
disagreement with all other philosophers, held a view 
peculiar to himself; for he says that the agent and 

the patient are the same and alike, for (he declares) 

it is not possible for things which are “ other ” and 
different to be affected by one another, but even if 

two things which are “ other ” do act in any way upon 

one another, this occurs to them not in as much as 

they are “ other,’’ but because some identical pro- 
perty belongs to them both. 

These, then, are the views expressed, and it appears 
that those who so expressed them were obviously 
in opposition to one another. But the reason of this 
opposition is that each school, when they ought to 
have viewed the problem as a whole, in fact only 
stated part of the truth. For, firstly, it is reasonable 
to hold that that which is like another thing, that is, 
in every respect absolutely without difference from 
it, cannot be in any way affected by the other thing 
which is like it. (For why should one be more likely 
to act than the other? And if like can be affected 
by like, it can also be affected by itself; yet, if that 
were so—if like were liable to act qua like—nothing 
would be indestructible or immovable, for everything 


229 


323 b 
25 


30 


324 a 


o 


10 


ARISTOTLE 


/ ~ /, ~ 
aito Kwioe mav): TO Te TavTeA@s ErEpov Kal 
A ~ > A ¢ / Ok A ba) / 
TO pndaph tadtov WoatTws. ovdev yap av maBot 
\ ~ ” A 
AevKoTys bd ypappts 7) ypaypn bo AevKdTTOS, 
mAnv ef pn mov Kara oupPeBnKds, olov et oup- 
/ A n” / A 7 > 
BéBnxe AcvKiy 7 péAawar elvar THY ypappjv: odK 
7 \ a ~ , a J. 0 , 
e€iornot yap aAAnAa ris Pdoews doa pyr’ evavTia 
Foss > > / > / GAN’ > ‘ > \ A 
pnt e€ evavtiwy eoriv. émel od TO TUXOV 
/ / ¥ ~ > > Lid n” > 7 
mépuke Tmdoxew Kal Tovey, add’ doa 7H EvavTia 
” ~ 
€orly 7) evavTimow exer, dvayKn Kal TO ToLody Kal 
~ A /, 
TO TaoXov TO yever prev Gpovov elvat Kal TavTO, 
TH & €ider avdpowv Kai evavtiov (répuKe ya, 
p yap 
~ \ ~ 
cGpa pev bo owpatos, xupos 8 bro xvpod, 
~ > ¢ \ / / hid A A 
xpapa 8 dvro xpwpyatos mdoxew, GAws dé TO 
Spoyeves UO TOD Opoyevots. Tovrov 8° airiov Gre 
tavavria ev TabT@ yever mavra, trove? 5€ Kal md- 
> / e > > / LA > > 4 ~ A 
axe. Tavavtia bm’ adAjAwv), WoT’ avayKn TAS wev 
elvat tadTa TO TE TOLOdY Kal TO TAaaxXOV, TAS 5 
o A > , > ¢ > ‘ \ \ \ 4 
érepa Kat avouoa aAArjAows. eet 5€ Kal TO Ta- 
ayov Kal TO ToLOdY TH pev yever TadTA Kal GpoLa 
~ > ” > / ~ \ > / ‘ 
T@ & cider dvdpoa, Torabra dé tavavria, pavepov 
o \ A A > , >? ‘ , > 
6r. TabntiKa Kal mountiKa aAAjAwY €oTi Ta T 
> , \ A / ‘ \ hid A \ 
évavria Kal Ta petakd: Kal yap dAws Pbopa Kai 
yéveots ev ToUToLs. 
Aw Kai evtrAoyov 75n TO Te Top Oeppaivew Kat 
‘ A 4 ‘ Ld ‘ ‘ ¢ ~ 
TO yuxpov yyew, Kal GAws TO ToLNTLKOV OpoLoby 
~ / ~ 
éavt@ TO Tdo0xXoVv" TO TE yap ToLOdY Kal TO TdoXOV 
évavtia €ari, Kal 7) yéveots eis Tobvavriov. wor 
230 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 7 


will move itself.) And, secondly, the same thing 
happens if there is complete difference and no kind 
of identity. For whiteness could not be affected in 
any degree by line, or line by whiteness, except per- 
haps incidentally, if, for example, it happened that 
the line was white or black ; for unless the two things 
are contraries or made up of contraries, one cannot 
displace the other from its natural condition. But, 
since only such things as possess contrariety or are 
themselves actual contraries—and not any chance 
things—are naturally adapted to be acted upon and 
to act, both “ agent ” and “ patient ”’ must be alike 
and identical in kind, but unlike and contrary in 
species. For body is by nature adapted so as to be 
affected by body, flavour by flavour, colour by colour, 
and in general that which is of the same kind by 
something else of the same kind ; and the reason of 
this is that contraries are always within the same kind, 
and it is contraries which act and are acted upon 
reciprocally. Hence “ agent” and “ patient ”’ are Aristotle’s 
necessarily in one sense the same, and in another S°inition of 
sense “ other” and unlike one another; and since and ve 
“agent” and “ patient” are identical in kind and P*’°"” 
like, but unlike in species, and it is contraries which 
have these characteristics, it is clear that contraries 
and their “intermediates” are capable of being 
affected and of acting reciprocally—indeed it is 
entirely these processes which constitute passing- 
away and coming-to-be. 

It is, then, now reasonable to hold both that fire 
heats and that what is cold cools and, in general, 
that what is active assimilates that which is passive 
to itself; for the agent and patient are contrary to 
one another, and coming-to-be is a process into the 


231 


324 a 


1 


oa 


2 


o 


25 


30 


ARISTOTLE 


> / ‘ / > \ A / 
avaykn TO Tacxov eis TO Tovwodv peTtaBdAdew: 
‘ 
ovTW yap €oTar eis TovvavTiov 1 Yyéeveots. Kal 
\ / \ A \ > \ / > , 
Kata Adyov 67 TO 7 TadTa A€yovtas audotépous 
Ld a ~ "A \ 
Guws anreaba tis dicews. Adyouev yap macxew 
@>a'9 A a’. .@. / ¢ / A y+ 
OTe Lev TO bTrOKEipEvoV (olov byidlecIar Tov avOpw- 
mov Kat Jeppaivesbor Kai pvyeoPa Kail taéAAa Tov 
a8 , en3% \ t \ \ hee 
adrov tpdtov), oTe dé Oeppaivecbar ev TO yuypov, 
byialeobar Sé€ TO Kdpvov: auddrepa.d eoriv adnOA 
(rov adrov 5€ Tpdmov Kal emi Tob movodyTos* OTE 
\ \ \ ” 6 / Q / A $e | A 
prev yap Tov avOpwrov dapev Oepuaivew, ore Se 
\ / ” A \ ¢€ ¢ Ma / ” > 
TO Jeppov: Eort pev yap ws 7 vAn macxeL, corr 8 
¢ > / ¢ A > > > aA 4 
Ws Tovvarvriov). ot pev odv eis exeivo Brdavres 
ravtov tu detv wHOnoav TO Tovwodv Exew Kal TO 
c > 
maoxov, ot 8 eis Odrepa trobvavtiov. 
\ >? \ \ / ¢ / \ ~ 
Tov abtrov d€ Adyov dbroAnmréov elvar wept tod 
Touly Kal maoxEW OVvTEp Kal TEepl TOD Kwely Kal 
A ~ \ ‘ ~ 
KwetoOa. Sdiy@s yap A€yerar Kai TO Kwodv- ev 
\ A / val ~ ~ 
@ TE yap 7 apxy Tis Kwicews, Soe? ToOTO Kweiv 
¢ \ > \ / ~ te \ / ‘ 
() yap apy? mpwrn T&v airiwv), Kal madw To 
\ , 
€oyaTov mpos TO Klivovpevov Kal THY Yyeveow. 
dpolws dé Kal mept Tob movwdvTos: Kal yap Tov 
> , MRR \ \ \ \ > 
iatpov dapev vyidlew Kat Tov olvov. To pev odv 
Tmp@tov Kwobv ovdev KwAver ev pev KWHoEL aKivn- 
» et > 7 \ \ > ~ ‘ > 
tov elvar (em eviwy b€ Kal dvayxKaiov), 7d 8 
€oxyatov del Kuweiv Kwovpevov, emi d5é Trowjoews 





@ i.e. immediately next to that which is moved. 
232 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 7 


contrary, so that the patient must change into the 
agent, since only thus will coming-to-be be a process 
into the contrary. And it is reasonable to suppose 
that both schools, though they do not express the 
same views, are yet in touch with the nature of things. 
Tor we sometimes say that it is the substratum which 
is acted upon (for example, we talk of a man as being 
restored to health and warmed and chilled and so 
on), and sometimes we say that what is cold is being 
warmed and what is ill is being restored to health. 
Both these ways of putting the case are true (and 
similarly with the agent : for at one time we say that 
it is the man that causes heat, and at another time 
that it is that which is hot ; for in one sense it is the 
matter which is acted upon and in another sense it 
is the “ contrary ”’). One school, therefore, directed 
its attention to the substratum and thought that the 
agent and patient must possess something identical, 
the other school, with its attention on the contraries, 
held the opposite view. 

We must suppose that the same account holds 
good of “ action” and “ passion” as about moving 
and being moved. For “ move ”’ is also used in two 
senses; for that in which the original source of 
motion resides is generally held to cause motion (for 
the original source is the first of causes), and so also 
is that which is last in relation to that which is moved @ 
and to the process of coming-to-be. Similarly, too, 
in the case of the agent ; for we speak of the doctor, 
and also of wine, as healing. Now, in motion, there 
is nothing to prevent the first mover being unmoved 
(in fact in some cases it is actually necessary), but 
the last mover always causes motion by itself being 
moved ; and-in action, there is nothing to prevent 


233 


324 a 


ARISTOTLE 


‘ A ~ > / A > ” A > ‘ 
TO pev mp@tov amalés, to 5 EcyaTtov Kat avTo 
\ a 

mdoxov' doa yap pr exer THY adryv VAnv, Tort 


> a ” e c > / » AR. | ‘ ~ 
35 ama07y ovra (olov 1 tatpiK7, avdT7 yap Tovotca 


os 7 29O\ / € \ ~ ¢ / ‘ 
324b Vyleravy ovdev mdoxe. UO TOD Byvalopévov), TO 


5 


dé outiov Trovobv Kal adro maoxet TL H yap Deppai- 
”“ 4 n“ + / Ld ~ 

verar 1) ydyerar 7) GAXAo TL TaoxXEL apa ToLodv. 
” \ ¢ A > \ ¢ > / \ A / ‘ 
€oTt b€ 7) pev larpiKn ws apy, TO Sé€ atTiov TO 
€oxaTov Kal amTopevov. 

Ld \ “2 \ > 5X ” \ / lo) 

Oca pev obdv pn) ev VAn exer THY popdyy, Tatra 

\ > land ~ ~ Lid > > A 
pev arab tav TontiK@v, doa 8 ev vAn, Taby- 
TUKa. THY bev yap VAnv Adyopev dpotws ws €imeiv 
Thy adtny elvar TOV avTiKElpevwv O7oTEpovOdY, 
? / + ‘ A / ‘ 
@aTep yéevos ov, TO dé Svuvdpevov Oepuov elvar 
mapovros Tob OeppavtiKod Kal mAnovdlovTos avayKn 


/ / / ” \ \ ~ 
10 Oeppaivecbau: S16, Kabamep eipnrar, Ta pev TOV 


1 


or 


~ > ~ \ A / ‘ ov 
mountik@v analy ta Sé mabytikd. Kal wormep 
> a 
emi KWHoEews, TOV a’TOV EXEL TPOTOV Kal ETL THV 
TOLNTLK@V" eel TE Yap TO TPWTWS KWodbV aKivynToV, 
Kal emt TOV ToLnTLK@V TO Tp@Tov trovobv amales. 
” \ ‘ ‘ ww € @ ¢ > A ~ 
€ott 5€ TO ToLnTLKOV altiov ws dOev 7 apxn TiS 
vA ‘ > e ° > 7, \ e 
Kwicews. TO 8 od Evexa ov TovntiKov (S10 4 
7 
byteva od TonTiKoV, et pi) KaTAa peTapopay)* Kal 
~ ~ , 
yap Tod pev rovodvros Otay brdpyn, yiveTai Te 
TO maaxov, Tav 8 e€ewv Tapovodv odKért yiveTat, 
GAN éorw dn: Ta 8’ €idn Kal ra TEAH eEers TwWes. 





* Of which the two opposites are species. 
® Such as ‘‘ health ”’ or “* disease.” 


234 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 7 


theefirst agent being unaffected, but the last agent 
is itself also affected. For those things which have 
‘not the same matter act without being themselves 
affected (for example, the art of the physician which, 
while it causes health, is not itself acted upon by 
that which is being healed), but food, while it acts, 
is itself all somehow acted upon, for, while it acts, 
it is at the same time being heated or cooled or 
affected in some other way. Now the art of the 
physician is, as it were, an original source, while the 
food is, as it were, the final mover and in contact with 
that which is moved. 

Of the things, then, which are capable of acting, 
those of which the form does not consist in matter 
are not affected, but those of which the form consists 
in matter are liable to be affected ; for we say that 
the matter of either of the two opposed things alike 
is the same, so to speak, being, as it were, a kind @; 
and that which is capable of being hot must become 
hot, if that which is capable of heating is present and 
near to it. Therefore, as has been said, some of the 
active agencies are unaffected, while others are liable 
to be acted upon; and what holds good of motion 
is also true of the active agencies ; for as in motion 
the first mover is unmoved, so among active agencies 
the first agent is unaffected. The active agency is 
a cause, as being the source from which the origin 
of the movement comes, but the end in view is not 
“ active ”’ (hence health is not active, except meta- 
phorically) ; for, when the agent is present, the 
patient becomes something, but when “ states”? 
are present, the patient no longer “ becomes ”’ but 
already “is,” and the “ forms,”’ that is the “ ends,” 
are a kind of “ state,’ but the matter, gua matter, 


235 


324 b 


30 


325 a 


o 


ARISTOTLE 


¢€ WA e ~ 
7 8° vAn H VAN TabntiKdv. TO pev odbv Top exer ev 
4 \ , > Sk, / ~ 
vAn TO Deppov: ei Sé ru etn Oepuov ywpiordv, TodTo 
A BO) a 
ovdev av mdaaxot. TodTo pev obv tows advvarov 
>? ~ / 
elvan xwpioTov: ei 8 eotiv eva Towabra, én’ éexel- 
n” ” A / > / / \ mn A 
vwv av ein TO Aeyopevov dAnbés. Ti pev obv TO 
~ \ ‘ A 
Tovey Kat TaoXEW €oTl Kal Tiow Brdpyer Kal did 
ti Kat 7@s, Suwpicdw tobrov tov tpomov. 
nn \ ~ / 
8. Il@s dé evdexerar totro ovpBaivew, madw 
Aéywpev. Tots pev odv SoKel macxew Exaorov did 
TWwv TOpwv ElovdvTos TOD TroLobYTOS eaxdTOUV Kal 
KUpLwTaTov, kat TodTov Tov TpdTov Kal Opav Kal 
> / ¢ ~ \ \ \ ~ > /, > / 
akovew Has pact Kal Tas dAAas aicOyoes aicba- 
/ ” , oa. eee / 77 Ve 
veoOar maoas, ett dé dpdoba dia Te depos Kal bda- 
Tos Kal TOV diadavarv, dud TO Tépous Exew Goparous 
\ A 
pev dia puKpdTynta, muKvovs dé Kal KaTa oTOtxXoV, 
Kal paAdov éxew Ta diadavy padAdrov. 
Ot pev odv emi twwv ottw Sidpicav, worep 
= / ~ P 
Kat “EpmedoxAfs, od povov emt t&v movwvvTwv 
\ /, > \ \ / , Lid 
Kat macxdvtTwy, aGAAa Kali plyvucbai dacw dowv 
¢c / 7 A > / » MACE ¢ ~ 
ol mopot avppeTpor mpos aAAjAovs <iciv: 6d@ 
/ \ / 
de pdAwora Kal wept mdvtwy evi Adyw Swwpi- 
kaot AevKurmos Kat Anpoxpitos, apynv mounod- 
Ul ‘ ~ 
pevo. kata dvow rep eotiv. eviois yap TaV 
> / ” \ bal > > /, a A 
apxaiwy €d0€e To dv e€ avaykns &v elvar Kal 
” ~ 
akivntov' TO fev yap Kevov ovK ov, KwyPHva 3° 
” ~ 
otk av dvvac8ar py dvtos Kevod Keywpiopevon, 
29> > A \ ” ~ / 
odd’ abd moAAa elvas pt) Ovtos Tod Sielpyovros. 





* Namely, Parmenides and Melissus. 


236 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 7-8 


is passive. Now fire holds the heat embodied in 
matter : but, if there were such a thing as “ the hot ” 
apart from matter, it could not be acted upon at all. 
Heat, therefore, perhaps cannot exist separately ; 
but, if there are any such separate existences, what 
we are saying would be true of them also. Let this, 
then, be our explanation of “ action ”’ and “ passion,”’ 
and when they exist, and why and how. 

8. Let us now go back and discuss how it is possible How do 
for action and passion to occur. Some people hold. ons 
that each patient is acted upon when the last agent “ “passion” 
—the agent in the strictest sense—enters in through °“"" 
certain pores, and they say that it is in this way that 
we also see and hear and employ our other senses. 
Furthermore, they say that things are seen through 
air and water and the other transparent bodies, 
because they have pores, which, owing to their 
minuteness, are invisible, but are set close together 
and in rows, and are more transparent the closer 
together and in more serried array they are. 

Some philosophers (including Empedocles) held the 
this theory as regards certain bodies, not confining (Por or 
it to those which act and are acted upon ; but mixture Empedocles. 
also, they assert, takes place only between bodies 
whose pores are symmetrical with one another. The 
most methodical theory, however, and the one of 
most general application has been that enunciated 
by Leucippus and Democritus, taking what is the 
natural starting-point. For some of the ancient 
thinkers * held that ‘‘ what is ” must necessarily be 
one and immovable ; for they argued that the void 
does not exist, but that, if there is not a void existing 
separately, “ what is’ could not be moved; nor, 
again, couldthere be a multiplicity of things, since 


237 


325 a 


1 


1 


2 


2 


0 


5 


—) 


oO 


ARISTOTLE 


~ > 291 / ” Ww A A 
totro 8 ovdev diadépeww, el tis olerar pt) ovvexes 
\ ~ > > @ / ~ / 
elva TO Trav GAN arrecbar Sinpnuevov, Tod davat 
TOAAG Kal pn €v elvar Kai Kevov. et ev yap TaVTH 
, LAN} > Ld a ON /, > A 
duarperov, ovdev clvar ev, wore ode ToAAd, aAAa 
\ » Pag > A a \ ond \ / f 
Kevov TO OAov: et be TH pev TH SE py}, weTAAGcHEvH 
TWt ToT é€oiKévar’ péxpt TOoov yap Kal dua TL 
TO pev oUTWS Exe TOD SAoV Kal mAfpées eoTL, TO 
dé Sunpnuevov; ert opoiws ddvar avayKatov 1) 
elvat Kivnow. €ek pev odv TovTwY TaV Adywr, 
brepBavres THY aicOnow Kal mapidovTes adtnVv ws 
T@ Adyw Séov axodovbeiv, Ev Kal akivnrov TO av 
elvai dao, Kal dmeipov Evior- TO yap mépas TeEp- 
aivew Gv mpos TO Kevov. of pev odv oUTWS Kal 
\ / ‘ PF, > 7 ‘ ~ > 
dua TavTas Tas aitias ameprvavto Tepl THs aAn- 
Oeias: ere S€ emt pev TOV Adywv Boxe? TadTa ovp- 
Baivew, emi de THv mpaypdtwv pavia taparAjnotov 
elvar TO S0€dlew ovrws: oddéva yap Tay pawo- 
pevwv e€cotdvat Toootrov wore TO Trip ev elvat 
doxety Kal Tov KptoTaAdov, adda povoy Ta KaAa 
‘ \ / A / a 3 } RY \ 
kal Ta hawopeva da ovvyibevav, tadr’ eviows dia 
Thv paviay ovdev doxel diadépew. 
/ >” Mel 6 / Ld \ \ 
Aedvxurtros 8° exew @79n Adyous oitwes mpos THY 
/ 

alcOnow opodroyovpeva A€yovtes odK avaipyocovow 
ovre yeveow ovte Plopay ovre Kivnow Kal To TAAOos 

~ / “a a 
TOV Ovrwy. opodoyrnoas bé€ Tabdra pev Tots pawwo- 

a A 
pévows, Tots b€ TO EV KaracKevdlovaw ws ovK’ av 
1 odk E: ovre FHJIL. 





4 i.e, the Monists. 


238 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 


there is nothing which keeps them apart ; and they 

declare that, if one holds that the universe is not 

continuous but maintains contact in separation, this 

does not differ from saying that things are ‘‘ many ”’ 

(and not “one ’’) and that there is a void. For if 

the universe is divisible throughout, there is no “ one,”’ 

and therefore no “ many,” but the whole is void ;_ but 

to suppose that it is divisible at one point but not 

at another seems like a baseless invention. For how 

far is it divisible ? And why is part of the whole in- 

divisible and a plenum, and part divided ? Moreover, 

they say that it is equally necessary to deny the 

existence of motion. As a result, then, of these 

arguments, going beyond and disregarding sense- 

perception, on the plea that they ought to follow 

reason, they assert that the universe is one and 

immovable ; some add that it is infinite as well, for 

the limit would be a limit against the void. Some 

philosophers, then, set forth their views about the 

truth in this manner and based them on these grounds. 

Furthermore, though these opinions seem to follow 

logically from the arguments, yet, in view of the facts, 

to hold them seems almost madness ; for no madman 

is so out of his senses as to hold that fire and ice are 

“one ’’; it is only between things which are good 

and things which, through habit, seem to be good, 

that some people, in their madness, see no difference. 
Leucippus, however, thought that he had argu- The 

ments, which, while agreeing with sense-perception, , 340s and 

would not do away with coming-to-be and passing- pen A 

away, or motion, or the multiplicity of things which pepe oe 

are. While making these concessions to things as ‘Titus. 

they appear, and conceding to those who postulate 

the oneness of things * that there could not be motion 


239 


325 a 


30 


35 


325 b 


ARISTOTLE 


Kivnow ovcoay avev Kevob 76 TE KEVOV p1 OV, Kal TOD 
* 29OA A * ‘ A , nv 
dvtos ovdev pn ov dynow elvar. TO yap KUpiws dv 
TrapmAnfes ov: ard’ elvar To Torwobrov ody Ev, GAN 
ameipa TO TARVos Kai dopara Sia opiKpoTnTa TOV 
oyKkwv. tadra 8 ev TO Kev@ dépeobar (kevov yap 
elvar), Kal ovvioTrdpeva prev yeveow trovety, Sta- 
/ \ , a \ ‘ / 
Avdpeva Se POopdv. moretv € Kal maoxew 4 Tvy- 
xdvovow antopeva (ravrn yap ody ev elvat), Kal 
ovvTidueva Sé€ Kal mepiTAcKdpeva yevvay: ex be 
~ ar J / CQ. 46N > a“ / lol 29> 
Tob Kat’ aAjPevay Evos odK av yevécbar TAHGos, odd 
ex TOV GAnf&s todAAGv Ev, GAN’ civat Tobr’ advva- 
tov, GAN womep "EuredoxAfs kai tOv aAAwy tweés 
/ \ / 4 ~ > / 
dao. macyew dia Tépwv, ovTw macav addAoiwow 
Kal av TO maaxew TobTov yiveoDat Tov TpdToV, Sia 
Tod Kevod ywopevns THs Siaddvcews Kat THs POo- 


~ c / \ \ lon > / 7 / 
5 pds, Opmoiws dé Kal tis adfjoews, trevodvopevwv 


10 


OTEpEea@v. 

Lyedov dé Kat “EuredokAe? avayxatov Aéyew, 
7 ‘ 4 , A »” / 
wotep kai AevKinmds pynow: elvar yap arta oteped, 

a eee f 
ddiaipera Sé, ef pur) mavTn mdpor ovvexets eioiv. 

A ‘ 
tobTo 8 advvarov: ovdév yap EoTaL ETEPOV OTEPEOV 

A \ / > \ land / > / »” 
mapa Tovs mépouvs, adAAa wav Kevov. avdyKn dpa 

\ A c / > / \ \ \ 
Ta plev anropeva elvar adiaipera, ta Se perakd 
ad’t@v Kevd, ots éxeivos A€yer mdpovs. ovTws Se 
kat Aedkimmos Aéyer mepl Tod Toveiv Kal mdoxew. 

e A s / > “a \ \ a \ A 

Oi pev obv tpdmo Kal? obs Ta pev more? Ta Se 

‘ ‘ \ 4 
maoxer, axedov obra. A€yovraL* Kai mepl prev Tov~ 
240 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 


without a void, he declares that the void is “ not 
being,’ and nothing of “ what is ” is ‘‘ not being ” ; 
for “ what is”’ in the strictest sense is a complete 
plenum. “ But this ‘ plenum,” he says, “is not one 
but many things of infinite number, and invisible 
owing to the minuteness of their bulk. These are 
carried along in the void (for there is a void) and, 
when they come together, they cause coming-to-be 
and, when they dissolve, they cause passing-away. 
They act and are acted upon where they happen to 
come into contact (for there they are not one), and 
they generate when they are placed together and 
intertwined. But from that which is truly one, a 
multiplicity could never come-into-being, nor a one 
from the truly many ; but this is impossible. But ” 
(just as Empedocles and some of the other philo- 
sophers say that things are acted upon through their 
pores) “ all ‘ alteration’ and all ‘ passion’ occur in 
this way, dissolution and passing-away taking place 
by means of the void, and likewise also growth, when 
solids creep into the voids.” 

Empedocles, too, is almost compelled to take the 
same view as Leucippus ; for he says that there are 
certain solids, but they are indivisible, unless there 
are continuous pores throughout. But this is im- 
possible ; for then there will be nothing solid except 
the pores, but the whole will be void. It necessarily 
follows, therefore, that those things which are in 
contact are indivisible, but the spaces between them, 
which he calls pores, must be void. This is also 
Leucippus’ view about “ action ”’ and “ passion.” 

These, then, are, roughly speaking, the accounts 
given of the way in which some things “ act’ and 
other things*are “acted upon.” As regards this 


241 


ARISTOTLE 
325 b 

Twv, Kal Tas Aéyovat, SHAov, Kal mpos Tas adtav 
15 Aces als xp@vrar oyeddov dpodroyoupevws daive- 
Tat oupBaivov. rots 8 aAXos Frrov, otov ’Epze- 
SoxAc? tiva tpomov gota yéevecis Kal dopa Kal 
adAoiwats, ob} SfAov. Tots ev yap eoTrw adiaipera 
Ta 7™pOTa TOV cwydtwv, oxynpatr Sdiadepovra 
povov, €€ Ov mpwtwv ovyKeita Kal eis a €oyara 
20 dvadverau’ "EpredoxAet S€ ta prev adda davepov 
OTe péexpt TOV oTowxelwy Exer THY yeveow Kal THY 
plopav, adrdv dé rovtwy mds yivera Kal pbei- 
peTar TO aGwpevdpevov péyeos, ovte SiAov ovre 
evdexerar Adyew adt@ pr) Aéyovtt Kal Tod mupos 
elvat orouxetov, dpolws dé Kal Tay GAAwy amdvtwr, 
25 woTep ev TO Tiaiw yéypade IlAdtwv: tocodrov 
yap Suad€éper Tob pur) Tov adrov tpdmov AevKinmw 
Aéyew, Ste 6 pev oreped 6 8 eimeda Aéyer Ta 
adiaipera, Kal 6 prev azretpors dpiobar oynpact 
[radv ddiaipérwv otepedv Exaortov], 6 S€ wpropevors, 
emrel aduaipeTa ye auddtepor A€yovar Kal wpropeva 
30 oxjpacw. eK 81) TovTwY ai yevéeoes Kat ai dia- 
kpioes Aevkinmw pev [S00 tpdmot av elev,| dud Te 
Tob Kevod Kal dia THs adjs (ravrn yap Siaiperov 
exaotov), [lAdtwu d€ Kata Thy adiy pdvov' Kevov 

yap ovk« elvai dynow. 
Kat wept pev trav ddvapérwv enumédwv eipr- 
Kapev é€v tots mpdtepov Adyous: wept Sé Tav adu- 
35 aipérwy oTepe@v TO pev emi TAdov Dewphaat To 





“ i.e, Leucippus and the other Atomists. 
> i.e. the Atomists, 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 


school,*it is obvious what their views are and how they 

state them, and they are clearly more or less consistent 

with the suppositions which they adopt. This is less 

clearly the case with the other school; for example, 

it is not clear how, in the view of Empedocles, there 

are to be coming-to-be and passing-away and “altera- 

tion.”’ For to the other school ® the primary bodies, 

from which originally bodies are composed and into 

which ultimately they are dissolved, are indivisible, 
differing only in structure ; but to Empedocles, it 

is clear that all the other bodies, down to the elements, 

have their coming-to-be and passing-away, but it 

is not evident how the accumulated mass of the ele- 

ments themselves comes-to-be and passes-away ; nor 

is it possible for him to give an explanation without 
asserting that there is also an element of fire and like- 

wise of all the other kinds, as Plato has stated in the 
Timaeus.° For Plato is so far from giving the same Plato’s 
account as Leucippus that, while both of them declare Jared with 
that the elementary constituents are indivisible and Daas 
determined of figures, (a) Leucippus holds that the 3 
indivisibles are solid, Plato that they are planes, and 

(6) Leucippus declares that they are determined by 

an infinite number of figures, Plato by a defi- 

nite number. It is from these indivisibles that the 
comings-to-be and dissolutions result : according to 
Leucippus, through the void and through the con- 

tact (for it is at the point of contact that each body 

is divisible) ; according to Plato, as a result of contact 

only, for he denies that a void exists. 

Now we have dealt with indivisible planes in neither the 
earlier discussions 4; but with regard to indivisible ceanadocina 
solids, let us leave for the moment further discussion nor that 

¢ 53 a ff. 4 De Caelo 298 b 383 ff. 


243 


325 b 


326 a 


5 


10 


i 
or 


20 


ARISTOTLE 


aA > / ‘ ~ e A \ 
cupBaivov adeicbw ro viv, ws Sé puKpov TapeK- 
~ a a / 
Baow cimeiv, dvaykatov amabés te Exaorov Aéyew 
~ iO 4, > \ e7/ 4 GAN’ a“ 
TOV adiaipérwv (od yap oldv te macyeL 7 
~ ~ ” 
dua Tod Kevod) Kal pndevds TountiKov 7abous* ovTE 
/ 
yap yvypov otre aoxAnpov olov 7 elvar. Kairou 
TOUTO ye AToTOV, TO povovy amodobtvar TH TEpL- 
pepel oxrjpart TO Oepyov: avayKn yap Kal Tobvav- 
~ / 
tiov TO vxpov dAAw Til mpoojKew TOV oynuaTov. 
~ A 
atomov dé Kav ei tadta pev brapxe, Aéyw Se 
/ 
Oepudrns Kai wuyporns, Bap¥tns Sé Kal Kkovdorns 
/, 
kat okAnpétns Kal wadakorns pa) brap§eu Kaitou 
> 
Bapitepov ye Kata tiv wtrepoxnvy dynow elvar 
Anpckpitos Exactov ta&v ddvaipérwv, wore SiAov 
ort Kat Oeppdrepov. toadra 8 dvtTa pi) mdoyew 
€ > > 7 > 4, e e \ ~ \ ¢ 
bm’ aAdjAwy addvarov, olov b1d tod Todd drep- 
/ ~~ A > / / > A \ 
BddAovros Bepnot ro Hpeua Oepyov. GAA pay 
et axAnpov, Kal padakov. 7d dé padakdv 75n TO 
maaxew TL A€yera: TO yap UreukTiKOV padakov. 
> \ \ + A > A ¢ / > > n” 
aAAa piv dromov Kal ei pndev dadpye adr 7 
pdvov oxjpa: Kal «i dmdpyer, Ev S€ pdvov, ofov Td 
\ A ‘ A , > \ A av / ” 
Lev yuxpov 70 dé Oepyov: obd€ yap av pia Tis Ely 
€ / > ~ e / \ > / ‘ > , 
n dois abt@v. cpoiws dé addvvatov Kal ei mAciw 
~ ¢ ie io / \ n“ > ~ b) ~ ta ‘ 10: 
T@ evi: ataiperov yap dv ev 7H adr@ eer 7a maAOn, 
> , tA 
wore Kal €av macxn cimep yyera, Tatty TU 
Kal dAdo roujoer } meloerar. Tov adrov Sé Tpdrrov 
Kal emi t&v dAAwv mabnudtwv: todro yap Kal 


1 rabrn ted : tavern te EL: ravrn ro. F: ravro m1 H. 





* i.e, of the Atomists. 
24.4 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 


of what they involve and deal with them in a short of the 
digression. Itisa necessary part of the theory % that can aoogunt 
each “ indivisible ’’ is incapable of being acted UpeH for, "aetna 
(for it cannot be acted upon except through the void) a ein 
and incapable of producing an effect on anything 
else ; for it cannot be either cold or hard. Yet it 

is certainly strange that heat can only be attributed 

to the spherical figure; for then it necessarily 
follows that its contrary, cold, must belong to another 

of the figures. It is also strange if these properties, 

I mean heat and cold, belong to the indivisibles, 
while heaviness and lightness and hardness and soft- 
ness are not going to belong. Yet Democritus says 
that the more each of the indivisibles exceeds, the 
heavier it is, so that clearly it is also hotter. Being 

of this kind, it is impossible that the indivisibles should 

not be acted upon by one another, for example, the 
slightly hot should be acted upon by what far sur- 
passes it in heat. Again, if an indivisible can be 
hard, it can also be soft; and the soft is always 
so-called because it can be acted upon; for that 
which yields to pressure is soft. But, further, it is 
strange that no property except figure should attach 

to the indivisible ; and that, if properties do attach 

to them, only one should attach to each, e.g. that one 

“ indivisible ’’ should be cold and another hot ; for, 
then, neither would their substance be uniform. It 

is equally impossible, too, that more than one pro- 
perty should belong to one indivisible, for, being 
indivisible, it will possess these properties in the 
same place; so that if it is acted upon by being 
chilled, it will also, in this way, act or be acted upon 

in some other way. And similarly with the other 
properties also; for this problem also confronts in 


245 


326 a 


2 


o 


3 
326 b 


oO 


oo 


ARISTOTLE 


cal A \ a ee 4 a > 4 
Tois oTeped Kal Tois éemimeda Adyovow advaipera 
\ 
ovpBaiver tov adtov tpdmov ovTe yap pavorepa 
, a 
ovTe muKVvoTepa olov Te yiveoar Kevod pq) OVvTOS 
€v Tois aovapéros. €Tt 8 GATomov Kal TO piKpa 
A > , Z dA A 7 ~ \ \ 
pev addvaipera elvar, peydAa dé pj viv pev yap 
2\/ \ / 4 ~ an ~ \ 
evrAdyws Ta weil Opaverar waAAov TOV puKpav* TA 
\ \ 5 »\ 4 e Pf e A aA 
pev yap Siadverar padiws, olov ra peydAa* mpoo- 
/ ‘ lal \ \ > , Lid \ 
KomTe. yap moAXois: TO Se adiaiperov GAws dia 
a ~ = a a 
Ti waAdAov brdpxyer TOV peydAwv Tots puKpois; €Tt 
dé qmoTEepov pia mdavrwy H pvows exeivwy TAV 
otepe@v, 7) Sivadeper Odrepa Tav Eérépwv, worTep 
dv el Ta pev eln mUpwa, Ta S€ yHiva Tov OyKoV; 
ei pev yap pla dvos eotiv dmdvtwv, Ti TO xwpi- 
”“ ‘\ / > / ¢ /, id o 
cav; 7 Sua Ti od yiverar aibdweva Ev, WoTep 
4 A a / OA ‘\ / a 4 
bdwp bdatos dtav Diyn; ovdev yap diadéepe TO do- 
Tepov Tob mpotépov. «i 5° Erepa, mola TadTa; Kal 
SHAov ws Tatra Derdov dpxds Kal aitias THv oup- 
/, cand n“ \ / ” \ / 
Bawdvrwy paddAov 7) Ta oxnpata. ere de Suade- 
povra thv dvow, Kav Toh Kav macxn Ovyydvovra 
> 4 ” \ 7 \ ~ ? A \ ov 
aAAjAwy. ere S€ Ti TO KWobv; Et ev yap ETEpoV, 
41 > > es os. AP mw ” , \ 
mabnrika’: ef 8 adto atro ExaoTov, 7 SdiatpeTov 
€ora, Kat dAdo pev Kiwvodv Kat’ dAdo dé Kwod- 
“” ‘A : Pa! > / ¢ / eS ae 
pevov, ) Kata TadTo Tavavria drape, Kal 4 VAH 
> / > ~ ” / > \ ‘ / 
od povov apiOud eorar pia adda Kai duvaper. 
“Ooor pev obv dia THs TOV Tépwv KUHcews Pact 


1 gabyricad EHL: -dv F. 





* See Phys. 190 b 24, 192 a 1 ff, 
246 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 
the same way both those who assert that “ indi- 
visibles ”’ are solid and those who say they are planes, 
for they cannot become either rarer or denser, because 
there can be no void in the “ indivisibles.”’ Further, 
it is strange that there should be small “ indivisibles ”’ 
but not large ones; for it is natural to suppose at 
this stage that the larger bodies are more liable to 
be shattered than the small, for the former, like 
large things in general, are easily dissolved, since 
they come into collision with many other bodies. 
But why should indivisibility in general attach to 
small things rather than large ? Furthermore, is the 
substance of all these solids uniform or does it differ 
in different groups, as if, for example, some were 
fiery and some earthy in their bulk? For if they are 
all of one substance, what has separated them from 
one another ? Or why do they not become one when 
they come into contact, just as water does when it 
touches water? For there is no difference between 
the two cases. But if they belong to different classes, 
what are their different qualities ? Indeed it is clear 
that we ought to postulate that these classes rather 
than the “ figures’ are the origins and causes of 
the resulting phenomena. Moreover, if they were 
different in substance they would act and be acted 
upon reciprocally if they touched one another. Again, 
what sets these in motion? For if it is something 
other than themselves, they must be liable to be 
acted upon; but, if each is its own mover either it 
will be divisible, in part causing motion and in part 
being moved, or contraries will belong to it in the 
same respect, and the matter of it will be not only 
arithmetically but also potentially one.* 

As for those who say that the processes of being 


247 


326 b 


10 


15 


20 


2 


or 


ARISTOTLE 


Ta 740n ovpBaivew, «i pev Kat memAnpwpéevwv 
TOV TOpwv, Teplepyov ot mopar et yap Tadrn TL 
mdaoXeL TO Tv, Kav pn TOpovs exov GAX adro 
auvexes Ov TdoxoL TOV avTov TpdTOV. ETL de TAS 
evdexeTat Trept Tob Siopav ovpBaivew ws A€éyovaw; 
ovTe yap Kata Tas adas evdexeTar Suwéevar Sia TOV 
diadhavar, ove dia. TOV mopwr, et TANpns ExacTos* 
ti yap S.oice. Tod pr exew mopous; mav yap 
Opoiws €orat mAHpes. GAAG pry ei Kal Keva pev 
Tatra (avdykn d€ odpara ev abrois éxew), TadTo 
aupPyoeta mddw. ef dé tyHALKabTa 7d péyebos 
wore pr) Séxec0ar cdma pndev, yeAotov 7d puKpov 
bev otecOan Kevov elvan, peya dé py pnd? danA- 
Kovobdv, 7) TO Kevov aGAdo TL olecBar A€yew adi 
Xwpav owpatos, Wore SHAov Sri TavTi ow@pare TOV 
OyKov loov €oTat KEvov. 

“Odws 5€ 7d mépous Trovety meEpiepyov: et pev yap 
pndev trove? Kata tiv adyv, oddé dia TOV TOpwv 
Toujoe Sudv: ef d€ TH antecOa, Kal p71) TOpwr 
dvTwy Ta pev TeloeTar TA SE ToLnoeL THY TpOs 
aAAnAa tobrov Tov tpdmov mepuKdTwY. OTL pev 
obv ovTws A€yew Tods mdépovs ws Twes BroAap- 
Bavovow, 7 eddos 7) pdraov, davepov ex Tov’Twv 
eotiv: Svaperav 8 Ovtwv mavTn TOV owudTrwv 
mopous toveiv yeAoiov: 4 yap Siapera, ddvarat 
xwpileaba. 





* i.e, the body is none the less impenetrable, even if it is 
held that the pores, though se contain bodies, are them- 
selves, gua pores, empty channels. 

> i.e. the very fact that a body is everywhere divisible 


makes it possible to open up a channel in it. 


248 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8 


acted upon occur through movement in the pores, 
if this happens although the pores are filled, the pores 
are an unnecessary supposition; for if the whole 
body is acted upon at all in this way, it would be 
acted upon in the same way even if it had no pores, 
in its own continuous self. Again, how is it possible 
to carry out the process of seeing through a medium 
as they describe it ? For it is not possible to pene- 
trate through the transparent bodies either at the 
points of contact or through the pores, if each pore 
is full. For how will this condition differ from the 
possession of no pores at all? For the whole will 
be equally full throughout. Furthermore, if these 
channels, though they must contain bodies, are void, 
the same result will occur again®; but if they are 
of such a size that they cannot admit any body, it 
is absurd to suppose that there is a small void but 
not a big one, of whatever size it be, or to think that 
“a void’ means anything except a space for a body ; 
so that it is clear that there will be a void equal in 
cubic capacity to every body. 

In general, then, it is superfluous to postulate the 
existence of pores ; for if the agent effects nothing 
by contact, neither will it effect anything by passing 
through pores. If, however, it effects anything by 
contact, then, even without there being any pores, 
some of those things which are by nature adapted 
for reciprocal effect of this kind will be acted upon, 
while others will act. It is clear, therefore, from what 
we have said that it is either false or useless to talk 
of pores of the kind which some people suppose to 
exist, and, since bodies are everywhere divisible, it 
is ridiculous to postulate pores at all ; for since bodies 
are divisible, they can be separated into parts.” 


249 


326 b 


30 


3 


or 


327 a 


on 


10 


ARISTOTLE 


/ \ / ¢ /, a > ~ ‘ 
9. Tiva S€ tpdmov brdpyer Tots odor yevvay Kal 
a \ / / , > \ A 
Tovey Kal maoxel, Aéywpev AaBdvres apynv THY 
/ > / > / > \ \ 4 
TrodAdKis eipnuevynv. et yap éore TO pev Suvdper 
\ > > / ~ / > ~ \ ~ 
70 8° evredexeia Tovobrov, mépuKev od TH pev TH 
=” “a 7 > | / bed BJ \ ~ 
ov macyxew, adda ravTn Kal’ Goov éati ToLodTOV, 
HTTov bé Kal waAdAov 7 Towstrov padAdv é€ore Kal 
e \ 4 / mw” - od 
HTTOV’ Kal TavTH Topouvs av Tis A€yor paAAov, 
4 > a rg LA ~ 
Kabdmep ev Tots petadAcvopevois Siareivovat Tod 
Tabntixod pAdBes ovvexeis. oavpdves pev odv Exa- 
Vea nv > / / ¢ / A \ A 4, 
oTov Kat ev ov arabes. dpotws Sé Kal pr Ouyya- 
/ ¢ nl f. 93 + “a ~ / 
vovTa pnre avtadv pyr adAAwv, a Tovetv méduKe 
\ / , > e > / ¢ / 
Kat macxew. Aéyw 8 ofov od povov amrdopevov 
/ \ ~ > \ n” a > A A A 
Peppaiver to Tip, GAAa Kav arobev 7° TOV pev yap 
>/ A ~ ¢ > RS \ a / ‘ 
aépa To Tip, 6 8 anp TO cHua Oeppaiver, meduKars 
move Kat TmacxewW. TO dé TH pev olecIar macyew 
~ A i / > > ~ ~ / a 
TH dé yn, Svopicavras év apyn Todro AeKréov. Et 
\ \ \ / PS) ‘ \ / if] iA’ ” 
ev yap un mavrTn Siauperov TO weyeBos, GAA’ ore 
~ > ‘ ” / > bd) ” / 
Gua adiaiperov 7 mAdtos, obK av ein mavTn 
mabntikdv, add’ oddé avvexes oddév: ef 5€ TodTO 
pebdos Kal wav cdpa Siaperov, oddev Siadeper 
~ \ oo / “ , > 
Sinpjoba. pev amrecbar dé, 7) Siarperov elvar: ef 
\ / 4 \ A ¢ / o 
yap SvaxpiveoOar Svvatar Kata Tas adds, wWomep 


faci Twes, Kav pHimw 7 Sunpynuevov, €orar Sinpn- 





* It is difficult to extract any meaning from this sentence 
as it stands. Joachim supposes a lacuna after rf 5¢ py}. 


250 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 9 


9. Let us now deal with the question about the Aristotle's 
way in which existences have the power of generating Ofhianation 
and of acting and being acted upon, starting from and-pas- 
the principle which we have often enunciated. For > 
if there exists that which is potentially of a certain 
kind as well as that which is actually so, it is of a 
nature, in so far as it is what it is, to be acted upon 
in every part, and not in some part but not in another, 
and to a more or a less extent according as it is more 
or less of that particular nature; and one might 
speak of pores as having a particular nature in a 
greater degree, just as there are veins of substance 
which can be acted upon which stretch continuously 
in metals which are being mined. Every body, then, 
which is coherent and one is not acted upon; and 
this is equally true of bodies which do not touch 
either each other or other bodies which are of a 
nature to act or be acted upon. Fire is an example 
of what I mean: it heats not only when it is in con- 
tact with something, but also if it is at a distance ; 
for it heats the air, and the air heats the body, being 
of a nature both to act and to be acted upon. But 
having enunciated the theory that a body is acted 
upon in one part but not in another, we must first 
make the following declaration’: if the magnitude 
is not everywhere divisible, but there is a divisible 
body or plane, no body would be liable to be acted 
upon throughout, but neither would any body be 
continuous ; but, if this is not true and every body 
is divisible, there is no difference between “ having 
been divided but being in contact” and “ being 
divisible ”’ ; for if it is possible for a body to be “ sepa- 
rated at the points of contact ’’—a phrase which some 
people use—then, even if it has not yet been divided, 


251 


327 a 


15 


20 


35 
327 b 


ARISTOTLE 


La A \ 5 OF / ‘ 39 \ 
Lévov Suvarov yap SvapeOfvar- yiverar yap oddev 
advvatov. GAws b€ 7d TobTov yiveobas Tov TpdTroVv 

~ a \ 

oxilCouéevwy TOV GwudTwv aToToV: avaipel yap ob- 
tos 6 Adyos ddAoiwaw, spOpev S€ 76 ato oGpa 
auvexes Ov OTe ev Bypov OTe Se memnyds, od Siat- 
péoer Kal avvbécer Ttobro mafdv, oddé tpoTmH Kal 
diabiy9, Kabdmep Aé€yer Anpoxpiros: ovre yap 

\ 4 \ \ 7 ‘ > 
petatebev ore petaBaddv tiv dvow memnyos e& 
bypod yéyovev’ odd’ evuTrdpxer TA GKANpa Kal Te- 
TYOTA adiaipeTa TOs OyKous* GAA’ duolws amav 
vypov, ore dé oKAnpov Kal memynyds €oTw. Ere 

> 29? ” a7? > ‘ 4 > A 
d° odd’ avfgow ofdv 7’ elvar Kat Pbicw: od yap 
OTLodV EoTaL yeyovos peilov, cimep Cora mpdabeats, 
Kal pn mav petaPeBAnkds, 7) puxOevtos Twes 7 
Kal’ atiro petaBaddvtos. 

“ A Le 4 \ nn \ ‘ a“ ‘ \ 

Tl ev odV EoTL TO yevVaY Kal TO TroLEty Kal TO 

/ / \ , e. 3 > / \ , 
yweo8ai te Kal maoxew tm GAAjAwv, Kal Tiva 
Tpomov evdexerar, Kal tiva dact pev tives odK 
evdexerat 5é, Siwpicbw robrov tov tpdmov. 

\ \ ~ \ / ‘ ‘ 

10. Aourov S€ Pewpioa epi pikews Kata Tov 
avTov tpomov THs peOddou: Tobro yap tv tpirov 
Tov mpotelévrwy €€ apyfis. oKemréov dé ti 7° 
€oTlv 7 pikis Kai Ti TO puKTdv, Kal Tiow badpyxet 
Tov ovTww Kal Ts, er 5€ TérTEepov Eorr pikis 7) 
TobTo peidos* advvatov ydp ear. juxOHAvai Te Ere- 
pov €tépw, Kabdmep A€yovai twes: dvTwy pev yap 
” ~ / ‘ \ b] / > \ ~ 
eve TOV mxevTwv Kal 47 AAAoLWpEevwY oddev LGA- 





* The other two being addy (ch. 6) and zovetv Kal méoyxew 
(chs. 7-9). 
252 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 9-10 


it will be in a condition of having been divided ; for 
since it can be divided, nothing impossible results. 
And, in general, it is strange that it should happen 
in this way only, namely, if the bodies are being 
split ; for this theory does away with “ alteration,” 
whereas we see the same body remaining in a state 
of continuity, though it is at one time liquid and at 
another solid, and it has not undergone this change by 
“ division ” or “‘ composition,” nor yet by “ turning ’’and 
“mutual contact,” as Democritus declares ; for it has 
not become solid instead of liquid through any change 
of arrangement or alteration of its substance, nor do 
there exist in it those hard and congealed particles 
which are indivisible in their bulk, but it is liquid and at 
another time hard and congealed uniformly through- 
out. Furthermore, it is also impossible for there to 
be growth and diminution ; for if there shall be any 
addition—as opposed to a change in the whole, either 
by the admixture of something or by a change in the 
body itself—no part of it will have become greater. 

Let this, then, be our explanation of the way in 
which things generate and act and come into being 
and are acted upon by one another, and the manner 
in which these processes can occur and the impossible 
theories which some philosophers enunciate. 

10. It now remains to consider “ mixture ” by the 
same kind of method; for this is the third of the 
subjects originally proposed. We must consider 
what “ mixture ” is and what it is that can be mixed 
and of what things mixture is a property and how ; 
and, further, whether there is such a thing as mixture, 
or is it a fiction. For, according to some people, it is 
impossible for one thing to be mixed with another ; 
for (a) if the imgredients still exist and are not altered 


253 


The nature 
of “* mix- 
ture ”’ or 

** combina- 
tion ” and 
how it 
takes place. 


ARISTOTLE 
827 b 
Aov viv pepixyOai daow 7 mpdrepov, aA’ dpoiws 


exe, Oarépov dé dbapévros od peuiyOar, aAda 70 

\ \ > > \ \ / 3 , 
fev elvat To 8 ovK elvar, thy Sé piéw opotws 
> , \ > ‘ A /, ‘ >? > 

5 exovTwy elvar: Tov adrov S€ tpdTov Kal ef ap- 
, / ” ~ 4 
dotépwv avveAbovrwy edbaprar TOv puyvupevwv 
Exdtepov’ od yap elvar pepvypeva Ta ye OAws odK 
ovTa. 

Odros pev obv 6 Adyos Eotxe Cyreiv Siopioa ri 
8 uh / / ‘ 0, ~ \ / ‘ 

vadeper pi€is yevéoews Kal Pbopads, Kal ti Td pu- 

A ~ ~ \ lon ~ ‘ € a 
KTOV TOO yevvnTod Kal POaprod: SHAov yap ds Set 

/ ” ” a , + 
10 Suadepew, elmep EoTW. WoTe TovTwY dvTwY dave- 

~ A / , > + 
p@v ta duatropynbervta Avow7’ av. 

"AMa pv odde THv VAnv TH mpl peptybai 
payer odde plyvvobar Kacopevnv, odt’ adriy adris 
Tots poptous ovTE TH Tupi, GAAa TO ev TOp yivecOat, 

\ de a] / 0 \ > \ be / ” ~ 
Tv S€ Pbcipecba. tov adrov S€ tpdrov ove TH 

4 \ ~ ~ an 

15 O@paTe THY Tpopiy ovTE TO OXHLA TO KNPa@ puyvd- 
pevov axnpatilew Tov GyKov: ovd€ TO O@pa Kal TO 

‘ 2999 = \ / \ \ ” , 
AevKov 088’ dAws ta dO Kal Tas e€es ofdv Te 
piyvvoba tots mpdypacw: owldpeva yap oparat. 

> \ \ Boe \ A / \ \ > / 
aAra pv ovde TO AevKOV ye Kal THY emoTHmnY 
> / ~ 999 »” ~ A ~ 
evdexeTat puxOyvar, od’ ddAo trav pt) ywpioTradv 
20 ovdev. GAAa Tobro A€yovow od Kadd@s of mdvra 
mote Oot pdoKortes elvaw Kai peptyOar: od yap 





’ 


@ i.e, “white” and “knowledge” cannot exist by them- 


254 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 10 


at all, they are no more mixed than they were before, 
but are in a similar state ; and (6) if one ingredient 
is destroyed, they have not been mixed, but one 
ingredient exists while the other does not, whereas 
mixture is composed of ingredients which remain 
what they were before ; and in the same way (c) even 
if, both the ingredients having come together, each 
of them has been destroyed, there is no mixture ; for 
things which have no existence at all cannot have 
been mixed. 

This argument, then, seems to seek to define in 
what respect “ mixing ” differs from coming-to-be and 
passing-away, and how that which is “ mixed ”’ differs 
from that which comes-to-be and passes-away ; for 
obviously ‘‘ mixture,” if there is such a thing, must 
be something different. When, therefore, these ques- 
tions have been cleared up, our difficulties would be 
solved. 

Now we do not say that wood has mixed with fire 
nor that it mixes, when it is burning, either with its 
own particles or with the fire, but we say that the 
fire comes-to-be and the wood passes-away. Similarly 
we do not say that the food mixes with the body or 
that the shape mixes with the wax and so forms the 
lump. Nor can ‘“‘ body” and ‘“‘ white” be ‘‘ mixed ” 
together, nor, in general, can “ properties” and 
“states” be mixed with “ things”; for we see them 
persisting unchanged. Again, “ white ” and ‘“ know- 
ledge ” cannot be mixed together, nor any of the 
terms which cannot be used separately.¢ This is 
what is wrong in the theory of those who hold that 
formerly all things were together and mixed; for 


selves; a man can be “ white” and “ Jearned,”’ but these attri- 
butes can only exist as properties of someone. 


255 


ARISTOTLE 
327 b 
Grav amavTe puxrov, aAXr’ dadpyew Set ywprordv 


¢ / ~ / ~ A ~ OA 
exatepov TOV pux0evTwv: tTav de malay ovddev 
/ > \ 8” >? ‘ A \ 5 / ‘ ie 
xXwprorov. emret €oTt Ta prev Suvdper Ta 
> / a ba > sy / \ 62 t / 
evepyeia TOV OvTwr, evdexerar Ta pyOevra elvat 
25 TwWS KaL py elvoL, evepyeia pev érépov dvTOs TOD 
/ ? > ~ 8 / > ¢ / a 
yeyovotos €€ adbrav, duvduer 8 ert Exarépov amep 
= A 04 \ | > rv Ao "4 ~ 
qHoav mpw pux0qva, Kal od dmoAwddta: Tobro 
A ¢ A / Py / / / be A 
yap 0 Adoyos dunmdper mpdrepov: daiverar S€ Ta 
/ 
puyvipeva, mpdTepov TE eK KEXWpPLOLEeVWY GUVLOVTE 
\ 5 / / / * 8 / 
kal duvdpeva xwpilecbar mddw. ove dvapéevovow 
> > , LA A a \ \ / ” 
30 ov Evepyeia WaoTEp TO GMa Kal TO AEevKOV, OUTE 
/ + / ” 9 ” / \ 
peipovrar, obre Odrepov ovr’ dudw- owlerar yap 
¢ 4 9 \ “a \ > / \ 
n Svvapis abtdv. 80 tadra pev adeicbw: TO 
¢€ 
dé auvexes TovToLs amdépnua Svaiperéov, mdTEpoV 1 
/ \ A ” Mok 
pi€is mpos THv alcOnow ri éotw. 
v 4 ud od] \ a \ , 
Orav yap otrws «is puxpa SvapebH ra puyvd- 
ss \ A > » A ‘ t 
35 peva, Kal TEA map’ adAnAa Tobrov Tov TpdroV 
7 A ~ 4 a > / / 
wore pn SfAov exacrov elvac TH alcbyjcer, TdéTE 
/ ”“ ” > ore eR 7 ¢ ~ > ¢ 
328a epKTaL 7) OV, GAN’ eoTW WoTE OTLOdV Tap’ OTL- 
~ > /, ~ bé rNé \ > 
obv elvar popiov Tov pyOévrwy; Aéyerar prev odv 
> a a fo 
exeivws, olov Kpilas pepix0ar mupois, drav %jricobv 
Pp 2¢ ~ lol > o. 9 \ ~ ~ / 
map ovtwodv TeO7. €i 8 eorl rav copa Svaperov, 
elmep Kal €oTt Cua odpate puKTov dpovopepes, 


¢ ~ ba) / / , > c ~ > ‘ 
5 OTlobv av déou pépos yiveobar map’ dtiwdv. émel 
256 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 10 


everything cannot be mixed with everything, but 
each of the ingredients which are mixed must origi- 
nally exist separately, and no property can have a se- 
parate existence. Since, however, some things have 
a potential, and other things an actual, existence, it 
is possible for things which combine in a mixture 
to ““ be” in one sense and “ not-be ”’ in another, the 
resulting compound formed from them being actually 
something different but each ingredient being still 
potentially what it was before they were mixed and 
not destroyed. (This is the difficulty which arose in 
our earlier argument, and it is clear that the ingredi- 
ents of a mixture first come together after having 
been separate and can be separated again.) They 
do not actually persist as “‘ body” and “ white,” nor 
are they destroyed (either one or both of them), for 
their potentiality is preserved. Let us, therefore, 
dismiss these questions, but the problem closely con- 
nected with them must be discussed, namely, whether 
mixture is something relative to perception. 

When the ingredients of the mixture have been 
divided into such small particles and so set side by 
side with one another that each is not apparent to 
the sense-perception, have they then been mixed ? 
Or is this not so, and is mixture of such a nature that 
every particle of one ingredient is side by side with 
a particle of the other ingredient ? The term cer- 
tainly is used in the former sense ; for instance, we 
say that barley is mixed with wheat when each grain 
of barley is placed side by side with a grain of wheat. 
But if every body is divisible, then since body mixed 
with body is made up of like parts, every part of each 
ingredient ought to be side by side with a part of the 
other. But since it is not possible for a body to be 


K 257 


10 


15 


20 


ARISTOTLE 


> > ” > > /, ~ ” tA 
8’ odK €otw eis taddyiota SvarpeO var, ore avv- 
> \ ‘ , > > @ lol € w 
Beats tabTo Kal piis add’ Erepov, SHAov ws ovrE 
\ ‘ /, Cal \ , / 
Kata puKkpa owloueva dei Ta puyvdpeva dpavar 
pepixGar (cvvOeots yap €orar Kai od Kpaows ovde 
/ 2993 = ‘ , oe. id ~ @& ‘ , 
pl€is, odd” eer Tov adrov Adyov TH Aw TO poptov. 
\ \ Any. ee , 2 \ 4 
dapev de Seiv, elmep pepiKrat,” TO puxdev dpo.o- 
prepes elvar, Kal Womep TOO VdaTos TO pépos Vdwp, 
A A ~ / nn > A ‘A 
ovTw Kal Tod Kpabévros. av 8 % Kata pupa 
ovvbeos 7 pikis, odev ovpByoeTar TovTwv, GAA 
povov pepvypeva mpos Tv aloOnow: Kal TO adro 
~ \ / 2A \ Bré 5EU “ A 
TH pev pepwypevov, eav pr) BAemyn of, TO Avy- 
a > > \ / »” ~ / a 
ket 8° ovddev pepurevov) ovTe TH Siaipéoer Wore 
OTiobv Tap OTLoby pépos: advvarov yap odTw Sdvat- 
~ ”“ on > ” / ”“ , ~ 
peOjvar.  odv odK ott pikis, 7) AeKTEov TobTO 
~ > / / / 
ma@s evdexerar yivecBa maAw. 
” / e ” ~ + A A / 
Eort 5%, ws efapev, TOV OvTwv Ta Lev ToLNTIKG, 
‘ > € \ 4 4, ‘ A te > 
ta 8 bro TovtTwy TmabytiKd. Ta pev obV avTI- 
, o € ie a, > Pe , aR 
otpéper, Gowv 7) adr? VAn éoti, Kal mounTiKa aA- 
AjAwy Kal wabytixa dm’ dAAjAwv: ta Se rove? 
> ~ cd LA 4A e b] \ ¢ tA \ 
analy ovra, dowv py 4 adr? VAn. TovTwy pev 
> > » , 1 999 € 9 \ ae Lae 
obv odK €oTe pikis: 510 08d’ 1) larpiKy Trovet Hylevav 
ovd’ 7) vylea puyvupevn Tots awpacw. Tav dé 


1 8 EL. 
2 pémxrar FP: peutyOa E: det peptybai re L. 





* One of the Argonauts, famous for his keen sight 
(Apollonius Rhodius i, 153 ff.). 


258 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 10 
divided into its smallest parts and “ composition ” 
and mixture are not the same thing but different, it 
is clear (a) that we must not say that the ingredients, 
if they are.preserved in small particles, are mixed 
(for this will be “ composition ” and not “ blending ”’ 
or “‘ mixing,” nor will the part show the same ratio 
between its constituents as the whole ; but we say 
that, if mixing has taken place, the mixture ought 
to be uniform throughout, and, just as any part of 
water is water, so any part of what is blended should 
be the same as the whole. But if mixing is a com- 
position of small particles, none of these things will 
happen, but the ingredients will only be mixed 
according to the standard of sense-perception, and 
the same thing will be a mixture to one man, if he 
has not sharp sight, but to the eyes of Lynceus ¢ 
will not be mixed) ; it is also clear (b) that we must 
not say that things are mixed by means of a division 
whereby every part of one ingredient is set by the 
side of a part of the other; for it is impossible for 
them to be thus divided. Either, then, there is no 
mixing, or another explanation must be given of the 
way in which it occurs. 

Now, as we maintained, some of those things which 
exist are capable of action and others capable of 
being acted upon by them. Some things, then, 
namely, those whose matter is the same, “ recipro- 
cate,” that is, are capable of acting and being acted 
upon by one another, while other things, namely, 
those which have not the same matter, act but are 
not liable to be acted upon. Of the latter, then, no 
mixing is possible; hence, neither the art of healing 
nor health mixing with the patients’ bodies can pro- 
duce health. But of things which are capable of 


259 


ARISTOTLE 
328 a , 
mountikav Kal TmabntiKdv doa evdiaipeta, modAd 


\ s\7 \ / lal / > 
25 pev oAlyors Kal peydAa puKpots ovvTilemeva ov 
A / > > ” ~ ~ 
mouet piéw, add” avEgnow Tod Kpatodvros* peTa- 
/ \ / > \ ~ e ‘ 
BdArer yap Oatepov eis TO Kpatobv, olov oradaypos 
w / ~ A ? / 4 
olvov pupiots xoetow vdaros od plyvuTar AveTau 
yap TO €ldos Kal petaBddAAn eis TO Tay vdwp. 
a A a / > / / 
étav S€ tais duvdpeow iodlyn mws, TOTE peTa- 
/ \ ¢ 4 > \ ~ > ~ € ~ 
30 BaAAer prev Exdtepov Els TO KpaToby EK THs avTOD 
/ ? / \ / > A \ ‘ 
dvcews, od yiverar 5¢ Odrepov, adAd perad Kal 
KoUWOV. 
\ a « Sa Oi eat ,o¢ 2 ’ 
Davepov ody ott Tabr’ eorl puKTa doa evavTiwow 
” ~ 4 ~ \ \ C eS > re 
éyer TOV ToLlovvTwy: Tadra yap dy vm’ adAjAwy 
> A / A \ \ a , 
€ort mabntikd. Kat puxpa dé puKpots maparileueva 
lon a A a 
piyvuTa paddov: paov yap Kal Oarrov aAdAyAa 
/ ‘ \ \ \ ¢ \ ~ , 
35 pweOlornow. 7o Sé€ todd Kal bd ToAAOD xXpoviws 
~ ~ \ A 27 “ ~ - \ 
328b TOOTO Spa. S10 Ta eddpioTa Tav diawpeTa@v Kal 
~ ~ ‘ ~ 
mabynrikav puxta (Svaipetrar yap els puKpa Tadra 
c / ~ \ > \ >? / \ 
padiws: tobdro yap tv To evopiorw elvar), olov ra 
a“ / 
bypa pukra pddvora TOV owpdtwr: eddpioTov yap 


/ \ € ‘ ~ ~ A \ , 
pddvora TO bypov TaVv Siaiper@v, eav pur) yAioxpov 


o 


> ~ \ \ / \ / /, a 
fi Tatra yap 8 mAciw Kal peilw povov srovet 
\ ” 7 > / / \ ” 
tov byKxov. dtav 8 7 Oarepov pdvov mabyrikov 7 
, ‘ \ / > 7 “ 29O\ a ‘ 
adddpa, TO 8¢ maprrav Hpeua, 7 oddev mAciov TO 
260 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 10 


action and capable of being acted upon, those which 
are easily divisible, when many of one of them are 
compounded with few of another or a large bulk with 
a small, do not produce a mixture but an increase of 
the predominant ingredient, for there is a change 
of the other ingredient into the predominant. (For 
example, a drop of wine does not mix with ten thou- 
sand measures of water, for its form is dissolved and 
it changes so as to become part of the total volume 
of water.) But when there is some sort of balance 
between the “active powers,” then each changes from 
its own nature into the predominant ingredient, 
without, however, becoming the other but something 
between the two with common properties. 

It is clear, therefore, that those agents are capable 
of admixture which show contrariety, for these can 
be acted upon by one another ; and they mix all the 
better if small particles of the one ingredient are 
set side by side with small particles of the other, for 
then they more easily and more quickly cause a 
change in one another, whereas a large quantity of 
one takes a long time to be affected in this way by 
a large quantity of the other. Hence, those of the 
divisible and susceptible materials whose form is 
easily modified are capable of mixture ; for they are 
easily divided into small particles (for that is what 
“to be easily modified in form ” means) ; for example, 
the liquids are the most “ mixable ” of bodies, since 
of “ divisibles ” liquid is the most easily modified in 
form, provided it is not viscous (for viscous liquids 
merely increase the volume and bulk). But when 
one only of the ingredients is susceptible to action— 
or is excessively susceptible, while the other in- 
gredient is only slightly so—the result of the mixture 


261 


Aristotle’s 
view of 
** mixture.” 


ARISTOTLE 
328 b 
puxbev e& apdoiv 7) puKpov, Omep ovpPaiver repli 


\ ” 
TOV KaTTiTepov Kal Tov xaAKov. eva yap yWeAXi- 
10 Cerau mpds GAAnAa Tav ovTwv Kal errapdhorepiler: 
daiverar ydp mws Kal puKTa Hpeua, Kal ws 
Oarepov pev Sextixov Odrepov 8 eldos. dmep emi 
4 / ¢ \ / e /, 
TovTwv ovpfaiver: 6 yap Katrtitepos ws mafos Tt 
n” A Ad ~ ~ ‘ > / ‘ 
wv avev vAns Tob yaAKobd oyedov adavilera, Kal 
‘ ” / , b) \ \ lon 
puxOeis drrevo. xpwpatioas povov. tavTo de Tobro 
/ ted ot ee 
ovpPaiver Kai ed’ érépwv. 
A / > ~ > /, A Ld ” 

15 Wavepov toivuy ex TaV cipnuevwv Kal TL EoTL 
/ \ aoe \ \ / \ A ‘ ~ 
plkis Kal Ti €ore Kal bia Ti, Kal Tota puKTa TOV 
” > / > ‘ ” ~ / 
ovTw, émeimep eoTiv eva Tovatra ola mabyriKa 
€ FOr > / \ 77 ‘ ? /, ~ 
te Um aAAjAwy Kai eddpiora Kal evdiaipeTa* TadTa 
\ > > / > / / v9 ” 
yap ovr edbapfa avdyKn pepypéva ovr ETL 
bd \ ¢ ~ ” 4 \ / 
TravTa aTA@s elvar, ore atvOeow elvar thy pikw 
) ~ ” ‘ \ ” > > 2 ‘ 
20 abdt@v, ore mpos TH alobnow: add’ Eore puKrov 

\ a on 27 bal ‘ ‘ ‘ 
bev 6 av eddoprorov dv mabynriKov 7 Kal TrovnTuKOV 

\ 4 / A c / ‘ \ /, 
Kal TOLOUTW [LLKTOV (POS OUwVUpLOV ‘yap TO [LLKTOY), 


7 S€ pigis TOV puKT@v addowbévrwv Evwais. 


262 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 10 


of the two is no greater in volume or very little 
greater, as happens when tin and copper are mixed. 
For some things adopt a hesitant and wavering atti- 
tude towards one another, for they appear somehow 
to be only slightly “‘ mixable,” one, as it were, acting 
in a ‘“‘ receptive’ manner, the other as a ‘“‘form.” This 
is what happens with these metals ; the tin almost 
disappears as though it were a property of the copper 
without any material of its own and, after being 
mixed, almost vanishes, having only given its colour 
to the copper. And the same thing happens in other 
instances too. 

It is clear, then, from what has been said, that there 
is such a process as mixing, and what it is, and how 
it occurs, and what kind of existing things are “ mix- 
able,” seeing that some things are of such a nature 
as to be acted upon by one another and easily modi- 
fied in shape and easily divisible. For it does not 
necessarily follow either that they are destroyed by 
having been mixed, or that they simply remain 
still the same, or that their “ mixture ” is composi- 
tion, or only dependent on perception; but any- 
thing is ‘‘ mixable ” which, being easily modified in 
shape, is capable of acting or being acted upon, and 
is “ mixable ” with something of the same kind as 
itself (for the term ‘‘ mixable ”’ is used in relation to 
something else which is also called “ mixable ’’), and 
mixture is the union of “ mixables,” when they have 
undergone alteration. 


263 


B 


‘ a ~ a 
328b26 61. Ilepi pev odv pigews Kai ads Kat Tob zrovetv 
Kal mdoxew elpntar m@s brdapyer Tois peTtaPaA- 
Aovor Kata vow, Err 5€ Epi yevéoews Kal pOo- 
pas Ths amAfs, ms Kal tivos’ eori Kal dia Ti” 
B20 ¢ / \ \ + e-2 / ” / 
30 aitiav. dpoiws dé Kal repli adAowwaews eipynrat, Ti 
» ~ \ > \ > ~ ‘ 
70 GAAovotobat Kai tiv’ Exer Suadopav adr@v. Aourov 
ond 7, a ~ 
5é Gewpfoa epi Ta KaAovpeva oTotxeia TOY ow- 
/ 
pdrov. 
/, \ A ‘ \ / aA /, 
Tévects prev yap Kal dlopa macas tais dice 
auveotwoas ovata odk avev TdV aicbyTayv ow- 
pdtwv: tovtwv dé THv droKepevnvy VAnv of peév 
35 paow elvar piav, olov dépa tiWevtes 7 mop FH Tt 
~ c 
329a peTagv TovTWY, D@ua Te Ov Kal ywpLoTov, ot Se 
¢ ~ ~ c 
mAciw Tov apiOuov évds, of pev Tip Kal yyy, ot 
S€ tadra Te Kal dépa TpiTov, ot Sé Kal Vdwp ToUTwY 
Téraptov, womep "EumedoxAns: e€ dv ovyKpwo- 
” 
pévwv Kat Svaxpwouevwy 7) adAdAowovpevwv aup- 
a / 

5 Baivew tiv yeveow Kai tiv Pbopav tots mpdypacw. 
"Ort pev ody Ta mp@Ta apxyas Kat oTowxeia Ka- 
~ > 

ABs exer Adyew, Eotw avvopodcyovpuevov, €€ Av 

petaBadrAcvTwy 7) Kata ovyKpiow Kal SidKprow 7 
1 ras Kai tivos J1D>: tivos Kai mds EJ*: Kai rivos Kai 

nas HL. 

264 


BOOK II 


1. We have now dealt with the way in which mixture, Chapters 
contact and action-and-passion are attributable to 15-1 comes. 
things which undergo natural change; we have, to-be and 

} ; < passes-away 
moreover, explained how unqualified coming-to-be Consists of 
and passing-away exist, and with what they are ements, 
concerned and owing to what cause they occur. simple 
Similarly, we have dealt with “ alteration” and ex- 7 
plained how it differs from coming-to-be and passing- they 


and 
% - how do they 
away. It remains to consider the so-called elements combine ? 


of bodies. 

Coming-to-be and passing-away occur in all natu- Views held 
rally constituted substances, if we presuppose the D¥ vatious 
existence of perceptible bodies. Some people assert 
that the matter underlying these bodies is one ; for 
example, they suppose it to be Air or Fire, or an 
intermediate between these two, but still a single 
separate body. Others hold that there are more than 
one material, some thinking that they are Fire and 
Earth, others adding Air as a third, others (like 
Empedocles) adding Water as a fourth; and it is, 
they say, from the association and separation or 
alteration of these that coming-to-be and passing- 
away of things comes about. 

Let us, then, be agreed that the primary materials 
from the changes of which, either by association or 
by separation or by some other kind of change, 


265 


329 a 


10 


1 


or 


20 


25 


30 


ARISTOTLE 


Kat’ ddAnv petaBoAnv ovpBaiver yéveow elvar Kai 
P0opav. add’ of pév trovotvtes pilav vAnv Tapa 
Ta eipnueva, TavTHv S€ CwpaTiKHY Kal ywpLOTHY, 
dpaprdvovew: advvarov yap avev eVAVTUBOEWS el- 
vat TO o@pa ToOTo aicOnris* 7 yap Kodgov 7 
Bapd 7 uxpov 7 7 Oeppov dvdyan eva TO diaretpov 
TooTo, } Aéyouat Twes elvat THY apxynv. ws 8 ev 
7 Tyra yéyparrrat, ovdeva Exel Svopiopov" ov 
yap elpnke cadds TO mavdexes, et ywpilerar TOV 
oToixyeiwy. ovd€ xphrar oddev, dyaas elvar bro- 
Kelevov TL Tois KaAoUvpEevos OTOLXYEloLS TPOTEpOY, 
olov xpuaov Tois Epyous Tots xpuaots. (Kaitou Kal 
Tobto o¥ KaAds A€yeras TobTov Tov TpdToV Aeyo- 
pevov, GAN dv pev aAdoiwois, EoTw ovUTwWs, BV 
dé yeveots Kai dlopa, addvvatov exeivo mpocayo- 
peveobar e€ od yéyovev. Kaito. ye dyot papa 
dAnbéotarov elvar xpuvoov A€yew Exaorov elvat.) 
aAAa THY oTOLyeiwy OvTwWY OTEpE@V expt EeTLTEdwWY 
moveirar THY avdAvow: advvatov dé THY TOAYHY 
Kat THY vAnY THY TpwTHV Ta emimeda elvat. Hpets 
Sé dapev pev elvai twa vAnv TOV cwpdTrwv Tov 
aic@nrGv, adAa tavrnv od ywproriy aad’ del pet? 
evavTimaews, e& Hs yiverau Ta kadovpeva orouyeia. 
Suchprorat dé zrepi avr av ev ér€pous ducptBéorepov. 
ov pay GAN’ erevd7) Kat TOV TpoTrov TOOTOV €oTw 
eK Tis dAns Ta odpara Ta. mpara, Siopioréov Kat 
TEpt TOUTWY, apxXTV ev Kal mpwTHV olopevors elvat 


1 aicOnris HJ: aicOnrov E: 76 alcOnrév F: aicOyrov ov L. 





4 Plato, Timaeus 51 a. > Ibid. 49 p—50 c. 
© Ibid. 53 c ff. 4 Ibid. 49 a. 
¢ Phys. i. 6 and 7. 


266 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 1 


coming-to-be and passing-away occur, are rightly 
described as “sources” and “‘elements.”’ But (a) those 

who postulate that there is a single matter, besides 

the bodies which we have mentioned, and that this 

is corporeal and separable, are mistaken ; for it is 
impossible that this body can exist without “ per- 
ceptible contrariety,” for this “‘ infinite,” which some 

say must be the source of reality, must be either 

light or heavy, or hot or cold. And (6) what is written 

in the Timaeus * is not accurately defined ; for Plato 

has not clearly stated whether his “‘ omnirecipient ” 

has any existence apart from the elements, nor does 

he make any use of it, after saying that it is a sub- 

stratum prior to the so-called elements, just as gold 

is the substratum of objects made of gold. (Yet put 

in this way the statement is not a happy one. Things 

of which there is coming-to-be and passing-away 

cannot be called after that out of which they have 
come-to-be, though it is possible for things which are 

altered to keep the name of that of which they are 
alterations. However, what he actually says ° is 

that by far the truest account is to say that each of 

the objects is “‘ gold.””) However, he carries the ana- 

lysis of the elements,° though they are solids, back 

to “ planes,” and it is impossible for the ‘‘ Nurse,” 4 

that is the primary matter, to consist of planes. Our 

theory is that there is matter of which the perceptible 

bodies consist, but that it is not separable but always Aristotle's 
accompanied by contrariety, and it is from this that bai i 
the so-called elements come into being ; but a more ments are 
accurate account of these things has been given else- pers 
where.’ However, since the primary bodies are also 4nd certain 
derived in this way from matter, we must explain trarieties.”” 
about these also, reckoning as a source and as primary 


267 


ARISTOTLE 
329 a 
A ¢ \ > 7, / ¢ / A a 
Thy vAnv Thy axwpioTov pév, broKeywevnv Se Tots 
evavtious* ote yap TO Deppov vAn TO yvyp@ ovre 
~ ~ ~ > \ \ ¢ , > ~ 
totto TH Oepud, adda TO dbroKeipevov apdoiv. 
Wore mp@tov pev To Svvaper cpa aicOyrov apxy, 
/ > y iad / / > / 
Sevrepov 8 ai evavtidces, Aéyw 8 olov Pepyorns 
‘ / / iy ~ 5 ‘ \ 
35 Kal wuxpdorns, Tpitov 8 dyn Top Kal Vdwp Kal Ta 
~ ~ \ \ / > + 
329h ToLadTra: Tadra pev yap petaBdAder eis aAAnAa, 
‘ >’ ¢ > “~ AS / 3O\ 
Kat ody ws ’EpmedoxAfs Kal €repor Aéyovaw (odde 
\ Ao. ee ss , ¢ o> 2? / > 
yap av Hv addoiwots), at 8 evavtwaes od peTa- 
/ > > > \ \ a tA 
BadrAovow. add’ ovdév Frrov Kal Ws owpaTos 
/ \ / / > / © A A »” 
moias Kal mOaas AeKTéov apyds* ot pev yap aA- 
¢ / ~ ‘ ban! / 4 / 
5 Aow brobewevor yp@vrTar, Kal oddev A€yovor bia Ti 
adTa 7 Tooatrat. 
> \ ss ~ > A 7 > , 
2. ’Emei obv Cntodpev aicbnrot owpatos apxas, 
~ >. 9 \ c ~ c ‘ > @  £ w” c / 
tobTo 8° éotl anrod, antov 8 0b 4 atabnos adn, 
dhavepov Ott od mAoar at evavTidces awpatos 
A \ > \ ~ > A / € \ \ 
10 €l0n Kal apxas ToLotow, aAAd povov at KaTa THY 
¢ / 2 2 / / \ , ‘ \ 
adjv: kar evavriwolv te yap Siadépovor, Kal Kara 
dnt evavtiwow. 810 ode AevKdtys Kal peAavia 
” 4 ‘ / ¢ , > 299\ a“ 
ovte yAvKiTys Kal muKpdTys, Opoiws 8 odde TOV 
GAwy tdv atcbnrdv evavtudoewv ovdev Trove? 
a ~ ¢ - 
aTotxeiov. KalTor mpdorepov oyus ads, WoTE Kat 
” 
TO bmoKeipevov TpdTepov. GAA’ odK EoTL oapaTos 
¢ lon / > , > ‘ > 4 \ > 
antod ma0os # anrov, addAa Kal? Erepov, Kal et 
éruye TH poe. mpdorepov. 
Atrdv 5€ mp@tov trav anra@v diaperéov mrotat 
~ Cee | 
mparar Svahopat Kal evavtwdoes. etol 8 évavte- 
\ /, A 
woes Kata THY adi aide, Depudv yuxpov, Enpov 
268 


1 


o 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 1-2 


the matter which is inseparable from, but underlies, 
the contrarieties ; for “ the hot” is not matter for 
“‘the cold,” nor “the cold”’ for “‘ the hot,” but the sub- 
stratum is matter for them both. Therefore, firstly, 
the potentially perceptible body, secondly, the con- 
trarieties (for example, heat and cold), and thirdly, 
Fire and Water and the like are “ sources.”” For the 
bodies in this third class change into one another 
and are not as Empedocles and others describe them “ 
(otherwise alteration could not have taken place), 
whereas the contrarieties do not change. Neverthe- 
less, even so the question must be decided what kinds 
of contrariety and how many of them there are which 
are sources of body ; for all other philosophers assume 
and make use of them without stating why they are 
these and why they are of a particular number. 

2. Since, therefore, we are seeking the sources of The “ con- 
perceptible bodies, and this means tangible, and fanevet 
tangible is that of which the perception is touch, it and gold ” 
is clear that not all the contrarieties constitute and moist.” 
“forms” and “‘ sources” of body, but only those con- 
nected with touch; for it is in the matter of con- 
trariety that they differ, that is, tangible contrariety. 
Therefore neither whiteness and blackness, nor sweet- 
ness and bitterness, nor any of the other perceptible 
contrarieties constitute an element. Yet sight is 
prior to touch, so that its subject is also prior ; but 
it is a quality of tangible body not in virtue of its 
tangibility but because of something else, even though 
it happens to be naturally prior. 

Of the tangible differences and contrarieties them- 
selves we must distinguish which are primary. The 
following are contrarieties according to touch: hot 


4 j.e. as immutable. 


269 


329 b 


ARISTOTLE 


20 vypov, Bapd Koddov, oxAnpov padakdv, yAioxpov 


2 


3 


3 


330 


5 


o 


5 


~ \ lal \ / / \ 
Kpatpov, Tpaxd Aciov, mayd Aerrov. TovTwv Se 
\ \ \ ~ ? A 29O\ / 
Bapd pev Kat Koddov od mointixa ovd€ mabyriKa: 
> \ ~ ~ Ld ”“ , ey? Lomi 
od yap T@ moveiv Te EeTepov 7 Tacxew bp ETEpOV 
Aéyovra. Set S€ mrowntixa elvar addAAjAwv Kal 
TmabntiuKa TA oToLXYEla* pulyvuTaL yap Kal peTa- 
BddAe eis dAAnAa. Oeppov dé Kal vypov Kal 
¢ \ \ \ A A a \ ‘ \ 
bypov Kat Enpov Ta ev TH trountika elvar Ta Se 
~ \ /, \ / > ‘ 
T@ Talytiuxa Aéyerat: Oepyov ydp €ott TO avy- 
a \ ¢ a \ \ a id \ 
Kpivov Ta Opoyev) (TO yap Siaxpivew, orep pact 
a \ “~ , > \ hen 28 - i 
mouiv TO Tp, ovyKpivew e€oTi Ta OpddvdAa: cup- 
Baive. yap efapeiv ta dAddrpia), yuypov b€ 70 
ovvayov Kal ovyKpivov dpolws Td TE ovyyevh) Kal 
Ta pi) O-odvaa, typov S€ TO adptotov oikeiw dpw 
evdpiatov ov, Enpov d€ 7d eddpioTov pev oikel@ 
¢ / / ‘\ A \ ‘ \ ‘ 
dpw, Svadprotov dé. To dé Aewrov Kal Ttaxd Kal 
Ni ‘ lon \ r ‘ \ aA ‘ 
yAioxpov Kal Kpadpov Kal oxAnpov Kat padaKov 
‘\ ¢ ” \ > , > ‘ \ ‘ 
Kal at dAAa diadopal ex tTovTwv: eel yap TO 
> / > ~ ¢ ~ \ ‘ \ © , 
avanAnotiKov €ott Tod bypod dia TO put) wpiobar 
pev eddprotov 8 elvar Kal axodovbeiy 7H amro- 
/ A A \ > Xr / A A 
péevw, TO dé Aemrov dvamdAnoricdy (AeTTOMEpEs 


yap, Kal TO puKpopepes avarAnaotiKdv: GAov yap 
270 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 2 


and cold, dry and moist, heavy and light, hard and 
soft, viscous and brittle, rough and smooth, coarse 
and fine. Of these heavy and light are not active nor 
yet passive ; for they do not get their names because 
they act on something else or are acted upon by some- 
thing else ; elements, on the other hand, must be 
mutually active and passive, for they mix and change 
into one another. But hot and cold, and dry and 
moist are terms of which the first pair get their names 
because they are active, the second pair because they 
are passive ; for “ hot” is that which associates things 
of the same kind (for to “‘ dissociate,” which, they say, 
is an action of Fire, is to associate things of the same 
class, since the result is to destroy things which are 
foreign), but cold is that which brings together and 
associates alike both things which are of the same 
kind and things which are not of the same class. 
Moist? is that which, though easily adaptable to form, 
cannot be confined within limits of its own, while dry 
is that which is easily confined within its own limits 
but is not easily adaptable in form. From the moist 
and the dry are derived the fine and the coarse, the 
viscous and the brittle, the hard and the soft and the 
other contrasted pairs. For since “‘ capacity for filling 
up something ” is characteristic of the moist, because 
it is not confined within bounds but is adaptable in 
form and follows the shape of that which comes into 
contact with it,’ and that which is “ fine ”’ is “‘ capable 
of filling up something ” (for it consists of small par- 
ticles, and that which consists of small particles is 
capable of filling up something, for the whole is in 


@ Aristotle means liquid. 
> e.g., water conforms with the shape of the vessel into 
which it is poured. 


271 


ARISTOTLE 


330 sf Ld a A A 4 / lol 
OAov amrera: TO Sé AeTTOv pddvoTa ToLodror), 


A hd A A A »” a ¢ lol \ \ 
davepov ort TO pev AeTTOV EoTat Tod bypod, TO de 
~ ~ / ~ 
5 maxv tod Enpod. madw dé To pev yAloxpov Tod 
bypod (Tro yap yAicxpov bypov memovds ti eoTw, 
olov To €Aatov), To 5é€ Kpabpov Tob Enpod: Kpaipov 
yap TO Tedéws Enpdv, wore Kal memnyevar du 
” € , =) % iy \ a it a 
edeubw byporntos. “ert TO wev padakov Tob bypod 
(uadakov yap TO dretkov eis €avTo Kal py) beOLoTa- 
10 pevov, Orrep Trovet TO Bypdov: S10 Kal odK EoTL TO 
¢ A / > \ \ A “~ Lt ~ A 
bypov padakdv, aAAa TO padaKkov Tob vypod), TO 
dé oxAnpov tot Enpob: oxAnpov ydp é€ott TO Te- 

/ \ de ‘ / ré be A 
amnyos, TO dé memynyos Enpov. A€yerar Se Enpdv 
Kal Uypov TAcovax@s: avrixerrar yap TH Enp@ Kat 
TO Wypov Kal TO Siepov, Kal maAw TH byp@ Kal To 
15 Enpov Kal TO Temnyos: amavta dé tabr €otl Tob 
Enpot Kal rob bypob THv mpwrav AexPevtwv. eErret 
yap avrixertar TH diep@ To Enpov, Kai dvepov prev 
€oTt TO €xov aAdotpiav bypotnta émumoAjs, Be- 

/ A ‘ > / \ A oe! / 
Bpeypevov dé To eis Babos, Enpov Se TO earepnevov 
tavTys, pavepov ST. TO pev Siepov EoTat TOD ypod, 
2076 8 avTikeievov Enpov Tob mpwrov Enpod. mdaAw 
dé 70 bypov Kal TO Temnyos WoatTws: bypov fev 
ydp é€ott TO €xov oiketay bypornta, BeBpeypevov 
A ‘ ” > / ¢ / > ~ 4 
dé TO €xov aAdoTpiav bypornTa ev TH Baber, we- 
LA 

mnyos S€ TO €oTepypevov Ta’Tns. wate Kal Tov- 
Twv €oTar TO pev Enpod To dé bypob. S7jAov roivuv 

Li a ¢ ” \ > / J ‘ 
25 OTe Tacar at dAAa Sdiadopat avayovTa «is Tas 





@ See 329 b 30 ff. 
272 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 2 


contact with the whole, and that which is fine consists 
of the smallest possible particles), it is clear that the 
fine is derived from the moist and the coarse derived 
from the dry. Again, the viscous is derived from the 
moist (for that which is viscous is moisture which 
has undergone a certain treatment, as in the case of 
oil), and the brittle is derived from the dry ; for the 
completely dry is brittle, so that it has become solid 
through lack of moisture. Further, the soft is derived 
from the moist (for the soft is that which gives way 
and sinks into itself but does not change its position, 
as does the moist ; hence, too, the moist is not soft, 
but the soft is derived from the moist). The hard, 
on the other hand, is derived from the dry ; for that 
which has solidified is hard, and the solid is dry. 
Now “ dry” and “ moist ” are used in several senses ; 
for both moist and damp are opposed to dry, and, 
again, solid as well as dry is opposed to moist. 
But all these qualities are derived from the dry and 
the moist which we mentioned originally.?_ For the 
dry is opposed to the damp, and the damp is that 
which has foreign moisture on its surface, soaked 
being that which is damp to its innermost depth, 
while dry is that which is deprived of foreign moisture. 
Therefore, clearly the damp will be derived from 
the moist, and the dry, which is opposed to it, will 
be derived from the primary dry. So likewise, on 
the other hand, with the moist and the solidified ; 
for moist is that which contains its own moisture in 
its depth, while soaked is that which contains foreign 
moisture there, and solidified is that which has lost 
its foreign moisture; so that of these the latter 
derives from the dry, the former from the moist. It 
is clear, they, that all the other differences are re- 


273 


330 a 


30 


330 b 


oO 


15 


ARISTOTLE 


/ /, ou de > /, > > 4 
mpwras TéTTapas. avdtar dé odKéte eis €AdTToOUs- 
A \ \ A 
ovTe yap TO Jeppov Srep bypov 7 Omep Enpov, ovre 
‘ ¢ \ id 
TO vypov omep Oeppov 7 Omep yuypdv, ovTE TO 
\ ‘ 
yuypov Kal To Enpov otf’ br’ addr’ obf? dd 7d 
‘ 
Eppov Kal TO vypov eiow: wor avdyKn TéTTApas 
elvar Tavras. 
> a ~ 
3. ’Emet S€ rérrapa ta ortowxyeia, THv Se TeT- 
/ “ ¢ 7 A rig > / > / 
tdpwv €€ ai ovlev&es, Ta. evavtia ov mépuKe 
avvdudleabar (Geppov yap Kal yuyxpov elvar To adro 
Kal mdAw Enpov Kal bypov advvarov), pavepov 
6ru TérTapes EoovTar al TMV oToLxeiwy ovlevéets, 
Deppod Kai Enpod, kai Oepyod Kai bypod, Kal maAw 
yuxpod Kal vypod, Kal yvxpod Kat Enpod. Kai 
jKodovonke Kata Adyov Tots amAois Patvopevors 
owpac, mupt Kal dep Kal vdaTL Kal y* TO meV 
ap mop OYepuov Kat ov, 6 & anp Bepuov Kai 
ple 
¢ / e > \ \ ¢ >/ ‘ Pa A A 
bypdv (ofov atuis yap 6 arp), To 8 ddwp puypov 
1 ¢ /, ¢ de ~ ‘ ‘ / a > > / 
Kat dypov, } dé yh puxpov Kal Enpdv, war’ evrAdyws 
SiavéuecOar tas Suvahopas Tots mpwrous owpaot, 
Kal 76 TAHO0s adra&v elvar Kara Adyov. damavres 
yap of Ta aTAG owpara oToLxela TroLobyTEs ot peV 
4 € A 5 4 ¢ de / ¢ de / ~ 
év, ot d¢€ Svo, of Sé Tpia, ot de TéTTapa TroLovoW. 
doo. pev odv év pdvov A€yovow, elra muKvadet 
Kal pavwcer TaAAa yervaar, todrous ovpBaiver dvo 
mouiv Tas apxds, TO TE pavov Kal TO TUKVOV 7 
TO Oeppov Kai 70 yuypov: Tatra yap Ta Sypwoup- 
yoovra, To 8 &v broxertar Kabdmep VAn. of F 
ev0ds S00 mowdvrTes, Worep Lappevidns mip Kal 
yhv, Ta petasd piypata mower TovTwv, olov 
aépa Kat vdwp. woadrws Sé Kai ot tpia A€yovres, 





@ j.e, are mathematically possible. 
Q74 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 2-3 


duced to the first four, and these cannot be further 
reduced to a lesser number ; for the hot is not that 
which is essentially moist or essentially dry, nor is the 
moist essentially hot or essentially cold, nor do the 
cold and the dry fall in the category of one another 
nor in that of the hot and moist ; hence these must 
necessarily be four of these elementary qualities. 

3. Now since the elementary qualities are four in The four 
number and of these four six couples can be formed,? (emit 
but contraries are not of a nature which permits of eget 
their being coupled—for the same thing cannot be rel Bore 
hot and cold, or again, moist and dry—it is clear that roma in 
the pairs of elementary qualities will be four in different 
number, hot and dry, hot and moist, and, again, Sitite four 
cold and moist, and cold and dry. And, according ar: ce 
to theory, they have attached themselves to the Harth, Air, 
apparently simple bodies, Fire, Air, Water and {rand 
Earth ; for Fire is hot and dry, Air is hot and moist 
(Air, for example, is vapour), Water is cold and moist, 
and Earth is cold and dry. Thus the variations are 
reasonably distributed among the primary bodies, 
and the number of these is according to theory. 

For all those who make out that the simple bodies 
are elements make them either one or two or three 
or four. Therefore (a) those who hold that there is 
only one and then generate everything else by con- 
densation and rarefaction, as a result make the sources 
two in number, the rare and the dense or the hot 
and the cold; for these are the creative forces, and 
“the one ” underlies them as matter. But (6) those 
who hold that there are two from the beginning— 
as Parmenides held that there were Fire and Earth 
—make the intermediates, Air and Water, mixtures 
of these; and (c) the same thing is done also by 


275 


330 b 


20 


25 


30 


331 a 


ARISTOTLE 


4, / > a / \ \ / 
Ka0arep IlAdtwv ev rats Svarpéceow: TO yap éaov 
pitypa tov. Kat oxedov tavra Aéyovow of TE 
dvo Kal ol Tpia Tovodvres: TAI of pev Té“vovow 

] 7 A / c >, a /, lol 
eis 500 TO péacov, of 8 év pdvov motodow. eviot 
> ’ \ / / e > ~ 
&° «dds tértapa réyovow, olov "EumedokAfs. ovv- 
/ A ‘ kg > A 7, ~ A \ 
dyer 5€ Kal obdtos eis Ta SUo* TH yap Tupi TaAAa 
mavTa avrirOnow. 

Ov« eort d€ TO mip Kal 6 app Kal EKGOTOV 
TOV elpnpevev dshobv, dna puxrov. TO 5 anAa 
Tolatra pev €oTw, od pévtor Tabrd, olov el TL TO 
Tupt Opovov, mupoeidés, od Top, Kal TO TH Gépt 
> / ¢ / A > \ ~ + \ \ ~ 
aepoewdes* Opoiws b€ Kami THv GAAwy. TO de TIP 
> \ ¢ \ / 7 \ / 
eotiv brrepBodn Beppdrntos, womep Kal KpvoTtaddos 
puxpornros: 7) yap mhéus Kal 7, Céous brrepBodrai 
Twes €low, 7) pev puxpornros, 7 dé Deppornros. 
el obv 6 KpvoTAaAAds eort THES bypod yvypod, Kal 
TO Tip €orar Céois Enpobd Oeppod. 10 Kai oddev 
ovr’ €k KpvotdAdov yivetat ov’ ek mUpds. 

"Ovrwy dé tettdpwv Tv aTrAdv cwpdtwv, exd- 
Tepov tov dvoiv exatépov Tav ToTwY éoTiv: Tp 
fev yap Kal arp Tob mpos TOV Opov Pepomevov, YA 

~ ‘ 

dé Kal vowp Tod mpos TO pecov. Kal aKpa pev 

Kal <tixpwéorara. mop Kal yn péoa dé Kal pe- 
/ 

peypeva. padAov Sw Kal dip. Kal EKGTEPA. éxa- 

Tépous evavria* qmupl pev yap évavTiov vdwp, aépt 

d¢€ yi Tratra yap ex rdv evavtiwy mabnudrwv 





* It is doubtful what is meant here. The commentator 
Philoponos suggests that it was a collection of otherwise 
unpublished doctrines of Plato and thinks that Aristotle is 
referring to a theory of Plato that there was “ the great” and 
“the small ”’ and a third apy, which was a mixture of these 
and served as matter; but there is nothing to support this 
theory. H. H. Joachim ies “the Divisions ”’ to mean the 


276 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 3 


those who hold that there are three, as Plato does in 
the “‘ Divisions,’ * for he makes ‘‘ the middle” a 
mixture. Those who hold that there are two and 
those who postulate three say practically the same 
things, except that the former divide the middle 
into two, while the latter treat it as one. But (d) 
some declare that there are four from the start, for 
instance Empedocles, though he also reduces these 
to two, for he too opposes all the others to Fire. 

Fire, however, and Air and each of the other bodies 
which we have mentioned are not simple but mixed, 
while the simple forms of them are similar to them 
but not the same as they are; for example, that 
which is like fire is “ fiery,” not fire, and that which 
is like air is “ air-like,” and similarly with the rest. 
But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of 
cold ; for freezing and boiling are excesses, the former 
of cold, the latter of heat. If, therefore, ice is a 
freezing of moist and cold, so fire will be a boiling 
of dry and hot; and that is why nothing comes to 
be from ice or from fire. 

The simple bodies, then, being four in number, 
make up two pairs belonging to two regions ; for 
Fire and Air form the body which is carried along 
towards the “ limit,’’ while Earth and Water form the 
body which is carried along towards the centre ? ; 
and Fire and Earth are extremes and very pure, 
while Water and Air are intermediates and more 
mixed. Further, the members of each pair are con- 
trary to the members of the other pair, Water being 
the contrary of Fire, and Earth of Air, for they are 


sections in the Timaeus (35 a ff.), where Plato makes the © 
middle of his three kinds of substance a blend of the other 
two. > Cf. De Caelo 308 a 14 ff. 


277 


331 


1 


oO 


Oo 


15 


20 


2 


i 


ARISTOTLE 


/ ) \ > aixek ~ /, 4 
avveoTnKev. od pny add’ amdAds ye térrapa ovra 
Evos EkaoTOoV €oTl, yh ev Enpod waGAXov 7 yuvxpod 

» yh ev Enpod paMov 7} puxpod, 
7 \ lon a an ¢ ~ bea! > c A 
vdwp Sé yvypod padAdov 7 sbypod, anp 8 wbypod 
pGAAov 7 Oeppod, wip Sé Oepyod paArov 7) Enpod. 
> \ \ 4 / bd a ¢ ~ 
4. "Ezrei 5€ Stucdbprotar mpdorepov dtu tots amAois 
7 > > / ¢ / Mid \ ‘ \ 
cwpacw e€ addAjAwv 7) yéveows, dpa dé Kal KaTa 
\ wv / / > A nn > 
Thv atobnow daiverar ywopeva (od yap av jv aA- 
/ A » ‘ ~ ¢ ~ / ¢. > / / 
Noiwots: Kata yap Ta TOV anTdv 7aOy 7 addAolwais 
> / / ¢ / ~ > »” 
€or), Aextéov tis 6 Tpdmos THs eis GAANAa peTa- 
BoAjjs, Kal motepov amav e& admavros yivecbau 
\ ” \ \ \ \ > > 4 hd A 
duvarov 7 Ta ev Suvatov Ta 8’ advvaTov. OTL peV 
obv dmavra méduxev eis GAAnAa petaBadAdew, dave- 
pov 7 yap yéveas eis evavtia Kal e€ evavriwy, Ta 
\ Cal / ” > / ‘ mv 
S€ oro.yeta mavTa exer evavTiwow mpos adAnda 
dua 70 Tas Siadopdas evavrias elvar* Tots pmev yap 
> , > / ‘ ‘ MA \ A 
apdorepar evavtiar, olov mupi Kai vdare (TO pev 
\ ‘ \ , ‘\ > € \ \ / 
yap énpov kal Depudv, to 8 bypov Kat yuypor), 
~ > ¢e Se , >7 Vee ‘ ‘ 
tots 8° 4) €répa povov, olov aépu Kat vdare (To pev 
\ ¢ \ \ / \ \ ¢€ \ ‘ / 
yap vypov Kat Deppov, To S€ dbypov Kai yuvypdv). 
ote KabdAov pev dhavepov oti wav €K TavTos yi- 
\ 
veobar méduxev, 70n Sé Kal? Exaorov od xaAerov 
a ~ ” 
ideiv Os dmavtTa pev yap e€ anavrwy €orat, 
Sioicer 5€ TH OGrrov Kal Bpadvrepov Kal TH pov 
‘ r / Ld ‘ A .M” , A 
Kal xaAdeTuTepov. doa pev yap exer otpPoda 

A tAA PY a 4, c , o de 

mpos aAAnAa, Taxeta TovTwv 7 peTadBaots, doa dé 





@ De Caelo 304 b 23 ff. 
278 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 3-4 


made up of different qualities. However, since they 
are four, each is described simply as possessing a single 
quality, Earth a dry rather than a cold quality, Water 
a cold rather than a moist, Air a moist rather than 
a hot, and Fire a hot rather than a dry. 

4. Since it has been determined in a former dis- The four 
cussion * that the coming-to-be of simple bodies is imple 
out of one another, and at the same time, too, ae ee 
it is evident from sense-perception that they do in various 
come-to-be (for otherwise there would have been no ™®""°- 
alteration—for alteration is concerned with the 
qualities of tangible things), we must state (a) what 
is the manner of their reciprocal change, and (6) 
whether any one of them can come-to-be out of any 
other one of them, or some can do so and others 
cannot. Now it is manifest that all of them are of 
such a nature as to change into one another; for 
coming-to-be is a process into contraries and out of 
contraries, and all the elements are characterized 
by contrarieties one to another, because their dis- 
tinguishing qualities are contrary. In some of them 
both qualities are contrary, for example, in Fire and 
Water (for the former is dry and hot, the latter is 
moist and cold), in others only one, for example, in 
Air and Water (for the former is moist and hot, the 
latter is moist and cold). Hence, it is clear, if we 
take a general view, that every one of them naturally 
comes-to-be out of every one of them and, if we take 
them separately, it is not difficult now to see how 
this happens ; for all will be the product of all, but 
there will be a difference owing to the greater and 
less speed and the greater and less difficulty of the 
process. For the change will be quick in those things 
which have qualities which correspond with one 


279 


331 a 


3 


o 


331 b 


oO 


10 


ARISTOTLE 


A wv Cal \ \ ta ‘ a“ * A 

py) exer, Bpadeia, dia TO pdov elvar TO Ev H Ta 

\ / > \ \ ” aN 

moAAa petaBbdAdew, ofov éx mupos pev €arau dip 
barépov peraBadAovros (ro pev yap Hv Deppov Kal 
Enpov, TO de Oeppov Kal dypov, wate av KpatnOA 
To Enpov bod Tob bypob, anp €ora). mdAw de €€ 
calf A A ~ \ \ ¢ \ ~ ~ 
dépos vowp, eav KpaTynOA TO Peppov bro Tod ysvypod 
(ro pev yap Hv Oeppov Kai bypdv, TO dé vyxpov Kal 
€ /, 7 / ~ a ” 

bypov, Ware peTaBaAAovTos Tob Yeppod dwp €orar). 
Tov adrov d€ tpdmov Kal e€ BdaTos yh Kal eK ys 

“A ” \ a \ ” 4 ‘ \ 
mip: éxer yap audw mpos apdw otpuBoda- 7d pev 

A WA ¢€ \ \ / ¢ \ ~ \ ‘ 
yap vdwp bypov Kal wuxpov, 7 Se yR yYvypov Kal 
Enpov, Wate Kpatnbevros Tod bypod yh €oTa. Kal 

/ > ‘ | A ~ \ \ Ud 13 \ ~ 
mddw émet TO pev Trip Enpov Kat Deppov, 7 dé yh 
ysuyxpov Kat Enpdv, cay dbaph to yuypov, rip €orat 
ek ys. 

“Qote davepov ott KvKAw Te ora 7 ‘yeveots 
tois amAois owpact, Kal padotos obTos 6 TpoToS 
THs petaBPoAfs dia ro otpBoda evuTdpyew Tots 
> ~ > \ \ AA ‘ > 7 ~ \ 
ehefis. €k mrupos Sé vdwp Kai e€ depos yhv Kal 

/, > 4 ‘ ~ 7s A ~ > / 
mddw e€ vdaTos Kal yijs aépa Kat mop evdexeTat 
prev ylveoOa, Xareredrepov dé dia TO mevoven 
elvan 77 peTaBoAjy: dvdyen yap, et éorau ef 
vdaros Trop, Pbapivar Kal TO yuxpov Kal TO bypov, 
Kal mdAw ef ex yhs anp, P0apihva Kal ro yvypov 
Kat TO Enpdv. waatrws dé Kal ei ex mupds Kal 
>7 LA \ ~ > Le > / / 
aépos vdwp Kal yh, avdyKn auddrepa petaPaAdew. 
atrn pev obv xpoviwrépa 1 yéeveois: eav 8° Exa- 





* gvuBora was originally used of two pieces of wood or 
bone broken away from one another and kept by the two 
parties to a contract as a means of identification. 


280 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 4 


another,* but slow when these do not exist, because 
it is easier for one thing to change than for many ; 
for example, Air will result from Fire by the change 
of one quality ; for Fire, as we said, is hot and dry, 
while Air is hot and moist, so that Air will result if 
the dry is overpowered by the moist. Again, Water 
will result from Air, if the hot is overpowered by the 
cold ; for Air, as we said, is hot and moist, while 
Water is cold and moist, so that Water will result if 
the hot undergoes a change. In the same way, too, 
Earth will result from Water, and Fire from Earth ; 
for both members of each pair have qualities which 
correspond to one another, since Water is moist and 
cold, and Earth is cold and dry, and so, when the 
moist is overpowered, Earth will result. Again, since 
Fire is dry and hot, and Earth is cold and dry, if 
the cold were to pass away, Fire will result from 
Earth. 

It is clear, therefore, that the coming-to-be of 
simple bodies will be cyclical ; and this manner of 
change will be very easy, because the corresponding 
qualities are already present in the elements which 
are next to one another. The change, however, from 
Fire to Water and from Air to Earth, and again from 
Water and Earth to Air and Fire can take place, but 
is more difficult, because the change involves more 
stages. For if Fire is to be produced from Water, 
both the cold and the moist must be made to pass- 
away; and, again, if Air is to be produced from 
Earth, both the cold and the dry must be made to 
pass-away. In like manner, too, if Water and Earth 
are to be produced from Fire and Air, there must 
be a change of both qualities. This method of coming- 
to-be is, therefore, a lengthier process ; but if one 


281 


331 b 


15 


20 


25 


30 


ARISTOTLE 


/ ~ 
tépov Plaph Odrepov, pdwy pév, odk eis GAAnAa 
be c / iAN? > ‘ A ‘ MA 
€ 7 petdBaows, GAN ex updos pev Kal voaTos 
€oTat yh Kat anp, e€ depos dé Kal ys mip Kal 
LA Lid A A a~ ~ 4 ‘ 
vdwp. Orav pev yap Tob vdaros dbaph 70 yuyxpov 
Tob dé mupos TO Enpdv, anp Eorar (AcimeTaL yap 
Tob pev TO Oeppov Tob dé TO bypdv), Grav dé Tod 
fev mupos TO Oepuov Tob 8 vdatos 7d bypov, yh 

A ‘ , ~ \ \ \ ~ \ \ 
dua TO AeiweoBar tot pev to Enpov tod 8é 7d 
yuxpov. waadtws dé Kai e€ aépos Kal ys mip 
Kal vowp’ 6Tav prev yap Tod aépos PbapH 76 Depyov 

p pev yap pos pbaph 76 Bepp 
~ \ ~ \ / WA ” / 
Ths Se ys To Enpov, vdwp E€orau (AcimeTar yap 
~ \ ‘ ¢€ \ lod A \ , 7 \ ~ 
Tob ev TO vVypov THs Se TO Yuxpdv), Gtav dé TOO 
fev adépos TO bypov tis dé ys TO yuypdv, mip 
~ A \ ‘ ~ A 
dia 70 AeizrecPar Tob ev TO Veppov THs S€ TO Enpov, 
amrep Hv tmupds. opodroyoupevyn S€ Kal TH aicbjce 
¢ ~ A , dA \ A A ¢ Ad 
7) TOO Tupos yéveots: pdAvora pev yap Trip 7 PAdE, 
avrn 8 éori Kamvos Katopmevos, 6 b€ Kamvos ef 
dépos Kal yis. 

"Ev 8€ Tots edeEAs odK evdexerar POapévros ev 
éxatépw Qarépov ta&v aroixeiwy yeveobar pera- 
Baow eis oddev THv owudtwv ba TO AclmeoBar ev 
> a ”“ » SS ”“ > / > >) /, A 
audoiv 7 tabtta 7 Tavavria. e& ovdeTépwv Se 
eyywpet yivecbar odpa, olov ei Tob ev mupos 
plapein 7d Enpdv, Tod 8 aépos TO bypov: Aeimerau 

‘ > > a \ , A ri > ¢ , ‘ 
yap ev apdoiv To Oepudv: eav 8 e€€ éExarépov To 

‘ ‘ 
Geppov, Acimerar ravavtia, Enpov Kal dvypov. 





@ 4,¢, those which pass into one another by the “ cyclical” 
process described in 331 b 2 ff. 


282 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 4 


quality of each element were to be made to pass away, 
the change will be easier but not reciprocal ; but 
from Fire and Water will come Earth and (alterna- 
tively) Air, and from Air and Earth Fire and (alter- 
natively) Water; for when the cold of the Water 
and the dryness of the Fire have passed-away, there 
will be Air (for the heat of the Fire and the moisture 
of the Water are left), but, when the heat of the Fire 
and the moisture of the Water have passed-away, 
there will be Earth, because the dryness of the Fire 
and the cold of the Water are left. In the same 
manner also Fire and Water will result from Air and 
Earth ; for when the heat of the Air and the dryness 
of the Earth pass-away, there will be Water (for the 
moisture of the Air and the cold of the Earth are 
left), but when the moisture of the Air and the cold 
of the Earth have passed-away, there will be Fire, 
because the heat of the Air and the dryness of the 
Earth, which are, as we saw, the constituents of 
Fire, are left. Now the manner in which Fire comes- 
to-be is confirmed by our sense-perception ; for 
flame is the most evident form of Fire, and flame is 
burning smoke, and smoke is composed of Air and 
Earth. . 

No change, however, into any of the bodies can 
take place from the passing-away of one of the 
elements in each of them taken in their consecutive 
order,* because either the same or the contrary 
qualities are left in the pair, and a body cannot come- 
to-be out of identical or contrary qualities; for 
example, it would not result if the dryness of Fire 
and the moisture of the Air were to pass-away (for 
the heat is left in both), but, if the heat passes-away 
from both, the contraries, dryness and moisture, are 


283 


331 b 


35 


332 a 


or 


10 


15 


ARISTOTLE 


e / \ \ > a »” > 4 \ a 
dpoiws dé Kal év Trois dAAois: ev dmact yap Tots 
> a > / \ A > A \ > > , 
epeEfs evuTdpyes TO prev TavTO TO 8 evavTiov. 
id > A ~ Lid \ \ > [ee > “a 

wo? dua dSiArov ote Ta pev €€ Evos eis EV peTa- 

/ ei. % / / \ > > a 
Baivovra évos dbapévros yiverar, ta 8 €x Svoiv 
> “a / a \ > id > ‘ 
els Ev mAeudvwv. OTe pev odv AmavTa eK TaVTOS 

‘ / , 
yiverat, Kal Tiva tpdmov eis GAAnAa peraBaais 
yiverat, eipnrar. 

5. Od pay adr ere Kai Bde OewpHowpev epi 
ab’T@v. «i ydp €oTt TOV dvoikav owydtwv vAn, 
id ‘ lal 1.£ A \ 2A \ \ 
@otep Kal SoKxel eviows, Bowp Kal anp Kal Ta 

lol > 4, ” a a” 4 > fol ”“ / 
To.abra, avayKn HTou €v 7 Svo elvar Tabra 7H TAciw. 
a“ \ A / > el et tA /, nn 
év pev 61) mavTa ody oldv Te, olov dépa mavTa 7 
A bal ~ a lo v ¢ \ > > , 
vdwp 7) Tip 7) yhv, «imep 7) weraBodAr eis Tavavria. 
> ‘ mw DIP > \ ¢ / > , ” 
el yap eln anp, ef pev drropever, ddAoiwois Eorat 
> > > / Ad > 29> - f. Cal LA 
aA od yéveoits. dpa 8 od ottw doKel, Wore 
s ¢ He n »#\\> © a ” g7 
Bdwp elvoar dua Kal dépa 7) aA’ ériodv. Cora 8H 

> / ‘ \ a , 

Tis evavtiwois Kal Suadhopa is e&er te Odrepov 
, \ ~ te 0 / GAAG A b) 
popiov TO Top olov Oepydryra. a& pny ovK 
” / ~ >A 6 / ‘ LAA /, / A ‘ 
€otat TO ye Tp anp Oepuds: aAdoiwais TE yap TO 
~ ‘ > ‘ hd \ / >” 
TowovTov, Kal od daiverar. aya de maAw et Eorat 

~ ~ / 
€x mupos anp, Tod Yepnod eis rodvavriov pera- 

/ ” € 4 ” ~ >s ~ 
BddAovtos éora. drdpfer apa Ta aépt Todro, 

‘ ” e >A , ov ao , ‘ 
Kal €oTa 6 arp yuypdv TL. Ware advvaTov TO 

~ y WD ‘ MA A \ > ‘ ‘ 
mip aépa Oepyov elvary dua yap To adro Peppov 





* See Phys. 224 a 21 ff. 
284 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 4-5 


left. So likewise with the others too; for in all the 
consecutive elements there exists one identical and 
one contrary quality. It is, therefore, at the same 
time clear that some elements come-to-be by being 
transformed from one into one by the passing-away 
of one quality, but others come-to-be by being trans- 
formed from two into one by the passing-away of 
more than one quality. We have now stated that 
all the elements come-to-be from any one of them, 
and how their change into one another takes 
place. 

5. Let us, however, proceed to discuss the following Restate- 
points about them. If Water, Air and the like are, Mentof the 
as some people hold, matter for the natural bodies, chapter 4, 
there must be either one or two or more than two of Hosal. 
them. Now they cannot all of them be one (for °vidence. 
example, they cannot all be Air or Water or Fire or 
Earth), because change is into contraries.? For if 
they were all Air, then, if Air continues to exist, 
“alteration” will take place and not coming-to-be. 
Furthermore, no one holds that Water is at the same 
time also Air or any other element. There will, then, 
be a contrariety (or difference), and the other member 
of this contrariety will belong to some other element, 
for example, heat will belong to Fire. Fire, however, 
will certainly not be “ hot air”; for such a change is 
an “ alteration”’ and also is not observed to happen. 
Another reason, too, is that, if Air is to be produced 
from Fire, it will be due to the changing of heat into 
its contrary. This contrary, therefore, will belong 
to Air, and Air will be something cold ; hence it is 
impossible for Fire to be “ hot air,” for, in that case, 


» ¢.g., if Air isto alter into Fire, we must assign one of a 
pair of contrary qualities to Air and the other to Fire. 


285 


ARISTOTLE 
332_a A ” ” > > 
\ ” / ‘ ‘ 
Kal yvypov €ota. dAdo tu ap’ auddrepa To adro 
” 2) oe 7 
€orat, Kal GAAn Tis VAN KoWwy. 
c S > ‘ Ao ‘ c , i > ” 
O 8 adros Adyos epi amdvrwy, tt ovK EoTW 
a / > = \ 4 ? A 29> » / 
20 €v TovTwy e€ ob Ta TdvTA. Ov pv odd aAdAo Ti 
ye Tapa Tatra, olov écov TL depos Kab VdaTos 7 
dépos Kal mupds, aépos pev TaxvTEepov Kal Tupds, 
tav S€ AemTdTEpov: EoTar yap anp Kal mip éexeivo 
per’ evavTidtyTos* aAAa. orépynois TO ETEpov TAY ev- 
avtiwv: war odk evdexeTrar povodobar exeivo ovdE- 
25 MOTE, WoTTEp Paci TES TO ATTELPOV Kal TO TEPLEXOV. 
dpolws apa otwdy TovTwy 7 ovdev. 
Ei ody pndev aicbyrev ye mpdétepov TovTwr, Tad- 
Ta av ein TavTa. avayKn Toivuv 7 del pevovTa Kal 
dpetaBAnra eis aAAnAa, 7) petaBdAdovra, Kal 7 
dmavra, ) Ta pev Ta 8 Ov, WoTep ev TH Tipraiw 
30 [lAdrwv éypayev. dru prev rtoivuy petabdadAew 
> / > ” / , a > > 
avayKn eis GAAnAa, Séderxtar mpdétepov* dtu 8 ody 
¢ / / »” > ” ” , 
dpolws taxéws aGAXo €€ dAdAov, cipnra mporepor, 
ért Ta pev €xovta avpBodov Oarrov yiverar e& 
> 7 \ > > ” , > \ 
aAAjAwv, Ta 8 odk Exovta Bpadvrepov. «t pev 
/ +e > / , > \ > “a / 
rolvuy 4 evavTioTns pia éeoti Kal? jv petaBddA- 
35 Aovow, avayKn Svo «iva: 7 yap vAn TO pécov 





@ Aristotle’s apart dAn. 

» i.e. without having some quality attached to it. 

¢ This was the doctrine of Anaximander. 

4 The ‘ boundless ’’ cannot exist without being qualified 
by acontrary ; if it is qualified by a contrary, it is one of the 


elements. 
¢ i.e. there can be no simple bodies but Earth, Air, Fire 
and Water. ? Timaeus 54 B-p. 9 331 a 12 ff. 


h See 331 a 23 ff. and note. 
286 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, 8 ae 


the same thing will be hot and cold. Both Fire and 
Air will, therefore, be something else which is the 
same, that is, there will be some other “ matter ” @ 
which is common to both. 

The same argument holds good of all the elements 
and shows that there is no single one of them from 
which all are derived. Yet neither is there anything 
other than these from which they come, for example, 
an intermediate between air and water (coarser than 
Air, but finer than Water) or between Air and Fire 
(coarser than Fire, but finer than Air). For the 
intermediate will be Air and Fire with the addition 
of a pair of contraries ; but one of the contraries will 
be a privation, so that it is impossible for the inter- 
mediate to exist by itself,” as some people ° declare 
that the “ boundless ”’ or “ all-embracing ”’ exists ; it 
is, therefore, one of the elements (it does not matter — 
which), or nothing.? 

If, therefore, there is nothing—nothing perceptible 
at any rate—prior to the four elements, these must 
be all that there are’; it follows, therefore, neces- 
sarily, that they must either persist and be unable 
to change into one another, or they must undergo 
change, either all of them or some of them only, as 
Plato wrote in the Timaeus.’ Now it has been shown 
above ’ that they must change into one another ; 
and it has previously been stated that they do not 
come-to-be equally quickly from one another, because 
elements which have a corresponding quality ” come- 
to-be more quickly out of one another, while those 
which have not this do so more slowly. If, therefore, 
the contrariety, in virtue of which they change, is 
one, the elements must be two ; for the matter, which 
is imperceptible and inseparable, is the intermediate 


287 


332 b 


a) 


10 


15 


20 


ARISTOTLE 


> / > \ > / > \ A /, 
avaio§ntos otca Kal aydwpiotos. eézel 5é TrAciw 
e ~ ww 4 a“ i > / 4 > 
oparat ovra, dvo av elev ai eAdyiora. bo 8 
+ > el / > \ / id 
dvrwy ody oldv Te Tpia elvar, GAAd Téocapa, wWo- 
mep daiverar: Tooadra: yap at ovluyior €€ yap 
ovody Tas d¥o0 advvatov yevéobar dud TO evavTias 
elvar aAAjAaus. 

A \ s / ” / o > 

Ilepit pev obv trovtTwv eipnrar mpdrepov: ote 8 
emretd1) petaBdAdrovow «is dAAnAa, addvarov apyyv 
Twa elvar adt@v 7) emi TO akpw 7} péeow, ex THVOE 
~ > ‘\ A Ly i »* y ’ ; ” a 
O7jAov. emt prev ovv ToOis aKpows OvVK EOTAL, OTL 
mip €oTa } yn TavTa: Kai 6 adTos Adyos TH Pavat 
€x Tupos 7) yhs elvar mdavra: ote 8° ovde peaor, 
a ~ \ dA \ A >] ~ / 
oTep Soke’ Ticlv ap pev Kat eis Top petabadAew 
Kal eis Vowp, Vdwp Sé Kal eis aépa Kal eis yy, 


ra 8 €syara ovkért eis aAAnAa ex Tavde SHAov* 


Sei prev yap orhva Kal pr) eis ametpov TobTO tevat 

> > > / >J? c / + \ 77s / 

en” evleias ef’ ExdTEpa’ a7reLpoL yap at EevavTLo- 
| pee | ol e \ ” ~ 27? K WA 

myTes em Tod évos EoovTa. yh ef wo IT, vdwp 

~ > 

ef’ & Y, anp ef & A, wip ef @ Il. ef d) 70 A 

/ > \ \ > , ” ~ 

peraBdAre eis to II Kai Y, evavtidrns €ora THY 
” ~ / \ / / 

All. éorw ratra AevKdtns Kat peAavia. mdAw 

el eis TO Y tO A, €otar GAA’ od yap Tadro To Y 

kat Il. éorw dé Enpdoryns Kal dypdryns, TO pev 

= Enpdrns, 7d S¢ Y dypdryns. odKodv et pev péver 

A Le ¢ / \ LA ¢ \ ‘ , > 

TO AevKdv, brapfer TO VOwp bypov Kal AevKov, ek 
A 

Sé py, péeAav €ora 70 Bdwp: eis Tavavtia yap 7) 
, > / ” ”“ A ‘ ” /r i 

petaBoAy. avayKkn apa 7 AevKov 7 péAav elvar 


1 é« t@vde SiAov add. Joachim. 





@ Bk. II. chs. 2 and 8. 
288 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 5 


between them. But since the elements are seen 
to be more than two, the contrarieties would be at 
least two; but if the latter are two, the elements 
cannot be three but must be four, as is evidently the 
case; for the couples are of that number, since, 
though six are possible, two of these cannot occur 
because they are contrary to one another. 

These matters have been dealt with before,* but 
that, when the elements change into one another, 
it is impossible for any one of them, whether at the 
end or in the middle of the series, to be a “‘ source ’”’ 
is clear from the following considerations. There 
will be no “ source ” at the ends, since they will all 
be Fire or Earth; and this is the same as arguing 
that all things are derived from Fire or Earth. That 
the “‘ source ”’ cannot be in the middle either—as some 
people hold that Air changes both into Fire and into 
Water, and Water both into Air and into Earth, while 
the end-elements are not further changed into one 
another—is clear from these considerations. There 
must be a halt, and the process cannot continue in 
either direction in a straight line to infinity ; for, 
otherwise, the number of contrarieties belonging to 
a single element will be infinite. Let E stand for 
Earth, W for Water, A for Air and F for Fire. Then 
(a), if A changes into F and W, there will be a con- 
trariety attaching to AF. Let this contrariety be 
whiteness and blackness. Again (6), if A changes 
into W, there will be another contrariety ; for W is 
not the same as F’. Let this contrariety be dryness (D) 
and moisture (M). If, then, the whiteness persists, 
Water will be moist and white ; if not, Water will be 
black, for change is into contraries. Water, therefore, 
must be either white or black. Let it, then, be the 


t 289 


332 b 


25 


30 


35 
333 a 


oO 


ARISTOTLE 


\ ° ” \ A ~ e , / 
TO vowp. €aTw 51) TO TpP@Tov. opowws Towvv 
‘ ~ i" ¢€ / € /, ” 4 
kal t@ Il ro & brdpker » Enpdryns. Eorat apa 
‘ ~ ~ \ \ > \ @& > Ld 
kal t@ Il t@ mupt petaBodAr cis TO Vdwp- evavria 
yap umdpyeu TO pev yap Top TO mp@rov péeAav jv, 
” A /, A > WA ¢ /, ww A 
érecra Se Enpdv, 70 8 vdwp Bypov, emevta Se 
/ \ \ hid a > > / ” 
Aevkdv. davepov 87) Sti maow e& addAjAwy EoTat 

€ 7, \ > / , Ld \ > ~ 
4 petaBoAn, Kat emi ye TovTwv, oT Kal ev TO VT 
lod ~ € 4 ‘ A ‘ , / ‘ 
Th yh taapEe ta Aowra Kai dvo ovpPoda, To 
pédav Kal TO bypov: Taira yap od ovvdedvacrai 
TwWs. 

7 > > + b) e/ Si" \EF ¢ 

Oru 8 eis dmeipov ody ofdv 7” iévar, Omep peA- 
Ajoavres Sei~ew emi Tobro Eumpoobev HAPopev, d57- 
Nov ex Tavde. ei yap maAw To rip, ed @ II, ets 
dAXo peraBare? Kal pr) dvaxdpufer, olov eis ro Y, 
> / ~ \ ‘ ~ ” e 4, 
evavTioTns Tis TH Tupi Kal T@ VY adAn strdpFe 
Tov eipnpevwv: oddevi yap TO abto bmdKetTat TOV 
rYATII ro V. é€orw 8) 7h pev Il 7rd K, 7@ Se 
WY 76D. 76 8) K wéow trdpée tots T Y A I> 
peraBdAdovor yap eis aAAnAa. adda yap Tobro 

\ ” / Py / > > > a nA 
pev €oTrw pjmw Sedevypévov: add’ éxeivo diAov, 
étt et maAw To WY’ eis GAXo, dAAn evavtioTyns Kal 

~ ¢ 4 \ ~ ‘ 7 e / > 
t@ VY tadpée cat tH mupl rH Il. cpoiws 6 
del pera TOO TpooTiepevov evavridtys Tis brap&er 
trois €umpoobev, wor ei ameipa, Kal evavTidTnTEs 
dmeipo. TH evi drdpEovaw. ei dé Todro, od« Eorat 

” ¢ 57 > \ ” / / / 
ovTe dpicacbar oddéev ovTe yevéoBar Sejoe yap, 
ei GAXo éora €€ aAdov, Tooavras SueEeADeiv ev- 


, vt om ’ ¢ > > ” \ 
10 GVTLOTYTAS, KAL ETL mAelous, WOT €lS EVLA [LEV 


290 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 5 


first of these. Similarly, D will also belong to F ; there 
fore a change into Water will be possible also for Fire 
(F) ; for it has qualities which are contrary to those of 
Water, since Fire was first black and then dry, while 
Water was first moist and then white. It is clear, then, 
that the change of all the elements from one another 
will be possible, and that, in the above examples, E. 
(Earth) will possess also the two remaining “ corres- 
ponding qualities,” blackness and moisture (for these 
have not yet been in any way coupled together), 
That the process cannot go on to infinity—which 
was the thesis that we were about to prove when we 
digressed to the above discussion—will be clear from 
the following considerations. If Fire (F) is to change 
in turn into something else and not to revert again, 
for example into Z, another contrariety other than 
those already mentioned will belong to Fire and Z ; 
for it has been laid down that Z is not the same as 
any of the four, E, W, A and F. Let K belong to 
F, and ® to Z; then K will belong to EWAF; for 
they change into one another. But, let us admit 
that this has not yet been demonstrated ; yet this is 
evident that, if Z in turn is to be changed into 
another element, another contrariety will belong 
both to Z and also to Fire (F). Similarly, with 
each addition which is made, a fresh contrariety will 
attach to the preceding elements of the series, so 
that if the elements are infinite in number, infinitely 
numerous contrarieties will also attach to the single ele- 
ment. But if this is the case, it will be impossible to 
define any element and for any element to come-to-be. 
For if one is to result from another, it will have to 
pass through so many contrarieties and then through 
still more. Therefore (a), change into some elements 


291 


333 a 


15 


20 


25 


30 


ARISTOTLE 


207 >” , @ >» ee , 
ovdémor éorat petaBorAn, ofov et dmeipa Ta peTatv: 
> 4, > ” ” A a ” > 2»Q> 
avayKn 8’, eimep ameipa Ta oToLxeia* Ett 8 Ovd 
e€ dépos eis Trip, ef dmeupor at evavTioTynTes. ‘yive- 
Tat d€ Kal TdvTa ev: avayKn yap macas drdapxew 
Tois pev Katw Tod II ras THv avwlev, rovros Se 
Tas Tov Katwhev, wore TavTa ev EoTaL. 

6. Oavpdoeve 8 av tis Ta&v AeyovTwv TrEciw 
évos Ta OTOLYela THY GwWEaTwWY WoTE jA7) [ETA- 
Badrew eis adAnAa, Kabdmep "Euredoxdrys doi, 
mOs evdexerar A€yew adrois clvar ovpPAnta ta 
oTo.yeta. Kaitou rA€Eyeu OVTW: “ tabra yap lod Te 
mavta.”’ et pev odv KaTa TO TOGOV, avayKn TAadTO 
te elvar brdpyov dzact Tots acupPAntots @ pe- 
Tpotvrat, olov et e€ vdatos KoTUAns elev aépos 
déxa* TO adTo Ti Hv dpa audw, ei peTpeirar TA 

> nn > \ A 4 \ \ A ‘A 
ait@. et S€ pr ovTw Kara TO Toadv oupBAnTa 
e ‘ >? lol > > Ld / > 
ws mooov ek rogod, aA dcov dvvatat, olov et 

4 Ad w 4 4 \ / >7 
KoTUAn vdaTos loov Sdvatar pyew Kal déKa aépos, 
Kal oUTWS KATA TO TOGOV OdX 7 TOGOV avpPAnTa, 
> > vd / ” 7 Nn ‘ \ a ~ 
GAN’ 4 Svvavrai Te. ely 8 av Kal py TH TOD TO- 
cod pétpw ovpPdrAcoBar tas Suvdpers, aAAd Kar’ 
> / e ¢€ / ‘ / / ‘ 
avadoyiav, olov ws Ttode AevKov Tdd€ OHepudv. TO 

~ > 
8’ ws rode onpaiver ev prev ToL TO Spowov, ev SE 
T00@ TO toov. artorov 51 daiverar, et TA owpara 
> 4, od 4 > / / > 
dpeTaBAnra ovta put) avadoyia ovpPAnrad é€orw, 





4 Fr. 17 line 27 (Diels). 

» i.e. if one element is as hot as another is white, they have 
“by analogy ” the same amount, one of heat, the other of 
whiteness. 


292 





COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 5-6 


will never take place, for instance, if the interme- 

diates are infinite in number (and they must be so if 

the elements are infinite): and further (6), there 

will not even be a change from Air into Fire, if the 
contrarieties are infinitely many: and (c) all the 
elements become one, for all the contrarieties of the 
elements above F must belong to those below F, and 

vice versa; they will all, therefore, be one. 

6. One may well express astonishment at those Examina- 

who, like Empedocles, declare that the elements of Hgnana 


refutation 


bodies are more than one (and, therefore, do not of the 
2 theory of 
change into one another), and ask them how they Empedo- 


cles, who 
can assert that the elements are comparable. Yet (%Wi0 | 


Empedocles says, “‘ For these are all not only that his four 


equal. . . .” Now (a) if what is meant is that they (ments, 
are equal in amount, all the “ comparables ’’ must all be trans- 


possess something identical by means of which they into one 


are measured, if, for instance one pint of Water is 2™°ther 
equivalent to ten pints of Air, in which case both have 
always had something identical about them, since 
they were measured by the same standard. But 
(6) if they are not comparable in amount (in the sense 
that so much of the one is produced from so much 
of the other), but in power (for instance, if a pint of 
water and ten pints of air have an equal cooling 
power), even so they are comparable in amount, 
though not gua amount, but qua so much power. 
And (c) it would be possible also to compare their 
power not by the measure of quantity, but by an 
“analogy ’”’: for example, “‘ as X is hot, so Y is white.” ? 
But “ analogy,” while it signifies similarity in quality, 
signifies equality in quantity. Now it is obviously 
absurd that the bodies, though unchangeable, are 
comparable not merely by “ analogy,’”’ but by the 


293 


333 a 


35 
333 b 


10 


ARISTOTLE 


2\\\ ror A , A A ” 1 
aAAa pétpw tav dSuvdpewv Kat TO elvar iows 
a] ‘ ”“ ¢ 7 2 \ St Vy Bee vA 
Eppov 7 Opoiws® updos Tocovdl Kal aépos troAAa- 
mAdo.ov' TO yap avTo TAciov TH opmoyeves evar 
Towodrov e€eu Tov Adyov. 
> A \ 29> ” a“ ” > > 
Ada pv 005’ av&jois av ein Kar’ *Epme- 
/ > > an” \ / \ \ ” 
dokréa, add’ 7 Kata mpdobeow: mupl yap avéer 
\ ~ ce ” A \ A , / 3 
To Tip: “avEer dé xOwv pev aderepov dSéeuas, 
> / > ] / ” ~ \ / ~ 
aifépa 8° aifyjp.”’ tatra d€ mpooriferar: Soxe? 
> > 4 ” \ > Spl 4 A \ 
8’ ody ovtws aveobar ta ad€avepeva. odd dé 
xareruitepov amodobvat tepi yeveoews THS KaTa 
dvow. Ta yap ywopeva dvoc. mavTa yiverar 7 
esa | egv ww € sds. \ /, \ A A A > A ‘ 
del WOL 7 Ws em TO TOAV, TA SE Tapa TO Gael Kal 
ws éml to moAd and tadtoudtov Kal amo TUyNs. 
/ > ‘ ww ~ ? > 4 ” nn a 23% 
ti obv TO aitiov Tob €€ avOpdmov avOpwrov 7 dei 
n“ ¢ PAN ‘ / ‘ > ~ lot ‘ > \ 
7) ws emt TO Tod, Kal €k Too mupod mupov aAda 
\ ? / ”“ / 2A eg ~ > ~ > 
pn) eAaiav; % Kal, €dv wWdt ouvTeOH, doTodv; od 
\ Lid ” Abo Oe / 9? Aq 
yap Omws etvxe aovveAovrwv oddev yivera, Kal? a 
> re a > \ / / / Ss 7, 
exeivos dynow, adda Adyw Twi. Ti obv TodTwWY 
ww > \ \ ~ Bal ~ > A \ 299 
airiov; od yap 87 mip ye 7H yh. GAAd pry odd 
% piAia Kat TO veiKos* aovyKpicews yap pLdvov, TO 
de dvaxpicews airiov. todro 8 €or 7 odoia 7 
éxdotouv, GAN’ od povov “ wikis te diddAAakis Te 
, ” a > -~ f 4 > r PA 
puyevtwr,”” womep exeivds dynow. Tvyn 8 emi 
td > / > > > /, ” ‘ 
tovtwy ovoudletat, add’ od Adyos: Ear yap ju- 
xOfjvar ws ervxev. Tadv 8) doe dvTwy airiov 


1 tows: toov codd. 2 duoiws E: duouv FHL. 
3 §éuas H: yévos EFL. 4 xaba EHL: xaOdzep F. 





* Empedocles, fr. 37 (Diels). 
294 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 6 


measure of their powers ; that is, that so much Fire 
and many times as much Air are comparable because 
they are equally or similarly hot. For the same 
thing, if greater in amount, will, by being of the same 
kind, have its ratio increased correspondingly. 
Further, according to Empedocles, growth, too, 
would be impossible except by addition : for in his 
view Fire increases by Fire and “ Earth increases its 
own body, and ether increases ether,” “ and these are 
additions ; and it is not generally held that things 
which increase do so in this way. And it is much 
more difficult for him to give an account of coming-to- 
be by a natural process. For the things which come- 
to-be naturally all come-to-be, either always or 
generally, in a particular way, and exceptions or 
violations of the invariable or general rule are the 
results of chance and luck. What, then, is the reason 
why man always or generally comes-to-be from man, 
and why wheat (and not an olive) comes-to-be from 
wheat? Or does bone come-to be, if the elements are 
put together in a certain manner? For, according to 
Empedocles, nothing comes-to-be by their coming 
together by chance but by their coming together 
in a certain proportion. What, then, is the cause of 
this? It is certainly not Fire or Earth; but neither 
is it Love and Strife, for the former is a cause of 
“association ”’ only and the latter of dissociation only. 
No: the cause is the substance of each thing and not 
merely, as he says, “a mingling and separation of 
things mingled” ® ; and chance, not proportion, is the 
name applied to these happenings : for it is possible 
for things to be mixed by chance. The cause, then, 
of things which exist naturally is that they are in 


®’ Empedocles, fr. 8 (Diels) ; see also above, 314 b 7 f. 
295 


333 b 


ARISTOTLE 


A M4 ” A ¢ ¢ / 4 4 \ 

TO ovTws Exew, Kal 1) Exdorov Pais avTn, TEpi 
29 \ fs 2O.\ + \ 4 / 

Hs ovdev A€yer. ovdev apa Tept dicews Heyer. 

> A 34 \ \ > ~ ‘ > / 3 A \ 

GAAa pv Kal TO €d TobTo Kal ayablov: 6 Se THv 


20 pity povov émawel. Kaito. Ta ye aToryeia dea- 


25 


30 


334 a 


/ > \ a > 74 ¢ / \ / / 
Kpivet od TO vetkos, GAA’ 7 diAia ra hdoer mpoTEpa. 
Tob Oeot: Oeoi S€ Kai Tabra. 

pl f A ‘ 7, ¢ ~ / > ‘ 

tu b€ Tept KwHoews amA@s Aéyer: od yap 
¢ ‘ > a / ¢ / \ \ a ~ > 
ixavov eimeiv dudte 7) piAia Kat TO velKos Kuvel, €b 
\ a > Ss / \ /, / / 
pn tobr Hw diria elvac TO Kwioer Towadi, veiKet 
A \ / A EA a“ c fr ” e / 
dé TO Toiadi. der odv 7) dpicacba 7 brofécIar 
 amodetEa, 7 axpiB@s 7 padakds, 7 aAAws ye 
” eke 3 \ / \ / \ A 7 
mws. é7t 8 ere daiverar kai Bia Kat mapa pvow 
KWwovpeva TA OWpaTa, Kal Kata dvaw (olov ro 
lol + \ > / / \ / ~ \ / \ 
mip dvw pev od Bia, Kdtw Se Bia), ro 5€ Bia ro 
\ , > / ” A ‘ / ” »” 
Kata vow evartiov, é€ott 5€ To Bia, coTw apa 

\ \ \ /, a 4 > ¢ / 
Kal TO KaTa pvow Kwetoba. tadrTynv odv 7 drAia 
Kweli, ) ov; Tovvartiov yap THY yy Kdtw* Kal 
duaxpioes Eovkev: Kal paAdAov 70 veiKos altiov Tis 

\ 4 / ”“ c / ov \ i 
Kata dvow Kwioews 7 7 pidia. wore Kal drAwWs 
mapa dvow 7 PiAia av ein paAdov. andAds Se «i 
un 7 piAia 7) TO veiKos Kwel, adtav TOV Cwudtwv 

b] / / , > 29 \ / > > »” 
ovdepia Kivnois é€orw oddé€ povy. add’ aromov. 
ére 5€ Kal gdaiverat Kwovpeva’ dvexpwe pev yap 
\ a > / &° mv ¢ Hae > € A ~ 
TO vetkos, nvEexOn dvw 6 aldyp ody bd Tob 

, oom ee , e > 4 , 
veikous, GAN ore pev dnow WoTep amd TvyNs 

1 kdtrw EH: avw FL. 


@ Although it is entitled wepi Dicews. 
> i.e. natural motion. 





296 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 6 


such and-such a condition, and this is what constitutes 
the nature of each thing, about which he says nothing, 
There is nothing “‘ About the Nature of Things ” in his 
treatise. And yet it is this which is the excellence 
and the good of each thing, whereas he gives all the 
credit to the mixing process. (Yet it is not Strife 
but Love that dissociates the elements which are by 
nature prior to God, and they are also gods.) 
Further, his account of motion is superficial. For 
it is not enough to say that Love and Strife move 
things, unless Love has been given a certain faculty 
of movement and Strife a certain other. He should, 
then, have either defined or laid down or demon- 
strated their powers of movement either accurately 
or loosely, or at any rate in some manner. Further- 
more, since the bodies are seen to move by compul- 
sion (that is, unnaturally) and also naturally (for 
example, Fire moves upwards without compulsion, 
but downwards by compulsion), and that which is 
natural is contrary to that which is by compulsion, 
and movement by compulsion actually occurs, it 
follows that natural motion also occurs. Is this, then, 
the motion which Love sets going, or not? No: for, 
on the contrary, it ? moves the Earth downwards and 
resembles “ dissociation,” and Strife rather than Love 
is the cause of natural motion; and so, generally 
speaking, Love rather than Strife would be contrary 
to nature, and unless Love or Strife is actually setting 
them in motion, the simple bodies themselves have’ 
no motion or rest at all. But this is strange ; and, 
moreover, they are actually seen to move. For 
although Strife caused dissociation, it was not by 
Strife that the ether was carried upwards, but at one 
time Empedocles talks as if it were due to chance, 


297 


ARISTOTLE 
334 a 
ce M4 A / / / / > 
(‘“ottw yap avvexupce Oéwy tore, modAdKe 8 
A ”) £55 / / A ~ A 
aAAws’’), ore dé dynow meduKevat TO TIP avw 
/ ¢ > 217 poet 3 ~ A / 

5 dépecbar, 6 8 aifyp, dyai, ““ waxphor kara xOova 
, ¢7 ” ¢ \ \ \ , ae , 
dvero pitas.’ aya de Kat TOV KOGpLOV OLoLWS 
éyew nol emi te Tod veiKous viv Kal mpdrepov 

onl ~ ~ ‘ 
ent THs dirias. ti odv €otl TO KWobv mpOTov Kal 
” a / ? A \ ¢€ / \ A 
airiov THs Kwhoews; od yap 817 4 pidia Kal TO 
a ~ > 
vetkos, GAA Twos KWwHoews TabTa aiTia, el EoTW” 
exeivo apx7. 
” \ ‘ > ¢ \ > a“ , n” 
10 “Aromov 8€ Kai ei 7 yuyt eK TOV oToLYELwY 7) 
~ ¢ lod ~ lol 
év Tt adt@v* at yap dAAowoes at THs buys THs 
€sovrat, olov To povatkov elvat Kal mdaAw apougor, 
” / a“ / ~ \ bid >’ \ ~ € 
H pvnpn 7 AnOn; SHAov yap ore et pev Tip 7 
poyn, Ta 740n brdpbea adbrH doa wupt H mop* et 
Sé puxrov, Ta Gwpatikd TovTwv 8 oddev cwpa- 
15 TUKOV. 
> A \ \ A fa 4 ” > ‘ 
7. "AAAG epi pev totrwv ETépas Eepyov €oTi 
fewpias. epi dé Tv orovyeiwy e& dv TA owpara 
avveaTnKev, daots pev Sox? Te elvat KoWwov 7 jLeTa- 
/ > »” > / > / , 
BddAdew eis dAAndAa, avdyKn et Odrepov rovtwv, 
‘ / / a \ ! ~ > 
kat Odrepov ovpBaivew: door S€ pH Tovwodow €& 
> / / > € > c / \ ¢ > 
GAAjAwv yéveow pnd ws e& Exdotov, TAHY ws EK 
20 rolyov mAWbovs, aroTov mas e& exeivwv EgovTat 
odpkes Kal doTd Kat TOv GAAwy dtiobv. Exe Be 
‘ , > , \ a“ > > /, 
TO Aeydpevov amopiav Kal tots e€ aAAjAwy yev- 


1 ef dor. EHJ : €orw F: €f 8 €ore. 





@ Fr. 53 (Diels). » Fr. 54 (Diels). 
298 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 6-7 


saying, “ For thus in its rush it encountered them 
then, but oft-times in other wise,’ * whereas on 
another occasion he says that it is the nature of Fire 
to be borne upwards, and ether, he says, “ sank with 
long roots into the Earth.”’® At the same time he 
also says that the Earth is in the same condition now 
under the rule of Strife as it was formerly under that 
of Love. What,then,is the “ prime mover”’ and cause 
of motion? It certainly is not Love and Strife ; 
but these are the causes of a secondary motion, if 
the “ prime mover ” is the original source. 

It is also strange that the soul should consist of the 
elements or be one of them ; for how, then, will the 
“alterations” in the soul take place? How, for 
example, could the change from being musical to 
being unmusical occur, or could memory or forget- 
fulness occur? For evidently, if the soul is Fire, only 
such effects will be produced upon it as can be pro- 
duced by Fire qua Fire ; whereas, if it is a mixture 
of elements, only the corporeal effects will be pro- 
duced ; but no one of these effects is corporeal. 

7. The discussion, however, of these questions is 


the task of another investigation. But, as regards 


the elements of which bodies are composed, those 
who think that they all have something in common 
or that they change into each other, if they hold one 
of these views, must necessarily hold the other. For 
those, on the other hand, who do not make them 
come-to-be out of each other nor one from another 
taken singly (except in the sense that bricks come- 
to-be out of a wall), there is the paradox as to how 
flesh and bones and any of the other compounds will 
result from the elements. This suggestion involves 
a difficulty also for those who generate the elements 


299 


How single 
odies are 
combined 
to form 
compounds. 


334 a 


25 


30 


3 


a 


334 b 


o 


ARISTOTLE 


~ ~ ° 
vow, tiva tpdmov yiverar e€ adra@v Eerepdov Tt 
> > / / > e ” > \ MA 
map atvtd. Aéyw 8 olov éorw ek mupos vdwp 
Kat é€k tovrov yiveobau mop: gote yap Te KoWwoV 
TO Urokeievov. aAAa 57) Kal cap e€ adrav 
/ ~ an / 
yiverar Kal pveAds: tadra 81 yiverau THs; €ket- 
\ ad , ¢ > ~ / 
vos Te yap tots A€yovow ws "EpsedoxdAys tis 
” / > / \ 4 / 
éorau TpdT0s; avayKn yap otvOcow elvar Kabamep 
> / ‘ U lal ‘ \ ~ A 
éx mAWOwv Kat AiQwv Totyos: Kal TO piypa Be 
tobro €x owlopéevwy pev €oTa TOV oToLxeiwr, 
\ \ \ > ” / M4 
KaTa puKpa de map’ aAAnda ovyKeysevwv. ovTwW 
87) cdpé Kal tOv dAAwy exactov. ovpPaiver 51) 
pi) €€ Strovotv pépovs capKos yivecbar mip Kai 
id a > ~ / > nn” > \ A 
bdswp, Wovep ex Knpod yévour” av ek pev Tovdi 
tod pepovs odaipa, mupapis 8 €€ adAov twos’ 
> > > /, , ? ¢ / ¢ 4 , 
GAN’ évedéxeTd ye e& Exatépov éxdrepov yevecbar. 
robro jev 81) TodTov yiverau TOV TpdTOV eK THs 
\ ? ¢ ~ ” a on > U / 
aapkos e& otovoby dudw: tots 8’ exetvas Aéyovow 
obk evdéxerat, GAN’ ws ex Toixov Aifos Kai 7AWHos, 
¢ / >? »” , \ / c / \ 
éxdrepov e& dAdov Tomo0v Kal pépous. dpolws dé 
Kal Tots mowbor piav avt@v vAnv exer TWA aTo- 
/ ~ ” > > / ~ \ 
piav, 7@s €orar Te e& apudotépwv, olov yuxpod Kat 
a * \ ‘ ~ > / > c ‘ > 
Oepuot 7) mupds Kal ys. «tf ydp eorw 7 aapé €& 
> cal ‘ / >? / > - 4 
dpdoiv Kal pydérepov exeivwv, und’ ad avvbeas 
owlopévwv, ti deimerar mAnv DAnv elvar TO €& 
300 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 7 


from each other, namely, in what manner does any- 
thing else other than the elements themselves come- 
to-be out of them. The following is an example of 
what I mean: Water can come-to-be out of Fire 
and Fire out of Water (for their substratum is some- 
thing common to both), but flesh, too, and marrow 
come-to-be out of them ; how do they come-to-be ? 
What manner of coming-to-be is ascribed to them 
by those who hold such a view as that of Empedocles ? 
They must maintain that the process is composition, 
just as a wall comes-to-be from bricks and stones ; 
moreover, this “ mixture ”’ will consist of the elements 
preserved intact but placed side by side with one 
another in minute particles. This, supposedly, is 
what happens in the case of flesh and each of the 
other compounds. The result is that Fire and Water 
do not come-to-be out of any and every part of the 
flesh ; for example, while a sphere might come-to-be 
from one: part of a piece of wax and a pyramid from 
another, yet it was possible for either shape to have 
come-to-be out of either part of the material. This, 
then, is how coming-to-be occurs when both Fire and 
Water come-to-be out of any part of the flesh. But 
for those who hold the above view this is impossible, 
but the process can only take place as stone and brick 
come-to-be out of a wall, that is, each out of a different 
place and part. Similarly, a difficulty arises also for 
those who make out that the elements have a single 
matter, namely, how anything will result from two 
of them taken together, for instance, cold and hot 
or Fire and Earth. For if flesh consists of both and 
yet is neither of them, and again is not a compound 
in which they are preserved intact, what possibility 
remains except that the result of their composition 


301 


334 b 


1 


o 


oO 


i 


20 


25 


ARISTOTLE 


> , € \ / A « / an 
éxelvwv; 1 yap Barépov dbopa 7 Odrepov move? 7 
TH vAnV. 
*Ap’ odv éreid7) eort Kal wadAov Kai Artov Depyov 
\ / 7 \ ¢ ~ > / > / 
Kal yvypov, Grav pev amAds 7 Odrepov evredexeia, 
4, f »” hid \ \ ~ > > 
Suvdper Odrepov €orau: Stay dé pt) TavTeA@s, GAA 
€ \ \ / e \ 4 ‘ \ 
cis pev Deppov yuxpdv, ads dé yuxpov Oeppov dia 
A / / \ ¢ ‘ > 7 / 
76 puyvipeva pbeipew tas drepoxas aAAjAwy, TOTE 
ov0 4 bAN Eorae ove exeivwy TaV evavTiov Exd- 
> , € ~ > \ la ‘ A \ 
repov evredcxela amAds, adAd perakd: Kara dé TO 
8 / ~ t 0 ‘ “ ‘ x“ > uj 
vvdper paAAov elvar Feppov 7 yuxpov 7 TobvayTiov, 
Kata TodTov Tov Adyov SimAaciws BHeppov Svvdper 
an” / ” , ” > a /, 

3) wvypov, 7) TpitAaciws, 7 Kar’ dAdov tpomov 
~ ” \ / Ye 2-2 ~ > 
tovotrov ; eaTat 81) pixJevtwv TaAN’ €x TOV Evay- 

~ ‘ a 
riwy 7) T&Y oToLxelwy, Kal Ta oToLXEla e€ EKEtvwn 
$ , ”, > 4 Se ¢ ¢ iP > ‘ 
uvdper Ts OvTwr, odx OVTW SE ws 7 VAN, adAa 
A 
Tov elpnpévov TpoTov’ Kal EoTw ovTw pev pitts, 
\ / 
exeivws 5é vAn TO ywopevov. erel 5€ Kal Tdoxet 
‘ > a 
ravavtla Kata TOV ev Tots mpwTois Svopiopov: 
4 
gore yap TO evepyeia Oeppov Suvdwer yuypov Kat 
TO évepyeia yvypov Suvduer Oepudv, date av 42) 
/ > ” 
iodln, peraBdAdAer eis aMAnAa. cpoiws S€é Kal én 
~ / ~ 
tov dAAwv evavtiwv: Kal mp@tov ottw Ta oTot- 
yeta petaBdrre, ex S€ rodtwy adpKes Kal dora 
A lol A A 
Kal Ta ToLabra, Tod pev Oeppod ywopevov yvy- 
~ ~ \ ~ ~ 
pod, Tod Se yuxpod Oepyod, drav mpos TO péoov 





@ It is difficult to see any meaning in the words and they 
should perhaps be omitted. 

» i.e. the case where one contrary destroys the other, 
(lines 6, 7). 

¢ See 323 b 1 ff., where the law of the reciprocal aetion- 
and-passion of contraries is stated. 


302 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 7 


is matter? For the passing-away of either of them 
produces either the other or the matter. 

Is the following a possible solution based on the 
fact that there are greater and less degrees in hot 
and cold? When one of them is actually in being 
without qualification, the other will be potentially 
in existence ; but when neither completely exists 
but (because they mix and destroy one another’s 
excesses) there is a hot which, for a hot, is cold, and 
a cold which, for a cold, is hot, then the result will be 
that neither their matter nor either of the two con- 
traries will be actually in existence without qualifica- 
tion but an intermediate, and according as it is 
potentially more hot than cold or, vice versa, it will 
possess a power of heating greater in proportion — 
whether double or treble or in some such ratio— 
than its power of cooling. The other bodies will 
result from the contraries (that is, from the elements) ¢ 
when mixed together, and the elements will result 
from the contraries existing somehow potentially— 
not in the sense in which matter exists potentially 
but in the manner already explained. Thus “ mix- 
ture ” takes place, whereas what comes-to-be in the 
other case ° is matter. But since the contraries also 
are acted upon according to the definition given in 
the first part of this treatise “—for the actually hot 
is potentially cold, and the actually cold is potentially 
hot, so that, unless the hot and cold are equalized, 
they change into one another (and the like happens 
in the case of the other contraries)—thus in the first 
place the elements are transformed ; but out of them 
flesh and bones and the like come-to-be when the hot 
is becoming cold and the cold becoming hot and they 
reach the mean, for at that point there is neither hot 


303 


334 b 


30 


3 
335 a 


Oo 


o 


10 


ARISTOTLE 


” > ~ A 2 / A A , A 
EAOn: evrabla yap ovdérepov, To d5é€ frécov todd 
Kat ovK adtaiperov. dpolws dé Kal To Enpov Kal 
bypov Kal Ta Towatra KaTad peadTHTa ToLovaL 
odpka Kal doTobv Kal TdaAda. 

8. “Amavra 5€ Ta puKTa owpata, doa TeEpl TOV 
~ > ~ 
Tob pécov Tomov eoTiv, e€ amavTwv ovyKerTaL TOV 
amA@v. yh pev yap evuTdpyet maou dia TO ExaoTov 
elvar pddAvora Kai mAciorov ev TH oixeiw TOTw, 

4 A \ \ ~ A © ik ‘ 4 
vdwp dé dia TO deity pev dpilecbar To advberov, 
povov 8 elvar Tav anAdv eddpiotov TO Vdwp, Et 
A a ~ ~ \ , 

dé Kal TH yhv dvev Tob bypod pr) Sivac8a ovp- 

~ > > 
pevew, GAAA Tobr’ elvar TO ovvexov: ei yap €&- 

/ / > 7. ‘ ¢ / / * 
aipeJein TeAéws e€ adris TO bypov, Svamimrou av. 
[A pev odv Kat tdwp dia tavras evuTapyer Tas 

\ lol > > ~ 
aitias, anp S5€ Kal mip, ott evavtia e€ori yh Kal 
Ad ~ A A hold ¢ \ AnD Ul > / 
BdaTu’ yi} pev yap aépr, Vdwp dé mupi evavriov eoriv, 
ws evdéxerar ovoiav ovoia évavriav elvat. ezrel 
i > 
ovv ai yevéoeis ex TOV evavTiwv eioiv, evuTdpyet 
d€ Odrepa dxpa Tay evavTiwv, avayKn Kal Odrepa 
evuTdpyew, wor’ ev dmavt. T@® ovvlérw mavTa Ta 
c ~ rR A a > ” ‘ ¢ ‘A 
avd evéorat. paptupeiv 8’ €orxe Kal 1 Tpody) 
a a > 
ExdoTwv' dmavTa pev yap tpéderar Tots adrois €& 
oe 
dvrep eoriv, davra dé mAcioot tpédeTrar. Kal yap 
¢ ba) / ey / / ~ a A 
dmep av dd€evev Evi povw tpépecbar, TH VdaTt TA 
/ ~ 

dutd, mAcioot Tpéderar’ pépikrar yap TH vdare 





@ j.e, the Earth as the centre of the universe. 

» i.e, because the region in which mixed bodies exist con- 
sists mainly of earth. 

° i.e. cold-dry (Earth) and cold-moist (Water). 

4 i.e, hot-moist (Air) and hot-dry (Fire). 


304 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 7-8 


nor cold. (The mean, however, has considerable 
extension and is not indivisible.) In like manner , 
also it is in virtue of being in a “‘mean”’ condition that 
the dry and the moist and the like produce flesh and 
bone and the other compounds. 

8. All the mixed bodies, which exist about the Every com- 
region of the centre,* are compounds of all the simple ie eae 4 
bodies. For Earth enters into their composition, ®! four 

. : . ple 
because every simple body exists specially and in the bodies as 


greatest quantity in its own place »; and Water forms jf enis, 


part of them, because that which is composite must 
have limits, and Water. is the only one of the simple 
bodies which is easily confined within limits, and 
furthermore, the Earth cannot remain coherent with- 
out moisture, and this is what holds it together ; for 
if the moisture were entirely removed from it, it 
would fall apart. 

Earth, therefore, and Water enter into the com- 
position of simple bodies for these reasons ; so also 
do Air and Fire because they are contraries of Karth 
and Water—Earth of Air, and Water of Fire, in the 
sense in which one substance can be contrary to 
another substance. Since, then, comings-to-be result 
from contraries, and one pair of extreme contraries 
is already present,’ the other pair? must also be 
present, so that all the simple bodies are found in 
every compound. The food of each compound serves 
to supply evidence of this ; for they are all nourished 
by foods which are identical with their constituents, 
and all are nourished by more than one food. For 
indeed the plants, which would seem to be nourished 
by one food only, namely, Water, are fed by more 
than one food, for there is Earth mixed with the 
Water—and this, too, is why farmers experiment by 


305 


335 a 


ARISTOTLE 


yi: 516 Kal of yewpyol meipdvrar pigavtes apdew. 


ix érret 8 early 7 pev tpodr) THs BAns, TO Se Tpedo- 


20 


3 


o 


“a 
a 


/ ~ & € \ \ ‘ 78 
pevov avverAnuevov TH VAN 7 bop Kal TO €ldos, 
evAoyov 78n TO povorv Tav amAGv owuaTwy TpE- 

A ~ € /, bl > / / 
decbar TO Tip amdvrwy e€ adAjAwy ywopuevwr, 
MaoTep Kal ot mpoTepor A€yovow: povov yap €aTt 
Kat padvora Tod cldovs TO Trip dia TO TepuKEevas 

/ A ‘ av °v A / > 
dépeabar mpos Tov dpov. éexactov dé mépuxKev ets 

A € a , t ¢ A \ \ \ 
tiv éavtod xwpav pépecbar: 4 S€ popdy Kai TO 
eldos dmdvtwv év Tots Opois. Ott pev odv amavTa 
Ta owpara €& amdavrwy ovveornKe TOV aTdAdv, 
elpnrau. . 

9. "Eel 8 €or a yevnta kat POapra, Kat 
4 yeveots Tuyxdver odca ev TH TEpi TO pédov TO- 
mw, AeKTéov TEpl TAdONS yevesews Opolws TOGAaL TE 

~ ¢ a 
Kal tives adris ai apyat pdov yap otrw Ta Kab’ 
éxaotov Yewpraopev, Otav trept tTav KabddAov dAd- 
Bwpev mp@rov. 
| = \ ‘ > \ ww \ lo / c 

Eliot obv Kai Tov apiOuov toa Kal T@ yever at 
avrat almep ev tois aidious Te Kal mpwTors* 7 peEV 

/ > ¢ Ld ¢ > ¢ /, a A ‘ \ 
yap €otw ws vAn, 7 8 ws popdy. Set de Kat THY 
tpirnv éru mpooumdpxew: od yap tkaval mpos TO 
yevvjoa ai dvo0, Kabamep odd’ ev trois mpwdrots. 
«is pev odv vAn Tots yevntots early aitiov TO du- 
vatov elvar Kal pr) elvar. Ta pev yap e€ avdyKns 
> / \ 36h \ 2”) es > ” 
eotiv, olov Ta aldua, Ta 8° €€ avayKns odK ETL. 





@ See 321 b 16 ff. 
306 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 8-9 


making mixtures and use them for watering. Now 
whereas food is of the nature of matter, and that 
which is fed is the “shape” and “form ”’ taken to- 
gether with the matter,’ it is reasonable to suppose 
that of the simple bodies, while all come-to-be out 
of one another, Fire is the only one which is fed, as | 
is the view also of the earlier philosophers. For 
Fire alone—and to a greater extent than the rest— 
is of the nature of “ form,’’ because it naturally tends 
to be borne towards the limit. Now each of the simple 
bodies tends to be borne to its own place, and the 
“shape ” and “ form ”’ of all of them depend on their 
limits. It has now been explained that all the com- 
pound bodies are composed of the simple bodies. 
9. Since some things are of a nature to come-to-be Chapters 
. . 9 and 10. 
and to pass-away, and since coming-to-be actually phat causes 
takes place in the region about the centre, we must coming-to-be 
discuss the number and the nature of the sources of aay fo 
aterial, 


all coming-to-be alike ; for we shall more easily form ;,°°1) 

a theory about the particulars when we have first and final 

grasped the universals. es 
These sources, then, are equal in number to and 

identical in kind with those which exist among eternal 

and primary things. For there is one in the sense of 

material cause, a second in the sense of formal cause, 

and the third too must be present also ; for the two 

sources are not enough to generate things which 

come-to-be, just as they are not enough in the case 

of primary things either. Now cause in the sense 

of matter for things which are of a nature to come-to- 

be is “‘ the possibility of being and not-being.”” For 

some things exist of necessity, for example, the things 

which are eternal, and some things of necessity do 

not exist; and of these two classes it is impossible 


307 


335 a 


335 b 


or 


Cl 
ou 


20 


ARISTOTLE 


> 4, 
TovTwy d€ Ta pev advvarov pr) elvow, Ta Sé adU- 
s \ \ 2. 5D / \ Lee cal 
vatov elvat dua TO pun evdexeoOar Tapa TO avayKatov 
a ” ” A \ ‘ \ /, 
dAArws exew. eva dé Kai elvar Kal pur) elvar Suvara, 
hid > \ \ \ \ / \ A / 
omep €oTl TO yevntov Kat Plaprov: more pev ydp 
> ~ A > wv > LA > > / / 
€oTt TovTo, Tote 8 ovK eoTW. WoT avayKn ye- 
= \ \ ‘ A \ ‘ 
veow elvat Kat P0opav mept To Suvarov elvar Kat 
A > 8 \ 7 ¢€ A 5A: a > > ‘ ” 
pn elvar. dud Kat ws pev An Tobr’ éotiv aittov 
~ _ ¢ \ 1 fe € \ \ \ 
Tois yevntois, ws dé TO 0b Evekev 7) Lopdr) Kal TO 
> ~ a. 9 \ ¢ , ¢ ~ e 4 > ’ 
eldos: tobro 8 eotiv 6 Adyos 6 Tis ExdoTov ovaias. 
cal ~ ov 
Act 8€ mpoceivar Kai tHv Tpirny, fv dmavtes 
\ > 7 / > ? / > > ¢ \ 
fev overpwrrovar, Aéyer 5 ovddeis, GAN’ of pev 
€ \ 79 > PB tg ‘ \ , ‘ 
ixavnv @nOnoay airiav elvar mpos TO yivecBar tiv 
~ 2A / LA ¢ > / / 
Ttav «dav dvow, dorep 6 ev Daidwu Uwxpdrns: 
\ \ > ~ > /, cal ” e OA 
Kat yap ekeivos, emiTynjoas Tots aAAois ws oddev 
elpnkdow, vbrotiWerar Stu eoTt THY OvTwWY Ta peV 
ww A \ A ~ DA \o«@ \ 
el6n Ta dé pelextiKa THY cidv, Kal dre elvau prev 
¢ / \ ‘ , A A 
exaotov Aéyerat Kata 70 eldos, yiveoBar dé Kara 
\ > / 
TH peTaAnypuw Kal PbcipecOar Kata tiv amoBoAjy, 
id > > ~ > ~ \ ” ” > > / 
wot el Tadra aAnfy, Ta €idn olerar €€ avayKns 
Ww \ / \ ~ © > > \ 
airia elvat Kal yevécews Kal POopads. of 8° adriy 
Thy vAnv: amo Ta’Tys yap elvar tiv Kivnow. ov- 
/ \ / ~ > \ / > ww 
dérepou 5€ A€yovor KaAds. i pev .ydp eorw airia 
\ ” \ ‘ 2 > @ ~ ~ > \ A 
Ta €l6n, dia Ti od del yerva ovvex@s, aAAa Tore 
\ \ > ” + ‘ ~ 2. A aN \ ~ 
fev mote 8 ov, dvtwy Kal Tv €id@v del Kal TOV 


. 





* Plato, Phaedo 96 a—99 c, 
308 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 9 


for the first not to be, while for the second it is im- 
possible to be, because they cannot be other than 
they are in violation of the law of necessity. Some 
( things, however, can both be and not be. This is the 
ease with that which can come-to-be and pass-away ; 
for at one moment it exists, at another it does not 
exist. So coming-to-be and passing-away must occur 
in the sphere of what can-be-and-not-be. This, then, 
is the cause, in the sense of material cause, of things 
| which are of a nature to come-to-be, whereas cause, 
, in the sense of their “ end in view,” is their shape and 
. form; and this is the definition of the essential 
~nature of each of them. 

But the third source must also be present, of which criticism 
everyone dreams but never puts into words. But of the a 
some people have thought the nature of the “ forms ” posed in 
was enough to account for coming-to-be. Socrates, Bio8. 
for instance, did so in the Phaedo*; for he, after pee ars : 
finding fault with the other philosophers for having theory. 
made no pronouncement on the subject, lays it down 
that some of the things which exist are “ forms” and 
others “ partakers in the forms,” and that each thing 
is said to exist in virtue of the ‘‘form’”’ and to come- 
to-be in virtue of its participation in the “ form ”’ and 
to pass-away because of its rejection of it. Hence 
he thinks that, if this is true, the ‘‘ forms ’”’ are neces- 
sarily the causes of both coming-to-be and passing- 
away. On the other hand, some have thought that 
the matter in itself was the cause ; for it is from this, 
they said, that movement arises. But neither of 
these schools of thought is right. For, if the “‘ forms”’ 
are causes, why do they not always generate con- 
tinually but only intermittently, since the “ forms ” 
and the partakers in them are always there ? Further- 


309 


335 b 


3 


—] 


we) 
ou 


336 a 


5 


ARISTOTLE 


~ > ~ 
peOextixka@v; ett 8 em eviwy Oewpotpev aAXo 
TO altiov ov: vylevav yap 6 latpos eprrotet Kal 
* , > , \ , a 
ETLOTHUNVY O ETLOTHUWY, OVONS Kal vyleias avTAs 
kal émorhiuns Kal Tav peleKtuKdv: woadttws 
A A > A ~ »” ~ A 4 
d€ Kal emt TOV dAAwy THv Kara Sdvapww mpar- 
, | A A o , ~ 4 
Topevwy. et d€ THY VAnV Tis Pdhoee yevvay dia 
THv Kiwnow, pvoikwTepov pev av Ayo. TOV ovTw 
AeyovtTwv: TO yap aAdAowoby Kal TO peracynpatilov 
+s ~ ~ > a > 
aiTwwtepov Te Tod yevvav, Kal ev arracw cidbapev 
~ ~ / a 
Tobto A€yew TO TroLodv, dpoiws ev TE Tois Poet 
Kat év Tois amo Téxvns, 6 av H KWHTLKOV. od pHV 
> \ ‘ e >. > ~ / ~ A 
GAAa Kai odTot otk apbds Aéyovow THs pev 
A a \ / > ‘A ‘A ‘ ~ ‘\ ‘ 
yap vAns TO mdoxew €oTl Kal TO Kwetofa, TO dE 
~ 4 A ~ c / / a“ \ 
Kweiv Kal TO Troveiy ETépas Suvdpews (d7jAov de 
Kal emi tOv Téxvn Kal emi tov ddoe ywopevwr: 
> A , A a“ ‘ A ~ > € ~ , A 
od yap avro mrovet TO VOwp CHov e€ avrod, odde 
> td 
To €vAov KAivynv, add’ y TEéxVN). Wore Kal odroL 
\ ~ / , > ~ ‘ A /, 
Sua todro A€yovow odk dpbds, Kat dott mapadet- 
/ > ~ A ‘ , 
Tove. THY KupiwTépav airiav: e€aipotar yap TO TL 
\ A / ” A ‘ \ / 
hv elvar Kal tiv popdyv. ere S€ Kal tas Suvdpeis 
> / aA , > “a ~ Ad 
dmroduddact Tois awyact, du ds yevv@ar, Atav 
~ ~ A wv a7 
dpyavik@s, apaipodvres THv KaTa TO €ldos airiav. 
‘ 
emer) yap mépuKkev, ws hac, TO ev Oeppov dia- 
~ »” 
Kpivew 70 dé pvxpov ovmardvar, Kal T@v dAAwv 
~ > 4 
€xaoTov TO pev Tovey TO be TdaoyxEW, EK TOUTWY 


‘4 
A€gyovot Kat Sia TovTwy dmavta TaAAa yiveobar 


310 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 9 


more, in some cases we see that something else is the 
cause; for it is the physician who implants health 
and the scientific man who implants scientific know- 
ledge, although health itself and science itself exist 
and also the participants in them; and the same 
thing is true of the other operations carried out in 
virtue of a special faculty. On the other hand, if one 
were to say that matter generates by means of its 
movement, he would speak more in accordance with 
the facts of nature than those who state the view 
given above ; for that which “ alters” and transforms 
is a more potent cause of bringing things into being, 
and we are always accustomed, in the products alike 
of nature and of art, to make out that whatever can 
cause motion is the acting cause. However, these 
thinkers are also wrong ; for to be acted upon, that 
is, to be moved, is characteristic of matter, but to 
move, that is to act, is the function of another power. 
(This is evident both in the things which come-to-be 
by art and in those which come-to-be by nature ; 
for water does not itself produce an animal out of 
itself, nor does wood produce a bed, but art). So, for 
this reason, these thinkers are not correct in what 
they say, and also because they omit the most potent 
cause ; for they exclude the essential nature and the 
“form.” Moreover, also, when they do away with 
the formal cause, the powers which they attribute 
to bodies and which enable them to bring things into 
being are too instrumental in character. For since, 
as they assert, it is the nature of the hot to separate 
and of the cold to bring together and of each of the 
other qualities the one to act and the other to be 
acted upon, it is out of these and by means of these, 
so they say, that all the other things come-to-be and 


311 


336 a 


10 


15 


20 


25 


ARISTOTLE 


A “a \ , 
Kal Pbcipecbar haiverar dé Kai TO Top adto Kwov- 
pevov Kal mdoxyov. ert dé mapamAjovov trovotow 
oe ~ an > / 
WoTep el TIS TH Tmpiow Kal ExdoTw TOV opydavwv 
~ / A 
amrove“o. THY aitiay TOY yiwwopevwr: avayKn yap 
a / ‘ 
mpiovtos S.aipetobar Kai E€ovtos AealveoOar, Kat 
“a + € / LA > > Lid / 
emt T@V dAAwy opoiws. wor el OTL pddALoTa 
Toll Kal Kiel TO TOp, GAAA THs Kwel Ov Tpoo- 
fewpodaw,' dtu xetpov 7) TA Spyava. Hiv dé Ka- 
~ \ ~ 
dAov Te mpdTEpov elpnrat wept TOV aitiwv, Kal vov 
diwmpiora mepi Te THS BAns Kal THs popdis. 
” \ >? \ ¢ \ \ \ / / 
10. "Ere 6€ émet 4) Kara tHv dopav Kivynats Sé- 
devxrat OTe aldios, avayKn TovTwWY dvTwY Kal yEve- 
aw elvat cuvex@s* 7 yap Popa Troijoer THY yeveow 
evdercx@s Sua TO mpoodyew Kal amdyew TO ‘yev- 
/ a A iol hd ‘ a! / ~ 
vyatiucov. apa de diAov ort Kal TA mpdTEpov KAaADs 
eipntat, TO TmpwTHV TOV petaBoAdv tiv dopav 
aAAa py) THY yéveow eimetv: Todd yap edvroye- 
~ nn 
TEpov TO OV TH fy) OvTL yevecews aitiov elvar 7) TO 
pn ov T@ Ovte Tod elvar. TO pev obv depdpevov 
” \ \ / > ” ‘ \ ¢ ‘ 
€oTl, TO de ywwopevov odK Eat: 510 Kal 7 dopa 
TpoTepa THs yeveoews. emel 6 UroKeitat Kal dé- 
\ a 
devkTa ouvex7ns ovca Tois mpdypact Kal yeveats 
\ / \ > Oe 2 \ \ ~ 
Kat pbopa, payev 8° aitiav elvar tiv dhopav tod 
/ a ~ 7 
yweo0a, pavepov dtu puds pev ovens THs popas 
ovK evdexerau yiveoOar dudw dia 7d evavria elvar: 


1 ob mpocbewpotar: ob mpooewpoiaw E: od mpobewpodow H : 


ody dpdow FL. 





® Phys. ii. 3-9. > See 335 a 32-b 7. 
° Phys. viii. 7-9. 4 i.e. the sun, see below. 
¢ Phys. 260 a 26 ff. 


312 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 9-10 


pass-away. But it is evident that Fire itself is moved 
and is acted upon; moreover, they are doing much 
the same thing as if one were to ascribe to the saw 
or to any other tool the causation of objects which 
are brought into being ; for division must take place 
when a man saws and smoothing when he uses a 
plane, and a similar effect must be produced by the 
use of the other tools. Hence, however much Fire 
is active and causes motion, yet they fail to observe 
how it moves things, namely, in a manner inferior to 
that in which the tools act. We have ourselves dealt 
with causes in general in a previous work,* and we 
have now ” distinguished between matter and form. 
10. Moreover, since the change caused by motion The. 
has been proved to be eternal,¢ it necessarily follows, “Mclent 


cau 

if that is so, that coming-to-be goes on continuously ; eoting-t- 
for the movement will produce coming-to-be un- ste oot 
interruptedly by bringing near and withdrawing the ®Way is the 
“generator.” ¢ At the same time it is evident that movement 
our statement in a former work ¢ was also right in Daliotic 
which we spoke of motion, not coming-to-be, as the citele. 
“ primary kind of change.” For it is far more reason- 

able that that which is should be a cause of coming- 
to-be of that which zs not, than that that which is not 
should be cause of being to that which zs. For that 
which is being moved exists, but that which is coming- 
to-be does not exist ; therefore movement is prior to 
coming-to-be. Now since it has been suggested and 
proved f that coming-to-be and passing-away happen 

to things continuously, and we maintain that motion 

is the cause of coming-to-be, it is clear that, if motion 

is simple, both processes cannot go on because they 


are contrary to one another ; for nature has ordained 


t Of. 317 b 33 ff. 
313 


336 a 


ARISTOTLE 


A \ s 3 \ ¢ 7 wo 2 ah \ > eh / 
TO yap adTo Kal woatTws Exov del TO abTO TEépUKE 
~ vo ” / an a 
Toutv. WoTE ToL yeveots ae Eorar 7 POopa. Set 


\ / \ / \ > / ”“ a 
30 6€ mAelous elvat Tas KiWHGELS Kal EvayTias, 7 TH 


336 b 


o 


10 


~ ~ > ~ 
fopa i TH avwpadia: TOV yap evavtiwy Tavavria 
airva. 
\ \ ? ¢ , A pat 4 > A / 
Awd Kai ody 7) mpatyn popa aitia €ort yeveoews 
\ me 2\\> ¢ \ \ \ , > 
Kat PbOopds, aA 7% Kata tov Aokov KvKAOV: ev 
A > a 
ravTn yap Kal TO ovvexés €oTt Kal TO Kweiabat 
> / 
Svo KWiHoes* avdyKn yap, €l ye adel EoTraL ouvEexTs 
yéveots Kal POopa, acl péev te Kweiobar, va pur 
> / e c / / > id A 
emtAeinwow adrar at petaBodai, dvo 8’, dws pH 


‘Odrepov ovppaivn povov. Tis fev odv ouvexetas 


7 tod dAov dopa aitia, Tod de mpoovevat Kal 
amévar 7) €yKAvows ovpBaiver yap OTe bev Toppw 
/ | pee > > / > 7 A lol / 
yivecOar ote 8 eyyts. avicov d€ tod dia0Tn- 

¢ a 
peatos Ovtos avapados EoTrat 7 Kivnois* WoT Et 
~ \ ~ ~ 
T@ mpooevar Kal eyyds elvar yerva, TH amvévac 
~ \ Uy / 
ravtov TodTo Kal moppw yivecOar POeiper, Kal et 
~ / ~ al 
T& TodAdKis Tpocevar yevva, Kal T@ modAaKis 
She Cal , ~ \ > / > : , w 
ameAbeiv pbeiper: THv yap evavTiwv TavavTia aitia. 
¢ 
Kat ev low xpovw Kai 7 pbopa Kai 4 yéveots 7 
A 4, \ ‘ ¢ / ‘ c / ¢ / 
Kata dvow. 810 Kat ot xypdvot Kal ot Biou éexdorwy 
apiOuov €xovar kal todtw Sdwopilovrar: mdvtwv yap 
€ott Tatis, Kat mas Bios Kai ypovos perpetras 
/ \ ? a 2 A / > > ¢ \ 
mrepidsw, TAnV od TH adrh mavres, GAN ot pev 





@ The revolution of the zpdros odpavds or outermost sphere 
which revolves once every twenty-four hours. 

» The annual course of the sun in the ecliptic circle. 

¢ i.e. of the mp@ros obpavds, which also involves the revolu- 
tion of the concentric spheres. 

4 The inclination of the ecliptic to the equator of the outer- 


314 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 10 


that the same thing, as long as it remains in the same 
state, always produces the same result, so that either 
coming-to-be or passing-away will always result. 
The movements, however, must be more than one 
and contrary to one another either in the direction 
of their motion or in their irregularity ; for con- 
traries are the causes of contraries. 

It is not, therefore, the primary motion ¢ which is 
the cause of coming-to-be and passing-away, but the 
motion along the inclined circle ° ; for in this there 
is both continuity and also double movement, for 
it is essential, if there is always to be continuous 
coming-to-be and passing-away, that there should be 
something always moving, in order that this series 
of changes may not be broken, and double movement, 
in order that there may not be only one change 
occurring. The movement of the whole ¢ is the cause 
of the continuity, and the inclination? causes the 
approach and withdrawal of the moving body ; for 
since the distance is unequal, the movement will be 
irregular. Therefore, if it generates by approaching 
and being near, this same body causes destruction 
by withdrawing and becoming distant, and if by 
frequently approaching it generates, by frequently 
withdrawing it destroys ; for contraries are the cause 
of contraries, and natural passing-away and coming- 
to-be take place in an equal period of time. There- 
fore the periods, that is the lives, of each kind of 
living thing have a number and are thereby dis- 
tinguished ; for there is an order for everything, . 
and every life and span is measured by a period, 
though this is not the same for all, but some are 


most sphere ;*.according to Aristotle, the equator of the 
Universe is in the same plane as the earth’s equator. 


315 


336 b 


15 


2 


So 


30 


337 a 


ARISTOTLE 


2; 7 € \ / Cal \ A > / a 
eAdtrove ot S€ mAElove Tots pev yap eviavTos, Tots 
be peilwv, tois Se eAdrrwy mepiodds* éori 7d 
[EeTpov. 

Maivera S€ Kal Ta* Kara THY atcOnow dpodoyou- 
preva Tots Tap’ Tpav Adyous: “OpGpev yap ort 
TpOOLlovTos pev Tob HAiou yeveots coTw, dmdvros 
dé pOicis, Kal ev tow xpovm EeKdTEpov: tacos yap oO 
xpovos ths p0opds Kat THs yevéoews THS Kata 

, > \ / / > > / 
diow. aAda ovpBaiver TroAAdKes ev eAdrrove 
POeipedou Sua THY mpos dAAnAa ovyKpacw’ avw- 
pddov yap ovens THs vAns Kat od mavTayod THs 
aiths avaykn Kal tas yevécers avwpddrous elvat 
Kat Tas pev Odrrovs tas dé Bpadurépas, wore 

/ \ \ / / ” 7 
ovpPaiver Sua THY TovTWY yéveow aAXois yiveoBat 
pOopav. 

> \ > ¢ ” \ ” ¢ a 

Aci 8’, womep eipyntar, ovvexns EoTat 7) yeveots 

Ac 3f / \ > / it / 7, a m” 

Kal 1) pbopa, Kat ovdemoTe brroreiber Su Ty etrropev 
airiay. Tobro 8’ evrAdyws oupBeBnxev: evel yap 
ev amaow del Tod BeAriovos opéyeobat papev THV 
dvow, BéArvov dé TO elvan 7 TO py elvar (ro 8 elvac 
TOCAXDS A€yopev, ev dAdous cipro), TobTo O° 
dduvarov ev amracw dmdpxew dua. TO moppw THS 
apxis dpioracbar, T@ Aevtropevw Tpomey ouve- 
mAnpwoe TO ddov 6 beds, evdehexHy moujoas THY 
yeveow" ovTw yap av padvora avvetporro TO elvat 
dud TO eyyvrara elva THs ovaotas TO yiverBau ael 
Kal THY yeveow. Tovtov 8° aitiov, WaomTeEp elpyrat 

1 4 ante zrepiodds omisi. 

2 ra addidi. 
3 dvdedexq FH: evredexa E. 
* See 318 a 9 ff. 
> Metaphysics, passim. 





316 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 10 


measured by a smaller and some by a greater period ; 
for some the measure is a year, for others a greater 
or a lesser period. 

The evidence of sense-perception clearly agrees 
with our views ; for we see that coming-to-be occurs 
when the sun approaches, and passing-away when it 
withdraws, and the two processes take an equal time ; 
for the space of time occupied by natural passing- 
away and coming-to-be is equal. It often happens, 
however, that things pass away in too short a time 
owing to the commingling of things with one another ; 
for, their matter being irregular and not everywhere 
the same, their comings-to-be must also be irregular, 
sometimes too quick and sometimes too slow. The 
result is that the coming-to-be of certain things 
becomes the cause of the passing-away of other 
things. 

As has already been remarked, coming-to-be and Aristotle 
passing-away will take place continuously, and will jis theory 
never fail owing to the cause which we have given.“ explains 
This has come about with good reason. For nature, coming-to- 
as we maintain, always and in all things strives after ahi 
the better ; and “ being’ (we have stated elsewhere away main- 
the different meanings of “‘ being” ”) is better than ee 
“not-being,”’ but it is impossible that “ being ” can be lteration. 
present in all things, because they are too far away 
from the “ original source.”” God, therefore, following 
the course which still remained open, perfected the 
universe by making coming-to-be a perpetual pro- 
process; for in this way “ being’ would acquire the 
greatest possible coherence, because the continual 
coming-to-be of coming-to-be is the nearest approach 
to eternal being. The cause of this continuous pro- 
cess, as has been frequently remarked, is cyclical 


317 


337 a 


5 


10 


15 


20 


ARISTOTLE 


A 4 € 4 r / / ‘ / A 
moAAdKis, 1) KUKAw@ dopa: wdovn yap ovvexs. S40 
Kal TadAAa doa petaBddAa eis GAAnAa Kata Ta 
maby Kal tas Svvdpets, olov ta amrAG owpara, 
~ % / / hud \ > 7 
pupetrar Hv KUKAw dopav: otav yap e& vdaTos 
dnp yevnra Kat €€ aépos mip Kal maAw ek mupos 
55 4 r \ Xr r 62 \ Sf. A 
bswp, KUKAW hapev rrepteAnAvfevar tiv yéveow Sia 
A / > / a \ 2 > a A 
TO mdAw davakduntew. wore Kal 7 «deta popa 
puovpevn thy KUKAw ovVvEXT|S EOTW. 
“Apa 8€ dHAdov ex to’Twv 6 TwWes amopodaw, 
Sua Ti, ExdoTov TOV acwpudtwv eis THY oiKelav de- 
~ / ~ 
popévov ywpav, ev TH ateipw xpdvm od dveotaor 
\ / ww \ 7 >? \ ¢ > »” 

Ta Ow@para. altiov yap TovTov eoTlv 7 «is adAAnAa 
petdBaois’ €f yap exaoTov eueveyv ev TH avTod 
7 aS \ / AA ¢ ‘ ~ r / ” 
xopa Kat pr peteBaddcv bd tod wAnaiov, dH 
av SveorjKeoav. peraBdddAer prev odv dia THY 
dopav SumAqv odoav: dia S5é€ TO peraBdAdew ovK 
> / / > A > ~ > > ~ 4 
evdexerar pevew oddev adrav ev ovdeud xwpa 

TET MEV. 
Avére prev obv or. yeveors Kat Pbopa Kai dia 
43 a0 ‘ Ul \ \ A / 
ti’ airiav, kal ti TO yevntov Kal Pbaprov, da- 
~ / 
vepov €k Tov eipnuevwr. emel 8 avdyKn elvai 
~ @ 
TL TO KWodv, Et KivnoLs CoTAL, WoTeEp EipnTat mpd- 
tepov ev érépois, Kal ef del, Oru adel re Set elvar, Kal 
el ovvexijs, Ev 76 adbto Kal axivntov Kal ayévy- 
A > ‘ ‘ > / c 7 
tov Kal avaAdoiwrov: Kai €f mAElous elev ai KiKAw 
/ /, 
Kwioews, mAelous ev, mdoas 5é€ mws elvar TavTas 
avaykn tnd play apyyv- ovvexods 8° ovros Tob 


« Phys. 255 b 31 ff. 





318 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 10 


motion, the only motion which is continuous. Hence 
also the other things which change into one another, 
for instance, the simple bodies, by being acted upon 
or having power to act, imitate cyclical movement. 
For when Air comes-to-be from Water, and Fire from 
Air, and Water again from Fire, we say that coming- 
to-be has completed the cycle, because it has come 
back to its starting-point. Hence motion in a straight 
line is also continuous because it imitates cyclical 
motion. 

This at the same time clears up a point which some 
people find puzzling, namely, the reason why, since 
each of the bodies is being borne along towards its 
own place, the bodies have not become separated 
in the infinity of time. The reason is their reciprocal 
change of position ; for if each remained in its own 
place and was not transformed by its neighbour, 
they would have long ago been parted. Their trans- 
formation, then, is due to the movement of a double 
kind ; and, owing to their transformation, none of 
them can remain in any fixed position. 

From what has been said, it is evident that coming- 
to-be and passing-away take place, and why this is 
so, and what it is that comes-to-be and passes-away. 
But if there is to be movement, there must, as has 
been explained elsewhere in an earlier treatise,” be 
something which causes movement, and if movement 
is to go on always, that which causes it must go on 
always and, if it is to be continuous, that which causes 
it must be one and the same and unmoved, un- 
generated and unalterable ; and if the cyclical move- 
ments are to be more than one, they must, in spite 
of being more than one, be all subject somehow to 
one cause ; and since time is continuous, the move- 


319 


337 a 


25 


30 


oO 


ARISTOTLE 


, > / \ , a 
xXpovov avdykn tiv Kivnow ovvexh elvat, etmep 
> 4 / lo 
advvatov xpovov xwpls Kwicews elvar. ovvexods 
»” ‘ -3 \ ¢ /, ~ / +” 
dpa Twos apiOuos 6 xpdvos, THs KUKAW dpa, Kab- 
/ > “~ ? > load / , A 
dmep ev Tots ev apyt Adyous Suwpicbyn. avvex7s 
> € lal 
5° 7) Kivnois moTEepov TH TO Kwotpevov avvEexes 
a ~ A > big la A / / 
elvau 7) T@ TO ev @ Kwetrat, olov Tov ToTov Aéyw 
an“ \ / ~ x oe, a“ \ / ~ 
9 TO 7a0os; diAov 51 6tt TH TO KWovpevov: THs 
\ \ 4 \ > %. a \ ~ e 
yap To mdfos auvexes GAN 7 TH TO TpPaypa w 
ovpBéeBnKke ouvexes elvar; ei 5€ Kal TO Y @ 
upBéBnke avvexés elvac; ef b€ Kal TH & O, 
pov TobTo T@ Tow brrdapxeu" péyebos yap Te exer. 
, A \ / /, / ov ; ee," 
tovtov S€ To KUKAW pdvov auvexes, WoTe adTo 
ait@ det ovvexés. TobtTo apa €oTw 6 move? ouvert] 
/ \ 7, ~ / ¢ A / 
Kiynow, TO KUKAW cua pepdpevov: % Se Kivnats 
TOV Xpovov. 
> \ > > a a / ‘ 
11. "Eze 8 & Tots ovveyds Kwovpeévors Kata 
, ”“ > / ”“ a A € ~ 
yéeveow 7 dAdoiwaw 7 ddAws petaBoAny dpadpev 
A > ~ a“ \ / / A / A 
TO edeEns Ov Kal ywopevov Tdd€ peTA TOdE WaTE 
A / / / ” a“ > 
pt) Suareimew, oKertéov motepov eat. Te O e& 
> / ” ”“ ba / > \ / > / \ 
avayKns €otat, 7 ovdév, GAAA TavTa EevdexeTaL [1 
/ oe \ A ” ~ ‘ fh A 
yevéoOar. dri pev yap eva, SHAov, Kal edOds TO 
” \ \ / 7 \ ~ “ A A 
€orau Kal TO peAAov Etepov Sia TobTO: O pev yap 
GAnbes eimety drt Eorat, Set TobTO elvai more aAnfes 


étt €atw: 6 Sé viv aAnbes eimeiv dre pedAAc, oddev 





* Phys. 217 b 29 ff. 
320 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, IT. 10-11 


ment must be continuous, because it is impossible 
for there to be time without movement. Time, then, 
is a way of reckoning some kind of continuous move- 
ment and, therefore, of cyclical movement, as was 
laid down in our original discussion. But is move- 
ment continuous because that which is moved is 
continuous or because that in which it moves is con- 
tinuous (for example, the place or the quality) ? 
Clearly because that which is moved is continuous ; 
for how could the quality be continuous except 
because the thing to which it belongs is continuous ? 
And if it is because the place in which it occurs is 
continuous, continuity is to be found only in the place 
in which it occurs ; for it has a certain magnitude. 
But of that which moves, only that which moves in a 
circle is continuous in such a way that it is always 
continuous with itself. This, then, is what produces 
continuous motion, namely, the body which is moved 
in a circle, and its movement makes time continuous. 
11. When in things which are moved continuously 
in the course of coming-to-be or alteration or change 
generally, we observe a sequence, that is, one thin 
coming-to-be after another in such a way that there 
is no cessation, we must inquire whether there is 
anything which will necessarily exist in the future 
or whether there is no such thing, or whether any 
one of them may possibly fail to come-to-be. For 
it is evident that some of them fail to come-to-be, 
and the readiest example is the difference which for 
this reason exists between “ something will be’ and 
“something is about to be”; for if it is true to say 
“something will be,” it must be true at some future 
date to say that itzs. On the other hand, though it is 
true now to say that “ something is about to happen,” 


M 321 


‘ 


Things 
which 
come-to-be 
do so “ of 
necessity ” 
because a 
cyclical 
series of 
changes is 
absolutely 
** of neces- 
sity.” 


337 b 


10 


15 


20 


25 


ARISTOTLE 


A ba) / 
KwAver pr) yeveobar: péAAwy yap av Padilew tus 
> / ” 
ovk av Badicecev. GAws 8’, emel evdexeTar Evia 
site che \ wy te Ps ¢ i _o , 
T@v ovTwy Kal pn elvar, SHAov STL Kal TA ywomeva 
¢ 7 A > > > 4, a > / 
ovtws e€er, Kal o0K e€ avdyKns TOOT EoTAl. TOTE- 
s ¢ ~ nn“ A LAN’ A > a 
pov obv admavra Tovatra 7 ov, add’ Evia avayKaiov 
c ~ / \ ” ov L Dom ~ 
amA@s yiveoOa, Kal €oTw womep emi tod elvac 
\ \ > / \ \ \ / 7 A 
Ta pev advvata pr elvar Ta Se SuvaTa, oVTwWS Kal 
A > 
TEpt THY yéveow; olov Tpomas apa avdyKn ‘ye- 
/ \ > ei A > / 
véo0at, Kai ody ofdv Te pn) evdexeobar. 
> \ \ / > 4 / > A 
Ei 67) 70 mpdtepov avdyxn yeveobar, «i TO 
4 ” e > NE / > \ 
totepov €otat (olov «i oikia, Oeuedvov, et Se 
lon > A > / , 
tobto, mAdv), dp odv Kal et Aepedos yeyover, 
> / 9: ff / n” > / > \ > ~ 
avayKn oikiav yevéoOa; 7 ovKeTL, Ef pt) KaKEiVvo 
> 4 / c ~ > \ ~ > , ‘ 
avayKkn yevéeoba amA@s; el d€ TodTo, avayKn Kal 
/ / / oe! 4 A 
fepedtov yevopevov yevéobat otkiav: ovtw yap Av 
\ / ” \ A ¢ a > *" 2 a 
TO T7poTEpov Exov mpos TO VoTEpov, WaT Ei eKEivo 
” a 
€oTa, avdyKn ekeivo mpdTepov. ei Toivuy avayKn 
/ A MA ‘ A / > 4, A 
yevéobar To voTepov, Kal TO mpdTEpov avayKn* Kal 
> \ / \ \‘ «@ / > 4, > > 
el TO TpoTEpoV, Kal TO VoTEpov TolvuY avayKn, GAA 
> > > a > > 7 ¢ / > > / > / 
od &° éxeivo, aA’ dru bréKeito €€ avayKns €od- 
> A ‘ A > 4 > 
pevov. eév ols dpa To voTepov avayKn elvat, ev 
tovtois avTioTpéper, Kal del Tod mpoTépov yevo- 
4 > / / A ” 
pévov avaykn yevéobar TO vorepov. 
322 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 11 


' there is nothing to prevent its not happening—a man 
might not go for a walk, though he is now “ about to”’ 
do so. In general, since it is possible for some of the 
things which “ are ”’ also “ not to be,” obviously things 
which are coming-to-be are also in this case and their 
coming-to-be will not necessarily take place. Are, 
then, all the things which come-to-be of this kind ? 
Or is this not so, but it is absolutely necessary for 
some of them to come-to-be ? And does the same’ 
thing happen in the sphere of coming-to-be as in that 
of being, where there are some things for which it is 
impossible “‘ not to be’’ and for others which it is 
possible? For example, solstices must come-to-be and 
it is impossible that they should be unable to occur. 

If it is necessary for that which is prior to come-to- 
be if that which is posterior is to be—for example, 
foundations must have come-to-be if a house is to 
exist, and there must be clay if there are to be foun- 
dations—does it follow that, if the foundations have 
come-to-be, the house must necessarily do so? Or 
is this no longer so, if there is no such absolute neces- 
sity ? In this case, however, if the foundations have 
come-to-be, the house must come-to-be ; for such 
was the assumed relation of the prior to the posterior 
that, if the posterior is to be, the prior must have 
preceded it. If, therefore, it is necessary that the 
posterior should come-to-be, it is necessary also that 
the prior should have come-to-be, and, if the prior, 
then also the posterior, not, however, because of the 
prior, but because the future being of the posterior 
was assumed as necessary. Hence, whenever the 
posterior is necessary, the reverse is also true, and 
always when the prior has come-to-be, the posterior 
must also come-to-be. 


323 


337 b 


30 


3 


oO 


338 a 


ou 


ARISTOTLE 


> A > > ” ; ee ‘ 4, > 
Ei pev ody els dreipov elow emi To KaTw, odK 
” Ay A Ad / / c ~ 
€oTa. avayKn TO voTepov Tdde yeveoPar amdAds, 
> > > ¢ / b Mags * 4 ov uv 
aA’ €& troblécews: dei yap Erepov Eepmrpooberv 
ar iy ” OP AT rR + Faas « s ¢ 9 
avayKn €otat, du 6 exeivo avayKn yeveobar. wor 


lol ~ ” 
el py) €oTw apy? Tob azeipov, ode mp@Tov Eorat 


ovdev, dv 6 avayKatov éorar yevéobar. adda pv 


39> > a / ” a nd > ~ > 
ovd év Tois Tépas Exovot Tobr’ EoTat eizeiv aAn- 
fas, tu aTABS avayKn yevécbar, olov oikiay, drav 

/ / 7 \ 4 > A ig Bs 

fepedios yévnra: orav yap yéevnTat, et py) adel 

~ > 
TobTo avayKyn yiveobar, cupBryoera ae elvor TO 

\ a a / 
evdexopevov pur) adel elvar. aAda Set TH yevéoes adel 
cae} > a ° A? \ ¢ / \ ‘ 

elvat, ef €€ avdyKns adbrob éoTlv 7) yeveats* TO yap 
> > / \ eS 7 a“ A > Ul > 
e€ avayKyns Kal del dua 6 yap elvar avayKn ody 

/ \ Ad > > > > / Dh / 
oldv Te pr) elvau: wor’ ei coTw e€ avdyKns, aldidv 
>? . > >A >? > / \ >? ¢ / 
€oTl, Kal ei alduov, e€ avdyKns. Kal el 7 yeveots 

/ > > 4 > oh € 4 4 \ 
toivuy e€ avayKns, adios 7 yéveois TovToV, Kal 
> > oh! > > / 
el alduos, €€ avadyKns. 

> ” A > > / c ~ € / 

Ei dpa twos e€ avaykns amAds 1 yéveots, 

avayKn avakukrciv kal advakdpmrTew. avayKn yap 


” , ” \ / ” , wees, ae. 
TOL TTEPAS EXELVY TYV YEVEOLVY 1 M7), KGL Eb fL7), 1) 





* The argument is as follows: let « be one of the future 
members of the series of events, x’s occurrence is contingent 
on the future occurrence of a still later member of the series, 
which is itself contingent on a still later member, y. The 
occurrence of every subsequent member of the infinite series 
is therefore conditionally, not absolutely, necessary. If #’s 
occurrence were absolutely necessary, « would be the begin- 


324 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, IT. 11 


Now if the series is to go on indefinitely down- 
wards, any particular later member of the series 
must come-to-be not by absolute, but only by con- 
ditional, necessity ; for it will always be necessary 
that another later member of the series should exist 
first in order to make it necessary that the earlier 
member of the series should come-to-be. Hence, since 
the infinite has no beginning, neither will there be 
any primary member of the series which will make 
it necessary for the other members to come-to-be.? 
And further, it will not be possible to say with truth, 
even in the case of members of a series which is 
limited, that there is an absolute necessity that they 
should come-to-be. For example, a house will not 
necessarily come-to-be when its foundations have 
come-to-be ; for unless it is always necessary for a 
house to come-to-be, the result will be that when its 
foundations have come-to-be, a thing, which need 
not always be, must always be. No: if its coming- 
to-be is of necessity, there must be an “ always” 
about its coming-to-be ; for what must necessarily be, 
must at the same time always be, since what “ must 
necessarily be” cannot “ not-be ”; hence, if a thing 
is “‘ of necessity,” it is eternal, and, if it is eternal, it 
is “‘ of necessity’; if, therefore, the coming-to-be of 
a thing is “ of necessity,” it is eternal and, if it is 
eternal, it is “ of necessity.”’ 

If, then, the coming-to-be of anything is absolutely 
necessary, it must be cyclical and return upon itself ; 
for coming-to-be must either have a limit or not have 
a limit, and if it has not a limit, it must proceed either 


ning of the series (i.e. would necessitate the earlier members) ; 
but the series is infinite and therefore has no beginning or 
end. 


325 


338 a 


1 


o 


15 


338 b 


ARISTOTLE 


-} 299i ON 4, 4, > ” ” > hi 
eis €0Od 7) KUKAwW. TodTwv 8° elmep EoTat aidtos, 

> > 29\ es \ A ~ > \ 
ovk eis e000 oldv Te dia TO pndapds elvar apynv 

YA SR / e ee! ~ > / / 
unr av KaTw, ws emi Tav eoopevwv, AapBdvopev, 

Tm ee Cen EE. | - s BEe 2 > t 
unr ava, ws emi TOV ywopevwr: avayen 8 elvat 
> /, \ / ” ‘ > oh 
apXyv, p12) TeTTepacpevns ovens, Kal aidvov elvac. 

\ > / 4 3 / + > / 
S10 avayKn KUKAw elvat. dvTioTpépew apa avayKn 
” > \ > > 4 ‘ A /, 
€orat, olov ef Todi €€ avayKns, Kal TO TpOTEpoV 
” > \ \ > ~ A \ NA > / 
dpa: adAAa pv et todTo, Kal TO VoTEpov avayKn 

/ ‘ ~ I, A “~ >? \ \ 
yevéobar. Kal Todro del 51) ovvex@s: oddev yap 
totro Siadéper A€yew Sia Svo 7 TOAA@VY. EV TH 

, ” / \ / > ‘ a ae > / 
KUKAW apa KWo Kal yevéoer eoTl TO €€ avdyKns 
¢ ~ ‘ ” / > 7 7 , 
dmA@s: Kal etre KUKAW, avadyKn ExaoTov yivecbat 

> / 
Kal ‘yeyovévat, Kal et avayKn, 7 TOUTwWY yeEveots 
KUKAW. 

Taira pev 517 eddAdyws, émel aidvos Kat adAws 
> / ¢€ , Ud A ¢ lon > ~ oe 
epavn 7 KvKAw Kivnots Kal 7 TOD ovpavod, OTL 
ratra e€€ avdyKns ylverar Kal €orar, doar Tadrns 

/, \ a \ oa > A A , 
Kwhoes Kal doa Sia TadTnv: ef yap TO KUKAw 
a , 
Kwovpevov det TL Kel, avdyKn Kat TovTwWY KIKAw 
\ / a a” lot ” , 
elvar Ti Kivnow, olov Tis dvw popas ovons Kv- 
¢ ~ 
KAw 6 HAtos* di, eel S odTws, ai Spar ia TobTo 


1 KvKkdw 6 HAs F, Bonitz, 





@ Rectilinear movement, proceeding ad infinitum, does 


326 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, IT. 11 


in a straight line or in a circle. But of these alter- 
natives, if it is to be eternal, it cannot proceed in a 
straight line, because it can have no source,* whether 
we take the members of the series downwards as 
future events or upwards as past events. But there 
must be a source of coming-to-be, though without 
coming-to-be itself being limited, and it must be 
eternal. Therefore, it must be a cyclical process. 
It will, therefore, have to return upon itself; for 
example, if a certain member of the series is neces- 
sary, then the one before it is also necessary, and 
further, if the latter is necessary, then the one which 
follows must necessarily come-to-be. And this goes 
on always continuously ; for it makes no difference 
whether we speak of a sequence of two or many 
members of the series. Therefore, it is in cyclical 
movement and cyclical coming-to-be that absolute 
necessity is present, and if the process is cyclical, 
each member must necessarily come-to-be and have 
come-to-be, and, if this necessity exists, their coming- 
to-be is cyclical. 

This conclusion is only reasonable, since cyclical 
movement, that is, the movement of the heavens, 
has been shown? on other grounds to be eternal, 
because its own movements and the movements 
which it causes come-to-be of necessity and will con- 
tinue to do so; for if that which moves in a cycle is 
continually seeking something else in motion, the 
movement of those things which it moves must also 
be cyclical. For example, since the upper revolution 
is cyclical, the sun moves in a particular way, and 
since this is so the seasons come-to-be in a cycle and 


not involve an dpyy from which coming-to-be might derive 
its necessity. > Phys. viii. 7-9. 


327 


338 b 
5 


10 


15 


ARISTOTLE 


/ / ot / , > a 
KUKAW yivovTat Kal dvakadpmrovow, To’Twy 8 ov= 
Tw yiwopevwy madw Ta bd TOUTWY. 

/ > / \ \ NA / MA 
Ti odv 84 more Ta pev ovTw daiverat, olov vdaTa 

> ” 
Kal anp KUKAW ywopeva, Kal ef ev vedpos EoTal, 
Set Boar, Kai ed doer ye, Set Kat vedos elvar, avOpw- 
mot d€ Kal CHa ovK avaxdpmrovow eis abtods WoTE 

/ / \ > / ? \ > 4, > c 
mddw yiveobar tov adrov (od yap avayKn, el oO 
maTnp eyéveto, oe yevecba: ard’ ei ad, exeivor, 

> > \ 8. SF 4 ¢ lA 
els €b00d S€ Eouxey elvar adry mn yeéveats) ; apxn) de 
Tijs oKerpens amaAw avrn » TOT EpOv opotws aravTa. 
dvakdpmret 7) ov, dAAa Ta ev apiOud Ta Se cider 
pLovov. dowv pev odv adbapros 7 ovoia 7 Kiwov- 
pevn, pavepov ott kal apilud radra €orar (7) yap 

/ > cal ~ / bd A \ > A 
Knots akoAovbe? TH Kivovpevw), Gowv Se Ha a.AXa, 
plaprn, avayKn TO eiBet, appa be [y) ava- 
Kapmrew. 10 BBwvp ef aépos Kal a.7)p ef vdaTos 
eldet 6 avtrds, ovK apiOu@. «i dé Kai radra 
> ~ > > > a ¢ ey U 2 4 
apiOud, adr’ ody dv 7 ovata ‘al otoa TovavTn 
ota evdexecOar pur) elvar. 





« The sun moves in a circle in the ecliptic, and solar motion 
causes the cyclical changes of season, on which depend the 
vital periods of living things upon the earth. 

> And not to be cyclical. 

¢ In some cycles the same individual always recurs, in 
others successive individuals of the same species. 

@ As was the doctrine of Empedocles (cf. 315 a 4 ff.). 


328 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 11 


return upon themselves ; and since they come-to-be 
in this manner, so do those things which they cause 
to come-to-be.4 

Why, then, is it that some things evidently come- 
to-be cyclically, for example rains and air, and if 
there is to be cloud, it must rain, and if it is to rain, 
there must also be a cloud, yet men and animals do 
not return upon themselves, so that the same creature 
comes-to-be a second time ? For there is no neces- 
sity, because your father came-to-be, that you should 
come-to-be ; but if you are to come-to-be, he must 
have done so ; and in this case the course of coming- 
to-be seems to be in a straight line.? The starting- 
point for the discussion of this problem is this, to ask 
the question again whether all things alike return 
upon themselves, or whether some things recur 
numerically and others only specifically.“ Therefore, 
obviously, those things of which the substance (which 
is what is moved) is imperishable will be numerically 
the same ; for the nature of the movement depends 
on that of the thing moved ; but those things which 
are not of this kind but perishable must recur speci- 
fically and not numerically. Hence, when Water 
comes-to-be from Air or Air from Water, the Water 
or the Air is the same specifically but not numeri- 
cally ; and if these things also do seem numerically 
the same,® yet this is not true of those things whose 
“ substance ”’ comes-to-be, when it is such that it is 
possible for it not to be. 


329 


PSEUDO-ARISTOTLE 
DE MUNDO 





cy 





INTRODUCTION 
ANALYSIS 


Tue treatise opens with a short introductory chapter, 
commending to Alexander the study of “ the cosmos 
and the greatest things in the cosmos,” and continues 
with a description of the various parts of the cosmos, 
working from the region of the aether on the outside 
of the sphere to the earth at the centre. Chapter 2 
describes the shape, the arrangement and the material 
of the heavens, and indicates very briefly the nature 
of the “ fiery element ”’ and the air that lie inside the 
outer sphere of aether. Chapter 3 describes the 
geography of the sea and the earth; the author 
naturally concentrates on the “inhabited world,” 
though he maintains that there are other inhabited 
worlds also, beyond the seas. Chapter 4 is a very 
summary account of the “ most notable phenomena 
in and about the inhabited world”; a section on 
meteorology, including an elaborate catalogue of 
winds, is followed by a description of the things that 
happen on or in the earth or sea—volcanic eruptions, 
earthquakes, tidal waves, etc. 

The last sentence of Chapter 4 introduces the main 
theme of the work: there are many changes in the 
sublunary world, but the system as a whole remains 
constant, and is subject neither to generation nor to 


333 


[ARISTOTLE] 


destruction. In Chapter 5 the language is heightened 
in what is virtually a hymn to the eternal cosmos. 
Chapters 6 and 7 tell of the cause that ensures its 
eternity—the god who rules everything with his all- 
pervading power. This god is described in Chapter 
6 by means of a series of similes, which show how a 
remote and transcendent god can maintain the order 
and arrangement of the cosmos without personal 
intervention ; Chapter 7 lists a number of names by 
which God is known and shows how they arise from 
various aspects of his function. 


PuiLosopuy AND RELIGION 


Before examining the problem of the authorship 
and date of the De Mundo, we must consider its pur- 
pose and its philosophical position. It is an open 
letter, written with the most careful attention to 
style and language, summarizing persuasively the 
results of a study of the cosmos. The open letter was 
a common form of literary expression, particularly 
for protreptic discourses ; the outstanding examples 
are Isocrates’ Ad Nicoclem and Aristotle’s lost 
Protrepticus, addressed to Themison, the prince of 
Cyprus. The De Mundo shows many similarities to 
these protreptic addresses in style ; but the author’s 
purpose, emphasized several times, is to provide a 
summary of his subject, and in this he approaches the 
pattern of Epicurus’s letters or the popular “ Intro- 
ductions ” (eioaywyat) of the Hellenistic period. 

The author’s attitude of mind is given in a word 
in the first chapter: “let us theologize (@coAoympev) 
about all these things.’ A.-J. Festugiére has shown 4 


* Le Dieu cosmique, pp. 341 ff. 
334 


ON THE COSMOS 


how typical this is of that “ koine spirituelle ’’ which 
grew in the late Hellenistic age and flowered in the 
Roman Empire ; nature is explored, not as the object 
of scientific enquiry, but as the expression of the 
cosmic deity, and the results are presented straight- 
forwardly as dogma. 

The theology and cosmology of the De Mundo is, 
in general, Peripatetic, but the author borrows his 
details from many schools. Parallel passages and 
possible sources have been analysed in great detail by 
W. Capelle, W. L. Lorimer and Joseph P. Maguire,“ 
and there is no need to repeat their analysis. Capelle 
traced many of the details to Posidonius, and this 
view was for many years generally accepted. Maguire, 
however, found no reason to believe that anything 
came from Posidonius except some of the meteoro- 
logy, and showed that the closest parallels are in 
the Neo-Pythagorean writers ; he established at least 
that we cannot attribute a doctrine to Posidonius 
simply because it occurs in the De Mundo, but it 
would be surprising if a work written after the time 
of Posidonius were not considerably influenced by 
him. The paramount difficulty is that the author 
was an eclectic, living in an age when eclecticism was 
the fashion and there was a great deal of common 
ground between different schools; it is therefore 
sometimes impossible to say which authors, or even 
which schools, were chosen as sources. 

The scientific chapters of the De Mundo are typical 
of many “ introductions ’’ and summaries, and very 
likely are themselves derived from similar elementary 
handbooks rather than from the detailed expositions 
of original authors. The doctrine of the cosmic deity, 


@ See Bibliographical Note, below. 
335 


[ARISTOTLE] 


which is the climax of the book, developed gradually 
in the history of Greek religion. Its chief exponents 
were the Stoics, and no doubt the De Mundo is in- 
fluenced by Stoic religious thought. But the author 
rejects an important part of the Stoic doctrine : his 
god is not immanent in the world, interpenetrating 
all things, but remote, unmoved and impassive. He 
maintains the order of the cosmos by means of an 
undefined “‘ power,” which relieves him of the dis- 
honourable necessity of personal intervention. 
Clearly we have here a development, however 
remote, of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover. At first 
sight the god of the De Mundo seems far removed 
from the god of Physics viii and Metaphysics \, who 
is inferred as the necessary result of a theory of 
motion, whose only activity is thought which has 
itself as its object, and who moves “ as the object of 
love.” Aristotle himself, however, seems to have 
spoken with a rather different voice in his published 
works. In the De Philosophia he said that the orderly 
movement of the heavenly bodies was one of the 
reasons for man’s belief in gods. Cicero reports an 
elaborate passage from Aristotle to this effect: 
suppose there were men who had lived all their lives 
in caves under the earth and were then released ; 
‘““ when they saw, suddenly, the earth and seas and 
sky, when they learnt the vastness of the clouds and 
the force of the winds, when they beheld the sun 
and learnt its great size and beauty and the efficacy 
of its work, that it spreads its light over all the sky 
and makes day, and when night darkened the lands 
and then they saw the whole sky adorned with a 
pattern of stars, and the changes in the moon’s light 


@ Cie, De Nat. Deor. ii. 37 = Arist. fr. 12 Rose. 
336 


ON THE COSMOS 


as it waxes and wanes, and the rising and setting of 
them all, and their courses planned and immutable for 
all eternity—when they saw this, they would think 
at once that there are gods and that these mighty 
works are the works of gods.’’ This is close to the 
spirit of the De Mundo. 

In one other important respect the author sides 
with the Peripatetics and Neo-Pythagoreans against 
the Stoics. Most of the Stoics believed that the 
element of fire was more powerful than the other 
elements, and that it periodically enveloped the 
cosmos in a universal conflagration (éxripwous). 
Pseudo-Aristotle is emphatic in his rejection of this 
doctrine : the elements are equally balanced and 
there is no universal conflagration, nor any other kind 
of cosmic destruction. The eternity of the cosmos 
was maintained by Aristotle in the lost De Philo- 
sophia,* and in the De Caelo.” In Hellenistic times 
it was believed by the Stoic Panaetius, but his 
successor Posidonius apparently reverted again to 
éxtpwots. There are two Hellenistic treatises extant 
which argue that the cosmos is eternal—De Universi 
Natura, falsely attributed to the Pythagorean Ocellus 
of Lucania, and Philo (or Pseudo-Philo), De Aeterni- 
tate Mundi. 


AvutTuor AND Date 


It is almost universally agreed that this treatise is 
not a genuine work of Aristotle. The style and vari- 
ous details of doctrine all make it unthinkable that 
it was written either by Aristotle himself or during 
his lifetime ; but no such certainty is possible about 
the identity of the author or the date of composition. 


° Cf. fr. 22 Rose. > Bk. I, 10-12. 
337 


[ARISTOTLE] 


The first problem to be decided is whether the 
treatise was attributed to Aristotle by the author or 
by someone else. The probability is that it was a 
deliberate forgery. Attempts have been made to 
show that the Alexander to whom the work is ad- 
dressed is someone other than Alexander the Great : 
but it is difficult to find another Alexander who might 
be called “the best of princes.” ¢ Probably the 
author followed the example of an earlier forger, the 
author of the Rhetoric to Alexander, in the hope that 
his work might be taken as a respectful tribute from 
the master to his most famous pupil. 

The late Hellenistic author Demetrius ° says that 
Aristotle’s letters to Alexander were more like 
treatises (vvyypdéppara) than real letters. A man 
called Artemon, who is mentioned by Demetrius, 
arranged the letters then supposed to be by Aristotle 
into eight books. We can conclude from this that 
at the time of Demetrius, who was roughly contem- 
porary with Pseudo-Aristotle, there was in circulation 
a collection of Aristotle’s letters, which included 
letters to Alexander which were in the form of 
‘ treatises.” It would seem therefore that the author 
of the De Mundo had ample precedent for the form 
of his work, whether the De Mundo was known to 
* Demetrius or not. 

The habit of attributing one’s writings to an older 
and greater author in the same tradition was par- 


@ Max Pohlenz (Die Stoa, 1948, pp. 361-362) returns to a 
suggestion of Bernays that the addressee is Tiberius Alex- 
ander, nephew of Philo and governor of Egypt soon after 
A.D. 63. 

» On Style iv. 234. Demetrius wrote some time after 100 B.c, 
(see J. F. Lockwood, in C.R. lii (1938), p. 59) and pro- 
bably before a.p. 100. 


338 


ON THE COSMOS 


ticularly common among the Pythagoreans of the 
Hellenistic age ; the author of the De Mundo owes 
much to these Neo-Pythagoreans, and he certainly 
reproduces enough genuinely Aristotelian thought 
to make it reasonable that he should wish to usurp 
Aristotle’s name. 

This is an important point. Those who have proved 
that the work is a forgery have sometimes overlooked 
that it is a forgery of Aristotle, and that in this fact 
we might find a little help in dating the treatise. For 
if the author is imitating Aristotle at all, it is surely 
the Aristotle of the Protrepticus and De Philosophia, 
the Aristotle whose “ flumen orationis aureum ”’ was 
praised by Cicero,* rather than the Aristotle of the 
school-treatises which survive to-day. The school- 
treatises were either lost or disregarded after the 
death of Theophrastus, and did not begin to occupy 
the attention of the learned world again until the 
appearance of Andronicus’s edition in the late first 
century B.c.? 

These considerations will be variously interpreted. 
Those who believe that knowledge of Aristotle’s work 
was absolutely confined to the published writings until 
Andronicus’s edition, will say that the author of 
the De Mundo shows knowledge of doctrines (e.g. of 
the Unmoved Mover, if this was not contained in the 
De Philosophia, and various meteorological details) 
which were known only after Andronicus. But it is 
likely that much of Aristotle’s doctrine was known 
throughout the period, at least in his own school, 

* Acad. Pr. ii. 38, 119. 

» The date usually given for this is c. 40 B.c. I. Diring 
(Notes on the History of the Transmission of Aristotle’s 


Writings, Giteborg, 1950) thinks this is the earliest possible 
date, and would prefer 40-20 B.c, 


339 


[ARISTOTLE] 


even though it did not appear in the published works. 
I am inclined to believe that the author of the De 
Mundo could have known all the Aristotelian matter 
that he reproduces before the publication of Andro- 
nicus’s edition, and that the style and manner of 
the work indicate a date before this edition made 
Aristotle’s school-treatises more widely known. 

Other evidence for the date is confused and diffi- 
cult. It is certain that Apuleius De Mundo is a 
translation of the Greek, but it is not quite certain 
that this is genuinely by Apuleius. If it is, we have 
a terminus ante quem of c. a.p. 140. The work seems 
to have been known to Maximus of Tyre and must 
therefore be before a.p. 180-190. From other reports, 
references and imitations in later authors nothing 
firmer than this can be deduced. 

To reach a terminus post quem by an analysis of the 
sources is equally difficult, since it is usually hard to 
say who was the first to express a particular doctrine. 
Nevertheless some of the meteorology appears to 
depend on Posidonius and his pupil Asclepiodotus, 
and we might therefore give c. 50 B.c. as the terminus. 
There is no agreement about the date of the Neo- 
Pythagorean sources. Attempts have been made 
to argue from the silence of Cicero, Seneca and Pliny, 
but arguments from silence do not carry much 
weight. 

The date has been given by various scholars as 
follows: Zeller, Ist cent. a.p.; Diels, in the reign 
of Augustus; Wilamowitz, in the Julio-Claudian 
dynasty ; Capelle, the first half of the 2nd cent. a.p. ; 
Lorimer, probably a.p. 40-140 ; Maguire and Festu- 
giére, the first few decades of the Ist cent. a.p. In 
my view there is some slight reason for saying that 


340 


ON THE COSMOS 


it was written before or not long after Andronicus’s 
edition, and virtually no reason for choosing any 
other time within the limits already mentioned. 


BrisLioGRAPHICAL NoTE 


The editio princeps (1497) was based on a single ms., 
and this remained the common text until Bekker 
added the results of collation of four more ss. in the 
Berlin Aristotle (1831). Parts of the treatise were 
edited by Wilamowitz and Wendland and printed in 
Wilamowitz’s Griechisches Lesebuch, Text II (1906), 
pp- 188-199. 

W. L. Lorimer took into account the readings of 
over seventy mss., the quotations in Stobaeus and 
others, the Latin version of Apuleius, the Armenian 
and Syriac versions, and two mediaeval Latin versions. 
He published his results in three books: The Tewxt 
Tradition of Ps.-Aristotle ‘‘ De Mundo ” (St. Andrews 
University Publications, xviii, 1924) ; Some Notes on 
the Text of Ps.-Aristotle ‘‘ De Mundo”’ (St. Andrews 
University Publications, xxi, 1925); and Aristotelis 
De Mundo (Paris, 1933). The last of these contains 
the Greek text with a very detailed apparatus criticus 
and a German translation by E. Kénig of the Syriac 
version (chaps. v-vii only). 

On the sources, the most important works are : 
W. Capelle, “ Die Schrift von der Welt,”” Neue Jahrb. 
f. d. klass. Alt. xv (1905), pp. 529-568 ; and Joseph 
P. Maguire, “The Sources of Ps.-Aristotle ‘ De 
Mundo,’ ”’ Yale Classical Studies, vi (1939). 

The important article by Hans Strohm, “ Studien 


@ Prof. E, H. Warmington has pointed out to me that the 
geography of ch. 3 confirms an early date. 
341 


[ARISTOTLE] 


zur Schrift von der Welt,” Mus. Helv. ix (1952), 
pp. 137-175, did not reach me until this book was 
in proof. Strohm agrees with me in minimizing 
the influence of Posidonius and in marking the con- 
nexions with early Aristotle. 

The late Prof. E. S. Forster translated the De 
Mundo for the Oxford translation of Aristotle (1914). 
A.-J. Festugiére translates most of it into French, and 
adds important comments, in La Révélation d’Hermes 
Trismégiste, vol. ii, Le Dieu cosmique (Paris, 1949). 

I am indebted to all these, and particularly (as all 
students of the De Mundo must be) to W. L. Lorimer. 


Text 


The text is based on Bekker’s edition in the Berlin 
Aristotle ; I have indicated deviations from Bekker, 
except those that seem trivial. 

The four mss. used by Bekker are designated as 
follows : 


O=Vat. 316. 
P=Vat. 1339. 
Q = Mare. 200. 


R=Paris. 1102. 


Where necessary I have added references to mss. 
collated by Lorimer, as follows : 


B=Hieros. Patr. 108. 
C= Laur. 87, 14. 
D= Paris. 1302. 
E= Vat. Urbin. 125. 
F = Laur. 87, 16. 
G= Vat. 1025. 
W =Paris. 1038. 
Z = Paris. 2381. 


342 


ON THE COSMOS 


Stob.=Stobaeus. Ap. indicates reading confirmed 
by the Latin of Apuleius, De Mundo. 

Nearly all the deviations from Bekker follow 
Lorimer ; to avoid complicating the notes unduly, 
where I have followed Lorimer against Bekker and 
the ss. are fairly equally divided, I have used the 
abbreviations “ Bekk. ” and “ Lor.” without listing 
the mss. ‘‘ Lor. (Notes)”’ refers to the second and 
“ Lor. (De Mundo) ”’ to the third of Lorimer’s works 
cited in the Bibliographical Note above. 


I wish to record my indebtedness to Professor 
T. B. L. Webster for reading my work in typescript ; 
I am very grateful for his criticisms and suggestions. 


DIO: 


343 


391a1 


on 


10 


15 


APISTOTEAOTS 
IIEPI KO2MOY 


1. TloAAdKis pev Ewouye Oeidv te Kat Sapoviov 
dvrws xphpa, & “AdAdEavdpe, 7 didoaodia edo€kev 
elva, pdAvora 5é ev ols povn Svapapevn mpos THY 
tov dAwv béav éorovdace yrdvar tiv ev adbrois 
3. / \ ~ + , > / ‘ 
aAjGeav, Kal Tv dAAwy tav’Tys amoordavrwv da 
TO vyos Kal TO péyeos, attn TO mpaypa ovK 
” 29> ¢ \ ~ / > / 
édevcev ovd adriv Tav KadAloTwy aantiwaer, 
GAAa Kal ovyyeveotarny éavTh Kal pddvoTa mpé- 
movoav evojuoev elvan THY exeivwv udbnow. e7reLd7) 
yap ovx oldv Te Hv TH owpare eis Tov odpdviov 
aduxéobar tomov Kal THY yhv exAuTdvTa Tov odpa- 
vuov exelvov y@pov Katomreboat, Kabdmep of avon- 

/ > / > / ¢ ~ \ \ 
tot mote emevoovv *“AAwddar, 7 yotv ux dia 

/ ~ ¢ / ‘ lot > , 
drrooodias, AaBotoa iyepdva Tov vodv, émeparcbn 
Kal e€edjunoev, axomiatov Twa dddv ebpodaa, Kat 
ta mActotov aAAjAwy adeor@ra Tois tomo TH 
Siavoia auvedpdrvynce, padiws, oluar, Ta ovyyevij 

/ ~ a 
yvwpicaca, Kai eiw buys oupare ta Oeta Kata- 





@ See Introduction, p. 338. 
344 


ARISTOTLE 
ON THE COSMOS 


1. I nave often thought, Alexander,* that philosophy 
is a divine and really god-like activity, particularly 
in those instances when it alone has exalted itself 
to the contemplation of the universe and sought to 
discover the truth that is in it; the other sciences 
shunned this field of inquiry because of its sublimity 
and extensiveness ; philosophy has not feared the 
task or thought itself unworthy of the noblest things, » 
but has judged that the study of these is by nature 
most closely related to it and most fitting. It was 
not possible by means of the body to reach the 
heavenly region or to leave the earth and explore that 
heavenly place, in the manner once attempted by 
the foolish Aloadae ° : so the soul, by means of philo- 
sophy, taking the mind as its guide, has crossed the 
frontier, and made the journey out of its own land 
by a path that does not tire the traveller. It has 
embraced in thought the things that are most widely 
separated from each other in place; for it had no 
difficulty, I think, in recognizing things that were 
related to it, and with “ the soul’s divine eye ” ¢ it 
_  ° Otus and Ephialtes, the mythical Giants, who tried to 
reach heaven by piling Pelion on Ossa, 
¢ Probablya quotation: ef. the eye of the soul in Plato, 
Rep. 533 v. 
345 


[ARISTOTLE] 
391 a 

AaBobca, tois Te avOpwirois tpodyntevovoa. TodTo 
dé emabe, Kal” daov oldv te Hv, maow adbovws 
petadobdvar BovAnfeioa tHv rap’ airH Tipiwv. 810 
Kal TOUS META GTOVvdTs SiaypaavrTas Huiv Evos 
Tomov vow 7 puds oxHwa ToAEws 7) TOTALOD peye- 
20 Gos 7 Gpovs KdAdos, ofd tiwes dn TETOWNKAOL, 
ppalovres of pev tHhv "Ooaar, of d€ tiv Nuccay,’ 
ot 5€ TO Kwptxiov dvtpov, oi 5é dtiobdv eruxye TOV 
emt pL€pous, oiKTioelev av Tis THS puKpoysvyias, TA 
TvxovTa exmeTAnypevous Kal weya hpovodvtas emt 
25 Dewpia puKpd. tobro d5é€ mdoxovar dia TO abéaror 
T@V KpeiTTOvwy elvat, Kdopou Aéyw Kal TAV ev 
Koopm peyiotwv: ovdéToTEe yap av TovTOLs yvA- 
391 b clws emorioavtes COavpalov tt TMV dAAwy, adda 
mavra avdtois Ta dAAa puKpa Katedaiveto av Kal 

ovddevos a€ia Tmpos TH TOUTOV drrepoxny. 
Aéywpev 81) Teds Kal, Kal? ogov epuKTov, 
Deodoyapev mepl TOUTWY oupTavrey, ws eExagTov 
5 €xer pUoews Kal Oéoews Kal KWioEws. mpére SE 
ye olwor Kal col, ovt. hryeudvwv apiotw, THY TOV 
peylorwy totopiav petievar, piAocodia te pndev 
puKpov emuwoeiv, adAAa Tots Tovodrors Swpois Sekt- 

odc0a Tods apiorous. 
2. Kéopos pev obv éore avoTnpa e& odpavod Kat 
10 ys Kal Tv ev TovTos TeEptexonevwy ddcewv. 
Aéeyerar 5€ Kal Erépws Kdapos 7) TOV OAwv Takis TE 
Kat Svaxdopnats, b7r0 Yeod” re Kal dia Oedv® dvdar- 
1 Nvcoay Lor. : Nuvcav Bekk. 


2 Geod codd. Stob. Lor.: Gedy codd. al. Bekk. 
3 @edv codd. Lor. : Gedv codd. al. Stob. Bekk. 





@ Cf. Pausanias x. 32. 2. 
> Cf. Introduction, p. 334. 
346 


ON THE COSMOS, 1-2 


grasped things divine, and interpreted them for man- 
kind. This came about because it wished to impart to 
all unsparingly, as far as possible, a share of its own 
privileges. So those who have earnestly described 
to us the nature of a single place, or the plan of a 
single city, or the size of a river, or the beauty of 
a mountain, as some have done before now—some 
of them tell us of Ossa, some of Nyssa, others of the 
Corycian cave,* or whatever other detail it hap- 
pens to be—all these might well be pitied for their 
meanness of spirit, since they are overawed by 
commonplaces and pride themselves on insignificant 
observations. The reason is that they are blind to the 
nobler things—I mean the cosmos and the greatest 
features of the cosmos. For if they once genuinely 
gave their attention to these things, they would never 
wonder at any other ; everything else would appear 
small and worthless to them, in comparison with the 
matchless superiority of these. . 

Let us, then, take up the subject, and so far as they 
are attainable let us theologize ” about all the greatest 
features of the cosmos, discussing the nature, position 
and motion of each. It is right, I think, that even 
you, the best of princes, should undertake the study 
of the greatest things, and that philosophy should 
have no humble intentions, but should greet the most 
excellent men with worthy gifts. 

2. Cosmos, then, means a system composed of 
heaven and earth and the elements contained in 
them.° In another sense, cosmos is used to signify 
the orderly arrangement of the universe, which is 
preserved by God and through God. The centre of 


* So also Chrysippus ap. Arius Didymus fr. 31 (Diels, Doz. 
Graec. pp. 465-466), and Posidonius ap. Diog. Laert. vii. 138. 


347 


391 b 


15 


2 


—) 


2 


o 


392 a 


o 


[ARISTOTLE] 


/ ‘ 
Topevn. Tavrns dé TO bev peor, akivnTrov TE Kal 
e a ” ¢€ / ” ~ ~ 
edpaiov ov, » depéaPios €lAnye yh, mavtTodaTa@v 

7 ¢ , 7 \ 7 A \ Md 
Cawv €otia Te ovoa Kai prrnp. TO de Urepbev 
~ a ‘ 
atbrtis, mav Te Kal mavTn TeTEpaTwpevov eis* TO 
avwrdtw, Jedv oikyntipiov, ovpavos wvdpaorat. 
TAnpys 5€ dv cwpydtwv Oeiwv, a 8) Kadetv aotpa 
eiw@Bapev, Kivovpevos Kivnow aidiov, 1d TEptaywyh 
Kal KUKAwW ovvavaxopever maar TovToLs amavaTws 
~ lol ~ ‘ 
du aidvos. Tod dé ovpmavtos odpavod te Kal 
Koapouv odpaipoeidots OvtTos Kal Kwoupevov, Kab- 
/ s > ~ 4 > / > > / 
amep elmov, evdeAey@s, S00 axivynta e& avayKns 
> lal \ > / / ~ >? 
€oTt onpeta, Katavtikpd aAAjAwy, Kabdmep THs ev 
/ 
Topvw KuKAodopovpevns adaipas, aTeped jévovTa 
a c = ” 
Kal auvéxovta tHv odhaipay, mepl ad 6 mas OyKos 
KUKAW otpédeta®> Kadodvrat dé odTot mdAoL Bu 
e > yA > / > - a 
@v €l vonoapev emelevypevnv «dbeiav, Hv twes 
” a / ” an, 2 , 3 
afova KaAovdor, dudperpos EoTar TOD KdopMov, LeaoV 
A ” \ ~ A 5 A 8 / 5A / 
fev Exovoa THY yhv, Tos 5é d¥o mdAous mépara. 
~ A > / , 4 ¢ \ > N / 
TOV 5€ axwitwv méAwy TovTwWY 6 peV aEl havepds 
> ¢ \ A n” A \ / / 
cot vTep Kopudiv wv Kata TO Pdpevov KAipa, 
> \ / ¢ A ¢€ ‘ ~ oe A 
apktiKos KaAovpevos, 6 5€ bd yhv adel KaTaKe- 
KpUTTal, KATA TO VOTLOV, avTapKTiKOS KaAoUpeEVos. 
> ~ \ \ »” y -) \ m7 lol 
Odpavod 5€é Kai dotpwv odoiav pev aibépa Kadod- 
1 eis codd. Lor. : 4s P Bekk. 


2 mas dyKos Kikdw orpéderat Stob. Lor. : mas xdopos Kweirat. 
6 pev odv Kdapos ev Kixhw meprotpéperar codd. Bekk. 


348 


ON THE COSMOS, 2 


the cosmos, which is unmoved and fixed, is occupied 
by “ life-bearing earth,” * the home and mother of 
living beings of all kinds. The region above it, a 
single whole with a finite upper limit everywhere, 
the dwelling of the gods, is called heaven. It is full 
of divine bodies which we call stars ; it moves eter- 
nally, and revolves in solemn choral dance ? with all 
the stars in the same circular orbit unceasingly for 
alltime. The whole of the heaven, the whole cosmos,° 
is spherical, and moves continuously, as I have said ; 
but there are necessarily two points which are un- 
moved, opposite one another, just as in the case of 
a ball being turned in a lathe; they remain fixed, 
holding the sphere in position, and the whole mass 
revolves in a circle round them; these points are 
called poles. If we think of a straight line joining 
these two together (some call this the azis), it will be 
a diameter of the cosmos, having the earth at its 
centre and the two poles at its extremities. One of 
these two stationary poles is always visible, above our 
heads in the North : it is called the Arctic“ pole. The 
other is always hidden under the earth, in the South : 
it is called the Antarctic pole. 

The substance of the heaven and the stars we call 


* Cf. Hesiod, Theog. 693. 

» Ps.-Aristotle seems to recall Euripides, Jon 1079 6re Kai 
Avds dorepwrods avexdpevoev aifyp, xopever 5¢ ceAdva. Cf. also 
Soph. Ant. 1146 f. He develops the same image below, 
399 a 14. 

¢ Ps.-Aristotle here uses xéoyos in a third sense, as a 
synonym for odpavds. This sense is quite common from Plato 
onwards. 

4 The terms Arctic and Antarctic do not appear in extant 
literature before Hipparchus (2nd cent. B.c.). 





3 wéoov TWZ Lor. : peony codd. cet. Bekk. 
349 


392 a 


10 


15 


2 


o 


25 


[ARISTOTLE] 


> ” 5 \ ‘ 5d s ha 6 

bev, odx, Ws Tes, dia TO TUPwWdy odoay aifecBaL, 
~ ‘ a 
TAnppedobvtes Tept THY TAcioTOV mUpds amndAday- 
pevnv dvvayuv, adAAa dia TO dei Oeiv KuKAodopov- 
€vnv, oarotyetov obtoav €eTepovy TwY TETTAPwWV 
> 
/ a “ 

akipatov Te Kal Jeiov. TaV ye pry euTreptexomevwy 
doTpwv Ta pev arAavi TH ovprravtTe olpava avp- 
meptotpedetar, Tas adtas €xovTa edpas, Hv péaos 
6 Cwoddpos Kadovpevos KvKAos eyKdapatos bia TOY 
tpoTmuK@v duelwata, Kata pépos Siunpynpevos eis 

PS) bd yh / \ PS) / r \ ” ” 
woeka Cwdiwv xwpas, Ta dé, mAavnTA ovTa, ovTE 
Tois mpoTépois Opotax@s Kuweicbar wéduKev ove 

> /, > a. 3 ¢ / 4 22 / - o 
aAAjAous, add’ ev ETEpois Kal ETEpois KUKAOLS, WOTE 
avT@v TO ev Tmpoayerotepov elvat, TO’ b€ avwTEpov. 
TO pev odv TOV amAavav rAnOds eorw aveevpeTov 
avOpwrrois, Kaimep él pds Kivoupevwy éemipaveias 
~ ~ > ~ / 
THs TOO GvuTravtos obpavod: To b€ TOV mAaviTwWr, 
els érta péepyn Kedhadaovpevov, ev ToaovTos earl 
KUKAos edebfs Keysevois, Wore del TOV aGvwTEepw 
/ ~ ¢ / 4 c ‘ > > / 
peilw tod broKdtw elvat, Tov’s Te EmTa ev aAAr- 
Aois epmreptexeoOar, mavras ye pry bo THS TOV 
> ~ , ~ ~ A ae oe | 
amAavav ofaipas trepieAnpbar. ovveyh de Ever del 
tHhv bow ravrn 6 Tob Daivovros dua Kai Kpdovov 
~ A ~ 

KaAovpevos KUKAos, eheEfs 5€ 6 Tob Dadbovtos 
kal” Avos Aeyopevos, €i0’ 6 Ilupdes, ‘HpaxAdous 
\ Til / tha de ¢ > ir 
te kal “Apeos mpocayopevopevos, é€fs 5é€ 6 Urid- 
Bwv, dv tepov “Eppot Kadotow evor, twes dé 


176... 70 Lor.: rov ... tov Bekk. s 
2 «at Lor.: 6 kat BD: om. cett. 





* The author follows Aristotle in making aether a fifth 
350 


ON THE COSMOS, 2 


aether,* not, as some think, because it is fiery in nature 
and so burns (they fall into error about its function, 
which is quite different from that of fire), but because 
it always moves in its circular orbit ; it is an element 
different from the four elements,’ pure and divine. 
Now, of the stars which are encompassed in it, some 
are fixed and move in concert with the whole heaven 
always keeping the same position in it ; in the middle 
of these the circle of the zodiac, as it is called, set 
obliquely through the tropics, passes round like a 
girdle, divided into the twelve regions of the zodiac. 
The others, the planets, move, according to their 
nature, at speeds different from the fixed stars and 
from each other, each in a different circle, in such a 
way that one is nearer the earth, another higher in 
the heavens. The number of the fixed stars is not 
to be known by men, although they all move on one 
visible surface, namely that of the whole heaven : 
but the class of planets contains seven units, arranged 
in the same number of circles in a series, so that the 
higher is always greater than the lower, and all the 
seven, though contained one within another, are 
nevertheless encompassed by the sphere of the fixed 
stars. The circle which is always in the position next 
to this sphere is that which is called the circle of 
Phaenon (the Bright one) or Cronus (Saturn) ; then 
comes the circle of Phaéthon (the Shiner) or Zeus 
(Jupiter) ; next Pyroeis (the Fiery one), named after 
Heracles or Ares (Mars) ; next Stilbon (the Glittering 
one) which some dedicate to Hermes (Mercury), some 
element: the Stoics identified it with fire. He rejects the 
derivation of the word from ai@ec@a: (to burn) and relates it 
to dei Oeiv (move always), as Plato and Aristotle did (cf. Plato, 


Crat. 410 8, Aristot. De Caelo 270 b 22). 
> Earth, air, fire and water. 


351 


[ARISTOTLE] 
392 a ; 
> | ane,’ ¢ ~ / “a > 
AzodAwvos: eB? dv 6 tod Dwoddpov, dv ’Adpo- 
¢ 
Sirns, ot d€ “Hpas mpocayopevovaw, etra 6 jAiov, 
\ a c a Pal ~ 
Kat TeAevtatos 6 THs ceAjvns péxpe ys opilerar. 
A a 
30 6 S€ aidyp Ta TE Oeia eurrepréyer o@pata Kal THY 
THS KWHTEws Taéw. 
\ \ \ 17 \ / / a 
Mera 8€ tiv aifepiov Kai Oetav dvow, HvTwa 
retaypevyv amopaivopev, eT. d€ ATpemTov Kal av- 
eTepolwtov Kai amabh, ouvexyns eoTw 7 du oAwy 
maQnr) Te Kal tpemTy, Kal, TO ovprray eizeiv, 
35 bbapry Te Kal emiknpos. tavTns dé adbrijs mpwry 
392b prev eat 1) AeTTomepijs Kal droywdys ovata, d70 
tis aifepiov dicews mupovpevyn Sia TO péyebos 
airhs Kal tiv o€vTnTAa THs Kwihoews: ev SE TH 
mupwoe Kal ataktw Aeyouevyn Ta TE GéAa, SidTTEL 
‘ / > / \ / \ / 
Kat dddyes akovtilovras Kat doKides Te Kal Bofvvor 
5 Kal KopArae Aeyopevor ornpilovrar Kal oBévvuvrat 
ToAAdKts. 
‘E ~ 8 \ , e aA ¢ / NY) 
Ejs 5é tav¥rns 6 arp vroxéxuvta, Copwoys 
” \ , \ , «“N \ ? 1 
Ov Kat mayerwons thy pdow: bo Se KwHcEws 
Aapmdpevos apa Kat diaxadpevos Aapmpds* Te 
/ ‘ > / ? \ , ~ ~ 
yiverau Kau ddeewvos. ev de ToUTW, THs mabnrijs 
évTt Kat adt@ dSuvayews Kal mavrodamas aA- 
10 Aovwoupévw, vedn TE ovvictata Kai OuBpor KaT- 
apdocovat, xioves Te Kal mdayvar Kat xdAala 
mvoal Te avéuwv Kai Tupwrwyv, éTr Te BpovtTat Kal 


1 éxeivns BCWZ Stob. Ap. Lor. : xwjoews codd. cet. Bekk. 
2 Napmpds Lor. : Aapmporepés Bekk. 





@ This is the ‘‘ Pythagorean ”’ order of the planets, adgpted 
by Aristotle, Eudoxus, Eratosthenes, and probably the early 
Stoics. The other order commonly given by ancient writers, 
the ‘‘ Chaldean,”’ puts Venus and Mercury below the sun ; 
this order was adopted by Panaetius, and probably also by 


352 


ON THE COSMOS, 2 


to Apollo ; after this is the circle of Phosphorus (the 
Light-bearer), which some call after Aphrodité 
(Venus) and others after Hera ; then the circle of the 
sun“; and the last, the circle of the moon, is bounded 
by the terrestrial sphere.’ The aether, then, contains 
the divine bodies and their ordered orbits. 

After the aetherial and divine element, which is 
arranged in a fixed order, as we have declared, and is 
also unchangeable, unalterable and impassive, there 
comes next the element that is through the whole 
of its extent liable to change and alteration, and is, 
in short, destructible and perishable. The first part 
of this is the fine and fiery substance that is set aflame 
by the aether because of the latter’s great size and 
the swiftness of its motion. In this fiery and disorderly 
element, as it is called, meteors and flames shoot across, 
and often planks and pits and comets, as they are called, 
stand motionless and then expire. ° 

Next under this is spread the air, opaque and icy 
by nature, but when it is brightened and heated by 
movement, it becomes bright and warm.’ In the 
air, which itself also has the power to change, and 
alters in every kind of way, clouds are formed and 
rain falls in torrents ; there is snow, frost and hail, 
and gales and whirlwinds ; thunder and lightning, 


Posidonius. Lorimer writes (Votes, p. 51) that there were 
few uphoiders of the ‘‘ Pythagorean ”’ order after 200 B.c., 
though it appears in an unknown astronomer in Rhodes of 
about 100 sB.c. (1.G.Jns. i. 913). 

> yj here must refer to the whole “ sublunary ”’ sphere, not 
to the earth proper. 

¢ This is inconsistent with 395 a 29 ff. where these pheno- 
mena are put in the air. 

4 The coldness of the air is a Stoic doctrine ; Aristotle said 
it was warm and capable of being inflamed by motion 
( Meteor. 341 a 18). 


N 353 


[ARISTOTLE] 
392 b 
aotpatral Kal mrwoeis Kepavvav pupiwy TE yvodwv 
ovpTAnydoes. 

3. “EEjs 5€ THs depiov pdocws yi} Kal OéAacoa 
Epijpevoran, putois Bpvovea Kal Cwous myyats Te Kal 
motapois, Tots pev dva yiv édtropevois, tots Sé 
avepevyopevois eis OdAacoav. memoixiArar dé Kal 
xAoais pupiats dpeci te dyrAots Kal BabvEdAous 
dpupots Kal wdAcaw, as TO codov Cov, 6 avOpwros, 
20 (dptaaTo, vious Te evaAdlous Kal ATElpols. TIV [eV 

obv olkouvpevnv 6 Todds Adyos eis TE viGOVS Kal 

nmelpous dueiAev, ayvody ot. Kal 1) ovpTraca pia 
vijods éotw, b70 Tis *ArAavtixijs KaAovpevns Oa- 

Adoons mepippeopevn. roAdas dé Kal dAAas elds 

Thad dvrimopO Lous amwbev ketobar, Tas peev pret- 
25 Cous auras, Tas be eAdrrous, jpv be mdoas may 

Thode dopdrous: Omep yap at map’ jpiv vAgou 

mpos Taurl 7a. Teddy meTovOacr, TodTo Hoe 7 

oixoupevn mpos Tv ’AtAavtiKiy OdAacoav troAAai 

Te €TEpar pds avpTracay TIVv FdAaccav: Kal yap 

adrar peydAa ties elou vijou peydAots mepuxAv- 
30 Copevar meAdyeow. 1) be ovpTaca Tob vbypod 

pvous éemumoAdlovaa, KaTd TiWas Tis vis omiAous 

Tas _kadoupevas avarrehayKvia* olxoupevas, éfijs 

dv ein THs depiov padora Pvcews. pera dé TavTnv 

ev Tots Bubots KaTa TO pecaitatov Tob KOg}LOV 

ouvepnpeiopevn yh moa Kal TeTLEGHEVT) ovveorn- 
35 Kev, akivnTos Kal aadAevtos: Kal Todr’ Eat TOO 


1 


or 


1 dvarehayxvia coni. Usener Lor.: dvameduxvia codd: Bekk. 





* Aristotle apparently thought nothing but sea lay from 
Gibraltar westwards to India (Meteor. 362 b 28). Strabo (i. 
4. 6=65 c) notices the possibility of other inhabited worlds 
in his discussion of Eratosthenes. 


354 


ON THE COSMOS, 2-3 


too, and falling thunderbolts, and the clash of 
innumerable storm-clouds. 

3. Next to the element of air comes the fixed mass 
of earth and sea, full of plants and animals, and 
streams and rivers, some winding about the surface 
of the earth, others discharging themselves into the 
sea. This region is adorned with innumerable green 
plants, high mountains, deep-shaded woodland, and 
cities established by the wise creature, man; and 
with islands in the sea, and continents. The in- 
habited world is divided by the usual account into 
islands and continents, since it is not recognized that 
the whole of it is really one island, surrounded by 
the sea which is called Atlantic. Far away from this 
one, on the opposite side of the intervening seas, 
there are probably many other inhabited worlds,“ 
some greater than this, some smaller, though none 
is visible to us except this one ; for the islands we 
know stand in the same relation to our seas as the 
whole inhabited world to the Atlantic Ocean, and 
many other inhabited worlds to the whole ocean; for 
these are great islands washed round by great seas. 
The whole mass of the wet element lies on the surface 
of the earth, allowing the so-called inhabited worlds 
to show through where there are projections of the 
earth; it is this element that would properly ° be 
next in order to the air. After this, set in the depths 
at the centre of the cosmos, densely packed and com- 
pressed, is the whole mass of the earth, unmoved and 
unshaken. And this is the whole of that part of the 

> Taking pddvora with the verb ; it is probably postponed 
for rhythmic effect. The meaning is that water is in theory 
next to air, but.earth sometimes protrudes through the water. 


orridous (properly “ stains ’’ or ‘‘ marks ’’) in the previous line 
seems to be used in the sense of omAddas (“* projections ”’). 


355 


[ARISTOTLE] 
392 b 
KOGp}Lov TO Tav 6 Kadotpev KaTwW. TeévTE 51) OTOL- 
393 a yeia Tadra ev TévTE ywWpals ofaipiK@s eyKeimeva, 
TEpiexomevns acl THS eAdTTovos TH pellovi—réeyw 
be yas pev év voare, datos dé ev aépt, depos de 
ev trupl, tupos dé ev aifépi— Tov dAov Kdcpov auv- 
coTHoaTo, Kal TO pev avw Trav Oedv améderkev 
5 olKnTIpLoV, TO Kd de edn epeov Leuv. avrob 
ye pnv TOUTOU TO pev bypov €otw, 6 KaNety moTa- 
pLovs Kal vdwara. Kal Gaddooas <Wiopeba, 70 dé 
Enpov, 6 yhv Te Kal HmElpous Kal vious dvopd- 
oper. 

Tév de vse at pev elo. peydAa, kabdrep n 

10 ovpTraca NdE olKoupevy ddAeKrau mohAat TE ETEPAL 
preydAous Te puppeopievat mehdyeow, at de eAdrrous, 
pavepat TE Huty Kal evTos oboat. Kal TovTwV at 
pev akWrovor, LuKxeAa xal Lapdw Kal Kupvos 
Kpyrn te Kal Evpova Kal Kézpos Kal AéoBos, at 

15 d€ drode€oTepar, dv at pev Umopddes, at de Kv- 
KAdbes, ai de dws ovopdlovrar. 

IléAayos be TO pev €€w TIS olxoupevns "ArAav- 
TUKOV Te Kal ‘Oxeavos KaAetrar, mepippewy Auas. 
ev b€ TO mpos dvoeis oTevoTrépw Ssiavewyws 
oropare, Kara Tas “HpaxAetous Aeyopevas oTnAas 

20 TOV <lopouv ets TH éow OdAvacoay ws av eis Ayéva 
moiral, KaTa puKpov dé emumAaTUVopevos ava- 
xtra, peydAous mrepidapBavery KoArous dAAnjAous 
ovvadeis, 7H pev Kata aTevoropous adxéevas av- 
EOTOMMLEVOS, 17h Sé mdAw maruvopevos.. Tp@Tov 
pev obv A€yerar eyKexoAT@abar ev debug etomrA€ovre 

25 Tas ‘HpaxAetous or7Aas, dix@s, eis Tas KaAov- 
peévas Lupreis, @ @v TV bev MeydAny, Tay dé Mexpav, 
KaAobow: emt Odtepa d5€ odKétt dpoiws amoKoATov- 
356 


ON THE COSMOS, 3 


cosmos that we call the lower part. So these five 
elements, occupying five spherical regions, the larger 
sphere always embracing the smaller—earth in water, 
water in air, air in fire, fire in aether—make up the 
whole cosmos; the upper part as a whole is distin- 
guished as the abode of the gods, and the lower part 
as that of mortal creatures. Of the latter, some is 
wet, and this part we call rzvers and springs and seas ; 
the rest is dry, and this part we name land and con- 
tinents and islands. 

There are various kinds of island : some are large, 
like this whole inhabited world of ours, as I have said, 
and many others which are surrounded by great 
oceans ; others are smaller, visible to us and within 
the Mediterranean. Some of these are quite con- 
siderable—Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, Euboea, 
Cyprus and Lesbos ; some are smaller, like the Spo- 
rades, the Cyclades, and others with various names. 

The ocean that is outside the inhabited world is 
called the Atlantic, or Ocean, and surrounds us. To 
the West of the inhabited world, this ocean makes 
a passage through a narrow strait called the Pillars 
of Heracles, and so makes an entry into the interior 
sea, as if into a harbour; gradually it broadens and 
spreads out, embracing large bays joined up to each 
other, here contracting into narrow necks of water, 
there broadening out again. They say that the first 
of these bays that the sea forms, to starboard, if you 
sail in through the Pillars of Heracles, are two, called 
the Syrtes, of which one is called the Major, the other 
the Minor ; on the other side it does not form gulfs 





1 Scavewyds Lor.: dvavewyds Bekk. 
357 


[ARISTOTLE] 
393 a 
pevos Tplia moved meAdyn, TO TE Lapddvov Kal TO 


~ 4 
Tadatixov Kadovpevov kat ’Adpiav, é€fs be TovTwv 
? / \ / \ \ ~ ‘ /, 
eykdpo.ov TO LuKeAuKov, weTa d€ TooTO TO Kpyrucov, 
~ ~ \ 
30 cuvexes Sé€ adtod, TH pev TO Aiydmtiov Te Kal 
~ a ‘ 
IlapdvAvov Kai Xdprov, tH 5é TO Alyatoy Te Kat 
Mupta@ov. avtumapyKer dé Tots elpnuévois moAv- 
pepéotatos dv 6 Ildévros, od TO pev puxaitatov 
~ a / 
393 b Mardis KaAeirar, To Sé€ ew mpos tov ‘EAAjo- 
TOVTOV ovvaveoTopwTa TH KaAovperyn Ipomovride. 
a ~ /, 
IIpos ye py tats avacyéceot Tod HAiov maAw 
> / «3 / A > / » 'e ‘ 
elaopewy 6 "Qreavds, Tov “Ivducov te Kat Ileporxov 
/ / > / ~ \ > A 
diavoi~as KdATrov, avadaiver avvext THY °Epvbpav 
Odracoav diecAndws. emt Odrepov 5é Képas Kara 
oTevov Te Kal emuyinkn Sujkwv adyeva, madw 
> 4 \ € / \ , Cy 
aveupvverat, THY “Ypxaviav te kal Kaomiav opilwv: 
\ a Mase? A , \ ” A c A \ ~ 
70 5€ Urep Tavrnv Baldy exer Tov dep THY Mawrw 
rn , t > AC eu \ , 
iuvynv tomov. elta Kat oAtyov brép Tovs UKvbas 
te Kat KedArixiy odiyyer tiv oixovpevny mpds 
10 Te TOV TadatiKov KdAmov Kal Tas mpoeipnuevas 


o 


‘“HpaxAelous oTiAas, wv ew mepippéer THY yy oO 





« The Ocean makes three separate incursions into the in- 
habited world—the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the 
Caspian (see n. ¢ below). Festugiére (op. cit. p. 465) thinks 
these Eastern seas are spoken of as prolongatjons of the 
Mediterranean ; but adAw eiopéwy here is parallel to cov 
eicpodbv . . . mrovetrar at 393 a 19, 

Are these two gulfs or one ?_ If two, they are respectively 
the Gulf of Cutch (or the Gulf of Cambay) and the Persian 
Gulf ; if one, probably the Persian Gulf is meant. The Greek 
could be interpreted either way. 

¢ By ’Epv@pa (red) the author probably means what was 


358 


ON THE COSMOS, 3 


at first in the same way, but makes three seas, the 
Sardinian, Galatian and Adriatic ; next to these, and 
across the line of them, is the Sicilian sea ; after this, 
the Cretan ; and continuing this on one side are the 
Egyptian and Pamphylian and Syrian seas, on the 
other the Aegean and Myrtoan. Lying opposite 
these that I have described, in another direction, is 
the Pontus, and this has very many parts : the inner- 
most part is called Maeotis, and the outermost part, 
towards the Hellespont, is joined by a strait to the 
sea called Propontis. 

In the East, the Ocean again penetrates (the in- 
habited world) %; it opens out the gulf of India and 
Persia ° and without a break reveals the Red Sea,¢ 
embracing these as parts of itself. ‘Towards the other 
promontory (of Asia),? passing through a long narrow 
strait and then broadening out again, it makes the 
Hyrcanian or Caspian sea’; beyond this, it occupies 
a deep hollow beyond Lake Maeotis. Then little by 
little, beyond the land of the Scythians and Celts, it 
confines the inhabited world as it passes towards the 
Galatian Gulf and the Pillars of Heracles, already 
described, on the farther side of which the Ocean 


generally called the Erythraean Sea, which might include 
our Red Sea (called the Arabian Gulf at 393 b 28). 

4 Lorimer (Notes, p. 80, n. 3) quotes Mela i. 2 (9) to confirm 
this interpretation. In Mela, the two promontories are the 
land between the Nile and the Red Sea, and that between the 
Tanais and the Caspian. 

¢ Or “bounding the Hyrcanian and Caspian country ” 
(Forster). But @aAaccay is easier to understand here than 
yiv ; admittedly dpifZwv has an odd sense (perhaps ‘‘ marking 
out”), but the author is running short of synonyms for 
“forming ”’ seas. At all events, he means the Caspian Sea, 
which was thought of as a gulf of the Northern Ocean from 
the time of Alexander to Ptolemy. 


359 


[ARISTOTLE] 
393 b 
\ ~ , AS 
‘Qkeaves. a Toure YE py vijoow peyoran” Tuy 
xXavovaw odaa dvo, Bpertavixal® Aeyopevar, AAPi- 
~ - / / € \ 
av" Kal ‘lépyn, TOY mpotoropnwevav peilous, b7rep 
tovs KeArods Keievar. tovtwv dé odK €AdTToOUsS 
a \ \ 
15% Te TampoBavn mépav “Ivddv, Aoén mpos thy 
/ \ 
oikoupevnv, Kal 7 DeBorA Kadovpevn, Kata Tov 
/ ‘ 
"ApaBixov Keysevyn KoATrov. ovK dAlyar Sé puKpal 
/ 
mept tas Bpetravikas Kat tHv “I[Bnpiav KiKAw 
/, “a \ 
TepiecoTepavwvTar THY olKoupevny TavTynv, Av 41) 
~ / > \ \ / 
_ vijoov etpKapiev" As mraros: pev €o7e Kara TO Babv- 
20 TaToV THs Tretpou Bpaxd amodéov TeTpaxvopuplov 
aTadiwv, ws pacw ot ed yewypadyjoavres, wHKOS 
5€ mepl émtakiopupiovs pdAvora. dvapetrar de 
” > / \ > / \ A 7 
ets Te Edpwrnv kai “Aciav cai AiBunv. 
Edpwrn pev ovv eotw As opor Kv¥KAwW orhAat 
te ‘HpaxdAgous kai pvxot Iévrov OdAarra te ‘Yp- 
25 kavia, Kal’ Hv otevdtatos icOuos «is Tov Ilovrov 
dujker Twes d€ avti* tod ioOuod Tavaiv motapov 
cipjxaow. *Aoia dé €ott TO amd Tod eipnuevov 
ioOu06 Tob Te [lovrov Kal rhs “Ypravias Paddoons 
péexpt Oarépov iobuod, ds peratd Keira Tod Te 
’ApaBixod KdéAmov Kai Tis €ow Oaddoons, mepi- 
1 post péyvora add. re Bekk. 
2 Bperravixai Lor. : Bperavvixait Bekk. 


3 ’AABiwy Lor.: “AABiov Bekk. 
4 avri Stob. Lor. : aad codd. Bekk. 





* Very mysterious. It might well be Socotra, as Bochert 
suggests (Arist. Erdkunde, p. 93); Capelle (op. cit. p. 539) 
suggests Madagascar; Miillenhoff (Deutsche Altertums- 
kunde, pp. 322 f.), quoted with approval by Lorimer (Notes, 
p. 37, n. 1), suggests it is the island in Lake Tana (Psebo in 
Strabo) in Abyssinia, magnified and transplanted, 


360 


ON THE COSMOS, 3 


flows round the earth. There are two very large 
islands in it, called the British Isles, Albion and 
Ierne ; they are larger than those already mentioned, 
and lie beyond the land of the Celts. No smaller than 
these are Taprobane (Ceylon) beyond the Indians, 
which lies obliquely to the inhabited world, and the 
island known as Phebol,* by the Arabian Gulf. There 
is quite a number of other small islands round the 
British Isles and Spain, set in a ring round this 
inhabited world, which as we have said is itself an 
island ; its breadth, at the deepest point of the con- 
tinent, is a little short of 40,000 stades, in the opinion 
of good geographers,? and its length is approximately 
70,000 stades. It is divided into Europe, Asia and 
Libya. 

Europe is the area which is bounded in a circle by 
the Pillars of Heracles and the inner parts of the 
Pontus and the Hyrcanian Sea, where a very narrow ° 
isthmus passes between it and the Pontus ; but some 
have said the river Tanais, instead of this isthmus.? 
Asia is the region from this isthmus of the Pontus 
and the Hyrcanian Sea to another isthmus, which lies 
between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean ; 


» Posidonius put the length of the oixovyevn at 70,000 
stades, but no one reports his figure for the width ; since he 
thought the Ocean was quite close to Maeotis in the North, 
his figure would presumably be under 30,000 stades “ in 
agreement with the view then current”? (Thomson, History 
of Ancient Geography, p. 213). Eratosthenes estimated the 
length at 70,800 stades (with the addition of 7,000 for bulges 
and possible islands), and the width at 38,000. 

¢ Strabo reports (xi. i. 5=491 c) that Clitarchus and others 
made this isthmus absurdly narrow, while Posidonius thought 
it was 1500 stades. 

4 These variant opinions are noted by Eratosthenes ap. 
Strabo i. 4. 7 (65 c). 


361 


[ARISTOTLE] 


ee / ¢ / , \ ~ / > ~ 
30 exopevos Umd Te Ta’THS Kal TOD mEpLE “Oxeavod- 


twes 8é' amd Tavdidos péypr Netdov oropdatwv 

‘ a > / / a v4 \ \ > ‘ 
tov THs "Actas Tifevrar pov. AiBin de To amo 
tod *ApaBixod icOuot ews “HpaxAgovs arnAdv. 

394 aot S€ azo Tod NetAov daciv ews exeivwv. tiv de 
Alyurrtov, t16 tv Tob NeiAov oropdatwv Tepippeo- 

/ ¢ A ~ 3 / ¢ de ~ A / 

pevnv, of pev 7H Acia, ot de 7H ArBdn zpoo- 
>? ~ 
dmToval, Kal TAS VAGOUS Ot peVv e€aLpeToUS TOLOUOLY, 
of 5€ mpoovepovar tals yetroow dei poipats. 
~ \ \ \ / / \ / Ld 

5 [is pév 87 Kal Oaddrrns ddow kai Oéow, yvTwa 
kadeiv eidbapev oikovpervnv, Tordvde Twa taTopy- 
KOpeEV. , 

4. Ilept 8€ r@v avodoywrdrwy ev adri Kat tepi 
atti 7abav viv Aéywpev, adra TA dvayKata Kepa- 
Aaovpevor. 

4 \ / > > 27 A > / > 

Avo yap 8) twes an’ adrijs avabupuacers ava- 

~ € ~ 
10 pépovrar avvexas cis Tov brep juds a€pa, AewTo- 
a \ 
pepeis Kat ddpato. mavrdmaow, et [ru]? Kara 
ras ébas éorw at [re] d1a* morapa@v te Kal vapd- 
~ i? 
twv davadepopevar Oewpodvrar. todtwv Sé 7) pev 
€or Enpa Kal Kamvwdys, a0 THS yhs amoppéovca, 
* S€ vorepa Kal atpwdyns, amd Tis bypas avaby- 
> 4, 

15 puwpévn pdocws. yivovrar S€ amo pev TavTHS 
¢ / ‘ / \ / is / , ‘ 
dpixra Kat Spdco. Kai maywv iéau védn TE Kal 
a” ‘ / \ / > ‘ A ~ ~ 
duPpor Kai xudves Kal ydAalax, amd de tis Enpas 

‘ , 
dvepol Te Kal mvevpdtwr diadopal Bpovrai Te Kat 
dotparat Kal mpnoripes Kal Kepavvoi Kal Ta aAAa 
1 post $¢ add. 76 CGZ Bekk. 2 7 secl, Lor. 

362 


ON THE COSMOS, 3-4 


it is surrounded by the Mediterranean and the en- 
circling stream of the Ocean ; but some say that Asia 
stretches from the Tanais to the mouths of the Nile. 
Libya lies between the Arabian isthmus and the 
Pillars of Heracles (but some say from the Nile to 
the Pillars). Egypt, which is encompassed by the 
mouths of the Nile, is attached by some to Asia, and 
by others to Libya, and some make the islands 
separate, others attribute them to their nearest 
region of mainland. 

We have now given some account of the nature 
and situation of the land and sea which we call “ the 
inhabited world.” 

4. Now let us turn to the most notable phenomena 
in and about the inhabited world, summarizing only 
the most essential points. 

There are two exhalations* from it, which pass 
continually into the air above us, composed of small 
particles and entirely invisible, except that in the 
early mornings some can be observed rising along 
rivers and streams. One of these is dry and like 
smoke, since it emanates from the earth; the other 
is damp and vaporous, since it is exhaled from the 
wet element. From the latter come mists, dews, the 

various kinds of frost, clouds, rain, snow and hail ; 
from the dry exhalation come the winds and various 
breezes, thunder and lightning, fiery bolts (tpyo7ipes) ° 
and thunderbolts and all the other things of the same 


* For the two exhalations and their products cf. Aristot. 
Meteor. i. 4-12. Much of this chapter derives, ultimately, from 
Aristotle ; the proximate sources are discussed by Maguire 
(op. cit. pp. 128-133). > Cf. 395 a 10 and note. 





3 at [re] dca scripsi: ai re dca vel ai re ex codd.: dre azo 


Lor. (De Mundo) : ai [re] azo Lor. (Notes). 
363 


394 a 


20 


2 


o 


30 


35 


394 b 


o 


[ARISTOTLE] 


“A \ , > \ / 
& 82) TovTOLs €oTi ovppvda. €ote de opmixdn pev 
dr wesdns dvabupiaors dyovos vdaros, dépos pev 
maxutépa, vedous S€ aparorépa yiverar 5€ How €& 
> ~ / n > ¢€ / > U 7 
apyjs védous 7 e& doAcipparos. avrimados de 
ay Ja / / TE 4 >? td ) \ 4 5 al 
abt A€yeral Te Kal EoTw aifpia, oddev adAro otca 
\ >\ > / ETE / / FAD. 
TAnv anp avépedos Kal avoptyAos. Spdaos d€ eat 
bypov e€€ al0pias Kata avoracw Aerriv hepopevor, 
/ A > / A > ] Ul / 
Kpvotaddros dé aOpdov vdwp e& aifpias memnyos, 
mayvn S€ dSpdcos memnyvia, dpocomdaxyvyn Se 7yput- 
mayns Spocos. vedos dé eatt maxos atua@des 
OVVEOTPApLEevov, yovyLov VdaTos* O-Ppos SE yiveTat 
pev Kat exmeopov vedous ed dda meTaxvopevon, 
duadhopas S€ layer Toodade doas Kal 7 Tod vedous 
Orixbis* Aria pwev yap obdca padaKkas akddas dva- 
ometper, apodpa dé adporépas* Kal Tobro KaAodpmev 
derov, OpBpov peilw Kal ovveyh ovoTpempara ert 
yijs PEpopevov.’ xia de yiverat KaTa vep@v Te- 
TUKVOLEVODY dof pavow T™po THs els vdwp pera 
Bodfjs avaxorévtwy: epydlerar dé 1) ev Kom) TO 
> ~ \ ¢ \ , et oe 
adp@des Kat exAevKov, 7 S€ atumngis Tod EvovTos 
bypobd tiv wuvypornta ovmw xvbévTos ode Hpaw- 
pevov. adodpa dé atrn Kal abpda Kkatadhepoperyn 
vipeTtos wvopaota. yddAala be yiverar videTod 
ovotpaphevtos Kal Bpifos ex mAjpatos eis Kata- 
dopav Taxutépav AaPovros: Tapa de Ta pweyebn TAY 
amoppnyvupevwv Opavoudtwv ot Tre oyKor peilous 
ai te dopa yivovrar Buadrepa. tadra pev odv 
eK THs dypas dvabupudcews mepuKe oupirimrery. 
"Ex dé THs Enpas » b70 podxous pev wodeions @ WOTE 
peiv dveos eyéveto: oddev yap e€aTw ovtos mAjv 
364 


ON THE COSMOS, 4 


class. Mist is a vaporous exhalation which does not 
produce water, denser than air but less dense than 
cloud ; it comes into being either from a cloud in the 
first stage of formation or from the remnant of a 
cloud. The condition contrary to this is rightly called 
a clear sky, for it is simply air, with no cloud or mist. 
Dew is moisture that falls out of a clear sky in a light 
condensation ; ice is solidified water, frozen in a clear 
sky : hoar-frost is frozen dew, and dew-frost is half- 
frozen dew. Cloud is a dense, vaporous formation, 
productive of water : rain comes from the compression 
of a well-compacted cloud, and varies in character 
according to the pressure on the cloud: if the pres- 
sure is light it scatters gentle drops of rain, but if it 
is heavy the drops are fuller : and we call this latter 
condition a downpour, for it is larger than a shower of 
rain and pours continuous drops of rain upon the 
earth. Snow occurs when well-condensed clouds 
break up and split before the formation of water : 
the split causes the foamy and brilliantly white con- 
dition of the snow, and its coldness is caused by the 
coagulation of the moisture contained in it, which has 
not had time to be either fused or rarefied. If there 
is a thick and heavy fall of snow, we call it a snow- 
storm. Hail occurs when a snow-storm is solidified 
and gathers weight because of its increased density 
so as to fall more rapidly ; the hailstones increase in 
size and their movement increases in violence accord- 
ing to the size of the fragments that are broken off 
the cloud. These then are the natural products of 
the wet exhalation. 

From the dry exhalation, when it is forced to flow 
by the cold, wind is produced : for this is nothing but 





1 depopevov Lor.: depdpeva Bekk. 
365 


394 b 


[ARISTOTLE] 


2A A cys 5 ee) , a Ld A ~ 
anp Todds pewy Kal aOpdos: doTis dua Kal mvedpa 


/ / \ \ ¢ / ~ 7 > 
10 Aéyerar. Ad€yerar 5é Kal Erépws mvedua 7 TE eV 


2 


2 


3 


on 


0 


oo 


i) 


a \ / \ A , / ” /, 
gutots Kal Cobous Kal dia mdvrwy SijKovoa epuysvyos 
TE Kal yovios ovoia, Trept Hs viv A€yew ovK avay- 
Kaiov. Ta d€ ev aépe mvéovTa mvevpata Kadobpev 
avejwous, avpas be Tas €€ bypot Pepopevas exmvods. 
Tov dé avéwwv ot Lev EK VEevoTLapEeVnS YHS TVEOVTES 
amdéyevor A€yovrat, ot S€ ex KdATWY dieEdTTOVTES 
>? / 4 \ > / , ” ¢ > 
eyKoAriat: tovTos 5é€ avdAoyov Tu Exovaw ot €K 

~ ~ ¢€ ta 
Totapa@v Kal Apwvdv. of d€ Kara pHéw vedous 
ywopevor Kal avddvow tod mdaxous mpos EeavTovs 

7 >? / ~ > WA A 
movovpevor exvediac Kadodvrary pel? vdaros de 
> , ¢ t wee , , \ € \ 
abpows payevres’ e€vdpiar AéyovTat. Kal ol pev 

lol a / \ 
amo avaroAfs auvexeis edpor KéKAnvrat, Bopeau de 
c > A A / \ ¢ > A / /, 
ot amo apKxtov, Cépupor S€ of amo dvcews, vorot 
~ / 
d€ of ao peonuBpias. TeV ye pjV evpwv KaLKLas 
f ~ \ > A 
pev A€yerar 6 amo Tob meEpt Tas Depwas avatroddas 
a A 
TOTOV TVEwY avemos, amnALWTHs 5é 6 amd TOD TEpi 
~ \ ‘ 
Tas lonuepwds, edpos 5é 6 amo Tod mepi Tas xeEt- 
cal / > / \ 
pepiwwdas. Kal Tv evavtiwy Ceddpwv apyéarns pev 
lol ~ ~ > 
6 amo Ths Depwis Svcews, dv Tes KaAodaww GAvp- 
/ € \ 7s / \ ¢ > \ ~ > 
miav, ot dé idmuya: Cépupos S€ 6 amo THs ton- 

a a a“ \ ~ 
peeps, Aub S€ 6 amo THs xEyepwys. Kal TOV 

a a ~ a / 
Bopedv idiws 6 pev €€fjs TH karxia Kadeiras Bopéas, 
> / \ € > ~ > A ~ / \ A 
admapktias 5¢ 6 ébeEfs amo Tob médov KaTa TO 

© eA / an 
peonuBpwov mvéwv, Opackias dé 6 fis mvéwv TO 


1 payévres B Lor. : payévros codd. cet. Bekk. 





@ This is a common Greek way of describing points of 
the compass. They divided each quarter by three; so their 


366 


ON THE COSMOS, 4 


air moving in quantity and ina mass. It is also called 
breath. In another sense “ breath ” means that sub- 
stance found in plants and animals and pervading 
everything, that brings life and generation; but 
about that there is no need to speak now. The breath 
that breathes in the air we call wind, and the breath 
that comes from moisture we call breeze. Of the 
winds, some blow from the earth when it is wet and 
are called land-ninds ; some arise from gulfs of the 
sea and are called gulf-ninds. There is a similarity 
between these winds and those which come from 
rivers and lakes. Those which arise at the breaking 
up of a cloud and resolve its density against them- 
selves are called cloud-ninds : those which burst out 
all at once accompanied by water are called rain-ninds. 
Eurus is the name of the winds that blow steadily 
from the East, Boreas is the name of the North winds, 
Zephyrus of the West winds, and Notus of the South 
winds. One of the Euri is called Caecias: this is 
the one that blows from from the direction of the 
summer sunrise.* Apeliotes is the one that comes 
from the direction of the equinoctial sunrise, and 
Eurus proper the one that comes from the direction 
of the winter sunrise. Of the Zephyri, which blow 
in the opposite direction, Argestes comes from the 
direction of the summer sunset; some call this 
Olympias, and some Iapyx. Zephyrus proper comes 
from the direction of the equinoctial sunset, Lips 
from the direction of the winter sunset. Of the winds 
called Boreas, the one properly so-called is next to 
Caecias ; next to it is Aparctias, which blows from 
the North pole to the South; Thrascias is the one 


minor points cannot be translated simply into modern terms. 
Equinoctial sunrise and sunset can be taken as E. and W. 


367 


[ARISTOTLE] 
394 b 
> , a ” Page A \ A 
apyeoTn, Ov evo. KipKkiav’ Kadodow. Kal Tov 
votwv 6 Lev amd Tob adavods mdAov depdpevos 
avtiados TH atapktia KaXeirar voTos, evpdovoTos 
be ¢ \ / \ ” \ A bee. / 
€ 6 petagd voTov Kal evpov: Tov dé emi Odrepa 
\ A ‘ /, € \ / ¢ A 
petaéd Bos Kal vdtov oi péev ALBovotov, ot de 
35 ABodoivika, Kadobow. 
~ \ > / ¢ / > > 4 ¢ / 
Tdv d€ avéuwv ot pév ciow d0dmvoo, dmdcot 
/ / > > a c \ > , 
duexmvéovat mpdow Kar’ evdOelav, of dé dvakapupi- 
395a mvool, Kaldmep 6 Katkias Aeydopuevos, Kal ot pev 
~ c 
Xelu@vos, Womep of vdtor, Suvactevovtes, ot Se 
Ogpous, ws of érnaia Aeyopuevor, wiéw Exovtes TOV 
TE amo THS apKTov depopevwv Kal Cedpwv- oi Se 
opviliae KaAovpevor, €apivoi tiwes GvTEs avEepmot, 
5 Bopéa eiot T@ yever. 
Tay ye pny Braiwy mvevpdtwv Kararyis pev eore 
~ ” "4 ? / , \ ~ 
mvedpa avwlev tuntov eEaidvys, OvedAAa Sé mvedpa 
Biavov Kat advw mpocadddpevov, AatAa S€ Kal 
otpopiAos mvedpua ciAovpevov Kdtwhev dvw, ava- 
dvonpa dé ys mvedua dvw dhepopevoy Kata Tv 
10 €k Bvl0b twos 7 piypatos avddoow: drav 8e 
eiAovpevov odd dépytar, mpnoTip Odds eorw. 
ciAnbev dé mvetpwa ev veder axel Te Kal voTep@, 
Kal e€wobev du.’ adtod, Biaiws pyyviov ta ovveyt ” 
~ /, 
miAnpata Tob vépous, Bpdpov Kai matayov péyav 
Ls 
aneipydoato, Bpovriv Aeyopevov, womep ev Bdare 


1 xipxiav Forster : xacxiav codd. Bekk. 





@ Phenomena connected with wind and those connected 
with thunder and lightning are not clearly distinguished in 
Greek, and translation is difficult. Here zpyorjp seems to 


368 


ON THE COSMOS, 4 


next Argestes, though some call this Circias. Of the 
winds called Notus, the one that comes from the 
invisible pole, opposite to Aparctias, is properly called 
Notus, and Euronotus is the one between Notus and 
Eurus. The one on the other side, between Notus 
and Lips, is sometimes called Libonotus, sometimes 
Libophoenix. 

The current of some winds is direct—that is, they 
blow straight ahead; the current of others varies 
in direction, as in the case of Caecias. Some of them 
prevail in the winter, like the Noti; some prevail in 
the summer, like those called Etesian winds, which 
are a mixture of North winds and Zephyri. Those 
which are called Ornithian winds, which occur in the 
spring, belong to the class Boreas. 

Of the violent types of wind, a squall is a wind that 
strikes suddenly from above ; a gust is a violent wind 
that suddenly jumps up at you; a whirlwind, or 
cyclone, is a wind that whirls upwards in a spiral. A 
blast of wind from the earth is a gust caused by the 
expulsion of wind from some pit or chasm ; when it 
moves with a fierce whirling motion, it is an earth- 
hurricane (rpyorjp).* When the wind whirls round 
in a thick cloud full of water and is pushed out through 
it and forcibly breaks up the closely packed material 
of the cloud, it makes a great din and crash, which is 

‘ealled thunder—as air does when it is passed violently 


mean some kind of whirlwind, but in 394 a 18 and 395 a 24 
it isa sort of thunderbolt. Aristotle says (Meteor. 371 a 15): 
** When it (i.e. the cloud pulled down by a descending whirl- 
wind) is inflamed as itis pulled downwards . . . itiscalled a 
apnornp; for it inflames (cvvexaiumpyac) the neighbouring air 
and colours it with its fire.” The name implies a connexion 
with fire and perhaps here the zpyoryp comes up from a fiery 
chasm (cf. 395 b 20). 


369 


395 a 
15 


20 


25 


3 


o 


395 b 


[ARISTOTLE] 


~ ~ > / ‘A \ \ ~ 
mvetpa afodp@s eAavvdpevov. Kara de THY Tod 

/ ” \ \ ~ ‘ Le 
vepous expyg mupwber TO mvedpa Kal Adpupav 
dorpan) Aéyerau’ 6 51) TpOTEpov Tijs Bpovriis 
Mpooereney, Borepov yevopevov, Emel TO dxovaTov 
im Tod dpatod méduxe POdvecbar, Too pev Kal 
moppwlev dpwpevov, Tod dSé emedav eumeAdon TH 
akon, Kal pdAwra orav TO pev TaXLoTOV 7 TOV 
” / \ \ an \ \ 4 
dvrwy, Aéyw d5é€ TO TUp@des, TO SE FHrrov Tayv, 
b] ~ a” > ~ / \ > A > , 
aep@des ov, ev TH TAnEEr mpos akonv aducvovpevov. 
To S€ dotpayav avatupwév, Biaiws axpe THs yijs 
StexOéov, Kepavvos KaAcirar, eav 5€ tuimvupov 7, 

A \ a \ > / / 2A A 
afhodpov dé dAdws Kal aOpdov, mpnorip, eav de 
dmupov TtavTeAds, Tupav: Exaotov d€ ToUTwWY KaTa- 
oxhibav eis THY yiv oxnmTos ovopdlerar. Tav de 

an ¢ \ > / / / 
Kepavvav of pev aidaddders yoddevtes A€yovrat, 
of S€ taxéws Sidtrovres apyfres, éAukiar Se ot 
ypappoed@s depdpevor, oxnmTol d€ dco. KaTa- 
oKHTTOVOW Ets TL. 

LvAAnpony d€ TaY ev aépu pavracparuy TO. bev 
€oTl KaT eupacw, Ta de Kall? drdoracw—Kar’ 
éudacw pev ipides Kal paBdor kal Ta Tovabra, Kal? 
drdotacw dS€ céAa Te Kal SidrrovTes Kal KopyTaL 
Kal Ta TovTOLs TapaTAjoia. pis pev odv €oTiV 
” ¢ / / * / > , 
éudaois HAlov TunpaTos 7) ceArjvyns, ev vede voTeE- 
p@ Kat KoiAw Kal ovvexet mpds havtaciav, ws €v 
Katomtpw, Oewpovpevn Kata KvKAov mrepupeperay. 
cs / > ” ” 30 Cal tA 8 / 
paBdos 5é eorw ipidos eudacis edfeta. adws d€ 
€otw éudacis Aapmporntos aotpov mepiavyos’ 

* See p. 368, n. a. 


> ruddy is often a typhoon or hurricane (cf. 400 a 29), but 
here it is connected with lightning. In mythology Typhon 


370 





ON THE COSMOS, 4 


through water. Because of the breaking up of the 
cloud the wind is set on fire, and flashes : this is called 
lightning. This lightning falls upon our senses before 
the thunder, though it occurs later, because what is 
heard is by nature slower than what is seen: for the 
latter is seen a great way off, the former only when 
it approaches the ears ; particularly when one is that 
swiftest thing of all, the element of Fire, while the 
other is less swift, since it is of the nature of air and 
impinges upon the hearing by physical contact. 
When the flashing bolt is aflame and hurtles violently 
tothe ground it is called a thunderbolt; if it is half alight, 
but in other respects strong and dense, it is called 
a fiery bolt; if it is altogether fireless it is called a 
smoking bolt » ; but each one of these when it falls upon 
the ground is called a falling-bolt. Lightning ¢ is 
called smoky when it looks dark, like smoke ; vivid, 
when it moves very rapidly ; and forked, when it 
moyes along jagged lines ; but when it falls on to 
something it is called a falling-bolt. 

Briefly, the phenomena of the air are divided into 
those which are mere appearances and those which 
are realities: the appearances are rainbows and 
streaks in the sky and so on; the realities are lights 
and shooting stars and comets and other such things. 
A rainbow is the appearance in reflection of a portion 
of the sun or moon, seen, like an image in a mirror, 
in a cloud that is wet and hollow and presents an 
unbroken surface, and shaped like an arc of a circle. 
A streak is a straight rainbow. A halo is an appear- 
ance of brightness shedding its light round a star ; 


is the son of Typhos, the giant, who causes the eruption of 
Etna ; hence the connexion with fire. 
© xepavvds is used for “ lightning ’’ and ‘ thunderbolt.” 


371 


395 b 


o 


_ 
oO 


bo 
on 


[ARISTOTLE] 


/ 

diadeper dé ipidos ore 1) prev tpis e€ evavtias dpai- 
¢ / A /, € A a / A 

vetat HAlov Kat cedArjvys, %) 5€ GAws KvKAw TaVvTOS 
A / / > ‘ > i ” > 

dotpov. aédas dé é€ott mupds abpdov e€ayus ev 

> F ~ A / “a A > / a \ 

adept. Ttav dé ceAdwy & pev akovrilera, a Se 
a > A 

ornpilerar. 6 pev odv e€axovTiapos €oTL TUpOS 
/ 

yéveots ek Trapatpiibews ev aépu depopevov Taxews 

4 

Kat davraciavy pyjKous e€udaivovtos dua TO TaxOS, 
~ ” 

6 d€ oTnplypds €oTt xwpls hopas mpouynKyns EK- 

\ 

Tacis Kal olov dotpov pvois: mAatuvopevn de 

Kata Odrepov Koprjrns KaAeirar. moAAdKis 5€ TOV 

ccAdwy Ta pev emuyéver mAelova xpovov, Ta Se 

mapaxyphua oPevvuTa. modAdAai dé Kal adAa dav- 
~ ta 

Tacpatwy idéar Yewpotvrar, Aapmades Te Kadov- 
‘\ / \ / A / A A 

prevan Kat Soxides Kal 7iBow Kai Pobuvvor, Kata THY 

Tpos TabTa OpmoLoTnTa We mpocayopevleioa. Kal 

A A 4 € / 4 A ta A A > ~ 

Ta ev ToUTwWY éoTrépia, Ta SE EGa, TA DE apdidah 

fewpetrar, omaviws 5é€ Bopeva Kai votia. mdavrTa 

de aBeBava: oddémoTe yap Ti ToUTwY del havepov 
7 

toTopyTar KaTEOTYpLypevov. Ta eV TolvUY GeéepLa 

TOLAvTA. 

"Eprreprexer d€ Kal 7 vil moAAas €v abr, Kabdmep 
Baros, obrws Kat TVEVMATOS Kal mupos mnyds. 
TovTwv d€ ai pev bro yhv elow adpatot, moAAal Se 
avamvoas €xovo. Kal dvapvonoes, womep Aurdpa 

\ ” ‘ A > wis 7 a Al ‘ 
te kat Aitvyn Kai ta év AidAov vijaous: at 87° Kal 
péovat ToAAdKis ToTapod Siknv, kal pvdpous avap- 
purtovor dSuamdpous. eva dé bro yhv odaa mAy- 
ciov myyaiwy vdaTwv Oepyaivover tabra, Kal Ta 
pev xAvapa TOV vapdtrwv avido., Ta dé brépleorta, 
ra dé ed Eyovra Kpdoews. 

372 


ON THE COSMOS, 4 


it differs from a rainbow in that the rainbow appears 
opposite the sun or moon, but the halo is in a circle 
round the whole of the star. A light is the kindling 
of a mass of fire in the air. Some lights shoot like 
javelins, others are set in one position in the sky. 
The shooting is a generation of fire by friction in the 
air; the fire moves rapidly, giving the impression 
of length because of its rapidity. The latter, the 
stationary light, is extended and lengthy but keeps 
the same position, as if it were an elongated star ; if 
it spreads out towards one end it is called a comet. 
Often there is a variation in the duration of the light, 
some lasting a long time, some being extinguished 
at once. There are also many phenomena of different 
kinds to be seen, called torches and planks and jars 
and pits, taking their names from their likeness to 
these objects. Some of these can be seen in the West 
and some in the East, and some in both ; they rarely 
appear in the North and South. All of them are 
unstable ; for none of them has ever been described 
as always visible in the same place. So much, then, 
for the things of the air. 

The earth contains in itself many sources, not only 
of water, but also of wind and fire. Some of these 
are subterranean and invisible, but many have vents 
and blow-holes, like Lipara and Etna and the vol- 
canoes in the Aeolian islands. These often flow like 
rivers and throw up fiery, red-hot lumps. Some of 
the subterranean sources, which are near springs of 
water, impart heat to these: some of the streams 
they make merely lukewarm, some boiling, and some 
moderately and pleasantly hot. 





1 ai 87 codd. Lor.: ai 5¢ Bekk. 
373 


395 b 


30 


3 


o 


396 a 


5 


10 


[ARISTOTLE] 


‘Opoiws 8€ Kai THv mvevudtwv moAAd ToAAaxod 
yijs oropia avéwKrar: dv Ta pev evOovordv more? 
tovs eumeAdlovras, Ta 5é€ atpodetv, Ta SE yxpn- 
opmdciv, wWorrep ta ev AcdAdots kat AcBadeia, Ta 
d€ Kal mavrdtacw avaipet, Kabdmep TO ev Dpv- 
via. moAAdkKis d€ Kal ouyyeves med}. eUKparov 
év yn mapeEwaber els puxtous onpayyas avTijs, 
é ‘eSpov yevopuevov eK TOV oikeiwy TOTwY, moAAd. 
pépn avvexpddavev. moAdAdKis 5€ odd yevopevov 
e€wlev eyxaterAnOn tots tavrtys Koilwpacr Kal 
amokAewobev e€d50v peta Bias adriv avvertivaée, 
{ntobv e€odov é€avT@, Kal ameupydoato mabos 
TobTo 6 Kadeiv cidbapev cevopov. TaV dé ceLtoua@v 
ot pev eis TrAdyia oelovtes Kat d€elas ywvias ém- 
KXivtar KaAobvTaL, of Sé dvw piTTobvTEs Kal KAaTW 
Kat oplas ywvias Bpdorat, ot 5€ cvviljoeis trol- 
obvtes eis TA KotAa ilnpatia’: of Sé yaopaTta avoi- 
YovTes Kal THY Yhv avappyyvirres pHKTar KaAovVTAL. 
Tovtwy S€ of pev Kal mvedua mpocavaBdAdovow, 
ot d€ mérpas, of dé mnAdv, of dé mHyas daivover Tas 
mpotepov odK ovoas. Ties dé avaTpémova” KaTa 
pilav mpdwow, ods KaAodow aortas. ot d€ avrTamo- 
mdAddovres® Kal tais eis Exdrepov eyKAiceot Kat 
amomdAceat Siopbobvres del TO cevopevov maApariat 
Aéyovra, Tpdpum Taos Gpoov amepyalopevor. yi- 
vovrat d€ Kal puKyTAl cEeLopol, aelovTes THY YhV 
pera Bpopov. ToAAdKes be Kal ywpis cevapob 
yiverat UKHO yas; OTav TO med pa oetew [ev pn) 
avrapKes 7}, evetAovpevov Se ev abt KOmMTHTAL META 


1 (lnparia Z Lor. (cf. Johann. Lyd. De Ost. 54): yowparia 
Stob.: yaoparia codd. cet. Bekk. 


374 


ON THE COSMOS, 4 


_ Similarly, too, there are in many places on the 
earth’s surface open vents for the winds, which. have 
various effects on those who approach them, causing 
ecstatic inspiration, or wasting sickness, or in some 
cases prophecy, like those at Delphi and Lebadeia, 
or even complete destruction, like the one in Phrygia. 
Often, too, a moderate earth-born wind, forced into 
deep, hollow caves in the earth and becoming dis- 
lodged from its home, causes shocks in many places. 
Often when a large quantity from outside is confined 
within the hollows of the earth and cut off from exit, 
it shakes the earth violently, seeking an exit for 
itself, and produces the effect that we call an earth- 
quake. Earthquakes which shake the earth obliquely 
at a very acute angle we call horizontal ; those which 
blast upwards and downwards perpendicularly are 
called heaving earthquakes; those which cause a 
settlement of the earth into hollows are called sinking 
earthquakes ; and those which open up chasms and 
split the earth are called splitting earthquakes. Some 
of them stir up a wind, or rocks, or mud ; and some 
reveal springs that were not there before. Some, 
called thrusting earthquakes, overturn things with a 
single heave. Others cause recoil this way and that, 
and in the process of lurching to one side and re- 
bounding again the things that are shaken are held 
upright: these are called oscillating earthquakes, 
and their effect is a sort of trembling. There are also 
roaring earthquakes, which shake the earth with a 
great din. There is often, also, a roaring of the earth 
without an earthquake, when the wind is not sufficient 
to shake the earth but lashes about enveloped in the 





2 avatpémovar Lor.: dvatpémovres Bekk. 
3 dvramondAdovres Lor. : dvamdAdovres Bekk. 


375 


[ARISTOTLE] 
396 a 
c / / A \ 4 > , 

15 poiov Bias. cvoowparotoveirar S€ Ta e€iovovTa 
mvevpiata Kal To TOV ev TH yh byp@v Kexpup- 
peevenv. 

A A > , / , A > 
Ta d€ avddoyov ovprintrer Tovtois Kat ev Oa- 
Adoon: xdopata Te yap yiverar Paddoons Kal ava- 
xwpjpata toAAdKis Kal KUpLaTwY émdpopal, moTE 

20 Mev avTavaKkoTHY ExovoaL, ToTE Sé TpOWaLW [LOVOY, 
womep totopetrar mept “EXikny re Kai Bodpayv. 
moAAdkis b€ Kat avapvorjpara yiverau TUpos ev TH 
barddcon Kal mny@v avaBAvoes Kal motapdv ex- 

\ \ / > / c , ‘\ ~ ~ 
Bodai kat dévdpwv exddces poal Te Kal diva Tats 
TOV Tvevpatwv dvdAoyov, ai pev ev péoows me- 

25 Adyeow, at d€ kara Tovs edpimous Te Kal topOpous. 
ToAAai Te aumuTters A€yovtrar Kal KUYpaTwY apoets 
oupTreptodeve Gael TH oeAvn Kata Twas wpLopeE- 
vous Katpovs. 

c \ ‘ ~ ’ ~ ~ , ° 

Qs d€ TO wav eimetv, TOV OTOLYELwWY eyKEKpa- 

/ GAA Ar. > UF 4 \ load \ bar / 
pLévewv HAows ev dept Te Kal yh Kal doon 

30 KATA TO ELKOS at TOV Tabav OMmOLoTHTES ovviorav- 
Tal, Tois pev emi pepovs dlopas Kai yeveoets 
dpépovoat, TO dé avptrav avewbAcOpov TE Kal ayéevnTov 
pvAdtrovoa. 

/ / > , A > A 
5. Kairou yé tis eavpace mas Tore, et ex THV 
evavtiwy apx@v avvéornkev 6 Kdapos, A€yw Se 

35 Enp@v te Kat vypav, puyp@v te Kal Oepudv, od 

4, /, ‘A > /, ¢ bal > , 

396 b 7dAar SuehPaprar Kat amoAwdev, ws Kav «i Td- 
Aw tives Oavpalorev, dws Siapéever ovveatynKvia 

ex TOV evavTlwratwr' ebvar, mevyitwv A€éyw Kat 
tAovaiwy, véewv yepovtwr, aobevadv ioxupav, movn- 
p&v xpnor@v. ayvootou dé ott Tobr’ Av modutt- 


1 évavrwTdrwy codd. pler. Lor. : évavriwy codd. cet. Bekk. 


376 


ON THE COSMOS, 4-5 


earth with tumultuous force. The blasts of wind that 
enter the earth are recondensed also by the moisture 
that is hidden in the earth.” 

There are also analogous happenings in the sea : 
chasms occur in the sea, and its waves often withdraw ; 
and there are incursions of waves, sometimes with 
a recoil, sometimes with a forward rush only, as they 
say was the case at Helice and Bura.? Often too 
there are exhalations of fire in the sea and eruptions 
of fountains, and rivers are shot forth, and trees grow, 
and there are currents and vortices like those of the 
winds, some in the middle of the oceans, some in the 
narrows and straits. There are many tides and tidal 
waves too, which are said to occur in concert with the 
moon at certain definite times. 

To sum up, since the elements are mingled one with 
another, it is natural that phenomena in the air and 
land and sea should show these similarities, which 
involve destruction and generation for the individual 
parts of nature, but preserve the whole free from 
corruption and generation. 

5. Some people, however, have wondered how the 
cosmos, if it is composed of the “ opposite ”’ principles 
(I mean dry and wet, cold and hot), has not long ago 
been destroyed and perished ; it is as if men should 
wonder how a city survives, composed as it is of the 
most opposite classes (I mean poor and rich, young 
and old, weak and strong, bad and good). They do not 
recognize that the most wonderful thing of all about 


* 4.¢., wind entering the earth may (a) cause an earth- 
quake, (b) cause a roar only, or (¢) be recondensed and so 
cause neither. 

> Cf. Strabo viii. 7. 2 (384 c), i. 3. 10 (54c), Aristot. Meteor. 
343 b 1, etc., on the destruction of these two cities in Achaia. 
The date was 373/2 B.c. 


377 


[ARISTOTLE] 
396 b 
5 KTS Opovolas TO Oavpacwitatov, Aéyw Sé To" ek 
ToOAAGY pilav Kal dpolav e& dvouoiwv dzoreXeiv" 
didBeow, brrodexouevny® racav Kal Pvow Kat TUynV. 
lows b€ Kal TOV evavtiwv 7 pdots yAlyerau Kal eK 
TOUTWY aTroTEAE? TO GUupwvov, odK eK TOV Opmolwr, 
woTrep apeder TO appev avvyiyaye pos TO OAV Kai 
10 obx EKdTEpov pos TO duddvdAoV, Kal THY TmpwTHY 
opovovay dua TOV evavTiwv onvinbev, od dua TeV 
opotwy. €ouxe O€ Kal 7) TeXVN THY pvow pupoupevn 
ToOTO Tovey. Cwypagia pev yap Aevkdiv TE Kad 
peAdvwv, wxp@v Te Kal epvbpav, xpwudtwv eéy- 
Kepacapevn pvoes Tas elkdvas Tots mponyov- 
15 HEevors amreTeAece ouppesvous, _Hovouxn) de o€eis 
apa Kat Bapets, waxpovs te Kal Bpayeis POdyyous 
pigaca € ev Scapdpors puvais pilav amreréAecev apj.o- 
viav, Ypapparuc d€ €k Puvnevroav kal apasveny 
Ypapyudroo Kpaow Trouoapevn THY oAny TeXVV 
am adbtav ouvert ioaro. tadto S€ Totro Hv Kal 
2070 Tapa TH akotew@ Acyopnevov ‘Hpaxdrcitrw- 
‘auvaipies 6Aa Kal odx dAa, cuudepopevov Siadepo- 
evov, avvddov diddov: Kal ex mavtwv ev Kat €& 
évos mavta.”* ovtws obv Kal TIv TOV dAwY av- 
aTaow, ovpavod Adyw Kal ys Tod Te avpmavTos 
25 KOGLOV, Oa THS TOV evavTiwtdtwv Kpdoews apY@v 


mC Jace ee droreheiv Lor.: 67u . . . dworeAe? Bekk. 
2 brodexomevny Lor. : provevrne Bekk. 
3 sic Diels ( Vorsokr.® 22 B 10): r. ad loc. 





2 The idea that art imitates nature occurs in Aristotle’s 
Protrepticus (see Jaeger, Aristotle, pp. 74 f.), and in Phys. 
B 199 a 15, Meteor. 381 b 5, De Part. Anim. 639 b 15 ff. But 
in Aristotle the point of comparison concerns teleology, not 


378 


ON THE COSMOS, 5 


the harmonious working of a city-community is this : 
that out of plurality and diversity it achieves a homo- 
geneous unity capable of admitting every variation 
of nature and degree. But perhaps nature actually 
has a liking for opposites ; perhaps it is from them 
that she creates harmony, and not from similar things, 
in just the same way as she has joined the male to 
the female, and not each of them to another of the 
same sex, thus making the first harmonious com- 
munity not of similar but of opposite things. It seems, 
too, that art does this, in imitation of nature %: for 
painting mixes its whites and blacks, its yellows and 
reds, to create images that are concordant with their 
originals ; music mixes high and low notes, and longs 
and shorts, and makes a single tune of different 
sounds; by making a mixture of vowels and con- 
sonants, grammar composes out of them the whole of 
its art. This is precisely what Heracleitus the Dark ° 
meant when he said “ Junctions are wholes and not- 
wholes, concord and discord, consonance and disso- 
nance. One out of All; All out of One.” So in the 
same way the complex of the Universe, I mean heaven 
and earth and the whole cosmos, by means of the 
mixture of the most opposite elements has been 


the harmony of opposites. The four colours mentioned by 
Pseudo-Aristotle are the colours of the restricted palette used 
by the Four Colour Painters, of whom the earliest recorded 
is Polygnotus and the latest Aétion in the age of Alexander 
the Great. Cf. Pliny, V.H. xxxv. 50, and A. Rumpf, JHS 
Ixvii (1947), p. 16. It has been suggested that Empedocles’ 
comparison of painting and creation (Diels, Vorsokr.® 31 
B 23) was inspired by Four Colour Painting. 

» It is not likely that the author read Heracleitus in the 
original, or that the whole context is to be attached too 
closely to Heracleitus. Maguire (op. cit. pp. 134 ff.) finds the 
closest parallels to this passage in the Neo-Pythagoreans. 


379 


396 b 


30 


35 
397 a 


on 


10 


[ARISTOTLE] 


pia Suexdopnoev appovia Enpov yap typ@, Yeppov 
dé uxyp@, Bape? te Kotdhov puyev, Kal dpHov mrepi- 
depel, yhv Te acav Kat OdAacoav aifépa te Kal 
HAvov Kal ceAjvnv Kal Tov dAov otpavov dieKdopnoe 
pia 7) dua mavTwv SijKovoa Svvapis, €K TOV apik~ 
TWV Kal ETEpoiwy, Gépos TE Kal ys Kal TUpds Kal 
voaTos, TOV avpTTaVTA KoGpLoV SyjuoUpynoaca Kal 
pud diaAaBotoa odaipas emupaveia tas TE evavTiw- 
Tatas ev att@ dioes addAjAas avaykdoaca Omo- 
Aoyfjioat Kat ex TovTwWY pNnxXavnoapevn TH TavTi 
owTypiav. airia de tavrns pev 7) TOV OTOLYELwY 
oporoyia, THs dé dpodroyias 1 tcopowpia Kal TO 
pndev adr@v mA€ov erepov érépov dvvacbar: Tv 
yap tonv avrioracw €xer Ta Bapéa mpds Ta Kotha 
Kal Ta Oepya mpos Odrepa, ris pvcews emi TaV 
pelLovwv dSidacKovons Ott TO iaov aworTiKdV Tus 
eoTw Opovoias, 7) S€ Oudvoia TOD TaVTWY ‘yeveTHpos 
Kal mepikaAAeoTaTou Kdopov. Tis yap av etn dvots 
TOOOE KpElTTWV; ‘NV yap av Eelmy® Tis, epos eaTiW 
avtod. TO Te KaAov Tav erwvupov éort TOVTOU Kal 
TO TETAypEeVOV, amo TOO Kdapov Aeyopevov KEKO- 
opjnoda. ti? d€ rdv emi pépovs ddvait’ av eErow-. 
Ojvar TH Kat’ ovpavov rageu te Kal dopa TaVv 
dotpwv yAlov Te Kal ceArvns, Kwovpevwy ev akpt- 
Beordrous peérpois e€ aidvos eis erepov ai@va; Tis 
d€ yévour’ av aibeddera Tordde, HvTwa dvdAdrrovow 
at KaAal Kai yovyso. TOV GAwY Dpat, Oépn TE Kat 
xeyuOvas emdyovoar reTaypévws Wuépas te Kal 
1 @arepa ETZ Lor. : 7a Odrepa codd. cet. Bekk. 
380 


ON THE COSMOS, 5 


organized by a single harmony: dry mixed with 
wet, hot with cold, light with heavy, straight with 
curved—the whole of earth and sea, the aether, the 
sun, the moon and the whole heaven have been set 
in order by the single power which interpenetrates 
all things : from things unmixed and diverse, air and 
earth and fire and water, it has fashioned the whole 
cosmos and embraced it all in the surface of a single 
sphere, forcing the most opposite elements in the 
cosmos to come to terms, and from them achieving 
preservation for the whole. The cause of its pre- 
servation is the agreement of the elements, and the 
cause of the agreement is the principle of equal shares 
and the fact that no one of them has more power than 
each of the others : for the heavy is in equipoise with 
the light, and the hot with its opposite. In these 
greater matters nature teaches us that equality is the 
preserver of concord, and concord is the preserver of 
the cosmos, which is the parent of all things and the 
most beautiful of all. For what being could be better 
than this? Anything that might be suggested is a 
part of it. And everything that is beautiful takes its 
name from this, and all that is well-arranged ; for 
it is called “ well-ordered ” (kexoopijoGac) after this 
“universal order ”’ (kécpos). What particular detail 
could be compared to the arrangement of the heavens 
and the movement of the stars and the sun and moon, 
moving as they do from one age to another in the 
most accurate measures of time ? What constancy 
could rival that maintained by the hours and seasons, 
the beautiful creators of all things, that bring summers 
and winters in due order, and days and nights to make 





2 eimn EP Lor.: eto. codd. cet. Bekk. 
3 +i Lor.: ris Bekk. 


381 


397 a 


1 


2 


oO 


o 


[ARISTOTLE] 


viKras eis pnvos amoté\eopa Kal eviavTod; Kal 
pay peyéber ev obros* mavumepratos, Kwhoe dé 
d€vtatos, Aapmpornri S€ edavyéoratos, Suvdper 5é 
ayjpws te Kat adbaptos. otros evariwy Caowv 
Kat mel@v Kal depiwy dices exwpice Kat Biovs 
eueTpnoe Tats éavTod Kwiaeow. €k TovTOV TaVTA 
eumvel Te Kal puyiv loxer TA CHa. rTovrov Kal at 
mapadsofou veoxuwoers tTeTaypevws amoredodvrat, 
cuvapaTTovTwy pev avé“wv TavToiwy, mumTévT@V 
dé €€ obpavod Kepavvav, pnyvupevwn d€ yeymovev 
eEatciwv. dia d€ tovTwv 70 vorepov exmvelopevov 
TO Te Trup@des Siarrvedpevov els dpdvoav dyer TO 
mav Kat Kabiornow. 1 Te yh puTots Kou@oa tavto- 


cal / / V4 \ / 
25 Samrots vdyaot te mepiPAdlovoa Kal mepioyoupevy 


Cwous, Kata Kaipov expvovod te TavTa Kal TpE- 
govoa Kai dexopevn, pupias Te dépovoa ideas Kal 
740n, THY ayjpw ddow duoiws typet, Kaitou Kal 
GElopots TWaccomEervy Kal TANLUpiow émiKAvlopevn 


-—m A / / ~ A 
30 wupKaiats Te Kata péepos droyilopevn. tadra de 


mdavTa €o.xev adTh mpos ayabod ywopeva tiv Sv 
ai@vos owrTnpiav mapéxew: cevopevns te yap bu- 
eEdrTovow at TOV Tvevpdtwv TapeumTw@oes KATA 
Ta pryyywata Tas avatvoas taxovoa, Kalas dvw 
AéXexTa1, Kabaipopevn te OpBpois azoKxAvlera 


35 TaVTA Ta VvooWwdyH, TEpiTVEeomEevN dé avpais Ta TE 


ert ie \ 4 ets 8 Sh ey ? a \ 
UT QUT7V KAaL TA UTEP QAvUT1V etAuKpwvetrac. Kab 


\ € , \ \ A > , eotnad | 
397 b nv at pAdyes prev TO TrayeT@des Hrvaivovow,* ot 


/ \ \ / > = ‘ “~ Nae! / 
mayo. dé Tas dAdyas avidow. Kal TOv emt pépous 
\ \ / \ A > / \ A / 
Ta pev ylvera, TA S€ axpdler, Ta 5 POeiperar. 


1 obdros Lor.: 6 adrés Bekk. 
2 ymaivoverv) BCFG Lor. : maivovow codd. cet. Bekk. 


382 


ON THE COSMOS, 5 


up the number of a month or a year? In size too the 
cosmos is mightiest, in motion swiftest, in brightness 
most brilliant, in power never-aging and indestruc- 
tible. It is this that has given a different nature to 
the creatures of the sea, the land and the air, and 
measured their lives in terms of its own movements. 
From this all creatures breathe and take their life. 
Of this even the unexpected changes are accom- 
plished in due order—the winds of all kinds that dash 
together, thunderbolts falling from the heavens, and 
storms that violently burst out. Through these the 
moisture is squeezed out and the fire is dispersed by 
currents of air ; in this way the whole is brought into 
harmony and so established. The earth, too, that 
is crowned with plants of every kind and bubbles with 
springs and teems with living creatures everywhere, 
that brings forth everything in season and nurtures 
it and receives it back again, that produces a myriad 
shapes and conditions—this earth still keeps its never- 
aging nature unchanged, though it is racked by 
earthquakes, swamped by floods, and burnt in part by 
fires. All these things, it seems, happen for the good 
of the earth and give it preservation from age to age : 
for when it is shaken by an earthquake, there is an 
upsurge of the winds transfused within it, which find 
vent-holes through the chasms, as I have already 
said ¢ ; when it is washed by rain it is cleansed of all 
noxious things; and when the breezes blow round 
about it the things below and above it are purified. 
Furthermore the fires soften things that are frozen, 
and frost abates the force of the fires. And of the 
particular things on the earth some come into being 
while some are in their prime and others are perishing : 


@ 395 b 26. 
383 


397 b 


oO 


10 


1 


2 


ou 


—) 


on 


[ARISTOTLE] 


\ ¢€ \ /, ? ra \ / 
Kal at pev yevécers etravaotéAAovor tas Pbopas, 

¢ de 6 \ / AY / / de > 
at 5€ Popa Kovdilovor tas yevéoeis. pia d€ ex 

> 
TAVTWY TEpawopern awrnpia dua TéAoUS avTLTEpt- 
4 A 
toTapevwy aArAjAois Kal TOTE fev KpaToUVTWY, TOTE 

\ / / \ / a > 
d€ Kpatovpevwr, duddtrer TO avptrav adbaprov 6. 
ai@vos. 

6. Aourov dé 81) wept THs TOV CAwY ovveKTiKAs 
aitias Keparaiwdds eimetv, dv TpoTrov Kal TEpl TOV 
»” \ \ \ / / ] 
dAAwv: mAnppedes yap mept Kdopov A€yovras, €t 

\ A > > / > > s € > A 
Kal py) du’ aKxpiBeias, add’ odv ye ws eis TUTMdH 
pdbynow, TO TOD KdopoU KUpLwTaToV TapadAuTeiV. 

= a , mn 
apxatos pev obv tis Adyos Kal TaTpLds €oTL TAOLW 
avOpwrros ws €x Oeod mavra Kat dia Geod rpiv 
, > / \ / ? \ > ¢ / 
auveaTnKev, oddeuia de dvarts adry Kal? éauripy 
> a ~ 
éoTw avtapKys, epnuwleioa tis ex TovTov aw- 
Typias. 810 Kat TOV Tada eizeiv TwWes mpOHnXOn- 
cav oT. Tavta tabdrd é€ott Dedv mAda ta Kai bv 
a“ oA ~ 
dpbarudv ivdadAdpeva juiv Kat 8’ aKofs Kat 
a / 
maons atcbjcews, TH pev Oeia Svvdper mpérovra 
\ a 
cataBadAdpevot Adyov, od nv TH ye odola. owrTi)p 
/ > ~ 
pev yap ovTws amdvrwyv €oTi Kal yevéerwp Tov 
\ 
OmwadnToTE KATA TOVdE TOV KdapLoV GuUVTEAOU- 
/ \ ~ 
pevwv 6 eds, od pv adtoupyot Kal émumdvou 
/ 
{ov Kduarov vropévwv, adAd dSuvaper ypodpevos 
A ~ / 
atpvtw, dv As Kal TOv mdéppw Soxotvvtwv etvar 
mepuyiveTaL. THV pev odv avwrdtw Kal mpwTnV 
edpav avros eAaxev, Umatds te Sia TodTO wrd- 
A ‘ 
pacrat, [Kat]’ Kata Tov mountiy ‘‘ axpotdTn Ko- 
1 xai om. BCG Lor. 
384 


ON THE COSMOS, 5-6 


and generation is set in the balance against destruc- 
tion, and destruction lightens the weight of genera- 
tion. There is one single principle of preservation, 
maintained without interruption among all these 
things that interchange with one another, ascending 
to power and declining in turn, and this keeps the 
whole system safe, eternally indestructible. 

6. It remains now to discuss summarily, as the rest 
has been discussed, the cause that holds the world 
together; for in describing the cosmos, if not in 
detail, at least sufficiently to convey an outline, it 
would be wrong for us to omit altogether that which 
is supreme in the cosmos. It is indeed an ancient 
idea, traditional among all mankind, that all things 
are from God and are constituted for us by God, and 
nothing is self-sufficient if deprived of his preserving 
influence. So some of the ancients were led to say 
that all the things of this world are full of gods,* all 
that are presented to us through our eyes and hearing 
and all the senses ; but in saying this they used terms 
suitable to the power of God but not to his essence. 
For God is indeed the preserver of all things and the 
creator of everything in this cosmos however it is 
brought to fruition ; but he does not take upon him- 
self the toil of a creature that works and labours for 
itself, but uses an indefatigable power, by means 
of which he controls even things that seem a great 
way off. God has his home in the highest and first 
place, and is called Supreme for this reason, since 
according to the poet ¢ it is on “‘ the loftiest crest ”’ 

* Cf. the saying attributed to Thales (Diels, Vorsokr.® 
11 A 22=Aristot. De Anima 411 a 7), 

» The adroupyds (cf. 398 a 5, b 4) is the man who works his 


own land without a slave, ¢.g. Electra’s husband in Euripides’ 
Electra, ¢ Hom. JI. i, 499. 


o 385 


[ARISTOTLE] 
397 b 
om ~ / > , > ~ 
pud7"’ tod ovpmavtos eyKkabidpupévos odbpavod: 
pdrvora 5€ mws abrod ths duvdpews atroAavet TO 
/ a ~ a 

mAnoiov avtod o@pa, Kal emeita TO peT ekeivo, 
WE ~ 4 ” ~ Can 4 ~ / \ 
30 kal ede€ts ovTws dxpi TOv Kal? Huds TomwWV. 810 
yi} Te Kal TA emt ys Eouxev, ev atroaTdce TAEcloTH 

a > a > / > lol Scie / 
Tis ek Jeod ovta whedeias, aobeva Kal axaradAnra 
> \ a \ ~ b) A > A 
elvat Kal moAAfjs peota tapayts: od pry ddda 
V1 > ¢ 2 \ mm mn , \ 
[xat]’ Kal? dcov emit wav duxvetobar mépuxe TO 
Oeiov, Kat Ta Kal” 7uds dpoiws ovpPBaiver Ta TE 
35 UTEP Huds, KATA TO EyyLov TE Kal Troppwrepw Heod 
98a clvar pwadddgv Te Kal ArTov Wdedeias peradrapPa- 
vovta. Kpeittov obv broAdaPelv, 6 Kal mpémov eoti 

at Oe@ pdadtota appdlov, ws 7 ev odpave@ bv 
kal 0e@ prolov, ds 7 ev odpav@ Stvays 
ae / ‘ a a > , ” 
iSpupevyn Kal tois mAciotov adeornkdow, ws eve 
ye eimeiv, kal ovpraow aitia yiverat owrnpias, 
~ ” e / 4 ~ ” \ \ 
5 paAdAov 7) Ws SiujKovea Kali doitdoa eva put) Kadov 
pndé evoxnpov avtoupye?l Ta emi yas. TobTo pev 
yap obd€ avOpimwv iyeudow apuotrer, mavTl Kal 

~ / >? / ” e ~ * 
T@ TvxOvTe ehioracbat Epyw, olov orparids apyovTt 
7 ToAews 7 otKkov, [Kal]’ ef ypewv oTpwparo- 
~ \ ” , > aA 
Seopov ein SHoa Kal el te havddrepov amoredciv 
” ag ” ‘ \ > 4 /, > > 
10 €pyov, 6° Kav TO TuxXOV avdparrodov Troujnoeev, GAA 

~ c a 

olov emi tod peyddov Baoiiéws iotropeira. To 
— / / 
<yap)» KapBdcov’® Bépfou te kai Aapeiov mpd- 


1 kai om, CGZ Lor. 
2 «al del. Wendland et Wilamowitz. 


36... KapBvoov sic Lor.: 6 émi rod peydAov Bactréws ovK 
bal ‘ ‘ > , / > > LJ ~ 4 
dv 70 tuxdv avdparodov romjaeev’ AX’ olov iaropetro KapBicov 
«rAd. Bekk.: v. Lor. ad loc. 


386 


ON THE COSMOS, 6 


of the whole heaven that he dwells: his power is 
experienced most of all by the body that is closest to 
him, less by the next, and so on down to the regions 
inhabited by us. So earth and the things that are on 
earth, being at the farthest remove from the help of 
God, seem to be feeble and discordant and full of 
confusion and diversity ; but nevertheless, in that 
it is the nature of the Divine to penetrate to every- 
thing, even the things around us occur in the same 
way as the things above us, each having a greater 
or smaller share of God’s help in proportion to its 
distance from him. So it is better to suppose, what 
is also fitting and most appropriate to God, that the 
power which is based on the heavens is also the cause 
of preservation in the most remote things, as we 
may say, and indeed in everything, rather than that 
of itself it carries out its tasks on earth by penetrating 
and being present where it is not honourable or 
fitting that it should.” For it is not fitting even among 
men for princes to superintend each and every action 
that may have to be done—for example, the com- 
mander of an army or leader of a city or head of a 
household, if it were necessary to pack up bedding or 
perform some other menial task which could be done 
by any slave—but rather it is fitting that they should 
act in the manner which was adopted, according to 
the records, under the Great King.’ The pomp of 
Cambyses and Xerxes and Darius was ordered on a 


@ The “ power’ has here become identified with god ; 
this is literally inconsistent with 397 b 19 above. 

» Pseudo-Aristotle describes the King of Persia in his 
glory in the 6th/5th century s.c. He accords well with 
Herodotus’s (i. 98) account of Deioces’ palace and régime at 
Ecbatana. This is a description of a fabulous past such as 
Aristotle would hardly have given. 


387 


398 a 


15 


2 


o 


2 


on 


30 


35 
398 b 


[ARISTOTLE] 


oyna eis aeuvorntros Kal drrepoxts dihos peya~ 
AompeTris SuekeKdopTo: avTos pev yap, os Adyos, 
idsputo ev Lovaois 7 ’ExBatdvos, mavtl adparos, 
Oavpacrov emréxwv Baoihevov olkov Kal mepiBodov 
xXpvo® Kal TAEKTpPY Kal ededavre dotpdmrovra. 
muldves d€ mroAAot Kal ouvexets mpobupa Te avxvo.s 
etpyopeva oradios am adn wv Ovpaus TE xadkats 
Kal TetXeat peydhous wxUpwro: e€w Se TovTwv 
dvOpes ot Tparor Kal Soxiperraror SuekeKdopnvTo, 
ot pev apd’ avrov TOV Baothea Sopuddpor Te Kal 
Oeparrovtes, of Se éxdorou meptBdoAov pudaes, 
muAwpot TE Kal @rakoveTal Acyopevor, Ws av o 
Baovheds avrés, Seomdrns Kal Deos  dvopalopevos, 
mavra pev BAémor, mavra d€ aKovor. Xwpis be 
Tovtwy dAAou kabevoriKecay mpoodduv Tapiar Kal 
oTpaTnyot ToN€jeov kal Kuvnyeatov debpwv Te 
dmrodeKr Apes TOV TE Aourav epyov EKAOTOL KaTa 
Tas xpelas empeAnrat. THY de ovpmacav dpyiy THs 
‘Actas, Teparovpevny ‘EMqorovrew ev ex T@v 
T™pos €aTrépav pHepav, "Tvd@ Se ex TeV pos Eo, 
Suen geoav Kata €0vn otpaTynyot Kal oaTparrat 
Kat Paouréis, Sobrou Tob peydAov Baoréws, Te- 
podpdjot TE Kal OKOTOL Kal _dyyedvadopor ppvuK- 
Twplwy TE eTOmT APES. toaobros Se v 6 Kéopos, 
Kal pddvora TOV ppukrwpioy,’ Kara badoxas 
TUPTEVOvTWV dAArAous* ek mepaTov Tis apyis 
pexpe Lovowv Kal "ExBardve, wore TOV Paow- 
déa ywdoKew avOnwepov mdavTa 7a. ev Th "Aoig 
KaLvoupyoupeva.. VOLT EOV 57 TY Tob peyd- 
Aov Bacwréws trepoxijy mpos THY TOD TOV KdcpoV 


1 dovxtwpiwy . . . dpuxtwpiwy scripsi: ¢puxrwpidv. . . 
dpuxtwpidv Bekk. 


388 


ON THE COSMOS, 6 


grand scale and touched the heights of majesty and 
magnificence : the King himself, they say, lived in 
Susa or Ecbatana, invisible to all, in a marvellous 
palace with a surrounding wall flashing with gold, 
electrum and ivory ; it had a succession of many gate- 
towers, and the gateways, separated by many stades 
from one another, were fortified with brazen doors 
and high walls ; outside these the leaders and most 
eminent men were drawn up in order, some as per- 
sonal bodyguards and attendants to the King himself, 
some as guardians of each outer wall, called Guards 
and the Listening-Watch, so that the King himself, 
who had the name of Master and God, might see 
everything and hear everything. Apart from these 
there were others appointed as revenue officials, 
leaders in war and in the hunt, receivers of gifts to 
the King, and others, each responsible for administer- 
ing a particular task, as they were necessary. The 
whole Empire of Asia, bounded by the Hellespont in 
the West and the Indus in the East, was divided into 
nations under generals and satraps and kings, slaves 
of the Great King, with couriers and scouts and 
messengers and signals-officers. And such was the 
orderly arrangement of this, and particularly of the 
system of signal-beacons which were ready to burn 
in succession from the uttermost limits of the Empire 
to Susa and Ecbatana, that the King knew the same 
day all that was news in Asia. Now we must suppose 
that the majesty of the Great King falls short of the 
majesty of the god who rules the cosmos by as much 





3 rupcevdvtwv aAAjAos Lor. : mupaevovady aAdjAus Bekk. 
389 


[ARISTOTLE] 
398 b 
eméxovtos Jeob toootrov Katadecotépav doov Tis 


> / \ ~ / \ > / 
exelvov THv Tod pavdrotdrov te Kai aabeveora- 
4 a w ” Ss >? ‘ e ~ 
tov Cwov, wate, cimep doeuvov Hv abrtov att@ 
~ —/ ? lal A \ >? ~ a“ 
5 doxeiv EépEnv adbroupyeiv dmavta Kal émtedely a 
BovdAoito Kat edvotdpevov SvorKxeiv, moAd padAAov 
> \ ”“ ” ~ / A \ 
ampemes av ein De®. cepvorepov Sé Kal mpe- 
mmdéoTepov atrov pev eml THs avwrdtw xwpas 
¢€ ~ \ \ 4 \ ~ /, / 
pica, rHv d5é Svvayuv ba Tod avpravtos Kd- 
/ id / a 4 / \ \ 
Gpov Sinkovaay yALv Te KivEetv Kal GeAnVV Kal TOV 
10 mdvTa ovpavov Tepidyew aitiv Te yiveobar Tots 
emt THs ys owrnpias. oddev yap emtexvicews 
~ a / ~ , a 
avt®@ det Kai dianpecias THs map’ érépwv, Womep 
Tois Tap piv apxovor THs mroAvyxeupias Sia TH 
> / > \ ~ Ss A , \ \ 
acbéveav, adAAa totro tv TO Oedtatov, TO pea 
pacTuvns Kal ands Kwicews tmavtodamas azo- 
aA OF ¢ a oe A ¢ ie 
15 TeAciv id€as, Worrep apércr Sp@ow of pwnxavorovol, 
> ‘ / 
dua puuds Opydvov oyaornpias ToAAds Kat mouKiAas 
A ¢ 
evepyeias amoteAobvres. dpoiws d5é Kai of vevpo- 
~ ‘ 
omdoTra piav prnpwlov emuomacdpevoe Trovodot Kal 
al a ~ s.~ A 
abyéva Kivetoba Kal xetpa Tob Cov Kal Bmov Kal 
, 
opbarpov, €or. 5€ Gre TAdVTA Ta pEpyN, META TIVOS 
€ 7, > / 
20 edpv0ulas. ovtTws obv Kal 7) Deia pias amd Twos 


1 unxavorowoit Z Lor. (Notes): Larxavoréxvat Lor. (De 
Mundo): peyaddrexvor codd, pler. Bekk. 
Bb xv 





@ It is not clear what kind of machine is meant; the 


390 


ON THE COSMOS, 6 


as the difference between the King and the poorest 
and weakest creature in the world, so that if it was 
beneath the dignity of Xerxes to appear himself 
to be the actual executor of all things, to carry out 
his wishes himself and to administer the Empire by 
personal supervision, it would be still more unbe- 
coming for God. It is more noble, more becoming, 
for him to reside in the highest place, while his power, 
penetrating the whole of the cosmos, moves the sun 
and moon and turns the whole of the heavens and is 
the cause of preservation for the things upon the 
earth. He has no need of the contrivance and support 
of others, as rulers among us men need a multitude 
of workers because of their weakness; the most 
divine thing of all is to produce all kinds of result 
easily by means of a single motion, just like the 
operators of machines, who produce many varied 
activities by means of the machine’s single release- 
mechanism.* In the same way too the men who run 
puppet-shows,° by pulling a single string, make the 
creature’s neck move, and his hand and shoulder and 
eye, and sometimes every part of his body, according 
to a rhythmical pattern. So also the divine being, 


““ varied activities ’’ probably refer to the various parts of 
the machine, and do not imply multi-purpose machines. 
Mechanopoios is most frequently used of military engineers. 
Schasteria is used of the release mechanism of catapults and 
ballistae. It is also used of the release-mechanism of auto- 
matic machines (such as Hero’s machine for providing holy 
water) ; but in conjunction with mechanopoios and organon 
a reference to catapults, etc., seems more likely. 

» Plato twice refers to puppets in the Laws (644 p, 804 B) 
as well as in the shadow-theatre of the Republic (514) ; in the 
Laws the puppets are worked by wires. Aristotle uses the 
example of puppets to illustrate a scientific theory in De Gen. 
An, 734 b 10 ff. 


391 


. [ARISTOTLE] 

398 b 
c ~ / ~ 7, A AL > ‘ 
anAfs Kwioews Tob mpwrov thy dSvivapw eis Ta 
auvexy Sidwou Kat am’ exeivwv mddAw els Ta TOp- 

/ / nv \ ~ \ / 
pwrepw, wéxpis av dia Tob tavrdos bueE€APn: Ki- 
\ \ 4 “a Se ‘ > \ / t Bas 

vnev yap €repov bd’ érépov Kal adro méAw exivncev 
aAXo abv Kéopw, Spivtwv pev mavTwv olkeiws Tals 
25 opeTepats KaTacKevais, od THs avTHs dé 6d00 TacW 
” > \ / \ ee 4 / ” A \ 
ovons, aAAd diapdpov Kai érepoias, éaru dé ols Kal 

a > 
evavtias, Kaito. THs mpwrns olov evddcews eis 
Kivynow puds* yevouevns: womrep av el tis €€ aimous® 

e a tF a \ 7 ‘ ~ ‘ , 
opod pibere ofaipay Kat KvBov Kal K@vov Kai Kv- 
Awdpov—exactov yap a’t@v Kata TO idtov Kwy- 
lod a” “A ~ ‘ 
30 Ojoerar oxfpa—7 €l Tis dod CHov evvdpov Te Kat 
XEpoatov Kal mTnVvov ev Tots KdATroLs Exwv exBaAou: 

~ A bid 4 \ A c / > \ 
dfjAov yap Ort TO pev vnKTOV adAdpevov eis THY 
€avTobd Siarav exvyiterar, TO 5€ yepoaiov eis Ta 

/ ” ‘ A , ‘ A 77 
adérepa 70n Kai vomods dveEeprrcer, TO S€ aéeprov 
e€aplev ex yis peTdpovov olynoetar meTOmevor, 
35 plds THs mpwTns aitias maow amodovens TH 
, 

399.a OlKelay evpdpetav. oUTwWSs EXEL Kal emt KdopoU* 
dua yap amAfs Tob avumavtos obpavod TmEpiaywyis 
Hepa KAaL VUKTL mEpaToupevyns aGAAotat mavTwy Bi- 

a / 
é£odou yivovta, Kaitou bo puds apaipas meptexo- 
pevwv, Tav pev OaGrtov, tav Sé ayodAadrepor 
a“ / 
5 KWoUpevwv Tapa TE TA TOV SiaoTHMaATwWY MAK 
/ \ 
kal Tas lias exdoTwv KaracKevds. oEdrnvn pev 
a , 
yap ev pnvi Tov é€avris dvatrepaiverar KUKAov adfo- 
/ \ / \ / Ld A > 
pevn TE Kal pevovpevn Kai POivovoa, HAvos dé. €v 
392 


ON THE COSMOS, 6 


with a single movement of the nearest element dis- 
tributes his power to the next part and then to the 
more remote parts until it permeates the whole. One 
thing is moved by another, and itself then moves 
a third in regular order, all things acting in the manner 
appropriate to their own constitution ; for the way 
is not the same for all things, but different and 
various, in some cases quite opposite, though the 
key of the whole movement, as it were, is set by a 
single opening note. For instance, a similar effect 
would be produced if one threw from a height a 
sphere, a cube, a cone and a cylinder, all together : 
each of them will move in the manner appropriate 
to its own shape ; or if one held in the folds of one’s 
cloak an aquatic animal, a land animal and a winged 
animal, and then threw them out all together ; clearly 
the animal that swims will leap into its own habitat 
and swim away, the land animal will crawl off to its 
own customary pursuits and pastures, and the winged 
creature will rise from the ground and fly away high 
in the air ; a single cause has restored to all of them 
the freedom to move, each in the manner of its 
species. So too in the case of the cosmos : by means 
of a single revolution of the whole heaven completed 
in a night and a day, the various motions of all the 
heavenly bodies are initiated, and though all are 
embraced in one sphere, some move rapidly and 
others more slowly, according to their distances and 
their individual characters. For the moon completes 
its orbit in a month, waxing and waning and dis- 
appearing ; the sun and those which have an equal 





1 was Lor.: piav codd. Bekk. 
2 aimovs scripsi: dyyovs codd. Lor. Bekk.: épouvs Z: per 
proclive Ap. 


393 


399 a 


10 


15 


20 


to 
or 


30 


[ARISTOTLE] 


eviavT@ Kal ot TovTov iaddpomor, 6 te Dwaddpos 
Kal 6 ‘Epuot Aeydopevos, 6 dé Ilupdets ev durAaciove 
Tovtwv xpovw, 6 dé Awos ev é€amAaciov Tovrov, 
Kal teXevtaios 6 Kpdvouv deyopevos ev diAaciove 
Kal juices TOO UroKdTw. pia de ex mavTwy ap- 
povia ovvadovTwv Kal yopevovTwy Kata TOV Odpavov 
e€ évds Te yiverat Kal eis Ev amoAnyer, KoopMov 
eTUpws TO ovpTrav GAN odK akoopiay dvopdoaca. 
Kabamep dé é€v yop@ Kopvdaiov Katdpfavtos 
auvernxel TAs 6 yopds avdp@v, éo8” dre Kai yu- 
vak@v, ev diaddpois dwvais o€vrépais Kal Bapu- 
Tépais pulav appoviav eupcA KepavvdvTwv, ovTWS 
éyer kal emi Tob TO ovprrav diémovtos Feod- Kara 
yap To avabev evddoywov bro Tod depwvdpws av 
Kopudaiov mpocayopevbevros Kivetrar ev TA GOTPA 
det Kal 6 ovpras ovpavds, mopeverar Se ditTas 
mopelas 6 maudans Alos, TH pev uepav Kat 
v0KTa Siopilwy avaroAn Kai dvoe, TH 5€ Tas Téo- 
capas wpas aywv Tob érous, mpdaw Te Bopeos Kal 
omiaw votios dueE€pTwv. yivovrar de dverol Kata 
KaLpov Kal avewor Kal Spocor Ta Te 7AOH Ta EV TO 
TepiexovTe ovpPaivovta dud THY TMpwTHY Kal apxe- 
yovov' airiav. €movrat dé TovTos ToTAU@V eKpoat, 
fardoons avowjoes, dSévdpwv exddoes, KapTav 
memavoets, yoval Cawv, extpopal te mavTwv Kal 
axpal Kat Pbices, cvuPadAopevns mpds Tabra Kal 
THs €xdoTov KaTaoKevis, ws epnv. <stav odv 6 
TAVTWY NyEMwV TE Kal yeverwp, adpatos @v addAw 


1 dpyéyovov Wendland et Wilamowitz, Lor.: dpyatdyovov 
codd. Bekk. 


394 


ON THE COSMOS, 6 


course with it, namely Phosphorus (Venus) and Her- 
mes (Mercury), complete their course in a year, 
Pyroeis (Mars) in twice this time, Zeus (Jupiter) in 
twelve years, and lastly the star called after Cronus 
(Saturn) in two and a half times the period of the 
one below it.? The single harmony that is produced 
by all these as they sing and dance in concert round 
the heavens has one and the same beginning and 
one and the same end, in a true sense giving to 
the whole the name of “ order” (xéapos) and not 
“disorder” (dxoopta). Just as in a chorus at the 
direction of the leader all the chorus of men, some- 
times of women too, join in singing together, creating 
a single pleasing harmony with their varied mixture 
of high and low notes, so also in the case of the god 
who controls the universe : the note is sounded from 
on high by him who might well be called the chorus- 
master ; then the stars and the whole heavens move 
continually, and the all-shining sun makes his double 
journey, dividing night from day by his rising and 
setting, and bringing the four seasons of the year 
as he moves forwards to the North and back to the 
South. There are rains in due season, and winds, 
and falls of dew, and all the phenomena that occur 
in the atmosphere—all are the results of the first, 
original cause. These are followed by the springing 
up of rivers, the swelling of the sea, the growth of 
trees, the ripening of fruit, the birth of animals, the 
nurture, the prime and the decay of all things ; and 
the individual constitution of each thing contributes 
to the process, as I have said. So when the leader 
and author of all things, unseen except to the eye of 


* i.e. thirty years. These periods correspond to those of 
Eudoxus (ap. Simplic. In de Caelo 495. 26 ff.). 


395 


399 a 


35 


399 b 


or 


10 


15 


20 


[ARISTOTLE] 


TAnv Aoytop@, onurvyn maon dda petakd odpavod 
Te Kal yhs pepowevyn, Kietrar mdoa evdeAey@s ev 
KUKAoLS Kal Tépacw idiots, mote ev adavilopern, 
mote dé dawopevn, pupias id€as avadaivovod Te 
Kal mdAw amokpUmTovoa eK pds apyns.  €oiKe 
dé Kopdh TO Spwpyevov Tois ev oAguov Katpots 
padtoTa ywwopevois, emedav 1) odAmuyE onuryjvn TO 
otpatomééw* TOTe yap THs dwvfis exaotos aKov- 
cas 6 pev aomida avaipetrar, 6 5é€ Odpaxa evdverar, 
6 5€ Kvnpidas 7) Kpdvos 7 Cworfpa mepiriferau: 
Kal 6 pev immov xadwvot, 6 S€ ovvwpida avaPaiver, 
6 b€ avvOnpa mapeyyva: Kabiorarar dé edbéws 6 
pev Aoxayos eis Adxov, 6 dé Takiapxos eis Taw, 
6 d€ inmeds emt Képas, 6 d5é yrds eis THY idiav 
extpéxer ywpav: mavta d€ bd’ Eva onuavropa So- 
veirar KaTa TpoaTdaéw Tod TO KpaTos ExovTOS HYE- 
povos. ovTw xpi) Kal Tepl Tod avptravTos ppoveiv- 
b70 yap pias poms OTpuvopevwy amravTwv yiveTat 
Td, oiKEla, Kal TavTYNS GopaTov Kal adavods. O7Ep 
ovdapas eat eumdd.ov ovTe exeivy Tmpos TO Spav 
ovTEe Hiv mpos TO MoTEDoaL Kal yap % yux7y, bv 
iv Capev TE Kal oikous Kal 7dAeus EXOMEV, ddparos 
oboa Tots epyors adrijs oparau mas yap 6 Tob Biov 
Sudxoopos b b70 Tavrns evpyrat Kal SvaréraKTa Kal 
ouvéxerar, yas apdces Kat dutedoets, TExVINS ETTl- 
voual, xpyoeis vouwv, Kdojos ToAtTelas, vdnpo1 
mpagets, bmepdpios moA€epos, <ipyv. Tatra xp 
Kal mept Oeob Suavocioban, Suvdpet bev Ovtos taxu- 
porarov, KdAAre S€ edrrpereardrov, Cw dé abava- 


Tov, aperh S€ Kpatiorov, did7. maon Ovynrh dice 
396 


ON THE COSMOS, 6 


reason, gives the sign to every moving thing between 
heaven and earth, everything is moved continually 
in its orbit and within its peculiar limits, now dis- 
appearing, now appearing, revealing innumerable 
different forms and concealing them again, all from 
a single beginning. The process is very like what 
happens, particularly at moments in a war, when the 
trumpet gives a signal in a military camp ; then each 
man hears the sound, and one picks up his shield, 
another puts on his breast-plate, and a third his 
greaves or helmet or belt ; one harnesses his horse, 
one mounts his chariot, one passes on the watchword ; 
the company-commander goes at once to his company, 
the brigadier to his brigade, the cavalryman to his 
squadron, and the infantryman runs to his own 
station ; all is stirred by a single trumpeter to a 
flurry of motion according to the orders of the supreme 
commander. It is a similar idea that we must have 
of the universe: by a single inclination all things 
are spurred to action and perform their peculiar 
functions—and this single agent is unseen and in- 
visible. Its invisibility is no impediment either to 
its own action or to our belief in it; for the soul, 
whereby we live and build households and cities, 
though it is invisible is perceived through its deeds : 
for all the conduct of life is discovered, arranged and 
maintained by the soul—the ploughing and sowing 
of land, the inventions of art, the use of laws, the 
order of a city’s government, the activities of people 
in their own country, and war and peace with foreign 
nations. This is what we must also believe about 
God, who is mightiest in power, outstanding in beauty, 
immortal in life, and supreme in excellence, because 





1 adrijs codd. Lor.: adrois codd. al. Bekk. 
397 


399 b 


25 


30 


w 
or 


: 


o 


[ARISTOTLE] 


/ > 7 > > ~ ~ . 
yevopevos abewpyntos an’ abrdv trav épywv Bew- 
a \ ‘ / ov ‘ 
petra. ta yap 7dOy, Kai 7a bu adpos dmavra Kal 
\ Fis4 ~ \ \ > A ~ / 7 KN A 
Ta ETL ys Kal Ta ev VdaTL, Deod A€youT’ av OvTwWS 
” > ~ 
epya elvar Tob Tov Koopov éméxovTos: e€ ob, KATA 
\ a ae s J 
tov dvouxov *EpzedoxrXéa, 


4 7 7 > ¢ a > > @ > »* i ems 
mav?’ doa T Hv 60a 7 €of dca 7° €otar oricow, 
/ / > bd] 4, .! > / > \ cal 
déviped 7° eBAdotynce Kai avépes HOE yuvaiKes 
Oijpés 7° olwvoi Te Kat bdaTobpéeupoves iyBis. 


” vow > \ , ae 
€oixe S€ OVTWS, EL Kal puKpdTEpov mrapafaAeiv, 
tots odpdadois Aeyopevois Tots ev tais ypadiow 
[Aidous],” ot pécou Keiwevou Kata TIV eis ExaTEpOV 
/ ~ 
fépos Eevdeow ev appovia typodor Kal ev taker TO 
a ~ ~ \ \ 
mav oxnua THs padidos Kat akivnrov. daci dé Kal 
Tov ayaApatotrowov Dewdiav KatacKkevalovra® tiv ev 
akpo7roAe "AOnvav ev péon tH Tavrns aomid: TO 
€avTod mpdawrmov evTuTw@oacbar, Kal ovvdjoa TO 
~ Ld > 
aydAuati dud twos apavotds Snpwovpyias, wate e& 
avaykKns, et Tus BovAowTo avdTo TrEpiatpeiv, TO OUpTrAV 
dyadpa Avew Te Kal ovyyeiv. TobTov obv exer TOV 
~ Ld 
Adyov 6 beds ev Kdopw, avvéxwv thy TaV 6AwY 
” 
dppoviay Te Kal owrnpiav, mAnv ovTe pécos WY, 
” ¢ lod ‘ ¢ \ , ze > > 
év0a 1) yi Te Kat 6 Borepds Tém0s obtos, dAN avw 
7 ~ a“ Ea 
Kabapos ev kabapd ywp@ BeBynxws, dv ervpws Ka- 
~ ~ \ 
Aodpev odpavov pev amo Tob dpov elvar Tov ava, 
” \ i ‘A. Xr a ‘ ‘ / ‘ 
Odvpuzrov 5 olov dAoAapurA Te Kai mavros Codov Kal 


1 wixpdrepov mapaBadcivy Lor.: puxporepov, mapaBdAAew rov 
xoapov Bekk. 

2 NBs del. Wendland et Wilamowitz. 

8 xataoxevalovra BDZ; [Arist.] De Mir. Ause, 155; Lor. : 


karackevalopevov Bekk. 


398 


ON THE COSMOS, 6 


though he is invisible to every mortal thing he is seen 
through his deeds. For it would be true to say that 
all the phenomena of the air, the land and the water 
are the works of the God who rules the cosmos; from 
whom, according to Empedocles* the natural philo- 
sopher, 

grows all that is and was and is yet to come, 

the trees and the whole race of men and women, 

beasts, birds and water-nurtured fish. 
Though it is rather a humble comparison, he is truly 
like the so-called “ keystones ” of vaults, which lie 
in the middle and by their junction with each side 
ensure the proper fit of the whole structure of the 
vault and preserve its arrangement and stability. 
They say too that the sculptor Pheidias, when he 
was making the Athena on the Acropolis, carved his 
own face into the middle of her shield, and by some 
hidden trick of craftsmanship attached it to the 
statue in such a way that if anyone tried to remove 
it he inevitably destroyed and demolished the whole 
statue.’ And this is the position held in the cosmos 
by God, who maintains the orderliness and preserva- 
tion of the whole: except that he is not in the centre— 
for here lies the earth, this turbulent, troubled place 
—but high aloft, pure in a pure region, which we 
rightly call “ heaven ”’ (ovpavds) because it forms the 
uppermost boundary (épos . . . dvw) or “‘ Olympus ” 
because it shines brightly all over (6AoAapmijs) and is 


@ Diels, Vorsokr.* 31 B 21. 

» Cf. Ps.-Aristot. De Mir. Ausc. 846 a 19 ff.; Plut. Pericles 
31; Cic. Tuse. Disp. i. 15.34; Val. Max. viii. 14. 6. Cicero 
and Plutarch only mention the portrait. The statue was the 
gold and ivory Athena in the Parthenon. In several economic 
crises the gokl was removed and melted down and later 
restored. 

399 


[ARISTOTLE] 


GTaKTOU KWWLaTos KexwpLopevov, ola yiverat Tap” 
10 nuiv dia yeus@vos Kal avéwwv Bias, womep Ehn 
Kal 6 trounths [“Opnpos |? 
OdvAvprovs’, 60. daci bedv dos aodadres aiet 
€upevar’ ovT advemowor TwdooeTaL OUTE TOT 
opBpw 
Severar, ovTe xiv emumiAvata, dAAd par’ atbpyn 
méntata avederos, AcvK7) 8 ei Sebpoen alyAn. 
15 OuveTuLapTupEt be kal 6 Bios amas, Tr dave Xepav 
drodovs fea: Kal yap TaVvres dvbpwror a avaTetvopev 
Tas xeipas els TOV ovpavov edyds ToLovpevar. Kal? 
dv Adyov od KaK@s KaKeivo avarepuvnTrat 
Zevs 8° €Aay’ odpavov edpdv ev aidéps kal vedeAnor. 
20 810 Kal TOV aicOnTav Ta TYmMmTaTa Tov avToV 
enéxen TOTOV, aoTpa Te Kal yAlos Kal ceArjvy: 
pova Te Ta Opava bia TobTO del THY adTiV ow- 
Covra ta€w Sdiakexdopyntat, Kal ovmote aAdow- 
bévra petexwOn, Kabdrep ta emi yas evrpenta 
évra moAAas éTepowwaces Kai 7d0n avadédexrat- 
25 ceopol Te yap on Piao. moAAa pépy Tis ys 
avéppnéav, ouBpou Te karéxAvoav ef w7tou KaTap- 
payerres, emdpopat TE KUEaTwY Kal dvaywproets 
Trohdxus Kal nreipous eJaddrrwoav Kal daddrras 
7Treipwoar, Bual te mvevpdtwv Kal Tugdvev € EOTW 
ore monets dhas dverpeyrav, mupKaial Te Kal prdyes 
at pev ef ovpavov yevopevar TpoTepov, woTrep 
pao, € emt Daebovros TO. mpos Ew epy karéprefav, 
at d€ mpos éomépay eK vis dvaBdJoaca Kal exdu- 
onoaca, abazep Trav ev Airvn Kpatipwy dvap- 
payévrwy Kal dvd TH viv pepopevory xXeLjudppov 
400b Siknv. €vOa Kal To trav edocBdv yevos eLdxws 
400 


3 


f—) 


ON THE COSMOS, 6 


removed from all darkness and disorderly motion 
such as occurs among us when there is a storm or a 
violent wind ; ‘as the poet says,* 

To Olympus, where they say the gods’ dwelling stands 

always safe; it is not shaken by winds, nor drenched 

by showers of rain, nor does snow come near it; always 

unclouded 

the air spreads out, and a white radiance lies upon it. 
And all ages bear witness to this fact, and allot the 
upper region to God : all of us men stretch out our 
hands to the heavens when we pray. According to 
this reasoning, the following also has been well said ? : 


To Zeus belongs the wide heaven in the clouds and the 
aether. 

So also the same place is occupied by the most honoured 
of perceptible things, the stars and the sun and the 
moon ; and for this reason only the heavenly bodies 
always keep the same order and arrangement, and are 
never changed or altered ; while the transient things 
on earth admit many alterations and conditions. For 
violent earthquakes before now have torn up many 
parts of the earth, monstrous storms of rain have burst 
out and overwhelmed it, incursions and withdrawals of 
the waves have often made seas of dry land and dry 
land of seas ; sometimes whole cities have been over- 
turned by the violence of gales and typhoons ; flaming 
fires from the heavens once burnt up the Eastern parts, 
they say, in the time of Phaéthon, and others gushed 
and spouted from the earth, in the West, as when the 
craters of Etna erupted and spread over the earth 
like a mountain-torrent. Here, too, the race of pious 


4 Hom. Od. vi. 42-45. > Hom. Jl. xv. 192. 





1 “Ounpos om. Z Lor. 
401 


[ARISTOTLE] 
400 b 

eriunoe TO Sayidviov, mepixaradndbéevrwy d7d 
Tob pevuatos dia TO Baoralew yépovtas emi TeV 
@pwv yoveis kat odlewv: tAnoiov yevopevos 6 TOO 
mupos ToTapos e€eaxiabn Trapétpepe te Tod ddoy- 

5 od TO pev evOa, To dé Eva, Kal erypnoev aPda- 
Beis dua tots yovedau Tovs veavioxous. 

Kafodrov dé dep ev vt pev KuBepyyrns, ev 
appar d€ Hvioxos, év xop@ S€é Kopudatos, év méAe 
d€ vopo(Hern)s," ev oTpatomedqy d€ Tyepov, TOUTO 
feds ev Kdopm, tAIv Kal? doov Tots ev Kapary- 

10 pov TO dpxew ToAvKivyTov Te Kal ToAUpEepyLVoV, TO 
dé adumov dmovdv te Kal mdons KEeywpiopevov 
cwpatiucis aobeveias: ev axuijrw yap tdpupéevos 
TavTa Kuve Kal Trepidyer, O7rov BovAETaL Kal OTwWS, 
ev diaddpors id€ais Te Kal pdocow, wWomep apeAer 
Kal 6 THS moAEwS vopos aKivnTos Mv ev Tals TOV 

15 Xxpwpevwv yuvyais mdvra oikovopel Ta KaTa TIV 
Trodteiav: éederropevor yap adt@ Sndroveri e€iaow 
dpxovres pev emi ta apyetia, Oeopobérar Sé eis Ta 
olketa Sixaoripia, Bovdevral S€ Kat éxKAnovac- 
Tal els ouvedpia Ta TpoonKoVTa, Kal 6 MeV TIS Ets 
TO mputavetov Badiler ovrnadpevos, 6 Sé mpos Tods 

20 duxaoras amoAoynodpuevos, 6 dé eis TO Seapwrr- 
piov amofavovpevos. yivovtar dé Kat Snuobowiat 
vopipot Kal travyydpers eviatoror Oedv te Ovaiat 
kal jpwwv Oeparetar Kal yoal Kexunkdtwv: adAdAa 
dé ddAws evepyovpeva Kata piav mpooraéw 7) vd- 
pupov e€ovaiay awler TO TOD TowjoavTos OvTwsS STL 


/ > ¢ ~ A / / 
25 mods 8 pod pev Ovprapdarwv yee, 
6pod Sé€ maidvwv te Kal orevayparwv, 


1 youo<bérn>s coni. Lor.: vduos codd. Bekk. 
402 


ON THE COSMOS, 6 


men was especially honoured by the divinity, when 
they were overtaken by the stream of lava, because 
they were carrying their old parents on their shoulders 
to keep them safe; for when the river of fire drew 
near them it was split in two and turned one part to 
this side and the other to that, and preserved un- 
harmed both the young men and their parents. 

In a word then, as the helmsman in his ship, as the 
charioteer in his chariot, as the leader in a chorus, as 
the lawgiver in a city, as the commander in a military 
camp, so is God in the cosmos, except that their com- 
mand is wearisome and fraught with many movements 
and cares, while God rules without pain and toil, free 
from all bodily weakness : for he is established in the 
immovable, and moves and directs all things as and 
where he wishes, among the varieties of form and 
nature ; just as the law of the city, itself immovably 
established within the minds of those who observe 
it, disposes all the activities of the state: for in 
obedience to the law the magistrates go to their 
offices, the judges to their appropriate courts, the 
councillors and members of the assembly to their 
appointed meeting-places ; and one man goes to the 
prytaneum for his meals, another to the law-courts to 
defend himself, a third to prison to die. The law also 
ordains public feasts and annual festivals, sacrifices to 
the gods, cults of heroes and libations to the dead : 
and other varied activities, all arising from a single 
ordinance or authority of the law, accord well with 
these words of the poet ? : 


The city is full of heavy incense-fumes, 
with crying for deliverance, and laments. 


. _® The story is told of Amphion and his brother by the poet 
of the Aetna (625 f.) » Soph. O.T. 4-5. 


4.03 


[ARISTOTLE] 
400 b 
ottws troAnmréov Kal emi tis peilovos mdAcews, 
Aéyw 8€ Tob Kdcpov: vopos yap jytv icoxAwis 6 
feds, ovdepiav éemideydpevos didpPwow 7) peTa- 
30 Deow, Kpeittwv S€, ola, Kal BeBasdtepos THY ev 
tais KUpBeow dvayeypappevwv. ayoupevov de 
aKwTws adtob Kat eupeAds 6 otpmas oikovo- 
pctrar Sidkoopos ovpavod Kal ys, pewepropevos 
Kata Tas pvoets Tdoas dua TOV olkeiwy omeppaTwv 
els Te huta kal CHa Kata yevn TE Kal €ldn* Kal yap 
401a durreAon Kal oivikes Kal mepoeat 
ovKéa Te yAvKepai Kat edatat, 
ws dnow 6 mounts, Ta Te Akapta pev, GAAas de 
Tapexoweva xpeias, TAdTavor Kal mitves Kal mvEoL 
KAnOpn 7 alyeipos Te Kal edwWdns KUTA pLGGOS, 
5 al Te Kapirov omwpas 7ddv GAAws dé dvabncav- 
piotov dépovaa, 
dxvar Kal poval Kal unAda ayAacKaprrot, 
tov te Cobwv TA TE Aypia Kal NuEpa, TA TE EV aEpt 
Kal emt ys Kal ev vdaTt Bookdpeva, yiverar Kal 
1 dakpale. Kat Pbeiperar tots Tod Oeod mevldpeva 
Beopots: “wav yap éprrerov mAnyh veuerat,”’ ws 
dynow “Hpakdertos. . 

7. Eis 8€ dv wodAvavupos eott, Katovopaldopevos 
Tois 7d0eo. maow amep adtos veoxpot. Kadodpev 
Sé adrov Kal Zijva kat Aia, mapadAjAws xpwpevor 

15 Tots Ovopacw, ws Kav ed A€yormev Su dv CHpev. 
Kpdvov 8€ mats Kai ypovov Aéyerar, SujKcwv e& 
ai@vos atéppovos eis érepov ai@va: daotpamaids 
te Kat Bpovraios Kal allpios Kai aidépros Kepavvios 

1 dxunjrws Stob, Lor.: deuwrws codd, Bekk. 
404, 


ON THE COSMOS, 6-7 


So it is, we must suppose, with that greater city, the 
cosmos : God is a law to us, impartial and admitting 
no correction or change ; he is surely a stronger and 
more stable law than those inscribed on tablets.* 
Under his motionless and harmonious guidance all 
the orderly arrangement of heaven and earth is 
administered, extending over all things through the 
seed proper to their kind, to plants and animals 
by genus and species; vines, palms and _perseae, 
“ sweet figs and olives,” ° as the poet says, and those 
that bear no fruit but serve some other purpose, 
planes and pines and box-trees, “the alder, the 
poplar and the sweet-scented cypress-tree ’”’ °; and 
those which in the autumn bring forth a harvest that 
is sweet but hard to store, “ pears and pomegranates 
and apples with shining fruit ” ¢; and animals, some 
wild, some tame, that live in the air and on the earth 
and in the water,—all these come into being and grow 
strong and perish, obedient to the laws of god. “ For 
every creature that crawls is driven to pasture by his 
goad,’’ * as Heracleitus says. 

7. Though he is one, he has many names, accord- 
ing to the many effects he himself produces. We call 
him both Zena and Dia, using the names interchange- 
ably,f as if we were to say “ Him through whom (d:4 
ov) we live (¢jv).”” He is called the Son of Cronus and 
of time (Chronos), because he lives from endless age 
to another age ; God of Lightning and of Thunder, 
God of the Air and Aether, God of the Thunderbolt 


* At Athens, tablets on which the early laws were written. 
> Hom. Od. xi. 590. © Hom. Od. v. 64. 
@ Hom. Od. xi. 589. 
® Diels, Vorsokr.§ 22 B 11. 
2 ? Ziva and Aéa are used interchangeably as accusatives of 
eus, 


405 


[ARISTOTLE] 
m1 , VY  €.7 > ‘ ~ ¢ a ‘ ~ \ ~ 
TE Kl VETLOS ATO THY VeTav Kal Kepavvav Kal TOV 
dAkwy Kadetrar. Kai pay emuKdpmios pev amd TOV 
20 KapTra@v, mrodueds d€ amo TOV mr Kewy dvopdteras, 
yevebduds TE Kat épketos Kal opoyvuos Kal mraTp@os” 
amo THs mpos TAvTA Kowwvias, éraupetos Te Kal 
ditios Kat E€vios Kal otpdtios Kal TpoTaLodyos, 
Kabdpowds Te Kat madapvatos Kal ikéotos Kat peLAt- 
Xlos, WomTep of mrownTral Aéyovar, owrhp Te Kal 
25 eAevbepios erdpws, ws Sé TO mav eimeiv, odpdvids 
Te Kat xPdv0s, dons émudvupos diaews wv Kal 
TUXNS, ATE TdvTwY adros aitios wy. 80 Kal ev 

tots ’OpdiKois od} Kakads Aéyerat 


Levs mp@ros yeveto, Leds totatos apyucépavvos*: 
Zeds Kxedadry, Zeds péaoa, Aws 8 &k mdvra 
TETUKTOL* 
4oib Zevds mud env yains TE Kal ovpavod aaTEpoevToOs* 
Levs a, dpony YEVETO, Leds dBporos e€mrAeTo vpn: 
Zevs mvour) mavrwy, Leds akapatov mupos oppn: 
Ledbs rovtov pila, Zeds HAvos Ade cedAjvn: 
5 Leds Pacireds, Zeds dpyos amdvrwv apyucépav- 
vos*: 
mdvras yap Kptibas abfis paos és toAvynbés 
e€ lepis Kpadins dvevéykato, wépyepa pelov. 


Olwar d€ Kai tiv "Avayxny odk dAdo Tu AéyeoOat 

7 ¢ 
mAnv Tobrov, otovel avixnrov airiav* dvra, Eivap- 
10 hee dé dua TO elpew tre Kal ywpeiv axwdvrws, 


? natp@os Wendland et Wilamowitz, Lor.: adrpios codd. 
Bekk. 


* dpxixépavvos P Lor.: dpyixépavvos codd. cet, Bekk. (et 
401 b 5). 


406 


ON THE COSMOS, 7 


and the Rain—he takes his name from all these 
things. He is called Harvest-God and City-God, God 
of the Family and the Household, God of Kinsmen 
and Ancestral God, because of his connexion with 
these things; God of Fellowship and Friendship and 
Hospitality, of War and Victory, of Purification and 
Vengeance, of Supplication and Grace, as the poets 
say, and in a true sense Saviour and Liberator. To 
sum up all, he is a God of Heaven and God of Earth,4 
and takes his name from every kind of nature and 
estate ; for he himself is the cause of all. So it is 
rightly written in the Orphic books ® ; 


Zeus is the first-born, Zeus is last, the lord of the lightning ; 

Zeus is the head, Zeus the centre; from Zeus comes all 
that is; 

Zeus is the foundation of the earth and the starry heavens ; 

Zeus is a man, Zeus an immortal maid ; 

Zeus is the breath of all things, Zeus is the spring of tire- 
less fire ; 

Zeus is the root of ocean, Zeus is the sun and moon ; 

Zeus is king, Zeus is the master of all, the lord of the 
lightning. 

For he hid all men away, and has brought them again to 
the lovely light 

from the holiness of his heart, working great marvels. 


I think too that Necessity (’Avdyx7y), is nothing but 
another name for him, as being a cause that cannot 
be defeated (avixyros); and Destiny (Kipappevy), 
because he binds things together (eipev) and moves 


@ XOdvo0s usually implies the Underworld ; but Pseudo- 
Aristotle is probably stretching the meaning slightly to suit 
his own cosmology. 

> Kern, Fragm, Orph. 21 a. 





3 vid. 401 a 28. 
4 aitiav CG Lor.: odciay codd. al, Bekk. 


407 


[ARISTOTLE] 
401 b 
A \ A A ~ Ra A 
Ilempwpevnv dé dia TO meTmepaTHoOar mavTa Kat 
pndev ev tots obow ametpov elvar, Kat Motpav pev 
amo Tod pepepicba, Neweow dé amo THs ExdoTw 
/ > / A > / 2 be. 
duaveunoews, “Adpdoreav d5€ avamddpacrov airiav 
> \ vA A sa R in / \ 
ovcav Kata puow, Atoav dé aet ovoav. Ta TE TEpL 
15 tas Moipas Kai Tov dtpaxtov eis TadTO Tmws veveL’ 
tpets pev yap at Moipar, Kata Tovds xpovous pe- 
peptopevar, vaa dé atpdkrov To pev ebeipya- 
v4 A \ / A A / 
apévov, To S€ péAdov, 7d Sé mEproTpepdpevov: 
TéTaKTal O€ KATA fev TO yeyovos pia TOV Moupdv, 
” > A A /, / wy fa = 
Atpomros, éret Ta tapeAOovta mavTa aTpEnTa €OTL, 
\ \ \ , , 271 , ‘ ¢ 
20 KaTa b€-TO péAAov Adxeous—[eis |’ mavTa yap 7 
A , / ~ A \ \ > \ 
Kata dvow peéver AnEis—KaTa Se TO €EveaTos 
KAw0, cupepatvoved re kat KAudPovoa Exdorw 
TQ OlKELA. TEpaiveTat dé Kal O p00 ovK ATAKTWS. 
~ \ / > \ > »” A ¢ , 
Tadra dé wavra éotiv odk dAdo ti 7AnV 6 Oeos, 
/ \ ¢ aA / / 6. 8 A 4 
Kabdmep Kat 6 yevvaios IlAdtwv dyaiv: “ 6 pev 57 
, av e ‘ / > / \ A 
25 eds, Wamrep 6 TaAatds Adyos, apynv Te Kal TeAEUTHV 
Kal ecu TOV OvTwy amrdvTwy exwv, evbeta mepaivet 
Kara pvaw Topevdomevos: TH Se act Evvererat dixn, 
A ~ / 
T&v amoAeTopevwy Tod Oeiov vowov TYyswpos—ijs 
€ / 2 / / / A > / 
6 yevyioecba” pédAAwy paKkapios TE Kal evoaiwwv 
’ > a >] A / ” a” 
e€ apyis «v0ds péroxos ein. 
1 eis del. Wendland et Wilamowitz. 


oo Biicheler : evdaiovijcew vel eddaovqca codd, 


2 
(cf. Plato, Laws 716 a). 


408 


ON THE COSMOS, 7 


without hindrance ; Fate (Ilerpwpeévy), because all 
things are finite (rereparéoGar) and nothing in the 
world is infinite ; Moira, from the division of things 
(nepiferv) ; Nemesis, from the allocation of a share to 
each (d:aveynors) ; Adrasteia—a cause whose nature 
is to be inescapable (dvarddpacros airia); and Aisa— 
a cause that exists for ever (dei oboa). The story of 
the Fates (Moipa:) and the spindle also has much 
the same tendency: there are three Fates, corre- 
sponding to different times, and part of the yarn on 
their spindles is already completed, part is still to be 
spun, and part is now being worked. The past is the 
concern of one of the Fates, called Atropos, because 
all past things are irreversible (4rperra) ; the future 
belongs to Lachesis, for a fortune allotted (Ajé:s) by 
nature awaits all things; the present is Clotho’s 
province, who settles each man’s own destiny and 
spins (xAwGev) his thread. So the story ends, and it 
is well said. 

All these things are no other than God, as the great 
Plato tells us*: “ God, as the ancient story says, 
holding the beginning and the end and the middle of 
all things that are, moves by a straight path in the 
course of nature, bringing them to fulfilment ; and 
behind him, taking vengeance on all that fall short of 
the divine law, follows Justice—let no man be without 
this, even from his earliest years, if he is to live in 
blessed happiness.”’ 

“6 pe... tyswpds Laws 715 E—716 a; Fs... ein 
Laws 730 c. The antecedent of #s in Plato is dAjOea. 
Pseudo-Aristotle runs the two passages together, making 
dixy the antecedent of js. 





INDICES 
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 


References are given according to page, column and line of Bekker’s 


Berlin edition, reproduced in this edition in the left-hand margin; other- 
wise references are to chapters (Roman figures). 


I. GREEK INDEX 


adyvowa (rob €Aéyxov) 166 b 24, 
167 a 21 ff., 168 a 19 ff. 

ddorecxetv 165 b 16, 173 a 
32 ff., 181 b 25 ff. 

dpudiBoria 165 b 26, 166 a7 ff. 
See ambiguity 

’Avadutixa 165 b 9 

dmewpov 165 a 12, 167 b 13, 170 
a 23 ff. 

amA@s (7d a. A€yeoOa) 166 b 
eh tag OG) D1) ite 
169 b 9 ff. 

amodextiKos (Adyos) 165 b 9 

a 170 a 24 ff., 172 a 
15 ff. 


BapBapilew 165 b 22 


yévos (school of philosophy) 
172 b 30 
yrOpa 176 b 18 


dvaipects 165 b 27, 166 a 33, 
168 a 27, 169 a 26, 177 a 
33 ff., 179 a 14 





diadexrixy, see dialectic 

diudvora 170 b 13 ff. 

didacxadixds (Adyos) 165 a 
39 ff. 


dvdaoxew 171 a 32 


éXeyxos, def. 165 a 3, 167 a 
22 ff.; false def. of 167 a 
22, 168 b 17 ff.; and ovA- 
Aoyiopds 171 a 3 ff. 

eMyvitew 182 a 34 

erayew, exnaywyn 165 b 28, 174 

a 34 


ézopevov 166 b 25, 167 b 1 ff., 
168 b 28 ff., 169 b 7 ff., 
XXVIII 

épiotixds 165 b 1 ff., 171 b8 ff., 
175 a 33 ff. 

Lon} 167 b 28 ff. 

vopnos (opp. dvars) 173 a 11 ff. 


dpovocxnpoatyy 168 a 26, 170 a 
15 


411 


INDICES 


opwvupia 165 b 26, 29 ff., 169 a 
23 ff., 170 a 14 

ovopa. (dist. mpaypa) 165 a7 ff., 
b 29, 167 a 24; (dist. did- 
vova) 170 b 13 ff. 

opyy 174 a 21 


metpaotikos 165 b 1 ff., 169 b 
25 ff., 171 b 5 ff. See ex- 
amination 

mpoowdtla 165 b 27, 166 b 1, 168 
a 27, 169 a 29, 177 b 3, 35 ff., 
179 a 15 


onyetov (dmddeéis KaTa TO a.) 
167 b 10 

codoxiopos 165 b 15. See 
solecism 

cogiorixds 169 b 21, 171 b 7 ff. 
and passim; o. réxvn= def. 
165 a 22 





ovxopdvrnua 174 b 9 

cvdMoy.opos passim ; def, 165 
al 

oupBeBnkos 166 b 22, 28 ff., 
168 a 34 ff., b 27 ff., 169 
b 3 ff., 179 a 27 

otvvOeats 165 b 27, 166 a 22 ff., 
168 a 27, 169 a 26, 177 a 
33 ff., 179 a 13 


TETpAywvLoLos, TeETpaywvilery 
171 b 15 ff., 172 a 3 ff. 


diroverkia 174 a 21 
dirocodia 175 a 5 
dvats (opp. vouos) 173 a 7 ff. 


evdoypdgdnua, yevdoypddos, 
yevdoypagety 171 b 14 ff, 
36 ff. 


II. INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS 


absolute (opp. qualified) use 
of expressions 166 b 23, 
37 ff., 168 b 11 ff., 169 b 
11 ff., 180 a 23 

accent 165 b 27, 166 b 1, 
168 a 27, 169 a 29, XXI, 
179 a 15; written 177 b3 

accident (cupBeBnxds) 166 b 
22, 28 ff., 168 a 34 ff., b 
27 ff., 169 b 3 ff., 179 a 27 

Achilles 166 a 38 

ambiguity (du¢iBodia) 165 b 
26, 166 a 7 ff., XVII, 177 
a 16 ff., 179 a 20 

Antiphon 172 a 7 


babbling, see adoAecxeiv 
breathings, written 177 b 4 


412 





Callias 176 a 1, 7 

Callicles 173 a 8 

Calliope 173 b 31 

case-forms 173 b 26 ff., 182 a 
12 ff. 

category-mistakes 168 a 26, 
169 a 35, 178 a 6 ff., b 
24 ff. 

cause, fallacy of mistaken 
166 b 26, 167 b 21 ff., 
169 b 14 

Cleon 182 a 32 

Cleophon 174 b 28 

consequent (7d  €mdpevor), 
fallacy of 166 b 25, 167 
1 ff., 168 b 28 ff., 169 b 
7 ff., XXVIII 

contentious argument 165 b 


ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS 


1 ff. and passim; five 
aims of III 

Coriscus 166 b 33, 173 b 31, 
39, 175 b 20 ff., 176 a7, 
179. a1, b 3 ff, 181 a 11, 


182 a 20 


demonstrative adjectives 175 
b 20 ff. 

demonstrative arguments 165 
b 9, 170 a 24 ff., 172 a 
15 ff. 

dialectic 165 a 39 ff., 169 b 
26, 171 b 1 ff., 174 a 16, 
183 b 1 

diction, see language 

didactic argument 165a 39 ff., 
171 a 32 ff. 


equivocation (duwvopuia) 165 
b 26, 30 ff., 168 a 25, 169 a 
23 ff, XVII, 177 a 10 ff., 
178 a "24 ff., 179 a 17 

Ethiopian 167 a 12 

Euthydemus 177 b 12 

examination 165 b 1 ff., 169 b 
25 ff., 171 b 5 ff., 172 a 28, 
183 b 1 

expression, see language 


aoe (ambiguity of) 180 
9 ff. 
Gags 183 b 37 


Hippocrates 171 b 15 
Homer, Jliad 171 a 10; 
quoted 166 b 4 ff., 180 a 22 


ignoratio elenchi 166 b 24, 
167 a 21 ff., 181 a 1 ff.; 
other fallacies reducible 
to 168 a 18 ff. 





Indian 167 a 8 
induction 165 b 28, 174 a 34 


language, fallacies dependent 
on IV, 166 b 10, 168 a 
24 ff., 169 a 37 ff., XIX- 
XXIII 

length (as confusing device) 
174 a 17 ff. 

Lycophron 174 b 32 

Lysander 176 b 5 


Mandrobulus 174 b 28 
Melissus 167 b 13, 168 b 36, 
181 a 28 


names, symbols for things 
165 a7 ff. See dvopa 


paradox 165 b 15,172 b11 ff., 
174 b 13 ff., 175 b 33 ff. 

Parmenides 182 b 27 

petitio principit 166 b 25, 
167 a 37 ff., 168 b 23 ff., 
169 b 13, 181 a 15 ff. 

Piraeus 177 b 12 

Plato, Gorgias 173 a 7 

proposition (mpdracs) 169 a 
7 ff.,b 17, 172 b8 

Protagoras 173 b 20 


qualified use of expressions 
166 b 23, 37 ff., 168 b 11 ff., 
169 b 11 ff., 180 a 23 ff. 


Sicily 177 b 13 

Socrates 166 b 34, 183 b 7 

solecism 165 b 15, 173 b 17 ff., 
182 a8 ff. 

sophistry 171 b 25 ff., 172 b 
12, 174 b 18; def. 165 a 
22 


413 


INDICES 


substance 168 a 26, 169 a 35, | “‘ third man” argument 178 
170 a 15, 178 a 6 ff., 178 b b 37 
Q4 fF 
Zeno 172 a 9, 179 b 20, 182 b 
Themistocles 176 a 1 Q7 


414 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY 


For a Greek index see the edition by H. H. Joachim 
(Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away, Oxford, 1922), 


pp. 278-296. 


INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS 


References are given according to page, column and line of Bekker’s 
Berlin edition, reproduced in this edition in the left-hand margin; other- 
wise references are to chapters (Roman figures for book, followed by Arabic 


figures for chapter), 


action (opp. passion) 322 b 
7 ff., 323 b 1 ff., I. 7-8 

air 328 b 35 ff. See elements 

alteration (dAXoiwos) 327 a 
16, 329 b 2 ff., 331 a 9, 
332 a 8 ff., 337 a 35; dist. 
coming-to-be I. 1-4; dist. 

owth I, 5; illogical for 
luralists 314 b 15 ff., 329 

b 2; Atomists on 315 b 
7; =change of quality 
319 b 6 ff., 329 a 19; in 
the soul 334 a 10 

analogy 333 a 29 ff. 

Anaxagoras: “elements ” 
of 314 a 12 ff., fr. B 17 
314 a 12 

(Aristotle, other works) : 
Physics 316 b 18, 317 b 14, 
318 a 4, 320 b 28, 323 a 3, 
329 a 27, 336 a 13, 19, 337 
a 18,25; De Caelo 315 b 





31, 325 b 34, 331 a 7; 
Metaphysics 336 b 29 
art (opp. nature) 335 b 28 ff. 
association (cvyxpucis) 315 b 
17, 317 a 13 ff., 322 b 7 ff., 
329 a 4 ff., b 27, 333 b 
12 ff. 
Atomists, see 
Leucippus 
atoms 314 a 21 ff., I. 2, 325 a 
28 ff., b 34 


Democritus, 


categories 317 b 6 ff., 319 a 
11 


cause, efficient opp. material 
318 a 1 ff.; efficient 324 b 
13 ff., Il. 10; material 
318 a 1 ff., 319 a 19, 335 
a 30 ff.; formal 336 a 3; 
final 335 b 6; causes of 
coming-to-be IT. 9-11 

chance 333 b 7 ff. 


415 


INDICES 


cold, def. 329 b 29. See con- 
traries 

colour, Democritus on 316 
a2 

coming-to-be: dist. altera- 
tion, growth I. 1-5; pro- 
duced by elements I. 6- 
II. 8; material and formal 
causes of II. 9; final and 
efficient causes of II. 10; 
necessity in II. 11 

composition (avvOecs) 315 
a 23, 317 a 12, 327. a 18, 


334 a 27; dist. mixture 
328 a 6 ff. 

compound bodies, how 
formed II. 7-8 


condensation 330 b 10 

contact 316 a 30 ff., 322 b 
22 ff., 328 b 26 

contraries 314 b 26, 319 a 
20 ff., 324 a 2 ff., 328 a 31, 
329 a 32 ff., II. 2-8, 336 
a 31 

cycle of coming-to-be 331 b 
3 ff., II. 10-11 


Democritus 316 a 1, 323 b 
10, 325 a 2 ff., 326 a 1 ff, 
327 a 19; elements of 314 
a 17 ff., 315 b 29 ff.; 
praised 315 a 34 ff. 

diminution 314 b 15 ff., 319 
b 32, 320 b 31, 322 a 33, 
327 a 23 

Diogenes fr. B 2 322 b 13 

dissociation (dd«piois) 315 
b 17, 317 a 18 ff., 322 b 
1 ff., 329 a 4 ff., b 27, 333 
b 13 ff. 

division: of bodies 316 a 
16 ff., 318 a 21, 325 a 8, 


416 





327 a 10 ff.; and mixture 
328 a 15 ff. 

dry, def. 329 b 31. See con- 
traries 


earth, see elements 

elements (earth, air, fire, 
water) II. 1-8; in Pre- 
Socratics 314 a 11 ff. (see 
also Empedocles) ;_ inter- 
change of 318 b 4 ff., 322 
b 2 ff., 331 a 7 ff., 333 b 
14, 337 a8; only four 332 
a 26; in compounds II. 
7-8 

Empedocles 324 b 33, 325 b 
1 ff., 329 a 3, b 1, 330 
b 20, 334 a 27; elements 
of 314 a 19 ff “TES "6% 
frr. B 8 314 b 7, 333 b 14; 
B 17 333 a. 19); Bsisss 
bi; B 53 334a83; B 54 
334 a 5 

ether 333 b 2, 334 a 2 


farmers 335 a 14 

fire 318 b 3 ff., 319 a 15 ff., 
320 b 20 ff., 322 a 10 ff., 
323 b 8 ff., 324 a 9, 325 a 
90, 32% a 4h, D. bieaas 
328 b 35 ff., II. 3-8, 336 
a 7 ff., 337 a 5 ff.; only 
element fed 335 a 16; 
like form 335 a 19. See 
elements 

food 321 a 32 ff., 322 a 1 ff., 
327 b 14 ff., 335 a 10 ff. 

form 324 b 5 ff., 328 b 11, 
335 a 16, 338 b 18 ff. ; 
dist. privation 318 b 17; 
dist. matter 321 b 21 ff., 
322 a 2 ff., 28 ff.; =final 


COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY 


cause 335 b 6; Platonic 
Forms 335 b 11 ff. 


God 333 b 21, 336 b 33 

growth 314 a 3, 315 a 28 ff., 
$25 b 4, 333 a 35; and 
diminution 314 b 15 ff., 
327 a 23; dist. coming- 
to-be I. 5 


heat 314 b 18 ff., 318 b 16, 
322 b 16, 324 b 19, 326 a 
4, 327 a 8 ff., 329 a 12 

heavens 338 a 19 

homoeomeries: in Anaxago- 
ras 314 a 17 ff. See parts 
(uniform) 

hot 329 b 27. See contraries, 
heat 


increase, see growth 

indivisible magnitudes I. 2 

ne (element) 332 a 
19 ff. 


Leucippus 325 a 2, 23 ff. ; 
““elements”’ of 314 a 12 ff.; 
on alteration, etc. 315 b 
6 ff. 

liquid 314 b 19, 322 a 2, 327 
a 17 ff., 328 b 4, 329 b 
19 ff., 332 b 20 ff., 334 b 
29 ff., 335 a 1 ff. 

Love (in Empedocles) 315 a 
17, 333 b 12 ff. 

Lynceus 328 a 15 


matter I. 6-10, 328 b 33 ff., 
332 a 18, 35, 334 b 3, 335 b 
18 ff.; def. 320 a 2; in- 
separable 320 a 33, 329 a 
10, 30 





mean (between contraries) 
332 a 35, 334 b 27 ff. 

Melissus, see 325 a 3 

mixture 315 b 4,321 b 1, 322 b 
8, 327 a 30 ff., 328 a 6 ff., 
b 22, 333 b 19, 334 b 19; 
‘**pores”’ theory of 324 
b 32 

moist 329 b 31. 
traries, liquid 

Monists 314 a 7 ff. 

motion 315 a 28, 323 a 18, 
324 a 27 ff., 334a 8 ff, IT. 
9-10, 338 b 2 ff; in 
Empedocles 333 b 23; 
natural 333 b 27 ff. 


See con- 


necessity 335 a 34, II. 11 
nutrition (tpo¢y) 322 a 23, 
See food 


Parmenides 330 b 14; fr. B 
8318b6. See 325a3 

parts (uniform and _non- 
uniform) 321 b 18 ff., 322 
a 19 ff. 

perception : and mixture 327 
b 34 ff.; perceptibility= 
reality 318 b 19 

physical method: dist. dia- 
lectical 316 a 10 ff. 

place 320 a 20 ff., 323 a 1 ff., 
334 b 2 ff., 337 a 27 ff. 

planes, indivisible 315 b 
30 ff., 325 b 26 ff., 33, 326 
a 22 

plants 335 a 12 

Plato 315 a 29 ff., 325 b 
25 ff., 329 a 14, 332 a 29; 
‘* Divisions ”’ of 330 b 16; 
Timaeus 315 b 30, 325 b 
24, 329 a 13, 330 b 16, 


417 


INDICES 


ae 29; Phaedo 335 b 

18 i A 

pores 324 b 26 ff., 325 b 2 ff., 
326 b 7 ff. 

potentiality 316 b 21, 317 b 
16 ff., 318 a 21, 320a 13 ff., 
320 b 26, 322 a 6 ff., 
28 ff., 326 b 31 ff., 327 b 
23 ff., 334 b 9 ff. 

privation 318 b 17, 332 a 23 


rarefaction 330 b 10 


Socrates 335 b 10 
solstices 337 b 12 
ae (in Empedocles) 334 a 


Strife (in pape) 3l5a 
5 ff., 333 b 1 

substance 314 af 14, 317 b 
6 ff., 318 b 15, 35, 319 a 
13 ff., 321 a 34, 328 b 33, 
335 a 6, 338 b 14 ff. 

substratum 315 a 1 ff., 317 a 


418 





23, 318 b 9 ff., 322 b 19, 
324 a 17, 329 a 16 ff., 334 
a 25; in Pre-Socratics 314 
b 3 ff.; material cause 
319 a 19; dist. property 
319 b 6 ff. 

sun: in Empedocles 314 b 
20 ff., 315 a 10; motion 
of 336 b 18, 338 b 4 


time 337 a 22 ff. 
transparency 324 b 29, 326 
b il 


Unmoved Mover 318 a 4, 324 
a 30 ff., 337 a 19 ff. 


void 320 b 27 ff., 325 a 4 ff., 
b 3 ff., 326 a 24, b 15 ff. 


water 328 b 35 ff. See 
elements 

weight 323 a 8, 326 a 7 ff., 
329 a 12, b 19 ff. 


ON THE COSMOS 


References are given according to page, column and line of Bekker’s 
Berlin Edition, reproduced in this edition in the left-hand margin. 


I. GREEK INDEX 


dyadua 400 a 1 

dyaduatorrouds 399 b 33 

dyyedadopos 398 a 31 

dyovos 394 a 20 

adpdoreva 401 b 13 

aidépuos 392 a 31, b 1, 401 a 17 

a 392 a 5, 30, 393 a 3, 396 

b 27 

aifpia 394 a 22 ff. 

aifpros 401 a 17 

alzros 398 b 27 

aica 401 b 14 

aitia 397 b 9,398 a4, b 35, 399 
a 26, 401 b 9 

aidy 391 b 19, 397 a 10, 11, 31, 
b 8, 401 a 16 

axnjpatos 392 a 9 

axpy 399 a 29 

axovrilecbar 392 b 3, 395 b 4 

dxoopia 399 a 14 

dxpdmors 399 b 34. 

ddcewds 392 b 8 

dAjnbeva 391 a 4 

adAXovwtcAa 392 b 9, 400 a 22 

dAws 395 a 36 ff. 

dpruris 396 a 26 

wpans 395 b 14 
dvaBAvats 396 a'22 





avayxn 391 b 21, 400 a 1, 401 
b8 


dvddoars 395 a 9 

avabupiacrs 394 a 9, 19, b 6 

dvaxapupimrvoos 394 b 36 

avaAdvars 394 b 17 

dvamvoy 395 b 20, 397 a 32 

avaoxeats 393 b 2 

dvaroAy 394 b 19, 23, 399 a 
22 

avadvonpa 395 a 8, 396 a 21 

dvapdanats 395 b 21 

avaxwpnua 396 a 18 

dvaxwpnats 400 a 27 

avdpdarrodov 398 a 10 

aviip 399 a. 16 

avOpwros 392 a 17, b 19, 397 b 
14, 398 a 6, 400 a 16 

avoidnats 399 a 27 

avravaxo7rn 396 a 19 

avrapkxriKos 392 a 3 

avritrados 394 a 22 

avrizropO.0s 392 b 23 

avrioracts 397 a 1 

avtpov 391 a 21 

aéwv 391 b 26 

drrapxrias 394 b 29, 32 

dmnduatns 394 b 23 


419 


INDICES 


dm)avi}s 392 a 10, 17, 22 

amdyevos 394 b 14 

arodexTHp 398 a 25 

amd0pavars 394 a 33 

dmémadars 396 a 9 

dpyéorns 394 b 25, 30 

dpyis 395 a 27 

dpery 399 b 21 

apxrucos 392 a 3 

apxtos 394 b 20, 395 a3 

appa 400 b 7 

dppovia 396 b 17, 25, 399 a 12, 
17, b 31, 400 a 4 

dpoots 399 b 17 

dpots 396 a 26 

appev, 76 396 b 9 

dpyt 396 a 34, b 25, 398 a 27, 
33, 399 a 35 

dois 399 b 3, 35 

dorparraios 401 a 16 

dorpam 392 b 12, 394 a 18, 
395 a 16 

dotpov 391 b 17, 392 a 5, 10, 
395 b 1 ff., 8, 397 a 9, 399 
a 20, 400 a 21 

drps8ns 394 a 14, 19, 27 

drpaxtos 401 b 15 

arpogetv 395 b 28 

avpa 397 a 35 

avdroupyetv 398 a 6, b 4 

abroupyds 397 b 22 

avdynv 393 a 22, b 6, 398 b 17 

ddpebdns 394 a 35 

apevdera 397 a 11 


Babdévros 392 b 18 

Bacirevos 398 a 15 

Baowrevs 398 a 11 ff. 

Biaos 395 a 5 ff., 22, 400 a 25 
Bios 397 a 18, 399 b 16, 400 a 15 
BdOuvos 392 b 4, 395 b 12 
Bopéas 394 b 20, 28 ff., 395 a 4 


420 





Bopevos 392 a 3, 395 b 15, 399 
a 23 

BovAeurys 400 b 17 

Bpdorns 396 a 3 

BpiBos 394 b 2 

Bpopos 395 a 13, 396 a 12 

Bpovraios 401 a 17 

Bpovry 392 b 11, 394 a 18, 395 
a 13, 16 

BvOes 392 b 32, 395 a 9 


_— 395 b 5, 396 a 30, 397 
3 


yevetyp 397 a 4 ] 
yevérwp 397 b 21, 399 a 31 
yevos 400 b 1, 34 

yépwv 396 b 3, 400 b 2 
yewypadety 393 b 20 
yvddos 392 b 12 

yovevs 400 b 3, 6 

yor 399 a 28 

yovysos 394 a 27, b 11, 397 a 12 
ypdppa 396 b 18 
ypappatixy 396 b 17 

yor 399 a 16 


Saipdrios 391 a 1, 400 b 1 
dévdpov 396 a 23, 399 a 27 
Seopwryprov 400 b 20 
deorrdrns 398 a 22 
Snpcoupyeiv 396 b 31 
Snucoupyia 400 a 1 
Snpuobowia 400 b 21 
draypadew 391 a 18 
didBecrs 396 b 6 

diara 398 b 32 
dvaxdopyoars 391 b 11 
dudxoopos 399 b 16, 400 b 32 
duduerpos 391 b 26 
didvora 391 a 14 

dudrrew 392 b 3, 395 a 32 
dixaoriyprov 400 b 17 


ON THE COSMOS 


duxaorys 400 b 19 

divn 396 a 23 

ddpOwors 400 b 29 

doxis 392 b 4, 395 b 12 

dopuddpos 398 a 20 

dodAos 398 a 30 

dpocoraxvn 394 a 26 

Spdaos 394 a 15, 23 ff., 399 a 25 

dpupnds 392 b 18 

Sivayus 392 a7, b 9, 396 b 29, 
397 a 16, b 19 ff., 398 a 2, 
b 8, 20, 399 b 20 

dvvacreveww 395 a 2 

dvats 393 a 18, 394 b 21 fF., 399 
a 22 


eapwvds 395 a 4 

eyKapavos 392 a 12, 393 a 28 

éyxAors 396 a 9 

éyKoAmos 394 b 15 

dpa 397 b 25 

€Ovos 396 b 2, 398 a 29 

eldos 400 b 34 

eixov 396 b 14 

eiuappevn 401 b 9 

ciptvn 399 b 19 

exBody 396 a 23 

exdnuetv 391 a 12 

exkAnovaorys 400 b 18 

éxAevxos 394 a 35 

exvedias 394 b 18 

expnéis 395 a 15 

exraars 395 a 8 

exdvats 396 a 23, 399 a 27 

eAevbépios 401 a 24 

edédas 398 a 16 

édixia 395 a 27 

éudaors 395 a 29 ff. 

euspuxos 394 b 11 

évaytios 396 a 34, b 1 ff., 24, 
32, 398 b 26 

evddoyios 399 a 19 





evdoars 398 b 26 

evépyeva 398 b 16 

evOovarav 395 b 27 

éviavtos 397 a 14, 399 a 8 

e€axovtiapos 395 b 5 

e€ayfis 395 b 3 

e€vdpios 394 b 19 

emSpour 396 a 19, 400 a 26 

emxapmuos 401 a 19 

emixnpos 392 a 34 

émAivrns 396 a 1 

emwoeiv 391 b 7 

erivova 399 b 17 

emréxvnats 398 b 10 

emupavera 392 a 18, 396 b 31 

enonrnp 398 a 31 

eravupos 397 a 6 

épxeios 401 a 20 

éamreptos 395 b 14; ef. 398 a 
28, 400 a 32 

éoria 391 b 14 

éraipetos 401 a 22 

erjavos 395 a 2 

éros 399 a 23 

edOdmvoos 394 b 35 

edudpera 398 b 35 

evputros 396 a 25 

evpdvoros 394 b 33 

edpos 394 b 20, 22 ff. 

evpvOuia 398 b 19 

evoePeis, ot 400 a 34 

edx7 400 a 17 

eprepos 393 a 5 

é@os 394 a 11, 395 b 14; ef. 
398 a 29, 400 a 31 


Lédupos 394 b 20, 25 fF., 395 a3 
Lopedns 392 b 6 

Cwypadia 396 b 12 

Cadvov 392 a 13 

Coot 399 b 21 

{@ov 391 b 14, 392 b 15, 19, 


421 


INDICES 


393 a 5,394 b 10,397 a 17 ff., 
b 23, 398 b 3, 18, 30, 399 a 
28, 400 b 34, 401 a7 
Cwodpdpos 392 a 11 
Cwornp 399 b 4 


jyenav 391 b 6, 398 a 6, 399 a 
30, 400 b 8 

Fos 398 b 33 

qAextpov 398 a 15 

qAvos 392 a 29, 393 b 2, 395 a 
33, b 2,396 b 27, 397 a 9, 398 
b 8, 399 a 8, 21, 400 a 21 

‘uépa 397 a 13, 399 a 2, 22 

7Epodpopos 398 a 30 

qvioxos 400 b 7 

qretpos 392 b 19, 21, 393 a 7, 
b 19, 400 a 27 

jpws 400 b 22 





Bavpalew 391 b 1 

Oeios 391 a 1, 15, b 16, 392 a9, 
30 f., 397 b 19, 33, 398 b 13, 
20 

beodoyeiv 391 b 4 

beds 391 b 10 ff., 393 a 4, 397 b 
14 ff., 398 a 22, b 2, 6, 399 a 
18, b 19, 400 a 3, 16, b 8, 22, 
28, 401 a 10, b 23 

Geparreia 400 b 22 

Depwvds 394 b 22 ff. 

Bépos 395 a 2, 397 a 12 

Oéats 391 a 5, 392 a 23,394 b 5 

Deapobérns 400 b 16 

Beads 401 a 10 

Oewpia 391 a 24 

OAAv, 76 396 b 9 

OXiyjus 394 a 30 

Opackias 394 b 30 

Opatiopa 394 b 4 

Aveda 395 a 6 

Avpa 398 a 18 


422 ° 





Auaia 400 b 22 
Oapaé 399 b 4 


lanvé 394 b 26 

idéa 394 a 16, 395 b 11, 397 a 
27, 398 b 14, 399 a 34, 400 
b 13 

iepds 392 a 26 

ilnuaria 396 a 4 

ixéovos 401 a 23 

immeds 399 b 7 

immos 399 b 5 

Iows 395 a 30, 32 ff. 

ionuepwves 394 b 24 ff. 

io8uds 393 b 25 ff. 

icoporpia 396 b 35 

ioropia 391 b 6 


Kabapatos 401 a 23 

Kkaxias 394 b 22, 28, 395 a 1 

Kawvoupyovpeva, Ta 398 a 35 

Katpds 396 a 27, 397 a 26, 399 a 
24, b 1 

kanvadns 394 a 13 

kapros 399 a 28, 401 a 19 

kataryis 395 a 5 3 

karacxKeuy 398 b 24, 399 a 6, 30 

Karontpov 395 a 34 

xépas 393 b 5, 399 b 8 

kepavvios 401 a 17 

kepavves 392 b 12, 394 a 18, 395 
a 22 ff., 397 a 21, 401 a 18 

kivnos 391 b 5, 16, 392 a 30, 
b 2, 7, 398 b 13 ff. 

xipxias 394 b 31 

kAiwa 392 a 3 

pis 399 b 4 

koiAwpa 395 b 34 

KoAros 393 a 21, b 3 ff., 394 b 
15, 398 b 31 

xowirns 392 b 4, 395 a 32, 

9 


ON THE COSMOS 


kom) 394 a 34 

Kopudatos 399 a 15, 19, 400 b 8 

Koopos 391 a 26, (def.) 391 b 
9 ff., 19, 26, 392 b 33 ff., 393 
a4, 396 a 34, b 24, 30, 397 a 
4 ff., b 11 ff., 22, 398 a 32, 
b 2, 8, 23, 399 a 1, 13, b 18, 
25, 400 a 3, b 8, 27 

Kpavos 399 b 4 

Kpaors 396 b 18, 25 

kpatyp 400 a 33 

KpvaTaAros 394 a 25 

xuBeprirns 400 b 6 

KUBos 398 b 28 

KvAwSpos 398 b 28 

Kodua 396 a 19, 26, 400 a 28 

Kuvnyeovov 398 a 25 

KupBers 400 b 30 


AatAay 395 a 7 

Aapmds 395 b 11 

Aerrropepys 392 a 35, 394 a 10 

ABévoros 394 b 34 

ABodounré 394 b 34 

Auunv 393 a 20 

Aiwv7 393 b 8, 394 b 16 

Aub 394. b 27, 34 

Aoyiopds 399 a 31 

Aoyos 397 b 13, 20, 398 a 13, 
400 a 3, 17 

Aogéds 393 b 15 

Aoxayds 399 b 5 

Adxos 399 b 6 


pdOnors 391 a 8, 397 b 11 

péyeBos 391 a 5, 19, 392 b 1, 
394 b 4, 397 a 14 

perixtos 401 a 24 

peonpuBpia 394 b 21 

peonuBpios 394 b 29 

péaov (rob Kdopov), 74.391 b 12, 
cf. 392 b 33 





peTdbears 400 b 29 
pérpov 397 a 10 
ufos 393 b 21, 395 b 6 
pay 397 a 14, 399 a 6 
pjpwOos 398 b 17 
parnp 391 b 14 
pnxavorrores 398 b 15 
puxporsvyia 391 a 23 
pikis 395 a 2 

poipa 401 b 12, 14 ff. 
poovorky 396 b 15 
pvdpos 395 b 23 
dos 401 b 22 
pvixnua 396 a 13 
puxnris 396 a 11 
pdyvos 395 b 31 
pvxds 393 b 24 





vaépa 393 a 6, 394 a 12,397 a25 

vats 400 b 6 

veaviaxos 400 b 6 

veueots 401 b 12 

véos 396 b 3 

vedxpwots 397 a 20 

vevpoomaorns 398 b 17 

vépos 392 b 9, 394 a 16, 21, 26, 
28, 33, 394 b 17, 395 a 11 ff., 
33 

vipa 401 b 16 

vicos 392 b 19 ff., 393 a 9 ff., 
b 11, 18, 395 b 22 

vipetos 394 b 1 

vopoberns 400 b 8 

vopos 399 b 18, 400 b 14, 28 

vonos 398 b 33 

votios 392 a 4, 395 b 15, 399 a 
24 

voros 394 b 21, 31 ff. 

voos 391 a 12 

v0— 397 a 13, 399 a 2, 22 


€évios 401 a 22 
423 


INDICES 


dyKos 391 b 24, 394 b 4 

otknTnprov 391 b 15, 393 a 5 

oixovpern 392 b 20, 26, 393 a 
10, 16, b 9, 15, 18, 394 a 6 

otxos 398 a 8, 15, 399 b 14 

oixtilew 391 a 22 

6Aa, 74 391 a 3, b 11,396 b 23, 
397 a 12, b 9, 400 a 4 

dAvprias 394 b 26 

8uBpos 392 b 10, 394 a 16 ff, 
397 a 34, 400 a 26 

Suixdn 394 a 15, 19 

opoynos 401 a 21 

opodroyeiv 396 b 33 

opodroyia 396 b 34 

opovora 396 b 4, 10, 397 a 4, 
23, 400 a 4 

opodvaor, 76 396 b 10 

oudpards 399 b 30 

dvona 401 a 14 

omwpa 401 a 5 

opyavov 398 b 15 

opvidias 395 a 4 

dpos 391 a 20, 392 b 17 

dpos 393 b 22, 31, 400 a 7 

ovpamos 391 a 9, 400 a 21, 401 
a 25 

ovpaves 391 b 9, 15, 19, 392 a 
5, 10, 18, 396 b 23, 397 a 9, 
21, b 27,398 a2, b9, 399 a 1, 
13, 20, 32, 400 a 7 ff., 30, 
b 32 

ovoia 392 a 35, 394 b 11, 397 b 
20 


mayerwons 392 b 6, 397 b 1 

réyos 394 a 16, 397 b 1 

mraAatol, ot 397 b 16 

maAdapvaios 401 a 23 

mraAuarias 396 a 10 

mav, T0396 b 34, 397 a 24, 398 
b 22 


424 





mravyyupts 400 b 21 

mraparpufus 395 b 5 

marayos 395 a 13 

mratpios 397 b 13 

matpa@os 401 a 21 

maxvn 392 b 10, 394 a 25 

maxos 394 a 27, b 17 

mrévns 396 b 2 

mréravots 399 a 28 

mempapern 401 b 10 

mepaoov 391 a 12 

mrepraywyy 391 b 18, 399 a 2 

mrepiBodov 398 a 15, 22 

mreptéxor, Td 399 a 25 

mrepikrvlew 392 b 29 

mrérpa 396 a 6 

anyn 392 b 15, 395 b 19, 396 a 
6, 22 
Ads 396 a 6 

miBos 395 b 12 

mriAnua 394 b 3, 395 a 12 

mrAavnrdés 392 a 14, 19 

mAdtos 393 b 18 

TrAnuperciv 392 a 6 

mrAnpupis 397 a 28 

mrAngts 395 a 21 

mrAovawos 396 b 2 

medpa 394 a 17, b 9, 396 a 5, 
15, 24, 397 a 32, 400 a 28 

mrounrys 397 b 26, 400 a 10, 401 
a 1, 24 

mrotkidre 392 b 17 

mdNepos 398 a 25, 399 b 1, 19 

mrodevs 401 a 19 

mAs 391 a 19, 392 b 18, 396 b 
1,398 a 8, 399 b 14, 400 a 29, 
b 7, 27, 401 a 20 

modreta 399 b 18, 400 b 15 

mdAos 391 b 25, 392 a 1, 2, 394 
b 29, 32 

mroduxerpia 398 b 12 

mroAvwvupos 401 a 12 


ON THE COSMOS 


rropOds 396 a 25 

mpnoTyp 394 a 18, 395 a 10,23 

mpoOvpov 398 a 17 

mpdayevos 392 a 16 

mpdaodos 398 a 24 

mpoowrov 399 b 35 

mpogdnrevew 391 a 16 

mpowars 396 a 8, 20 

mputavetov 400 b 19 

muddy 398 a 16 

mruAwpos 398 a 21 

mip 395 b 3 ff., 19, 396 a 22, 
b30 

mupKaid 397 a 28, 400 a 29 

mupdets 392 a 25, 399 a9 

mupddns 392 a 6, b 2, 395 a20, 
397 a 23 


paBdos 395 a 30, 35 ff. 
peda 400 b 2 

piypa 395 a 9, 397 a 32 
pyxrns 396 a 5 

paéus 394 b 17 

poy 396 a 23 

for 399 b 11 

puots 395 b 8 


adAmyé 399 b 2 

catpamns 398 a 29 

cevopos 395 b 36 ff., 397 a 28, 
400 a 25 

aédas 392 b 3, 395 a 31, b 
4 ff., 9 

ceAnvn 392 a 29, 395 a 33, b 2, 
396 a 27, b 28, 397 a 10, 398 
b 9, 399 a 6, 400 a 21 

~ gepvorns 398 a 12 

onudvrwp 399 b 9 

onpeiov 391 b 21 

onpayé 395 b 31 

axnmros 395 a 25, 28 

oxomds 398 a 31 





oxorewwos 396 b 20 

aodds 392 b 19 

orréppa 400 b 33 

omovdalew 391 a3 

arrovdy 391 a 18 

orddia 393 b 20 

oT7HAn 393 a 19, 24, b 10, 22, 
32 


arnprypos 395 b 7 

arnpilecba 392 b 5, 395 b 4 

LUridBuwv 392 a 26 

ato.xetov 392 a 8, b 35, 396 a 
28, b 34 

oropa 393 a 18, b 31, 394 a 2 

ordmov 395 b 27 

otparnyds 398 a 25, 29 

oTparia 398 a 8 

otpatios 401 a 22 

orparorebdov 399 b 2, 400 b 8 

atpopiAos 395 a 7 

oTpwparddecpos 398 a 8 

ovyyevys 391 a 6, 14 

ovprrav, 76 396 a 31, 397 b 7, 
399 a 18, b 10 

ovprngis 394 a 35 

ovpmAnyades 392 b 13 

oupdpoveiy 391 a 14 

avpdwvos 396 b 8, 15 

avvavaxopeve 391 b 18 

avvéedpiov 400 b 18 

auvextixds 397 b 9 

avvOnua 399 b 6 

avvilnars 396 a 3 

avvwpis 399 b 5 

ovotaais 394 a 24, 396 b 23 

avornua 391 b 9 

avorpeupa 394 a 32 

ofaipa 391 b 24, 392 a 22, 396 
b 31, 398 b 28, 399 a3 

opatpoerdys 391 b 19 

adiyyew 393 b 9 

oxacrnpia 398 b 15 


425 


INDICES 


odpa 391 a 8, b 16, 392 a 30, 
397 b 28 

owatikos 397 a3 

owrnp 397 b 20, 401 a 24 

cwrnpia 396 b 34, 397 a 31, 
b 5, 16, 398 a 4, b 10, 400 
ad 


tapias 398 a 24 

tagiapxos 399 b 7 

rags 391 b 11, 392 a 31, 397 a 
9, 399 b 7, 32, 400 a 22 

tapaxy 397 b 32 

taxos 395 b 7 

teixos 398 a 18 

réxvn 396 b 11, 19, 399 b 17 

tTuHpa 395 a 33 

topvos 391 b 22 

Tpopos 396 a 10 

Tpotraodxos 401 a 23 

TpomiKkd, Ta 392 a 12 

tuddyv 392 b 11,395 a 24, 400 a 
98 

tuxn 396 b 7, 401 a 26 


vertos 401 a 18 

teTos 394 a 31, 399 a 24, 401 a 
18 

Urratos 397 b 25 

brrepoxy 391 b 4, 398 a 12, b 1 

banpecia 398 b 11 

brrorcippa 394 a 22 

trdaraats 395 a 30 ff. 

inbos 391 a 5, 398 a 12 


Daivwy 392 a23 
davracia 395 a 34, b 6 
ddvracpa 395 a 29, b 11 
depéafros (yf) 391 b 13 
dios 399 a 29 

b0dyyos 396 b 16 

P0opa 396 a 30, 397 b 4 


426 





pidos 401 a 22 

drdrogodia 391 a 2, 11, b7 

dddyes 392 b 3, 397 b 1 ff., 400 
a 29 

ddoypos 400 b 4 

proywodns 392 a 35 

dpuxrwprov 398 a 31 

dvAagé 398 a 21 

dvarkds 399 b 25 

dvas 391 a 19, b 4, 10, 392 a 31, 
b 1, 6, 14, 32, 394 a 5, 15, 
396 b 6 ff., 32,397 a3 ff., 17, 
27, b 15, 398 b 20, 399 a 32, 
b 22, 400 b 13, 33, 401 a 26, 
b 20 

dvrevors 399 b 17 

durov 392 b 15, 394 b 10, 397 a 
24, 400 b 34 

dev} 396 b 16, 399 a 16, bs 

Dwaddpos 392 a 27, 399 a 8 


xaAala 392 b Il, 394 a 16, 
bi 


xdopa 396 a 4, 18 

xelwappos 400 a 34 

xeepwvos 394 b 24 ff. 

xeydv 395 a 1, 397 a 13, 22, 
400 a 9 

x90 395 a 10, 401 a 25 

usv 392 b 10, 394 a 16, 32 

xAon 392 b 17 

xo7n 400 b 22 

xopeverv 399 a 12 

xopos 399 a 15, 400 b 7 

xpnopmdetv 395 b 28 

xpovos 401 a 15, b 16 

xpvads 398 a 15 

xp@pa 396 b 13 


baxds 394 a 30 
aris 399 b 30, 32 
yudds 399 b 8 


ON THE COSMOS 


podders 395 a 26 

yuxyn 391 a 11, 15, 397 a 19, 
399 b 14, 400 b 14 

dxos 394 b 7 


Spa 397 a 12, 399 a 23 
adorns 396 a 8 
wrakovoTys 398 a 21 
wdéreva 397 b 31, 398 a 1 


II. ENGLISH INDEX 


Abyssinia 393 b 15 n. 

Acropolis 399 b 34 

Adriatic Sea 393 a 28 

Aegean Sea 393 a 30 

Aeolian Islands 395 b 21 

aether 392 a 5 

Aétion 396 b 12 n. 

air 392 b 5, 396 b 29 

Aisa 401 b 14 

Albion, see England 

Alexander 391 a 2 

Aloadae 391 a 11 

Antarctic Pole 392 a 4 

Aparctias (wind) 394 b 29 

Apeliotes (wind) 394 b 23 

Aphrodite (planet), see Venus 

_ Apollo 392 a 27 

Arabian Gulf (Red Sea) 393 
b 4n., 16, 18 

Arabian Isthmus 393 b 32 

Arctic Pole 392 a 3 

Ares (planet), see Mars 

Argestes (wind) 394 b 25 

art: imitates nature 396 b 12 

Asia 393 b 22, 26 ff. 

Athena, statue of (simile) 
399 b 34 

Atlantic Ocean, see Ocean 

Atropos 401 b 18 

axis 391 b 26 


Boreas 394 b 20, 28 

breezes 394 a 17, 397 a 34 
British Isles 893 b 12, 17 
Bura, Achaia 396 a 21 and n. 





Caecias (wind) 394 b 22 

Cambay, see Cutch 

Cambyses 398 a 11 

Caspian (Hyrcanian) Sea 393 
b3n., 5 n., 24, 27 

catapults 398 b 15 

Celts 393 b 9 

Ceylon 393 b 14 

chariot (simile) 400 b 7 

— (simile) 399 a 15, 400 

7 

Circias (wind) 394 b 31 

city 396 b 1, 400 b 7, 14 

Clotho 401 b 21 

clouds 392 b 9, 394 a 16, 
26 

comets, 392 b 4, 395 a 32 

continents 392 b 21, 393 a 
7 . 


Corsica 393 a 13 

Corycian Cave 391 a 21 
Cosmos, defined 391 b 9 ff, 
Cretan Sea 393 a 29 

Crete 393 a 13 

Cronus (planet), see Saturn 
Cutch 393 b 4 n. 

Cyclades 393 a 15 

Cyprus 393 a 13 


Darius 398 a 12 
Deioces 398 a 10 n. 
Delphi 395 b 29 
Destiny 401 b 9 
dew 394 a 15, 23 
dynamis, see power 


427 


INDICES 


earth (element) 392 b 14, 33, 
396 b 30 

earth, the 391 b 13, 397 a 24, 
b 30 

earthquakes 395 b 36, 397 a 
28 ff., 400 a 25 

Ecbatana 398 a 10 n., 14, 


34 
Egypt 394 a 1 
Egyptian Sea 393 a 29 
elements 392 a 8, b 35, 396 


b 34 

Empedocles 396 b 12 n., 399 
b 25 

England 393 b 12 

Ephialtes, see Giants 

Erythraean Sea 393 b 4 n. 

Etesian winds 395 a 2 

Etna 395 a 24. n., b 21, 400 
a 33 and n. 

Euboea 393 a 13 

Euronotus (wind) 394 b 


33 
Europe 393 b 22 ff. 
Eurus 394 b 20, 24 
exhalations 394 a 9 and n. 


Fate (zempwpévn) 401 b 10 

Fates, the 401 b 15 

fire (element) 392 b 2, 395 a 
20, 396 b 30 

fire, subterranean 395 b 19 ff. 

flames 392 b 3 

floods 397 a 28 

frost 392 b 10, 394 a 16, 26, 
397 b 1 


Galatian Gulf 393 b 9 

Galatian Sea 393 a 27 

gales 392 b 11 

Giants 391 a 11 n., 395 a 
24n. 


4.28 





Gibraltar 392 b 23 n. 

God 391 b 11, 397 b 14 ff., 
398 a 22 

gods 391 b 15, 397 b 17 

gods, abode of the 391 b 16, 
393 a 4 


hail 392 b 11, 394 a 16, b 1 

halo 395 a 36 

harmony 396 b 8 ff., 25 

heavens (odpaveds), 391 b 16 ff., 
400 a 7 

Helice, Achaia 396 a 21 
and n. 

Hellespont 393 b 1, 398 a 
Q7 


Hera 392 a 28 

Heracleitus 396 b 20, 401 a 
11 

Heracles, Pillars of 393 a 24, 
b 10, 23, 32 

Hermes (planet), see Mer- 
cury 

Hero 398 b 15 n. 

Herodotus 398 a 10 n. 

Bi am Sea, see Caspian 

ea 


Iapyx (wind) 394 b 26 

ice 394 a 25 

Terne, see Ireland 

India 392 b 23 n. 

India, Gulf of 393 b 3 

Indians 393 b 14 

Indus 398 a 28 

inhabited world (oikowmene) 
392 b 20 ff.; dimensions 
of 393 b 18 

inhabited worlds, plurality 
of 392 b 23 ff. 

Ireland 393 b 13 

islands 392 b 20, 393 a 8 ff. 


ON THE COSMOS 


Jupiter (planet) 392 a 25, 
399 a 10 


keystones (simile) 399 b 30 


Lachesis 401 b 20 

land 393 a 7 

law (simile) 400 b 14 
lawgiver (simile) 400 b 7 
Lebadeia 395 b 29 

Lesbos 393 a 14 

Libonotus (wind) 394 b 34 
sy geome (wind) 394 b 


Libya 393 b 22, 31 

lightning 392 b 11, 394 a 18, 
395 a 16, 25 n. 

Lipara 395 b 21 

Lips (wind) 394 b 27 


machines 398 b 15 and n. 

Madagascar 393 b 15 n. 

Maeotis, Lake 393 a 32, b 7 

Mars 392 a 26, 399 a 9 

Mediterranean, geography 
of 393 a 12, 16 ff., b 3 n., 
29 

Mercury 392 a 26, 399 a 9 

meteors 392 b 3 

military camp (simile) 399 b 
2, 400 b 8 


mind 391 a 12 

mist 394 a 15, 19 

moon 392 a 29, 396 a 27, 397 
a 10, 398 b 9, 399 a 6, 400 
a 21 

music 396 b 15 

Myrtoan Sea 393 a 30 


Necessity 401 b 8 
Neo-Pythagoreans 
20 n. 


396 b 





Nile 393 b 5n., 31, 394a 2 
Notus (wind) 394 b 21, 32 
Nyssa 391 a 21 


Ocean 392 b 22 ff., 393 a 


16 ff., b 3 n., 30 
oikoumene, see inhabited 
world 


Olympias (wind), 394 b 26 
Olympus 400 a 7 
Bn principles’ 396 


Gaaniaa winds 395 a 4 
Orphic books 401 a 27 
Ossa 391 a 11, 21 

Otus, see Giants 


painting 396 b 21 

Pamphylian Sea 393 a 30 

Parthenon 399 b 34 n. 

Pelion 391 a 11 n. 

Persia, Gulf of 393 b 3 n. 

Persia, King of (simile) 398 
al0n. 

Persian Empire 398 a 27 

Phaethon 400 a 31 

Phebol 393 b 15 

Pheidias 399 b 33 

philosophy 391 a 2, b 7 

Phosphorus (planet), see 
Venus 

Phrygia 395 b 30 

pits (in the sky) 392 b 4 

planets 392 a 13 

planks (in the sky) 392 b 4 

Plato 401 b 24 

poles 391 b 25 ff. 

Polygnotus 396 b 12 n. 

Pontus 393 a 32, b 24 ff. 

power 396 b 29, 397 b 23 ff. 
and n., 398 b 8, 20 

Propontis 393 b 1 


429 


INDICES 


puppet-shows 398 b 16 and n. 
Pyroeis (planet), see Mars 


rain 392 b 10, 394 a 16, 27, 
397 a 33, 400 a 26 

rainbows 395 a 30 

Red Sea, see Arabian Gulf 

rivers, 392 b 15, 393 a 6 


Sardinia 393 a 13 

Sardinian Sea 393 a 27 

Saturn (planet) 392 a 24, 399 
all 


Scythians 393 b 8 

sea 392 b 14, 393 a 6 

ship (simile) 400 b 6 

shooting stars, 395 a 32 

Sicilian Sea 393 a 28 

Sicily 393 a 12 

snow 392 b 10, 394 a 16, 
32 

Socotra 393 b 15 n. 

soul 391 a 11, 399 b 14 

Spain 393 b 17 

Sporades 393 a 14 

springs 393 a 6 

stars 391 b 17, 392 a 10, 
397 a 9, 399 a 20, 400 a 
21 

streams 392 b 15 

sun 392 a 29, 397 a 9, 399 a 
8, 21, 400 a 21 

Susa 398 a 14, 34 

Syrian Sea 393 a 30 

Syrtes 393 a 25 





Tana, Lake 393 b 15 n. 
Tanais, River 393 b 5 n., 26, 
30 


Taprobane, see Ceylon 

Thrascias (wind) 394 b 30 

thunder 392 b 11, 394 a 18, 
395 a 13 

thunderbolts 392 b 12, 394 a 
18, 395 a 22, 397 a 21 

tides 396 a 26 

tropics 392 a 12 

Typhon 395 a 24 n. 

typhoons 400 a 29 

Typhos 395 a 24 n. 


Venus (planet) 392 a 28, 399 
as 
volcanoes 395 b 21 


water (element) 392 b 30, 
395 b 19, 396 b 30 

waves, tidal 396 a 17 ff, 

whirlwinds 392 b 11 

wind, names and types of 394 
b 8—395 a 10 

wind, subterranean 395 b 19, 
96 fr, 


Xerxes 398 a 11, b 4 


Zephyrus (wind) 394 b 20, 25 
Zeus (god) 400 a 19, 401 a 14, 
28 


Zeus (planet), see J a 
Zodiac 392 a 11 


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Orations: I-XVII anp XX. J. H. Vince. (2nd Imp.) 

Demostuenrs I]: De Corona anp De Fatsa Lecartione. 
C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. (3rd Imp. revised.) 

Demostuenes III]: Merpras, Anprotion, ARISTOCRATES, 
Trmocrates, Artstoceiron. J. H. Vince. (2nd Imp.) 

Demostuenes [V-VI: Private Orations anv In Nearram. 
A. T. Murray. (2nd Imp.) 

Demostuenes VII: Funerat Spreecn, Erotic Essay, 
Exorp1 anp Letters. N. W. and N. J. DeWitt. 

Dio Casstus: Roman History. E. Cary. 9 Vols. (Vols. 
I and II 3rd Imp., Vols. I1I-TX 2nd Imp.) 

Dro Curysostom. 5 Vols. Vols. land If. J. W.Cohoon. 
Vol. III. J. W.Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. Vols. IV 
and V. H. Lamar Crosby. (Vols. I-IV 2nd Imp.) 

Droporus Sicutus. 12 Vols. Vols. I-VI. C. H. Oldfather. 
Vol. VII. C. L. Sherman. Vols. 1X and X. Russel M. 
Geer. (Vols. I-1V 2nd Imp.) 

Drocenrs Larrtius. R.D. Hicks. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1 4th Jmp., 
Vol. II 3rd Imp.) 

Dionysius or Haticarnassus: Roman Antiquities. Spel- 
man’s translation revised by E. Cary. 7 Vols. (Vols. 
I-V 2nd Imp.) 


THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 


Ericrerus. W. A. Oldfather. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 

Euriripes, A. S. Way. 4 Vols. (Vols. I and II 7th Jmp., 
Vols. III and IV 6th Imp.) Verse trans. 

Eusesrus: Eccrestasticat History. Kirsopp Lake and 
J.E.L.Oulton. 2 Vols. (Vol. 13rd Imp., Vol. II 4th Imp.) 

Gaten: On THE Natura Facuttises. A.J. Brock. (4¢h Imp.) 

Tue Greek AntHotocy. W. R. Paton. 5 Vols. (Vols. I 
and II 5th Imp., Vol. III 4th Imp., Vols. [V and V 3rd Imp.) 

Tue Greex Bucouic Ports (TuHEocrirus, Bron, Moscuus). 
J. M. Edmonds. (7th Imp. revised.) 

Greex Execy anp Iamsus witH THE ANACREONTEA, J. M. 
Edmonds. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 3rd Imp., Vol. II 2nd Imp.) 

Greek Matuematicat Works. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols. 
(2nd Imp.) 

Heropres. Cf. THEopHrastus: CHARACTERS, 

Heroporus. A.D. Godley. 4 Vols. (Vols. I-III 4th Jmp., 
Vol. IV 3rd Imp.) 

Hesiop anp THE Homeric Hymns. H. G. Evelyn White. 
(7th Imp. revised and enlarged.) 

HippocraTEs AND THE FraGMEnts OF Heracteitus. W.H.S. 
Jones and E, T. Withington. 4 Vols. (3rd Imp.) 

Homer: Intap. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 7th Imp., 
Vol. II 6th Imp.) 

Homer: Opyssry. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (8th Imp.) 

Isarus. E.S. Forster. (2nd el 

Isocrates. George Norlin and ue Van Hook. 3 Vols. 
(2nd Imp.) 

Sr. Jonn Damascene: Bartaam anv loasaru. Rev. G. R. 
Woodward and Harold Mattingly. (37rd Imp. revised.) 

Josrrnus. H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus. 9 Vols. 
Vols. I-VII. (Vol. V 3rd Imp., Vols. I-IV, VI and VII 2nd 


Imp.) 

Jutran. Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. (Vols. I and II 3rd 
Imp., Vol. 111 2nd Imp.) 

Loneus: Dapnyis anp Cutor. Thornley’s translation 
revised by J. M. Edmonds; and Partuenius. S. Gaselee. 
(3rd Imp.) 

Lucran. A. M. Harmon. 8 Vols. Vols. I-V. (Vols. I and 
III 3rd Imp., Vols. II, 1V and V 2nd Imp.) 

Lycopuron. Cf. Catuimacuus. 

Lyra Grarca. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. (Vol. I 4th Imp., 
Vols, II and III 3rd Jmp.) 


7 


THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 


Lystas. W.R.M. Lamb. (3rd Imp.) 

Manetuo. W.G. Waddell; Protemy: Trerrapreros. F. E. 
Robbins. (2nd Imp.) 

Marcus Auretius. C. R. Haines. (4th Imp. revised.) 

Menanper. F.G. Allinson. (3rd Imp. revised.) 

Minor Artic Orators. 2 Vols. K. J. Maidment and 
J.O. Burtt. (Vol. I 2nd Imp.) 

evn) Dronystaca. W. H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols. (2nd 

mp 

a mi Coxttutuus, TrypHioporus. A. W. Mair. (2nd 

mp.) 

Papyri. Non-Lirerary Setections. A. S. Hunt and C. C, 
Edgar. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) Lirerary SE.LEcrions. 
(Poetry). D. L. Page. (3rd Imp.) 

Parruentus. Cf. Loneus. 

Pausantas: Description or Greece. W. H. S. Jones. 5 
Vols. and compenies Vol. arranged by R. E. Wycherley. 
(Vols. I and III 3rd Imp. bee II, [V and V 2nd Imp.) 

Puito. 10 Vols. Vols. I- F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H. 
Whitaker; Vols. VI- IX. F. H. Colson. (Vols. I-III, 
V-IX 2nd Imp., Vol. 1V 3rd Imp.) 

Two Supplementary Vols. ‘Translation only from. an 
Armenian Text. Ralph Marcus. 

Puitostratus: Tuer Lire or Arottonius or Tyana. F.C, 
Conybeare. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 4th Imp., Vol. II 3rd Imp.) 
Purtostratus: Imacines; CaLiistratus: Derscriprions. 

A. Fairbanks. (2nd Imp.) 

Puitostratus anp Evuwnarrus: Lives or THE Sopuists. 
Wilmer Cave ba Sea (2nd Imp.) 

Prnpar. Sir J. E. Sandys. (7th Imp. revised.) 

Prato I: Eurnyruro, Aporoey, Crito, Poarpo, PHAEDRUS. 
H. N. Fowler. (11th Imp.) 

Prato _ TueaEetetus anD Sornist. H. N. Fowler. (4th 
Imp 

Poors Ill: Srarresmayn, Poitesus. H. N. Fowler; Ion. 
W.R.M. Lamb. (4th Imp.) 

Prato IV: Lacues, Proracoras, Meno, Euraypemus. 
W.R.M. Lamb. (3rd Imp. revised.) 

Prato V: Lysis, Sympostum, Goraias. W. R. M. Lamb. 
(5th Imp. revised.) 

Prato VI: Cratytus, Parmenipes, Greater Hirrras, 
Lesser Hrepras. H.N. Fowler. (4th Imp.) 


8 


THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 


Prato VII: Timarus, Critras, CurropHo, Menexenus, Ept- 
stuLaE. Rev. R.G. Bury. (3rd Imp.) 

Prato VIII: CxHarmipes, Atcrsrapes, Hipparcuus, THE 
Lovers, TuHeaces, Minos anp Epinomis. W.R. M. Lamb. 
(2nd Imp.) : 

Prato: Laws. Rev. R. G. Bury. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.) 

Prato: Repusuic. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 5th Imp., 
Vol. II 3rd Imp.) 

Prorarco: Morauia. 14 Vols. Vols. I-V. F.C. Babbitt ; 
Vol. VI. W.C.Helmbold; Vol. X. H.N. Fowler. (Vols. 
I-VI, X 2nd Imp.) 

Prurarcu: Tue Pararcet Lives. B. Perrin. 11 Vols. 
(Vols. I, II, VI, VII and XI 3rd Jmp., Vols. III-V and 
VIII-X 2nd Imp.) ; 

Potysius. W.R. Paton. 6 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 

Procopius: History or tHE Wars. H. B. Dewing. 7 Vols. 
(Vol. I 3rd Imp., Vols. II-VII 2nd Imp.) 

Protemy: Tetrasistos. Cf. Manernuo. 

Quintus SmyrnaeEus. A. S. Peg, (3rd Imp.) Verse trans. 

Sextus Emprricus. Rev. R. G. Bury. 4 Vols. (Vols. I-III 
2nd Imp.) 

Sornoctes. F. Storr. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1 9th Imp., Vol. Il 6th 
Imp.) Verse trans. 

Srraso : Geocrapny. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. (Vols. I, 
V and VIII 3rd Jmp., Vols. II-IV, VI and VII 2nd Imp.) 

Turorpurastus: Cuaracters. J. M. Edmonds; Heropes, 
etc. A.D. Knox. (3rd Jmp.) 

TuropHrastus: Enquiry into Puants. Sir Arthur Hort. 
2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 

Tuucypipes, C.F. Smith. 4 Vols. (Vol. I 4¢h Jmp., Vols. 
II-IV 3rd Imp.) 

TryrHioporus. Cf. Oppran. 

XenopHon: Cynoparpia. Walter Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 
4th Imp., Vol. II 3rd Imp.) 

XenopHon: Hetrenica, Anasasis, APoLocy, anp Sympo- 
strum. C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. (Vols. I 
and III 38rd Jmp., Vol. II 4th Imp.) 

XenopHon: Memorasitia anD Orconomicus. E. C. Mar- 
chant. (3rd Imp.) 

Xenopuon: Scripta Minora. E.C. Marchant. (2nd Imp.) 


(For Volumes in Preparation see next page.) 


9 


THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 
VOLUMES IN PREPARATION 





‘GREEK AUTHORS 





Aristotte: History or Anrmats. A. L. Peck. 
Protrius. A. H. Armstrong. 


LATIN AUTHORS 





Sr. Auveustine: City or Gop. 

Cicero: Pro Sestio, In Vatinrum, Pro Carrio, De Pro- 
vinciis ConsuLarisus, Pro Barso. J. H. Freese and R. 
Gardner. 

PHAEDRUS AND OTHER Fapuuists. B. E. Perry. 


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Full text of "On sophistical refutations [and] On coming-to-be and passing away [translated] by E.S. Forster. On the cosmos [translated] by D.J. Furley"

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